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Abstract 
 
 
While the literature on the European Union’s foreign policy has heavily emphasized the EU’s 
marked preference for diplomacy and the conduct of dialogues, the rationale behind the 
salience of this practice has not yet been fully explored. Therefore, this thesis asks why the 
European Union promotes and conducts so many political dialogues with third countries in its 
external relations. The original contribution of this thesis is two-fold: theoretically, it 
contributes to the literature on the practice of dialogue in International Relations by moving 
away from theories stressing the rationality of the institutional actors involved in dialogical 
interactions. Instead, this thesis grounds itself in socio-psychology applied to institutions to 
conceptualize the practice of dialogue as a symbolically-framed interaction through which 
institutional identity is recognized and anchored. In doing so, this research demonstrates that 
the European Union promotes and conducts such an extraordinary number of dialogues with 
third countries in order to get recognition of its institutional identity as a distinct and relevant 
international actor. More specifically, the study sheds light on the mechanisms through which 
the dialogical interaction at the micro-level helps anchor the institutional identity of the EU at 
the macro-level. Empirically, the thesis contributes to a more nuanced and better understanding 
of one of the most complex and important relationships of our times – the transatlantic 
relationship — by presenting original findings on the multiple dialogical encounters occurring 
at different levels of representation: at the highest level of diplomatic meetings, at the inter-
parliamentary level and at and the level of civil society. The present work thus departs from 
traditional perspectives on transatlantic relations by focusing on the micro-level of interaction 
and its symbolic implications at the macro-level. Through the conduct of interviews with 
European and American officials involved in these dialogues and several participant 
observations in the meetings, this study offers a fine-grained analysis of the dialogue as one of 
the most frequently tool of foreign policy used by the EU in its external relations. 
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Chapter 1 –Why talk about dialogue? 
 
“They may forget what you said, but they will never forget how you made them feel” (Buehner, 
quoted in Evans 1971, p. 244)  
1.1. The thesis in a nutshell  
 
Not a day goes by without a report in the news on a new political dialogue established between 
the European Union (EU) and non-EU countries, covering an ever-increasing range of issues 
and involving different sets of actors. The recent renewal of the political dialogue with Cuba 
(European Commission, 2017b), the Human Rights Dialogue freshly started with Vietnam 
(EEAS, 2017), or the project of establishing a strategic dialogue with the Arab League (EEAS, 
2015c) are just a few examples of this wider phenomenon that conveys the impression that the 
EU is talking with virtually all the countries of the world about everything. The establishment 
of political dialogues between the EU and third countries has definitely become a wide-spread 
institutionalised practice over the years, constituting in Monar’s (1997, p. 272) words an entire 
‘dialogue system’. With the EU currently involved in more than 100 different dialogues with 
individual countries and international organisations, a non-negligible amount of time and 
resources is invested in these dialogues.  
Surprisingly, this pervasive dialogical practice has not instigated in-depth research 
about its rationale and significance so far. In common wisdom, the EU dialogues with third 
countries are either quickly dismissed as cheap talking shops and empty performances 
(Herranz, 2005) or highly praised as an important foreign policy tool allowing the EU to 
potentially exert its normative influence on third parties (Smith, 1998, p. 70). There is, 
however, a dearth of research as to the specific dynamics unfolding during these dialogical 
interactions and their added value. Therefore, through an in-depth examination of the practice 
of dialogue at the micro-level (granular level) and a macro analysis of these practices’ 
significance, this thesis re-examines the rationale behind the systematic institutionalisation of 
political dialogues with third countries. In doing so, it answers the following research question: 
why does the EU promote and conduct more dialogues than any other actor in the world?  
The study shows that the main goal of the EU in conducting these dialogues with non-
EU countries is to anchor its institutional identity by gaining recognition as a key international 
actor. In this quest for recognition, the dialogue offers an instance in which institutional actors 
can experience the institutional identity of the other and their own and engage in recognition 
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processes with far-reaching implications at the macro-level. In fact, the dialogue constitutes a 
framework of direct encounter in which temporal and spatial immediacy allows for non-verbal 
cues and emotions to take a prominent position alongside other forms of communication.  
From a theoretical perspective, traditional IR theories and approaches (realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism) have proposed different perspectives on the added value and 
significance of dialogues in international politics: while for realists, dialogical interactions are 
nothing more than a pure reflection of power constellations hinging on coercive mechanisms, 
liberal institutionalists consider this practice to be a real engine for cooperation, enabling 
intense exchange of information and views, and possibly leading to joint action. As to the 
constructivist approach, it considers dialogues as a site in which genuine processes of 
persuasion and arguing might develop, resulting in the emergence of common understandings 
and shared ideas. In sum, these theoretical approaches define the essence of dialogue either in 
terms of power relations or in terms of communication revolving around the transmission of 
information and knowledge in a rationalistic/cognitive vein. By contrast, this thesis argues that 
in order to fully understand the significance of the practice of dialogue, one needs to take into 
account the socio-psychological dimension underpinning the dynamics at play in dialogues. 
Borrowing insights from socio-psychology and organisational studies, this thesis shows that 
the EU conducts a large number of dialogues in order to gain recognition for its relevance as a 
distinct and relevant international power and anchor its institutional identity. In this sense, this 
thesis challenges the common conceptualisation of EU dialogues as solely foreign policy tools 
designed to exert influence on the behaviours of non-EU countries and points to another 
rationale behind the extensive use of these dialogues – one that is related to internal identity 
and recognition matters.  
1.2. The significance of the research question and of the selected case 
study  
 
In EU foreign policy literature so far, there has been a distinct lack of theoretical analysis 
regarding the dynamics and outcomes of the political dialogues conducted by the EU with non-
EU countries. Therefore, it is an objective of this research to go some way towards remedying 
this omission. Indeed, most of the works done so far on the topic of ‘political dialogues’ consist 
either of historical and legal overviews dating to the 1990s (Flaesch-Mougin, 1990; Nuttall, 
1992; Regelsberger, 1991) or provide descriptions of more specific dialogues with China 
(Kinzelbach, 2015; Kinzelbach & Thelle, 2011), Central Asian states (Axyonova, 2011), Israel 
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(Harpaz, 2011), and Malaysia (Chevallier-Govers, 2011) without analysing more 
systematically the nuts and bolts of this dialogical practice and its added value. Yet these 
dialogues promoted and conducted by the EU are particularly important: they are both a 
‘signature practice’ of the EU as a normative power and also constitute a primary instrument 
to achieve foreign policy goals in that they deal with the issue of effectiveness of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor. As a result, there is a taken-for-granted assumption that these dialogues 
are used to influence outcomes in third countries, i.e. in helping the EU to exert influence 
worldwide. But is it really the case? The main research question guiding this research project 
is the following: Why does the EU promote and conduct so many dialogues with non-EU 
countries? What can we learn from the fine-grained analysis of the dialogue’s mechanisms and 
its implications at the macro-level?  
This research question is important for several reasons. Broadly speaking, one cannot 
emphasise enough the relevance of the practice of dialogue in today’s world characterised by 
global disorder and even – according to certain commentators – by international chaos. Against 
the backdrop of a sharp increase in ethnic conflicts exemplified by the implosion of Syria and 
the barbaric use of chemical gas against citizens, coupled with the development of so-called 
apocalyptic terrorism (Flannery, 2016) and growing economic uncertainties,  a new rhetoric on 
chaos and global insecurities has emerged. It is the unpredictability of myriad actors – both 
state and non-state – with means and intentions difficult to comprehend that fuels the fear of 
the disintegration of the civilizational order (Berthelet, 2014). In these times of turbulences and 
uncertainty, dialogue is more important than ever. It remains a crucial means of communication 
and can provide a platform to manage disagreements peacefully, eventually creating the ‘glue’ 
that make states and other entities stick together. This civilising function of the dialogue 
becomes all the more important as a testament to the commitment to a non-conflictual on-going 
interaction, thereby sustaining the civilising process of the international relations. After all, as 
Jovchelovitch (2011, p. 150) emphasises, ‘The ontogeny of human experience is about 
encountering and communicating with the other, and succeeding in this encounter is paramount 
for human life’.  
Understanding the reasons that make states engage in dialogue and how the subsequent 
dynamics unfold in the interaction is therefore essential to avoid the slippery slope towards war 
and violence. As Mitzen reminds us (2005, p. 401), anarchy lurks outside the meeting room: 
‘Without some constraint to keep actors committed to resolving their disagreements 
discursively, argument can spill over from the conference table to the street, or even to the 
battlefield’. As such, this enquiry about the added value of the dialogue and its dynamics can 
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be viewed as an expression of the courage to hope for a wold beyond global disorder (Dallmayr 
& Demenchonok, 2017). An advanced understanding of dialogue is also crucial in these 
contemporary times when collective action appears to be the only approach to common global 
problems such as climate change and pandemics, and when – in an economically globalised 
world – the use of force is not only irrelevant for managing such issues but is a less-effective 
instrument of power (Kerr, 2010, p. 238). As such, the topic of this thesis is consequential for 
understanding something that significantly affects many people’s lives – and this is an essential 
criteria for sound research in social sciences (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).  
In the specific context of the EU, this research question is also important and useful 
from a practical perspective. In fact, given the time and the huge resources invested in the 
conduct of these dialogues with more than 100 countries and regional institutions, it appears 
crucial to reach a better understanding of the reasons for, and implications of, this practice. 
Such a reflexion about the conduct of EU foreign policy is extremely timely in light of the 
recent political, economic, and institutional developments shaking the EU: while the EU is 
going through a turbulent phase facing both internal and external crises that have the potential 
to tarnish its image as a foreign policy actor, it has deliberately built up its diplomatic capacity 
in the post-Lisbon era, aiming at making its foreign policy more effective and raising its profile 
as a genuine diplomatic actor. One recent book about the EU as a diplomatic actor focuses on 
the EU’s capacity to engage authoritatively in the core process of negotiation, representation, 
and communication in order to influence third parties (Koops & Macaj, 2014). By uncovering 
how power constellations, institutional processes, and inter-institutional relations affect the 
diplomatic performance of the EU, its focus is very much on how internal EU coordination 
impacts its capacity to act as a diplomatic actor. My perspective differs in the sense that it 
examines the interaction with the third country itself and not with the internal functioning of 
EU diplomatic machinery.   
To answer the key research question mentioned above, I confine myself to the dialogue 
that presents the most interesting features for the purpose of this research, namely the EU-US 
dialogues. Three main reasons motivate my choice for this case study. First, in terms of policy 
relevance, there is no doubt that the transatlantic partnership is worth studying in depth, as it 
has retained its importance in shaping the outcome of future global developments. The 
transatlantic relationship is arguably the most significant relationship in the international 
system (McGuire & Smith, 2008; Steffenson, 2005, p. 1). Moreover, because this study aims 
at understanding the rationale and dynamics inherent in the dialogues, one needs to select a 
case in which the study variable (i.e. instances of dialogues) is present in unusually large 
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quantities (Van Evera, 1997). The EU-US dialogue meets perfectly this criterion and 
corresponds in this sense to the most extreme case method (Gerring, 2008): due to the 
complexity of the EU-US relations made of many configurations of actors and issues, the 
density of the dialogues is particularly striking. Indeed, the EU-US bilateral partnership 
features an intensity and frequency of consultations on a wide range of transatlantic and 
multilateral issues, unprecedented in the diplomatic relations of either partner and in the history 
of diplomacy writ large (Ginsberg, 2001a). Thirdly, the initial research was originally 
undertaken in an exploratory fashion and therefore not constructed to test the specific 
hypothesis that is now the primary argument. The rationale behind the analysis of this specific 
case rather lay in the promises it held in terms of the quality and quantity of the discursive 
interaction based on the Habermasian pre-requisites for an ideal-speech situation. First, it 
arguably features a significant common lifeworld reflected in the basic political values and 
norms that the EU and the United States share, and it also roughly approximates the 
configuration of a ‘dialogue among equals’ where the power asymmetry is not so accentuated 
(in economic terms at least). In fact, the United States and the EU are unique partners in the 
sense that there are no other comparable partners that share such similar interests and values. 
In the words of Baun (2014, p. 25), ‘Europe and the US remain the essential, and to some 
extent, “natural” partner of the other, a consequence of existing institutional and economic ties 
and more than seven decades of cooperation, historical and cultural bonds that remain 
substantial, shared values and common value-based interests and the absence of other credible 
alternatives as reliable long-term partners’. Yet as Gerring (2008) argues, research is about 
discovery and in the course of the research dead ends are reached and surprising phenomena 
revealed. Finally, from a more practical perspective, this case presents advantages in terms of 
source availability. As Cohen (1997, p. 19) mentions, ‘Material on contemporary diplomacy – 
archival, published and oral – is very much accessible in the United States and the openness of 
American public life facilitates political research to a degree hardly found elsewhere’.  
1.3. What is a dialogue? A working definition  
A short background on the key concept of ‘dialogue’ at the heart of this study is in order. I first 
emphasise the positive connotation that the term ‘dialogue’ has acquired over centuries and 
across disciplines and then specify the working definition of dialogue used in this study in the 
context of international relations.  
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The magic of dialogue across disciplines  
First of all, as the title of Yankelovich’s book Magic of dialogue: transforming conflict into 
cooperation suggests (1999), dialogue has become a buzzword with a taken-for-granted 
positive value. Indeed, in everyday parlance, dialogue is generally positively considered as it 
holds the promise of bringing positive outcomes. It is often referred to as a means to improve 
a problematic situation: it is expected to ‘transform’ and ‘change’ for the better and to allow 
the interlocutors of the dialogue to reach a specific goal through the use of language and 
communication. Even when dialogue fails to bring the positions of diverging sides any closer, 
its outcome is still presented in a positive light with the participants often ironically declaring 
at the end of the meeting that ‘they agreed to disagree’, as in the case of high-level diplomatic 
dialogue between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu in December 2012. Merkel reported that they had an ‘open discussion between 
friends. Everything was on the table. But on the settlement issue we agreed to disagree’ 
(Keinon, 2012).  
The virtues of dialogue have been hailed in a variety of contexts. In the words of 
Yankelovich (1999, p. 16), ‘When dialogue is done skilfully, the results can be extraordinary: 
long-standing stereotypes dissolved, mistrust overcome, mutual understanding achieved, 
visions shaped and grounded in shared purpose, people previously at odds with one another 
aligned on objectives and strategies, new common ground discovered, new perspectives and 
insights gained, new levels of creativity stimulated, and bonds of community strengthened’. 
Similar conclusions have been reached in studies examining the benefits of dialogue in the 
business sector between companies and stakeholders, for instance (Burchell & Cook, 2006). 
Applied to the realm of international politics, the same assumptions are made: dialogue has 
traditionally been opposed to coercion and associated with consensus building. The promise of 
dialogue is ‘to facilitate the conduct of international relations along consensual, non-coercive 
lines’, potentially allowing parties to ‘overcome the fragmentation of the international system’ 
(Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005, p. 178) and transcend ‘power politics’. Phrased differently, there 
is an implicit assumption that the dialogue has a transformative power, and that the discursive 
interaction is able to change things for the better. 
This well-accepted positive connotation associated with the concept of dialogue finds 
its roots in ancient historical practices and influential philosophical works on the subject. First, 
it is worth remembering that the very term ‘dialogue’ comes from the Greek words dia and 
logos. Dia meaning ‘through’ and logos translating to ‘word’ or ‘meaning’. In essence then, 
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dialogue refers to a flow of meaning from which shared understanding can emerge (Isaacs, 
1999, p. 19). The tradition of dialogue in its idealistic form – that is, in which people think 
together in relationship – can be traced to the talking circles of Native Americans, to the Agora 
(market place) of ancient Greece, and beyond that to the tribal rituals of many indigenous 
peoples in Africa, New Zealand, and elsewhere (Isaacs, 1999, p. 26). In addition, over 
centuries, influential philosophical works have attempted to capture the essence of dialogue in 
its ideal-typical form (Buber, 1958; Levinas, 1991). For instance, in a Socratic perspective, 
dialogues serve as a means to find the rational truth through questioning, while for the German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas, dialogue is the best way to improve and transform societies by 
coming to a reasoned consensus among truth-seeking actors (Habermas, 1981). The common 
denominator among all these conceptions of dialogues is their view on dialogue as a particular 
type of communication of the highest quality holding great promises in terms of change.  
From Thucydides’s ‘Melian Dialogue’ in the first century to the most recent ‘strategic 
dialogues’ between NATO and its former adversaries to the East and its Mediterranean 
partners, through the ‘inter-civilizational dialogue’ launched by the former Iranian President 
Khatami with the United States in the 1990s, the term ‘dialogue’ has also acquired a 
multiplicity of meanings in International Relations that require some definitional clarifications. 
This is all the more true, considering the fact that ‘dialogue is not a concept that has a “natural” 
home at the international level of analysis’ (Fierke, 1999, p. 27). 
A working definition of dialogue   
For the purpose of this study, I adopt a working definition of ‘dialogue’ intended to draw 
attention to the main relevant features of the concept developed in the IR literature. I define 
here dialogue as a ‘face-to-face interaction in an institutionalised framework’.  The face-to-
face aspect of the interaction is key as its inherent spatial physical immediacy allows for the 
use of non-verbal communication and the display of emotions. As to the institutionalised nature 
of the dialogue, it sets the parameters and rules of the interaction, influencing the behaviour of 
the participants. In what follows, I briefly explain how dialogue has been used in the context 
of cooperation, diplomacy, and conflict resolution, and emphasise the relevant aspects that I 
incorporate in my own working definition of dialogue and the justification behind this choice.  
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Dialogue and cooperation  
In the realm of cooperation, the term ‘dialogue’ appears very often in two different forms: as a 
general framework of cooperation and as a narrower component of this large framework, 
corresponding to the very action of exchanging views which generally occurs in a discursive 
context and on an institutionalised basis. Indeed, over the years, the term ‘dialogue’ has been 
used interchangeably with the notion of ‘partnership’, entailing the idea of a rapprochement 
between two distinct political entities. Originally conceptualised at the interpersonal level, this 
term has come to be applied to dialogues between states, cultures, and even civilisations. The 
studies on the NATO dialogue with Eastern European countries at the end of the Cold War 
(Fierke, 1999), on the important dialogue or ‘engagement policy’ launched by the United States 
vis-à-vis China in the mid-1990s, or on the ‘inter-civilizational dialogue’ promoted in the 
framework of the tense relations between Iran and the United States (Lynch, 2000) are just a 
few examples. Yet within these broader frameworks of cooperation, one often finds provisions 
for the establishment of more concrete dialogues defined in narrower terms – as an 
institutionalised setting involving participants that engage in face-to-face communication to 
achieve specific goals, such as the exchange of views and ideas, the monitoring of progress, 
and more. In this sense, dialogue refers to the practice of ‘talking’, to the actual meetings, 
consultations and forums of discussion that are supposed to be the engine of cooperation. 
Furthermore, the importance of the repeated nature of the interaction should not be 
underestimated because the expectation to meet again repeatedly in the future affects the 
actors’ behaviour and enhances the prospects for cooperation (R. Axelrod, 1984). Therefore, 
an important characteristic of dialogue in this context is its institutionalised dimension, which 
clearly establishes the aims and rules informing these discursive face-to-face interactions. This 
feature is important to underline as it makes the difference between ‘dialogue’ and a mere 
ordinary discussion that can virtually take place everywhere with all kinds of actors on an 
informal basis.  
 
Dialogue and diplomacy  
In the realm of diplomacy, one can similarly draw a distinction between a broad 
conceptualisation of dialogue as the ‘essence of diplomacy’ (Jönsson & Hall, 2005) and a 
narrower understanding of dialogue as one specific means through which diplomacy is actually 
conducted. Regarding the first aspect, it is worth reminding that diplomacy has traditionally 
been conceived as essentially a dialogue between independent states, or as Watson (1982, p. 
11) put it, as ‘the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their 
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relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war’. In this perspective, also shared by 
Sir Harold Nicolson, diplomacy is a process of negotiation and deliberation that promotes 
peace and international cooperation among states. According to Watson, diplomacy is 
inevitable: ‘States which are aware that their domestic policies are affected by “everything that 
happens” outside, are not content merely to observe one another at distance. They feel the need 
to enter into dialogue with one another. This dialogue between independent states … is the 
substance of diplomacy’ (Watson, 1982, p. 14).  
The second and narrower use of dialogue in the diplomatic context relates to the specific 
setting of ‘face-to-face interaction’ between official representatives. In this respect, the 
distinction between negotiations and dialogue is telling. According to common wisdom, 
negotiations are often associated with the dramatic moment in which all the stakeholders are 
‘around the table’ in a face-to-face interaction, trying to reach a final agreement. Yet the overall 
process of negotiations cannot be reduced to the final face-to-face interaction: negotiation is 
defined as a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands, arguments, 
and proposals to each other for the ostensible purpose of reaching an agreement (Iklé, 1964, p. 
711; Odell, 2000, pp. 10–11). It does not involve only face-to-face exchanges but also other 
activities, such as lobbying, exchanges of proposals, and intense correspondence between the 
parties about certain principles or detailed revisions of an agreement. Furthermore, it is worth 
emphasising that negotiations do not necessarily require the simultaneous physical presence of 
the negotiators: they can be carried out ‘at a distance’ through diplomatic correspondence, 
telephone, fax, or email (Barston, 2006, p. 48). Hence in this context, dialogue corresponds 
only to one means of communication among many others that might be used during the process 
of negotiations or in the service of any other diplomatic function. What matters is the face-to-
face nature of the interaction because it confers a higher degree of importance to what is being 
done or said in this framework. As such, the dialogue works as a key clinching moment – 
particularly relevant when it comes to the psycho-sociological needs of the participants in terms 
of recognition and respect.  
Drawing on this short survey of the use of dialogue in diplomatic context, my working 
definition of dialogue puts the emphasis on the face-to-face interaction characteristic of 
dialogue that differentiates it from other diplomatic tools. Furthermore, by differentiating 
dialogue from negotiations, I made clear that my working definition of dialogue does not 
assume that dialogues necessarily aim at reaching agreement; their goals can be multiple and 
are determined by the institution in which they are embedded.  
 
19 
 
Dialogue and conflict resolution  
The third literature in which the term ‘dialogue’ has great prominence corresponds to the sub-
field of conflict resolution and peace-building. In this perspective, dialogue is typically hailed 
as a progressive force fostering mutual understanding and as an effective tool for conflict 
resolution. Yet despite this broad understanding, ambiguity characterises the use of the term 
‘dialogue’ with no proper comprehensive definition being offered (Feller & Ryan, 2012, p. 
153). One main distinction that warrants underlining in this context, however, deals with the 
notion of ‘dialogue’ as opposed to ‘talks or negotiations’. The literature on conflict resolution 
categorises negotiations as being outcome-oriented and as unfolding in an adversarial formal 
configuration whereas dialogue is conceived as a process geared towards trust and confidence 
building in a less structured and more empathetic atmosphere (Burton, 1997; Fierke, 1999;  
Fisher & Keashly, 1988; Reimann, 2004; Rothman, 1992). An additional element 
differentiating negotiations from dialogue deals with the type of actors participating: whereas 
negotiations (or track I diplomacy) traditionally involve officials, political leaders, diplomats, 
and formal mediators, dialogue (track II and track III diplomacy) involves civil society actors, 
such as private persons, former diplomats, academic institutions, religious organisations, as 
well as NGOs and local organisations (Reimann, 2004). For the purpose of this study, I do not 
adopt the distinction made in the conflict resolution literature between negotiations and 
dialogue. Stripping away the normative dimension of dialogue, I rather take the term at face 
value, i.e. as a mere instance of discursive exchange without previously assuming an 
adversarial outcome-oriented or more conciliatory process-oriented approach to the interaction 
itself. A particular aspect of this body of literature that will be further developed in the 
theoretical framework relates to the socio-psychological dimension inherent in conflict 
resolution and peace building (see Kelman, 1965, 2008, 2012).  
1.4. Overview of the argument   
 
The thesis puts forward a socio-psychological explanation of the EU dialogues. It shows that 
the practice of dialogue serves to anchor the EU institutional identity through an on-going and 
iterative process of recognition unfolding in the face-to-face interaction between 
representatives of participating institutions. By moving beyond the traditional 
conceptualisation of dialogue in IR and by taking into account the socio-psychological 
dimension of the dialogue, I propose a richer conceptualisation of dialogue in IR rooted in the 
full appreciation of the identity factor. I show that the dialogue constitutes an instance in which 
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the recognition process of institutional identity is at work. The inherent characteristics of the 
dialogue in terms of spatial and temporal immediacy allows the display of emotions that 
becomes crucial in this recognition process. Institutional identity is defined as ‘the identity 
which is the most central, enduring and distinctive about an organization’ (Albert & Whetten, 
1985, p. 410). While the interaction unfolds among individual representatives at the micro-
level, its significance transcends the meeting room due to the power of symbolism. More 
specifically, my argument unpacks this recognition process of institutional identity at three 
critical moments of the dialogue: (1) entering in the room, i.e. the preparation and setting; (2) 
communication and exchanges within the room; and (3) leaving the room – pointing to the 
different practices and discourses that emanate from the dialogue and that eventually anchor 
institutional identity. The third phase of the dialogue is particularly important because it allows 
actors to project the outcomes of the recognition process taking place behind closed doors to 
the world.  
The explanation proposed in this thesis does not refute the other theoretical approaches 
in IR on the added value of dialogue and its function in the pursuit of other goals pursued by 
international actors, such as security and profit. Rather, the thesis sheds light on the fact that 
the quest for recognition underpins other practices, such as the quest for security and profit. In 
fact, the quest for recognition is the most important of the three modes of interactions, as the 
social structure that underpins the quest for security and profit assumes identity in the first 
place. This point follows the constructivist logic, according to which interests are not given as 
such, but always depend on an entity’s identity. So, following the symbolic interactionist 
tradition à la Goffman, I argue that dialogue can also be thought of as a performance in which 
actors can experience first-hand the institution they represent in all its complexity and 
uniqueness. In fact, in this symbolically framed interaction, the actors project the identity of 
the institution they represent in terms of values, interests, and procedures.  
The need for recognition of the EU’s institutional identity transpires across all the 
different components and actors constituting the EU, hence the study of the different case 
studies with different actors (i.e. dialogue among parliamentarians, dialogue among diplomats, 
and dialogue among members of civil society). While the inter-parliamentary and executive 
dialogues directly involve EU representatives and as such is more straightforward, the third 
case study involves non-state actors, i.e. European and American business and consumers’ 
representatives. These in a way are outside of the formal institutions of the EU but the vitality 
and success of these transatlantic civil society dialogues act as an indirect recognition of the 
relevance of the EU and its policies.  
21 
 
1.5. Contribution to the literature 
By answering this research question, the thesis offers both a theoretical and empirical 
contribution.  
Theoretically, it deepens our understanding of the practice of dialogue and role of 
dialogue in international relations. Dialogue has traditionally been conceptualised as fulfilling 
different functions, according to various IR theories. In the realist perspective, whereby states 
are first and foremost concerned with the quest for security, dialogue is seen as a full 
manifestation of power and as an instance dominated by bargaining dynamics in a coercive 
setting. By contrast, for liberal institutionalist and constructivists, dialogue is instrumental in 
allowing the exchange of information and the emergence of shared understandings, thereby 
benefitting states and institutions in their quest for profit and progress. My focus in this research 
is on the quest for recognition and on the specific and important role that dialogue plays in this 
context. While rationalist and constructivist approaches emphasise the cognitive capacity of 
the participants – either as utility-maximising actors, sensitive only to new information that 
might change their cost-benefits, or as actors deploying logical arguments in the form of 
practical inference – the identity-based model proposed in this thesis brings to the fore key 
socio-psychological elements inherent in the dialogue, inviting us to understand ‘homo 
politicus’ as ‘homo symbolicus’. Dialogues are not merely instances in which speakers raise 
rational claims, whether in the form of threats/rewards, information, or more complex ideas. 
Other dimensions of human experience do matter, such as the quest for respect and for 
recognition often accompanied by the display of emotions. The research also shows that the 
identity-based model proposed in this thesis essentially underpins the other IR theories: the 
quest for the recognition of one’s identity informs the other dynamics and vice versa. The 
discursive dynamics at play during the dialogue itself serve to anchor the identity of the 
interlocutors.  
Theoretically, the thesis also makes a contribution to the literature on recognition in 
International Relations by shedding light on the micro-foundations of recognition in dialogical 
interaction. Indeed, the thesis unpacks the process through which recognition can also be 
granted or withdrawn at the micro-level during dialogical interactions with far-reaching macro-
institutional consequences. In this sense, the thesis is a great addition to the recognition 
literature that has mainly focused so far on either formal modes of recognition used by states 
to grant or withhold recognition from other states and collectives, such as recognition acts 
enacted in the legal realm (Fabry, 2010), or on more informal modes of recognition, such as 
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public statements at the international level (Gustafsson, 2016). This study suggests that 
recognition processes are at play in everyday diplomatic practice, such as regular dialogues 
and meetings with implications at the macro-level for the whole institution. It thus broadens 
the universe of instances in which recognition can be sought and granted. The study makes an 
additional contribution to the literature on recognition by further exploring the burgeoning 
concept of ‘indirect recognition’, whereby recognition is given to states or institutions by non-
state actors (Geis, Felh, Daase, & Kolliarakis, 2015). Typically, the literature on recognition 
dealing with non-state actors, such as NGOs, has explored the phenomenon of ‘vertical 
recognition’, whereby NGOs seek ‘vertical’ recognition from states and international 
organisations. In the words of Heins (2015, p. 204), ‘In order to be able to participate in 
international conferences convened by the United Nations (UN), NGOs have to go through a 
quasi-diplomatic accreditation process’. In the case of this study, however, I explore the 
‘reverse directionality’ of this vertical recognition and show how non-state actors can actually 
recognise and contribute to reinforce state or institutional identities.  
This research also helps bridge the gap between the literature on dialogue in 
International Relations and diplomatic studies. Drawing on Jönsson and Hall (2005), Bjola  
rightly emphasises that, ‘the bulk of the literature on diplomacy has been written either by 
practitioners or diplomatic historians, neither of whom are much interested in theoretical and 
conceptual development. On the other hand, those engaged in theory, namely IR scholars - 
have rather been oblivious to the study of diplomacy. As a result, a gap has emerged between 
the theory and the practice of diplomacy – to the extent that the two camps do not comfortably 
talk to each other’  (Bjola, 2013, p. 3). To some extent, this study helps bridge this theory-
practice gap by linking the practical day-to-day management of diplomatic relations in the case 
of dialogues to broader questions regarding power relations, the role of enmity and friendship 
in world politics, and issues of recognition.  
Furthermore, from a diplomatic studies perspective, this research also offers a valuable 
contribution by exploring an interesting confluence of trends: the persistence of a long-standing 
form of diplomacy (face-to-face encounters in an institutionalised framework) combined with 
new practices in terms of issues covered and actors involved. Regarding the century-old 
practice of dialogue – defined as a face-to-face encounter among official representatives in an 
institutionalised framework – one might ponder its added value in a world where diplomacy 
takes place more and more in the digital space (cf. digital diplomacy). In fact, gone are the days 
of the Medici when envoyés were sent on horses across the European continent to deliver 
important messages. Nowadays, in light of technological advances, an incredible number of 
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emails can be exchanged and video conferences can easily be held with interlocutors on the 
other side of the world. Still, face-to-face encounters continue to take place, exactly as in the 
time of the Medici. So why does the physical encounter still matter so much in today’s fast-
paced world? What is its enduring added value? Secondly, this study also addresses new 
practices of diplomacy characterising the beginning of the 21st century. First, research has 
shown that the range of issues discussed at the international level has expanded significantly 
to a variety of areas that go beyond the immediate military and political remit of traditional 
diplomacy (i.e. immigration, environment). Second, the range of actors involved in diplomatic 
activities has expanded and the traditional lines between public and private actors are 
increasingly blurred. For instance, parliaments have become vocal on the international stage, 
giving rise to parliamentary diplomacy (Stavridis & Jančić, 2016). Civil society actors have 
also come to play a more prominent role in international affairs and their role has often been 
central in the conclusion of agreements (Davenport, 2002; Hochstetler, 2013). As we shall see, 
the dialogues that the EU institutionalises with third countries involve this whole range of 
actors – from diplomats to civil society actors through parliamentarians. In this sense, the study 
provides a fine-grained analysis of the dialogical interactions in these different diplomatic 
frameworks – old and new.  
Empirically, the thesis investigates the practice of dialogue conducted by the EU with 
third countries making two main contributions to the EU foreign policy literature. First, the 
precise analysis of the mechanisms at play during the dialogue constitutes an important 
contribution of knowledge on how the EU diplomacy works at the micro-level (Adler-Nissen, 
2016; McNamara, 2015). It helps understand the practice of EU external affairs and important 
diplomatic aspects that remain otherwise under-appreciated: how do EU officials prepare the 
meetings? What is their purpose? What happens during the interaction? And afterwards? In 
other words, the analysis goes beyond the description of the formalities of the dialogues and 
invites the reader to enter the meeting room and understand how the EU does things and how 
it understands and interprets these things. Secondly, thanks to the investigation of this practice 
at such a granular level, the study reveals another rationale (beyond the attempt to influence) 
behind the extensive use of political dialogues – namely the quest for recognition as a relevant 
international player. Thirdly, this study reflects an ambitious effort to gather first-hand 
accounts from a wide variety of participants of these dialogues – both European and American 
– as it draws on an array of original interviews as well as on an exhaustive examination of 
existing primary and secondary sources.  
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In addition, new empirical data on the transatlantic relations is brought forth: the study 
provides an empirical analysis of recent developments in the realm of the transatlantic relations. 
In particular, it covers in depth the EU-US dialogues during the Obama administration and 
provides a glimpse of the changes introduced by the Trump administration.  It also offers a new 
fine-grained perspective on the multiple interactions involving European and American 
diplomats, lawmakers, and actors of the civil society.  
Last but not least, the results of the research can also be relevant in terms of policy 
implications/recommendations. The thorough analysis of the practice of the dialogue – from 
the preparation to the follow up phase – provides insights as to the potential and limits of this 
foreign policy instrument. It also helps generate practical advice on how to maximise the 
impact of the dialogue and how to set up discussions that will engender better results.  
1.6. Roadmap: structure of the thesis   
 
In this spirit of enquiry, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the analytical 
framework used in this research and carves out the key theoretical notions that will later be 
used in the empirical analysis. More specifically, it outlines the relationship between dialogue, 
identity and recognition, and unravels the mechanism of recognition at work during the 
dialogue that anchors the EU’s institutional identity. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the methodology 
used in this study. Chapter 4 focuses on the EU’s distinctive features and explains why this 
unique institution has specific needs of recognition of its institutional identity, especially vis-
à-vis the United States. The two following chapters provide an overview of the practice of 
dialogue conducted by the EU across time (Chapter 5) and an overview of the architecture of 
dialogues in the transatlantic context (Chapter 6). Chapter 5 analyses the evolution of the use 
of dialogues in EU foreign policy, pointing to the incremental multiplication of dialogues and 
its rationale. It offers an up-to-date mapping of all the dialogues currently being conducted 
between the EU and the rest of the world, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. Chapter 6 focuses 
on the evolution of the EU-US architecture of dialogues against the backdrop of different stages 
in transatlantic relations. Chapters 7 to 9  are devoted to the three key components of the 
transatlantic dialogue and de facto constitute three case studies: the case of the Transatlantic 
Legislators Dialogue (TLD), which involves members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and 
members of the American Congress; the case of the executive dialogues between the European 
External Action Service (EEAS)/European Commission (EC) and the US State Department; 
and the case of the transatlantic civil society dialogues, i.e. the Transatlantic Business Council 
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(TABC) and the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD). Finally, the concluding chapter 
(Chapter 10) will weave the threads of the thesis together. The findings across the different 
chapters will be compared and conclusions about the practice of dialogue and the EU quest of 
recognition for its institutional identity will be reached and contextualised in the literature. The 
implications for further research will also be drawn.  
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Chapter 2 – A theoretical framework for the 
identity-based dialogue: recognition and 
anchoring of institutional identity  
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will provide the theoretical framework of the study and present the 
propositions to be evaluated in the case studies. The main purpose of the study is to investigate 
the dynamics of the dialogical interaction at play at the micro-level and their significance at 
the macro-level in order to understand why the EU institutionalises and promotes so many 
dialogues. The concepts of dialogue, institutional identity and recognition form the analytical 
spine of this study.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section sheds light on the particularities of 
dialogue as a form of human communication and foreign policy tool, thereby specifying the 
key characteristics of this practice. The second section anchors the discussion in the realm of 
international relations theory by outlining the role of dialogue in the different logics of 
international action (i.e. the quest for security, profit, and recognition). Building on this, the 
following section explores the underlying layer at the base of the dialogue related to identity 
and recognition matters in socio-psychological terms. It shows how dialogue constitutes an 
instance in which recognition processes are at play, thereby reinforcing the identity of the 
institutions represented by the actors present. The theoretical framework is itself divided into 
several parts: (1) it first defines recognition, de-recognition and indirect recognition; (2) it then 
spells out the power of symbolism linking the recognition process at the micro-level with the 
macro-institutional level; (3) outlines how the process of recognition is brought about during 
the dialogue by pointing to the key symbolic elements present across the different phases of 
the dialogue;  (4) and it finally assesses the outcome of the  recognition process by delineating 
different shades of equality in various kinds of relationships.  
2.1. The particularities of dialogue: spatial temporal immediacy and 
emotional display  
As mentioned in the introduction, I define dialogue in this study as a ‘face-to-face interaction 
in an institutionalised framework’. Two key aspects of this definition deserve further analysis, 
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namely the non-mediated, direct physical character of the interaction and its institutionalised 
nature.  
Looking first at the specific configuration of a ‘face-to-face’ interaction, its main 
distinctive feature relates to the fact that participants are in a state of temporal and spatial 
immediacy with their interlocutors (Markova, 1990, p. 6). This basic fact has far-reaching 
implications both in terms of verbal and non-verbal communication.  
First, the fact that the parties are in a temporal immediate contact allows for an 
instantaneous reciprocal exchange. There are real-time constraints on production and 
comprehension under which participants in conversations operate, and it creates a very high 
degree of responsiveness that is not very easily obtained in other communicative configurations 
(Krauss & Fussell, 1996, p. 683; Markova 1990, p. 9; McHale 2004, p. 28). As a result of the 
instantaneous nature of dyadic or small group conversations, processes of arguing and 
persuasion are more likely to unfold (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). 
Second, the physical spatial proximity in which the participants operate enables the 
capture of non-verbal communications in direct visual contact (McHale, 2004, p. 18).1 This 
makes possible the exploitation of the physical dimension of body language (gestures, dress 
code, venue, and setting) and of the social rituals that help to create the atmosphere in which 
messages are most likely to be sympathetically received, such as the handshake, the embrace, 
and displays of inconvenience and triumph (Berridge, 2005; Cohen, 1987). The importance of 
these gestures should not be underestimated as they convey meaningful political messages – 
and particularly so in the diplomatic setting. For Jönsson and Hall, non-verbal language is as 
important as what is spoken during diplomatic encounters, leading them to argue that ‘saying 
is doing’ and ‘doing is saying’ (Jönsson & Hall, 2002). In this respect, the proliferation of 
‘handshake analysis’ is telling because this gesture has become the metaphor capturing the 
state of the relationship (Cohen, 1987, p. 91; Faizullaev, 2013, p. 106). At one extreme, the 
omission of the handshake conveys a deep sense of disapproval of the rejected party and of a 
disturbance of the relationship. For instance, at the peace conference on Indochina in Geneva 
in 1954, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, deliberately refused to shake hands with 
the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai. This symbolic gesture rankled leaders in Beijing for 
years (Cohen, 1987, pp. 92-93). His refusal of any kind of physical contact with Communist 
leaders stemmed from his vision of the communist world as the embodiment of metaphysical 
                                               
1 For a discussion on the difference between a real face-to-face dialogue and video conferencing (as an 
advanced form of telecommunication), see Berridge (2005, pp. 113–114).  
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evil (Ibid.). Arguing against a US-Soviet summit in 1955, he mentioned that ‘the spectacle of 
Eisenhower shaking hands with Krushchev would destroy the moral image of the United States, 
have a bad effect domestically, and tend to weaken the Allies’ will to stand up to Communism’. 
Similar considerations have probably been applied to his encounter with Zhou Enlai (Ogoura, 
2012, p. 27). This can be contrasted with the famous handshake between President Richard 
Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1972; that handshake came to symbolise the end of 
several decades of wary relations between the two countries. For the former US diplomat 
Winston Lord – who witnessed this event, this second-long handshake had the effect of a 
‘geopolitical earthquake’ (BBC news, 2017), thereby emphasising the political significance of 
the gesture.  
 
This photo of the meeting between Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon on the 21st of 
February 1972, has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
Often captured visually, these historic handshakes remain glued in our memory even if the 
peace or the reconciliation that they were supposed to bring about never materialised – as in 
the case of the famous handshake on the White House lawn between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser 
Arafat under the benevolent eye of President Bill Clinton.  
 
 
 
 
 
This photo of the handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Washington in 1993 has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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    More recently, it is the unusual handshakes of US President Donald Trump that have 
been in the eye of the media storm: the tight-gripped hand-wrestling between Trump and 
French President Emmanuel Macron has been described as the ‘never-ending handshake’ 
where neither male leader seemed to want to be the first to let go during their first face-to-face 
meeting in July 2017. This gesture was far from being innocent: as Macron himself admitted 
on French television, this was a ‘moment of truth’ (Dettmer, 2018) when he did not want to 
come across as a leader ready to make concessions to the United States. Another distinctive 
feature of a ‘face-to-face interaction’ worthy of comment is the highly symbolic value that it 
entails, contrary to other forms of communication, such as letters (McHale, 2004, pp. 30-31). 
This is all the more true in the age of  ‘digital’ diplomacy (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Dizard, 
2001), when traditional diplomatic tasks can easily be performed on the internet in a few clicks. 
In this virtual context, the physical presence of attendees acquires a strong symbolic value, 
conveying a sense of importance and priority, amplified by a high level of representation.   
Related to the non-verbal cues of communication, the spatial immediacy characterising 
dialogues allows for the display of emotions that can have a critical role in the diplomatic 
process. Indeed, when state representatives meet, they mainly exchange words – but there is 
much more going on at the emotional level that also needs to be taken into account. Following 
Crawford’s (2000) call for greater interest in emotions, a burgeoning literature has 
convincingly made the case that ‘emotions matter’ in world politics. The bulk of the literature 
has tackled the broad question of how emotions and affective response shape international 
politics, focusing mainly on the emotions experienced by policy-makers and their publics as a 
large collective group and on their impact at the macro-level (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008; 
Fattah & Fierke, 2009; Löwenheim & Heimann, 2008; Moïsi, 2009; Ross, 2006; Sasley, 2011; 
Saurette, 2006). A few studies have, however, showed that emotions matter at the ‘micro-level’ 
of face-to-face diplomacy as well. For Wong (2015), emotions enable practitioners to exchange 
individual-level expressions of intentions – and, by extension, the intentions of the government 
or institution they represent – that are otherwise lost, attenuated, or distorted if communications 
were to occur through other impersonal channels. Anecdotal evidence confirms this 
communicative function of emotions, whereby emotions on display during the dialogue allow 
practitioners to better comprehend the intention of their counterparts. For one EEAS official 
participating regularly in EU-US dialogues, ‘The emotions do tell you something about the 
level of importance of this issue for both sides. It does make a difference if you feel that it is 
very important to them (the United States), you are more ready to accommodate. Or sometimes 
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you are just more trustful that they will follow through, so you can actually agree on their 
proposal’ (Interview no. 23).  
In the framework of this study on recognition, the emotional aspect of the dialogical 
interaction is of primary importance. In fact, my contention is that the process of recognition 
of one’s identity – whether personal or institutional – inevitably involves emotions that can 
more visibly be expressed in face-to-face encounters. As I shall demonstrate later, emotions 
are omnipresent throughout all the stages of the recognition process, from entering the room, 
being in the room and leaving the room. In this case, emotional displays are not only cues 
regarding the intentions of the others but also regarding the degree to which actors feel that 
their identity has been properly recognised. In this sense, the emotional display will serve as a 
useful indicator for the outcome of the recognition process at play during the dialogue. I assume 
that the most salient emotions in the case of recognition will correspond to trust and to a sense 
of pride, satisfaction, joy, and enjoyment (respect), while in the case of lack of recognition, 
expressions of anger, frustration, humiliation and discontent will be dominant.  
As to the institutionalised nature of the dialogue, it is of great import for several reasons. 
First, it is an effective way to distinguish the instances of dialogue under analysis from ordinary 
conversations that do not take place within the formal framework of interaction. In the context 
of this research, while acknowledging the existence of ‘informal dialogues’ conducted on an 
ad hoc basis, the analysis focuses mainly on the formal official dialogues set up by the 
European Union with the United States. The institutionalised framework also sets important 
parameters for the dialogue, both in terms of objectives and format, which have obvious 
consequences on the dynamics developing within the room.  Secondly, the institutionalised 
character of the dialogue implies that the actors of the dialogue are expected to respect certain 
rules and norms of behaviour related to the context in which the social interaction takes place 
(in this case, diplomatic context), if only because they are likely to meet again in the future due 
to the repeated nature of their interactions. In other words, the actors of the dialogues operate 
under the ‘shadow of the future’ and will be therefore more inclined to engage in cooperative 
behaviours with their interlocutors (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Keohane, 1986; Fearon, 1998) 
In this regard, the institutionalised nature of the dialogue is also what makes it symbolic and 
meaningful, and explains the intensity of the emotions that can be felt by the participants of the 
dialogue in their representative roles.  
In short, the dialogue constitutes a framework of direct encounter in which temporal 
and spatial immediacy allows for non-verbal cues and emotions to take a prominent position 
alongside other forms of communication.  
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2.2. Dialogue in International Relations theories  
 
There is today a wide consensus around the idea that there are three core motivational dynamics 
characterising international affairs: the search for security, the profit motive, and the struggle 
for recognition (Lindemann & Saada, 2012). Emphasising the specific quest for recognition, 
Ringmar (2002, p. 16) succinctly argued: ‘Not only physical, but also social survival is at stake 
in international politics’. My contention is that in each one of these modes of interactions – 
dialogues constituting a particular sort of social interaction – fulfils a distinct function. In this 
sub-section, therefore, I review these three core motivational dynamics and highlight the role 
that dialogue plays within each one of them – i.e. how dialogue is conceptualised in these three 
different contexts associated with traditional IR theories (realism, liberal institutionalism, and 
constructivism). While for realists, dialogue is conceived as an instance in which power 
relations are reflected and material interests advanced, for institutional liberals and 
constructivists it corresponds to an instance in which communication processes allow the 
promotion of cooperation and the emergence of shared understanding in a quest for profit and 
progress.  
What has not been emphasised enough, however, is the specific role that dialogue plays 
in the quest for recognition in international politics, particularly through its socio-psychological 
dimension. The main argument developed here is that dialogue always encompasses an 
interactive process of recognition through which institutional identities are being anchored to 
different degrees. State representatives do not only engage in dialogue to coerce the other party 
(realist view) or to promote cooperation through the exchange of information (liberal 
institutionalism) and the emergence of shared understandings (constructivism), as traditional 
IR theories would argue. They are also sensitive to identity matters and use the dialogical 
interaction as an instance in which their institutional identity gets recognised and anchored. In 
what follows, I provide more details about how dialogues are conceptualised in main IR 
theories.   
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Fig. 2.2. Scheme of the different core motivational dynamics in IR and the respective role of dialogue 
 
 
The quest for security through dialogue  
According to the realist school of thought, states are primarily animated by the quest for power 
and security and ‘force is the only language that states understand’ (Fierke, 1999, p. 28). 
Viewed through this theoretical lens, dialogues are extremely important because they constitute 
an instance through which coercion is exerted. In fact, for realists, the main mechanism at play 
during the dialogue corresponds to coercion often accompanied by bargaining. In this 
configuration, power differentials are very much present in the ‘room’ where the dialogue takes 
place and clearly inform the dialogical interaction to the benefit of the most powerful actor. 
Put differently, the most powerful actor approaches the dialogue from a position of superiority, 
trying to impose its view on the problem or issue at stake upon the other side (Lynch, 2005; 
Tocci, 2007). In this sense, dialogues are a full demonstration of power whereby the outcomes 
always reflect relative power and self-interest  (Davis Cross, 2007, p. 5). As Langholz & Stout 
(2004, p. 3) explain, ‘Although at a superficial level, the psychology of diplomacy may be one 
of polite and ritualized discussion, the diplomats know that when they deal with their 
counterparts from other nations, they do so through a psychology that is at a fundamental level 
an adversarial one. It is the professional purpose of each diplomat to seek advantage for his or 
her nation’. Indeed, in this zero-sum game, agents enact given interests, trying to advance them 
in a game of give and take. When rational actors find themselves in such a strategic setting, the 
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goal of their action is to maximise or optimise their own interests and preferences, following 
the ‘logic of consequences’ very much as in rational choice theory (March & Olsen, 1989).   
It is in this sense that dialogue matters in the realist perspective: it supports this coercive 
game as communication between actors aims primarily at affecting the expected utility 
calculations of the target, which might in turn inform the rational actor’s decisions and course 
of action. As the communication is mainly about the costs, risks, and benefits of compliance 
or non-compliance, if actors change their positions during this communicative interaction, they 
have most likely done so because they see some benefits in doing so and not necessarily 
because they were persuaded of the merits of the others’ views (Crawford, 2011, p. 29). A 
possible empirical illustration would be a dialogue whose content revolves around exchanges 
containing reminders of the sticks and carrots in the EU’s arsenal (the power to withhold or 
grant membership, for instance) and would involve establishing linkages between political 
reforms and the likelihood of, for example, securing membership or concluding an economic 
agreement. For instance, in the context of the EU dialogues with the Balkan states, it has been 
argued that the asymmetric negotiation power in favour of the EU explains the patronising 
nature of the authority relations between the EU and these states, with the EU unilaterally 
defining the rules of interaction: ‘The term partnership should not hide the fact that in reality 
the EU-South East European interaction is a one-way, didactic and patronizing process’ 
(Anastasakis, 2005, p. 82).  
 
The quest for profit through dialogue  
The second kind of interaction mode to be considered corresponds to the quest for profit (and 
progress). In this respect, the rationalist institutionalist theory of international relations and the 
constructivist approach propose slightly different interpretations as to why states resort to the 
practice of dialogue and what is actually happening during dialogical encounters. While 
acknowledging the different ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying IR liberal 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches, both accounts consider dialogues and subsequent 
communication as a key tool in the pursuit of profit and progress under the form of better 
cooperation and understanding.  
Rather than viewing dialogue as a way to clarify the demands of a ‘coercive power’ 
towards another party in the quest for security, the liberal institutionalist theory – as 
exemplified by Keohane (1988) – addresses the exchange of information in a more cooperative 
light. As our definition of dialogue encompasses a strong ‘institutionalised’ character, we can 
assume that the mutual benefits usually attributed to regimes and institutions resonate in this 
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context as well. In fact, liberal institutionalists consider dialogue as one of the forums in which 
participants engage in a fruitful exchange of useful information about the behaviours of the 
side involved in the regime/agreement and about the progress being made or any other 
compliance issues. During the dialogical interaction, the parties genuinely inform the other 
participants of a specific problem, have the opportunity to acquire first-hand knowledge of a 
given situation, and can come to share precious information that might allow them to rationally 
solve common problems and thereby enhance cooperation in the pursuit of profit and progress. 
In this sense, problem-solving appears to be a key mechanism corresponding to the pursuit of 
solutions that satisfy the interests of all the parties. In problem-solving, the focus is on mutual, 
absolute benefits – contrary to bargaining characterised by a zero-sum game, as described by 
realists (Hopmann, 1996, p. 89).  
It also makes sense to assume that states engage in processes of political exchanges to 
learn more about the world, each other, and their joint expectations (Snidal, 2002). It allows 
them to clarify positions or avoid misunderstandings and this serves in turn to maximise their 
own interests in a rationalist vein. This function of the dialogue is particularly relevant in 
alliance relationships, like in the case of the EU-US relations: emphasising the importance of 
misperceptions, Jervis warns that while allies communicate much more extensively and openly 
than do adversaries, it creates a problem of its own whereby both elites and general populations 
are likely to overestimate the extent to which they understand each other (Jervis, 2009, p. 7). 
In this account, official representatives are conceptualised first and foremost as agents of 
cooperation, acting as transmission belts for ‘states’ (Pollack, 2003). This ‘informative’ 
function of the dialogue appears particularly relevant today, given the fact that one of the chief 
criticisms by the EU of the Trump administration is its contradictory signals. According to 
European officials, it is now even more difficult to discern ‘what they really think, how to react 
and even to distinguish between policy and rumination’ (Karnitschnig, 2017b).  
The IR constructivist scholarship with its own sets of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions engenders a slightly different perspective on the role that dialogue can play, but 
nevertheless points to the same logic/quest for profit and progress. Constructivism is a social 
theory that theorises the way our known social world came to be. The constructivist stance is 
that the social world becomes constructed through social knowledge, defined as people’s inter-
subjective understandings of their physical and human environment (Adler, 1997; Guzzini, 
2000; Weldes, 1996). Broadly speaking, social constructivism ascribes significant importance 
to communication and social interactions. According to this approach, dialogue is perceived to 
be a means not only to acquire information, as pure rationalistic approaches would argue, but 
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more importantly to construct ‘collective knowledge’ through deliberation. In turn, ‘The 
knowledge acquired and constructed through deliberation may serve as a requisite for the 
transformation of actors, institutionalized patterns, political identities and interests’ (Adler, 
1997, p. 348). To put it differently, the discursive interaction in the form of dialogue can be 
considered as a site of common production of knowledge. More specifically, the constructivist 
approach to dialogue has traditionally put the emphasis on argumentation and processes of 
persuasion inherent in communication with the potential to change the beliefs and preferences 
of the actors engaged in the dialogue.  
There are however important nuances within the constructivist approach regarding the 
mechanisms inherent in the dialogue. At one end of the spectrum, one finds liberal 
constructivists, such as Thomas Risse and others (Keck, 1995; Müller, 1994; Schneider, 1994; 
Zangl & Zürn, 1996), who completely exclude power relations from their account of dialogical 
interactions. This research trend started as a fierce criticism of the rationalist game theories that 
failed to take into account the power of words and processes of argumentation, inherent in any 
negotiation process. More specifically, Risse drew on Habermas’ concept of communicative 
action to develop his concept of argumentative rationality (Risse, 2000). He defined 
argumentative rationality as a process that involves a ‘logic of truth-seeking or arguing’ 
through which actors try to figure out ‘whether their assumptions about the world and about 
cause-and-effect relationships in the world are correct ... or whether norms of appropriate 
behavior can be justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances’ (Risse, 2000, pp. 
6–7). In contrast to the realist account, the participants do not seek to maximise their interests 
and preferences. The goal of argumentative rationality is to seek and reach a reasoned 
consensus about a situation that will symbolise the triumph of the better argument, embodying 
the reasons that are good for the collective and not simply for the most powerful actor. 
Arguments are assessed on the basis of their merit and reasonableness, not for the force or 
power that may back them politically (Ish-Shalom, 2011, p. 235). This is made possible in an 
ideal speech situation, because participants do engage in communication without using material 
power resources to impose their views on others and are open to persuasion by the better 
argument (Verständigungsbereitschaft). 2   
                                               
2 For criticism of the ideal speech situation, see Crawford (2011, p. 30) and Mitzen (2005). This trend of 
research has reached a dead end with the realisation that it was empirically impossible to infer the real 
motivations of speakers (i.e. the logic of action being adopted), based only on the analysis of the utterances 
of speech acts enacted  (Ulbert, Risse, & Müller, 2004, p. 352) leading to the conclusion that ‘a theoretical 
paradise was empirically lost’ (Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005). 
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While Risse refers to the works of Habermas, Checkel uses insights from social 
psychology and communications research on persuasion to develop a concept of 
‘argumentative persuasion’ (Checkel, 2001). In his view, argumentative persuasion is ‘a social 
process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of 
overt coercion’, that is ‘a process of convincing someone through argument and principled 
debate’ (Checkel, 2001, p. 562). He further distinguishes argumentative persuasion from 
manipulative persuasion, which he argues is ‘asocial and lacking in interaction, often 
concerned with political elites manipulating mass publics’ (Ibid). Here again, it is the non-
coercive nature of the process that is being emphasised. Yet as Kerr rightly points out, his 
reference to ‘the absence of overt coercion’ leaves open the prospect of covert, implicit, or 
background coercion and politics. By contrast, Risse appears not to consider such a prospect 
at all (Kerr, 2010, p. 243).   
At the other end of the constructivist spectrum, self-labelled ‘coercive constructivists’ 
such as Krebs and Jackson (2007) adopt a more nuanced stance towards the relationship 
between power and communication. Downplaying the importance of the strength of arguments 
in persuasion, Krebs and Jackson argue that their concept of ‘rhetorical coercion’ or ‘skilful 
framing’ that leaves opponents ‘without access to the rhetorical material needed to craft a 
socially sustainable rebuttal’ and that results in them ‘being talked into a corner, compelled to 
endorse a stance they would otherwise reject’ has more explanatory value (Krebs and Jackson, 
2007, p. 36).  
As this short review on the liberal institutionalist and constructivist approach has 
shown, dialogue can also be harnessed in the quest for profit and progress more generally. In 
this account, dialogue involving either the exchange of raw information in a cooperative game 
or the transmission of knowledge, leading to the emergence of shared understanding and 
meaning, leads to a situation in which both parties are more likely to benefit. But in either case, 
the focus is really on the cognitive rational capabilities of the actors involved in the dialogue 
with little to no attention given to deeper socio-psychological dynamics.  
 
The quest for recognition through dialogue  
Another key motivation of states relates to their quest for recognition on the international stage 
linked to identity issues. Research has shown that states might even go to war to gain 
recognition (Ringmar, 2008). Here again, I argue that dialogue is of primary importance 
because it creates a framework in which states (and institutions) can seek the recognition of 
their identities. By contrast to the two previously mentioned modes of interaction, which are 
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very much focused on the cognitive capabilities of the participants of the dialogue, here the 
dialogue entails a strong socio-psychological dimension that needs to be taken more seriously 
into account. In my view, the quest for recognition is the most important of the three (security 
and profit being the other two), because the social structure that underpins the two other modes 
of interaction assumes identity. In the case of the realist view on dialogue for instance, even if 
the dialogical interaction is very much based on an exchange of threats and promises processed 
in terms of benefits and costs, it also inevitably entails a message about the status and 
relationship identity between the two actors. In other words, the coercive dialogue also fulfils 
the function of granting an identity in addition to the delivery of provisions. Similarly, in the 
quest for profit, the participants of a dialogue display different degrees of openness when it 
comes to the exchange of information. This also carries an important symbolic message as to 
the kind of relationship identity shared by the actors. As such, the act of sharing exclusive 
information reinforces this understanding of the link between the actors present. Therefore, all 
the discursive dynamics identified by the other theories are meaningful in terms of identity 
recognition.  
The quest for the recognition of identity has been firmly established over the last decade 
thanks to the emergence of the recognition literature in international politics. Indeed, the idea 
that ‘recognition matters’ in international relations has been advanced in a wide variety of 
studies, tackling war and peace issues in the context of inter-state dynamics (Bartelson, 2013; 
Honneth, 2012; Lebow, 2010; Lindemann, 2010, 2014a; Ringmar, 2008; Wolf, 2011), of 
conflict studies and peace making (Jamal, 2000; Möller, 2007; Strömbom, 2012; 2013), and a 
wide range of other topics, including works on the search for great power status, struggles 
between have and have-nots and more (Haacke, 2005; Lindemann & Ringmar, 2012; 
Lindemann & Saada, 2012; Ringmar, 2002; Wendt, 1999; Gustafsson, 2015, 2016). 
Traditionally, the literature on recognition in IR has mainly dealt with the formal modes of 
recognition used by states to grant or withhold recognition from other states and collectives, 
such as recognition acts enacted in the legal realm (Fabry, 2010) related to the notion of ‘thin 
recognition’.3 Other scholars have looked at more informal modes of recognition, dealing with 
‘thick recognition’, such as public statements at the international level (Gustaffson, 2016). 
However, my contention is that states and institutions also actively use the practice of dialogue 
                                               
3 ‘Thin recognition’ is fundamentally about common identity with other actors – i.e. about being recognised 
as a fully autonomous member of a community mainly from a legal point of view (Wendt, 2003, p. 511). By 
contrast, ‘thick recognition’ acknowledges difference and uniqueness of a particular identity in the form of 
specific qualities (Gustaffson, 2016, p. 258).  
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in their quest for recognition. Recognition can also be played out at the micro-level of 
diplomatic practices, such as regular dialogues and meetings with implications at the macro-
level for the whole institution. 
Two different perspectives on the motivations behind the quest for recognition exist in 
the literature. According to the utilitarian approach, recognition is a desirable good to possess 
in order to get a solid reputation that can be used both internally and externally (instrumental 
view). There is, therefore, a strategic motivation behind the desire to be recognised in terms of 
prestige, of the political survival of the leader, or resources and funds in the case of an 
organisation. By contrast, the non-utilitarian perspective emphasises the importance of socio-
psychological factors: ‘Our desire to be recognized relates to the concept of ontological identity 
and to the emotional component of self-esteem. Even if there is a strategic calculation behind 
any move, there are also emotional dynamics at play, with a logic of self-esteem as an end in 
itself and not only as a means to achieve a wider objective’ (Lindemann & Saada, 2012, p. 15). 
Actors might therefore have different recognition needs.  
For the purpose of this study, it is important to highlight that the quest for recognition 
and its rationale hold true to institutions as well. In fact, the literature has shown that institutions 
– like states – are not only pursuing material gains but are also seeking the satisfaction of 
identity needs involving processes of recognition by others (Mitzen, 2006; Oelsner, 2013). As 
Albert et al. (2000) remind us, ‘Whether an organization, group or person, each entity needs at 
least a preliminary answer to the question: “who are we?” or “who am I?”’ in order to act and 
interact effectively with other entities over the long run, implicitly referring to the concept of 
ontological security.  
This point relates to the key concept of ‘institutional identity’ at the core of this study.  
In a seminal article in organisational studies, Albert and Whetten defined institutional identity 
as ‘the identity which is the most central, enduring, and distinctive about an organization’ 
(1985, p. 410). Following a series of criticisms on the ambiguity of this concept, Whetten 
(2006) proposed a ‘strengthened version’ of institutional identity in which he specified further 
how to distinguish bona fide organisational identity claims from a larger set of claims about an 
organisation. In particular, he mentions that the distinguishing characteristic of institutional 
identity means that if an organisation fails to honour its distinguishing commitments, it risks 
becoming unpredictable and untrustworthy. As to the central and enduring attributes, they refer 
to those identity claims – in the form of organisational elements – that have withstood the test 
of time (Whetten, 2006, p. 224).  
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While this clarification was in fact much needed, it still lacks concrete empirical 
examples of such identity claims lying at the core of institutional identity: are we talking only 
about organisational forms and practices? Or is there also a content-related dimension whereby 
a distinct set of values would also qualify as an enduring and central feature of an organisation, 
as Selznick (1957, p. 17) and Scott (2000, p. 24) suggest? For Mitzen, institutional identity 
definitely encompasses the values for which the organisation stands. In her research, she 
emphasises how the ‘civilizing identity’ of the EU draws on the values of multilateralism, 
‘diplomacy first’ and with commitments to pursuing representative democracy, the rule of law, 
social justice, and human rights in foreign policy. She argues that intra-European routines of 
multilateral security cooperation anchor the collective identity of ‘civilizing power’ as it 
permits deliberation and reflection (Mitzen, 2006, p. 272). Therefore, in my view, the features 
presumed to be central and relatively permanent distinguishing one organisation from another 
organisation (i.e. institutional identity) relate both to the specific procedures unique to the 
organisation as well as the values for which it stands. This is especially true, as both are often 
intertwined.  
In this study, I identify two institutional identity claims for which recognition will be 
sought during the dialogical interaction – namely relevance and distinctiveness. The first 
dimension relates to the relevance of the institution (in the case of the EU, relevance as an 
international actor). It echoes Ringmar’s point about the fact that states are generally looking 
for the recognition of their ‘social status’ (Ringmar, 2012), often associated with the concept 
of ‘great power’. The quest for recognition of this aspect is often expressed through claims 
such as ‘we want them to recognise that we matter’, ‘that it is worth talking to us’, or simply 
‘we want to be taken seriously’ (power symbolism). The quest for relevance is also associated 
with the relationship identity (relationship symbolism). In fact, this idea of relevance includes 
the demonstration of ‘capabilities’ and ‘efficiency’ in ‘delivering results’ as it would be 
expected in a partnership type of relationship. Similarly, the sub-themes of reliability and 
coherence are also linked to the wider idea of relevance of one’s identity.  
The second dimension of institutional identity deals with the uniqueness and 
distinctiveness of the institution in line with the socio-psychological literature (Brewer, 1991; 
Snydern & Franklin, 1980). This implies giving respect to the differences of the other both in 
terms of interests and values, as mentioned by Selznick (1957), Scott (2000), and Mitzen 
(2006). This can entail the respect for differences in terms of organisational practices, which is 
not necessarily detached from the previous aspect because the way we do certain things are 
informed by the values we hold. As Missoni (2014, p. 370) further specifies, institutional 
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identity encapsulates the essential characteristics of an organisation such as its missions, 
values, expertise, and qualities – as well as its procedures.  
Based on the case of Mercosur, Oeslner explains why a strong sense of institutional 
identity is essential: 
Internally, it projects its image onto member states and their public opinion, which are 
the source of its political legitimacy. Internationally, the projection onto regional and 
international actors of a defined image constructed (partly) upon its institutional 
identity contributes toward the organization’s credibility, recognition, and reputation. 
Finally, temporally, a solidly structured institutional identity helps to convey internally 
and externally the idea of the organization’s continuing relevance into the future; that 
its continuity will transcend mere inertial permanence (Oelsner, 2013, p. 115). 
 
Following in the footsteps of Oelsner and adopting the ‘social conception of institutional 
identity’ proposed by Whetten and Mackey, institutions are considered in this study to be social 
actors, authorised to engage in social intercourse as a collective, and possessing rights and 
responsibilities, as if the collective were a single individual (Whetten & Mackey, 2002, p. 395). 
Reinforcing this point, Missoni mentions that ‘organizations exist with their identity, their 
values, their mission, their activity and history before communicating them’ (Missoni, 2014, 
p. 364). In this view, institutions are agents in their own right and build their own institutional 
identity for which they seek recognition in interactions with others. In the next section, I 
elaborate on the recognition process of institutional identity at play during the dialogues and 
explain how this outcome is then being anchored and projected to the outside world.  
 
2.3. A theoretical framework for the identity-based dialogue  
 
The main argument developed here is that dialogue provides an instance in which institutional 
identity is possibly recognised and anchored. More specifically, dialogue is a performance 
during which actors project an image and act in line with the institutional identity for which 
they seek recognition. To back this argument, this section first defines the concept of 
‘recognition’, ‘indirect recognition’ and ‘de-recognition’ and its effects. It then emphasises the 
power of symbolism inherent in diplomatic dialogues to explain how the recognition process 
in the meeting room at the micro-level has far-reaching implications related to the macro-
institutional level. It then unpacks the process of recognition and anchoring of institutional 
identity unfolding during the dialogue following three main stages: (1) entering the room 
(including the preparation and the setting); (2) communication and interaction within the room; 
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and (3) leaving the room. For each one of these stages, precise indicators are given in order to 
better ‘recognise recognition’ at play.  
 
2.3.1. Recognition, indirection recognition, and de-recognition 
 
Traditionally, the literature on recognition in IR has made the distinction between recognition 
and mis-recognition (Gustafsson, 2016). For Lindemann – one of the key scholars in the field 
– recognition is granted when the nature of the interaction confirms the actors’ self-ascribed 
value and importance. In other words, for recognition to be granted, there needs to be a match 
between the self-image of the actor seeking recognition and the treatment it deems appropriate 
to receive by the recognising party (Lindemann & Saada, 2012, pp. 17-18). Thick recognition 
acknowledges difference or uniqueness, for example, in the form of specific qualities (Wendt, 
2003, pp. 511–512). Conversely, the denial of thick recognition (i.e. misrecognition) entails 
not recognising an actor’s particular identity. In this configuration, the actor in question is 
recognised in a way that differs from its own understanding of itself and this is expressed by a 
mismatch between the self-image of the actor and the perceived inadequate treatment it 
receives from the actor granting recognition. In my view, the term ‘mis-recognition’ is 
misleading because it implies a form of mistake by the ‘recogniser’ that did supposedly not 
fully comprehend the identity of its interlocutors. It suggests the existence of a ‘right or wrong’ 
form of recognition. This is not necessarily the case. The recogniser does recognise the other 
in a way that might not live up to its expectations but a recognition process is going on anyway.4 
In terms of effects, institutional identity is reinforced in this recognition process. Rather than 
creating a ‘common and collective identity’ as Wendt suggests in his works, the recognition 
process actually strengthens processes of ‘othering’, of ‘constituting in-group and out-group 
relations’ (Greenhill, 2008). For instance, as one member of the EP delegation to the United 
States recalled: ‘During the TLD, we really came to develop a “delegation identity”: we 
(MEPs) are all together and the “other” is not the socialist MEPs anymore but the Americans’ 
(Interview no. 2). This is a reminder that dialogue is fundamentally about engaging the ‘other’ 
and the self at the same time. In the words of Blaney and Ayatuallah (1994, p. 41), dialogue 
can be seen ‘as a source of critique and reaffirmation, a process of mutual criticism that allows 
each civilization to rediscover and reinvigorate its own vision, including the recovery of lost 
or submerged knowledge’. Moreover, regardless of the quality of the interaction with their 
                                               
4 This echoes Steele’s critique of Lindemann’s definition (Steele, 2014, p. 2).  
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counterparts, the preparation of the ‘team performance’ itself contributes to reinforce 
institutional identity. The prospect of the dialogue triggers intense preparation within the 
institution itself and acts as a ‘bureaucratic catalyst’ whereby the different actors need to come 
to a unified position in line with their overall institutional identity, as I will explore in greater 
depth when examining the preparation of the dialogues in section 2.3.2.1.  
Typically, international recognition is provided by actors who are themselves state 
actors – particularly so when it comes to thin recognition. However, more recent research on 
recognition suggests that it can also be provided by actors who are themselves not widely 
recognised states or by entities which do not at all aim to become states, such as multinational 
companies, labour unions, and private individuals. For states or institutions in quest for 
recognition, their recognition by this latter type of actor can also be important (Geis et al., 
2015). To illustrate the importance of non-state actors recognising states, Bailes (2015, p. 260) 
gives the glaring example of the power of credit ratings agencies, recalling how the EU and its 
governments scrambled to deal with the damage done by such agencies ‘changing their 
categorization of states’ like Greece and Spain during the Euro crisis. As it will be shown in 
chapter 8, the vitality of the transatlantic civil society dialogues created by the EU and the 
United States eventually reinforces the EU’s institutional identity both by providing it with 
instances to demonstrate its attachment to democracy and transparency and by making it more 
efficient and relevant. 
Can identities go unrecognised? Research in socio-psychology has shown that the 
concept of identity is multiple and context-bound – and that the process of being, or identity, 
is constantly re-created in each new situation corresponding to the individuals’ or institutions’ 
active engagement with the social world. Particularly influential in this respect has been 
Charles Taylor’s seminal work on the politics of recognition and multilateralism in the 
domestic sphere, in which he argues that ‘the making and sustaining of our identity remains 
dialogical throughout our lives’ (1994, p. 25) [emphasis added], stressing the infinite nature of 
this process. Because identities are formed inter-subjectively, the process of establishing and 
maintaining an identity is wrought with insecurity as interactions always holds the possibility 
that an actor’s self-understanding will not be recognised by others (Murray, 2012, p. 135). In 
other words, there is always a possibility of ‘backtracking’ in terms of institutional identity, or 
what I call ‘de-recognition’. This corresponds to a situation in which a certain institutional 
identity has long been recognised and that suddenly is subjected to a ‘reversal’, whereby actors 
do not get the recognition they were accustomed to getting in line with their self-image.  
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Thus, what happens when the identity claims are not recognised and accepted? At the 
macro-level broader level, Ringmar (2012, p. 7) suggests three possible options as a response: 
(1) a state can accept that its stories were inaccurate and that those ascribed to it by others were 
accurate. In that case, it needs to refashion its story about itself and hope that the new narrative 
will be accepted; (2) the second option is for the state (or institution) to accept that its narrative 
was incorrect but argue that it can change in order to become what it has claimed it is. In our 
study, this would amount to: ‘We, the EU, accept what the US denial suggests – i.e. the EU 
does not live up to its self-image – and we decide to work harder to be what we consider 
ourselves to be; (3) finally, the third option is to stick to its stories without altering its 
behaviour. To that end, the state (or institution) can then try to persuade those that do not share 
their belief that their narrative is accurate.  
In these two last scenarios where recognition does not fit the self-image of the 
‘recognisee’, institutional identity might actually be reinforced. In other words, in case of 
recognition not aligned with the self-identity of the actor, the institutional identity of the actors 
seeking recognition can be eventually strengthened by reifying differences. Consider for 
instance the reaction of the president of the EU Council, Donald Tusk, (2017) following the 
provocative statement of Donald Trump regarding the future of Europe: 
Mr. Trump has personally sought to undermine the unity of Western European nations. 
Let us show our European pride. … If we pretend we cannot hear the words and we do 
not notice the decisions aimed against the EU and our future … global partners will 
cease to respect us. Today we must stand up very clearly for our dignity, the dignity of 
a united Europe – regardless of whether we are talking to Russia, China the US or 
Turkey. Therefore, let us have the courage to be proud of our own achievements, which 
have made our continent the best place on Earth. 
 
As the journalist Karnitschnig (2017a) ironically put it, ‘Trump makes Europe (feel) great 
again’. Here clearly, the explicit statements denying recognition of the EU triggers a fierce 
counter-reaction that only reinforces the sense of being European. In a similar vein, a high-
level European official mentioned that ‘the new preferences and priorities of the Trump 
administration led us (Europeans) to understand even more how attached we are to certain 
principles. When we see in America things that we don’t like and that are important to us, it 
helps us build a narrative in Europe. What are we doing together? What is European identity 
versus other identities in the world? This kind of big event obliges us to think collectively about 
our project’ (Ripoll, 2018). Translated at the micro-level, the possible mismatch between the 
self-image and the treatment received during the dialogue might lead the actors to leave the 
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room with a reinforced sense of who they are – in this case, more ‘European’, with a greater 
sense of ‘Europeanness’.  
A thorny debate in the literature centres on how to recognise thick recognition under 
the label of ‘the recognition of recognition’ (Gustafsson, 2016, p. 257; Lindemann, 2012, 
2014b; Steele, 2014). In this study, I follow Gustaffson’s approach focusing on thick 
recognition, which is generally straightforward. To start with, he recommends identifying a 
specific self-identity that the actor wants recognised. For instance, in his study of the Sino-
Japanese relationship, he shows how China actually denied Japan’s self-identity as a peaceful 
country. In this research, the so-called ‘self-identity’ corresponds to the institutional identity 
composed of the relevance and distinctiveness aspects detailed earlier. Once this institutional 
identity has clearly been defined, Gustaffson suggests looking for four different ways through 
which thick recognition can be granted or denied: (a) explicit recognition; (b) explicit denials 
of recognition; (c) implicit acts, behaviours, or statements interpreted as recognition; and (d) 
implicit acts that are interpreted as denials of recognition. In his account, explicit recognition 
refers to statements to the effect that: you are X when the target’s self-identity is constructed 
as X (Gustaffson, 2016, p. 260).  
While this approach fits well with the analysis of recognition and mis-recognition at 
the broader level such as in the case of public statements, some adjustments need to be made 
for recognising recognition at the micro-level of interaction, i.e. at the dynamics developing 
behind closed doors.  
First, in the face-to-face encounter, I expect more acts of implicit recognition and non-
recognition than explicit ones. As Honneth (2012, p. 30) argues, ‘The aim of avoiding public 
embarrassment prevents a people desire for recognition of its collective identity from being 
directly and openly expressed by its political representatives. This recognitional dimension of 
IR is thus typically expressed indirectly and symbolically’. Accepting the fact that the dialogue 
setting is one of these states in which both protagonists engage in an implicit game of 
recognition to save face, the analysis at the micro-level has to focus on the subtle and inter-
subjective understandings specific to the context and to the participants of the dialogue. This 
involves the analysis of all cues present at the different stages of the dialogue and how they are 
interpreted by the participants of the dialogue: as they are well-aware of the symbolism of these 
aspects, they pay particular attention to these elements as indicators of recognition for their 
institutional identity. Emotions will also be scrutinised and taken into account in the analysis 
because identity is closely linked to emotions (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015; Lindemann & 
Ringmar, 2012). Denial of recognition is often understood as humiliating and disrespectful 
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(Gustafsson, 2015; Wolf, 2011) while acts that recognise or confirm an identity, by contrast, 
are typically seen as respectful and thus induce pride and make actors feel ontologically secure 
(Gustafsson, 2015). Therefore, the emotional aspect will also be taken into account as a key 
component of the anchoring of institutional identity.  
Secondly, the analysis of the emotions and non-verbal cues needs to be adapted to the 
specific ‘scenery’ of the dialogue as a specific social setting of interaction. Lindemann & 
Saada’s definition of recognition on which this study is based refers to ‘the match between the 
self-image of the actor seeking recognition and the treatment it deems appropriate to receive 
by the recognizing party’ (2012, pp. 17-18). It is thus necessary to disentangle the different 
aspects of the term ‘treatment’ in this specific dialogical context. Moreover, all the indicators 
that will be detailed below can be exploited in the performance of both those seeking 
recognition (recognition-seeking behaviour) and of the recognisers. In other words, these 
symbolic elements can either be used to project and perform a certain identity or to grant 
recognition /or deny recognition to others.  
 
2.3.2. Symbolism as the link between the micro and the macro-levels  
While the recognition process at play during the dialogical interaction takes place first and 
foremost among individual actors at the micro-level, my contention is that its dynamics and 
outcomes have more far-reaching consequences due to the power of symbolism inherent in the 
diplomatic setting at the macro-level. In this sub-section therefore, I explain how the 
recognition process experienced by individuals (i.e. the participants of the dialogue) during the 
interaction transcends the wall of the meeting room to reinforce the identity of the institution 
as a whole. While the individuals participating in the dialogue might apparently do little, what 
they do actually has major implications in terms of institutional identity. But how is it possible 
that an actor enters the room and an institutional identity is anchored? To answer this question, 
I elaborate on the link between the micro and macro levels by conceptualising the dialogue as 
a symbolically framed interaction. In line with the ‘social conception of institutional identity’ 
mentioned above, this research does not problematize the identity of the participants as 
individual actors but puts the onus on the symbolic function they fulfil as representatives of 
political entities, as carriers of institutional identity seeking recognition on behalf of their 
institutions.  
The symbolic nature of the diplomatic encounter is key to understand why the 
interaction at the micro-level has far-reaching consequences beyond the meeting room in terms 
of institutional identity. Following the symbolic interactionist tradition à la Goffman (1959) 
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and echoing the works of Raymond Cohen (1987), I argue that the dialogue is a performance 
during which actors project a certain image of themselves (i.e. of the identity of the institution 
they represent). It is during this performance that recognition will be sought and possibly 
granted. Performers have only a short lapse of time in the other’s immediate physical presence 
to show their relevance and this often involves more than one individual. The actors of the 
dialogue are well aware of their role in the interaction and its meaning. That is why they engage 
in what the sociologist Erving Goffman calls a ‘team performance’ – defined as a collection of 
individuals cooperating to project and maintain a certain impression or definition of a situation 
upon the others (Goffman, 1959, p. 47). In the preparation phase (or ‘rehearsal’), they go to 
great length to come across as serious interlocutors – as a concerted effort – because they know 
that their performance in the dialogue will be extrapolated to the EU as a whole. In fact, the 
participants of the dialogue do not interpret nor react to the dialogical interaction personally or 
individually. They tend to display a high level of identification with the institution they 
represent and tend to interpret the American attitude as responsive to the EU at large (and vice 
versa) and not to them as individuals. As one EU diplomat succinctly put it, ‘Personally, I don’t 
try to gain recognition from the Americans but for the EU as a whole, this is definitely an issue’ 
(Interview no. 23).  
 Turning now to the performance itself, Goffman distinguishes two parts: the first 
relates to the ‘setting’ – i.e. the scenic part, involving furniture, décor, physical lay-out, and 
other background items that constitute the scenery. The second part, i.e. ‘the personal front’, 
refers to items identified with the performers themselves, such as clothes and facial expressions 
(Goffman, 1959, p. 13). The bottom line is that ‘if the individual’s activity is to become 
significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during the interaction 
what he wishes to convey. In fact, the performer may be required not only to express his 
claimed practices during the interaction but also to do so during a split second in the 
interaction’. To do so, ‘the individual typically infuses his activity with signs which 
dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent 
or obscure’ (Ibid., p. 19). This is possible because the social setting in which the actors interact 
is wrapped with meaning and governed by shared understandings and behavioural expectations 
related to the practice of diplomacy. This is why every single word and gesture matters in this 
context. The performance is imbued with symbolism based on common understandings: from 
the timing, place, and design of the venue to the food offered to the guests through the seating 
arrangements in the meeting room. All of these elements count due to their symbolic character 
and they all carry important messages in terms of recognition.  
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That is why symbols are so important in world politics. They make the relationship 
between abstract entities more concrete and tangible. For Faizullaev (2013, p. 92), the very 
abstract nature of the state and by extension of any political institution requires a certain degree 
of objectification in order to allow meaningful and concrete interactions. ‘When no one can 
see the state, and international politics does not present itself directly to our senses’ (Wendt, 
1999, p. 5), the use of symbols becomes indispensable to make the state and other institutions, 
such as the EU visible and more tangible. The organisational studies perspective makes the 
same point. As Missoni highlights, the image of an organisation (or institution) is the result not 
only of its activities but also of the behaviour of those who represent it. A negative image of 
the organisation will be generated if their attitudes are not coherent with the values and aims 
that the organisation declares (Missoni, 2014, p. 370). This concern regarding how the 
institution is perceived via the performance of its representatives during the dialogue is 
confirmed by evidence gleaned from my interviewees. For instance, an EEAS official 
complained about the poor performance of a higher official representing the EU during a 
meeting with US representatives where the lack of knowledge and determination conveyed the 
image of the EU as a weak and incapable actor: ‘Why would the Americans bother engaging 
with lower-ranking diplomats if this the image they get from a key representative? This reflects 
poorly on the EU’ (Interview no. 23). Conversely, the positive behaviour of the representatives 
of an institution and the way they perform during the dialogue can also project an image 
emphasising the positive features of institution’s identity as a whole. The anthropomorphic 
discourse equalises the characteristics of the diplomats with the institution they represent and 
is telling in this respect. The anthropomorphisation of the political entity points to the fact that 
we can experience it (Faizullaev, 2007, p. 532). Consider, for instance, the words of this US 
official: ‘The dialogue triggers more desire to work with the EU because it proves that it is 
effective. We learn a lot from the EU’ (Interview no. 14). In this case, it is clear that the level 
of preparation and the ensuing quality of the discussions held between the EU and the American 
representatives is interpreted in a way that applies to the value of the institution as a whole (i.e. 
the EU). The dialogue can therefore be seen as an instance in which the state or institution 
represented is experienced first-hand.  
To conclude, the dialogue is a performance during which actors project the institutional 
identity they are carrying. As such, what happens in the meeting room is much more than an 
ordinary discussion – it has a wider significance at the macro-level due to the symbolism 
inherent in the interaction. 
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2.3.3. The process of recognition  
Delving into the intricacies of the process of recognition at play during the dialogue, I 
distinguish between three main stages of this symbolically framed interaction: first, ‘the entry 
to the room’, including the level of preparation of the participants and the format of the dialogue 
(i.e. the setting of the room); second, ‘the interaction within the room’, corresponding to the 
bulk of the dialogue in which the participants experience the relationship while talking about 
it; and third, ‘the leaving of the room’, referring to the symbolic actions and elements taken out 
of the dialogue to the outside world. This third phase is particularly important because the 
participants of the dialogue do not only want to be recognised in the room but are also looking 
for this recognition to be celebrated outside the room. This is where the anchoring of the 
institutional identity is clinched. For each one of these crucial stages, I identify the main 
symbolic elements, implicit statements, and acts that amount to the recognition of the 
institutional identity of the other party relying on the work of Faizullaev (2007, 2013). They 
refer to the material setting and to the features of the dialogical interaction both in its verbal 
and non-verbal form.  
 
2.3.3.1. Entering the room: preparation and setting  
First, even though the analysis focuses on the face-to-face dialogical interaction, the main 
features of the preparation beforehand are worth taking into account as they have repercussions 
on the dialogue itself and therefore cannot be viewed as a separate element. To keep the 
theatrical metaphor of the dialogue, the preparation of the dialogue corresponds to the 
‘rehearsal’ of the performance. It is at this stage that the actors of the dialogue coordinate ‘their 
team performance’ à la Goffman (1959, p. 47). A few indicators point to the recognition-
seeking behaviour of the participants at the preparation stage such as the fact of taking the lead 
in the preparation vis-à-vis the other partner, or the considerable efforts invested in the 
preparation with the aim to come across as a reliable and competent interlocutor in the eyes of 
the other. In the case of complex institutions, the preparation phase entails a phase of intense 
coordination among relevant bodies in order to send a unified message and come across as a 
coherent actor, thereby projecting the image of a relevant actor. This is particularly relevant in 
the case of the EU, which has traditionally been criticised for being incoherent and 
contradictory (Chapter 4). As mentioned earlier, one of the side effects of this coordination 
exercise triggered by the prospect of the dialogue is the ‘bureaucratic catalyst’ that reinforces 
the institutional cohesion regardless of what is going on during the interaction with the external 
49 
 
actors. Moreover, it is often in this preparation phase that the key parameters of the dialogue 
are set among both sides such as the date, the topics on the agenda, or the choice of speakers 
for specific sessions. The way this process is conducted also carries a symbolic meaning. For 
instance, when choosing the topics on the agenda, a high degree of importance is given to 
respect the concerns and wishes of the other side as a way to recognise its own specificity and 
identity.  
Alongside the preparation, a first important parameter of the dialogue is the frequency 
with which the sides convene. Obviously, the more one meets, the more relevant one is. 
Conversely, the cancellation of a meeting or the reduction in the number of meetings send a 
message in terms of recognition – signalling among other things that the relevance of the actor 
has changed in light of other priorities and that it does not warrant an investment of time and 
resources. For instance, the refusal of the US President, Barack Obama, to attend the EU-US 
summit in 2010 was obviously not warmly received by the EU and, in particular, by Spain, 
which hosted this high-profile transatlantic event (MacAskill & Watt, 2010). The timing of the 
dialogue is also highly symbolic. The fact that European chief diplomat Federica Mogherini’s 
first visit to the United States happened relatively soon after the election of Donald Trump has 
been interpreted as a clear sign of the EU and US’s foreign policy priorities. As she declared 
in a press conference, ‘I was received quite early in the beginning of the work with the new 
administration and this gives me a sense of priority that is put in working with the European 
Union as such’ (Mogherini, 2017b).   
The size and composition of the delegations physically attending the meeting is highly 
relevant as well. From the perspective of the host country/institution, the ability to attract 
influential politicians or organise high-level meetings is a symbolic demonstration of power 
and prestige (Faizullaev, 2013, p. 109). The large size of a delegation or/and the presence of 
high-level personalities are often interpreted as a sign of recognition of the importance of the 
hosting country, because it shows that foreign delegates are showing interest and willingness 
to invest time and resources to make the visit. The composition of the delegation can also be 
used to project a certain institutional identity in terms of distinctiveness. This is exemplified 
by the fact that the composition of the EP delegation to the United States deliberately represents 
all political parties of the EP (Interview no. 2). The composition of the delegation is also telling 
in terms of inclusion and exclusion. In the transatlantic context, the exclusive ‘transatlantic 
dinner’ on the margins of the UN General Assembly representing the whole international 
community is dedicated to the ‘West’ only – that is, representatives of the EU’s member states, 
NATO, and the United States. The symbolism behind this meeting is very strong: with all the 
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world representatives gathered in the same physical space, the leaders of the European states 
and the United States chose to isolate themselves to talk about priorities for the year ahead. 
They perform a joint ritual that highlights the wall separating insiders from outsiders. This is a 
strong symbolic act, physically and symbolically setting them apart from the Rest as in the 
‘West versus the Rest’ (Mahbubani, 1993).  
As a key part of the ‘scene’, the place of the meeting is highly telling in terms of 
recognition of the ‘status/importance’ of the guests and their hosts (Cohen, 1987, p. 119). This 
choice is never random and always entails an implicit message. In the case of the political 
dialogues institutionalised by the European Union, it is interesting to note the systematic 
emphasis put on the notion of ‘equality’ and ‘co-ownership’ when it comes to the location of 
the meeting. The EU clearly insists on having the meetings take place alternatively between 
the EU and the partner country, with the aim of instilling a spirit of respect, equality, and 
partnership through the practice of dialogue. Simultaneously however, the location of the 
meeting can also be telling in terms of distinctiveness. In the framework of the TLD, the 
meetings are held in the EU presidency country. This is a way to show the Americans that the 
EU is much more than Brussels and to reflect the rich diversity characterising the EU (Interview 
no. 6).  
The venue and the design of the room where the meeting takes place are also important 
symbolically charged elements that need to be taken into account in assessing the recognition 
granted of the participants’ identity. From the perspective of the host country, the splendour of 
the ceremony and the buildings in which the meetings take place is a strong manifestation of 
power and status but it is also being exploited to honour and recognise the power and 
importance of the guests (Faizullaev, 2013). The luxurious room in which the ‘Transatlantic 
Dinner’ is held annually is a fine illustration of this point: ‘the ‘transatlantic dinner’ is one such 
great experience. ‘Our secretary of state hosts all the EU and all the NATO Foreign ministers 
– everyone is super busy with the UN conference and they are running around doing individual 
meetings and it’s a nice opportunity to come together and talk about the biggest priorities that 
will be of the year: what’s pressing on the world stage? It’s a lovely atmosphere – this past 
September, it was at the Morgan library in New York, such a nice setting, such a nice 
atmosphere. It’s just so positive’ (Interview no. 39).  
 
This photo of the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry hosting the Transatlantic Dinner on 
the side-lines of the 70th regular session of the UNGA in New York, 30 September 2015 
has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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Sometimes, even entrance to the room itself needs to be carefully orchestrated in order to create 
a sense of equality among the participants, as exemplified in the delicate case of the last 
meeting between the Chinese President and the Representative from Taiwan who insisted on 
entering the stage at exactly the same time (Ramzy, 2015).  
The design of the room is also significant. For instance, disagreement over the shape of 
a conference table might be enough to postpone a conference. In fact, the shape of the 
conference table was the major stumbling block in the peace talks between the United States, 
the government of South and North Vietnam, and the National Liberal Front (Viet Cong), 
which were supposed to start in November 1968 but were postponed for 10 weeks for that 
reason (Morgenthau, 1993, p. 88). The seating arrangements can also point to varying levels 
of power and, as such, are often planned in such a way as to reflect the idea of equality among 
states and institutions participating in the meeting. Historical precedents have shown that when 
these basic rules are not respected, a strong emotional reaction with important diplomatic 
consequences can ensue. In December 2010, newspapers and websites in the Arab world 
extensively reported on a meeting between the Turkish Ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz 
Celikkol, and the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Daniel Ayalon, in which the Turkish 
representative felt deeply humiliated because he had been invited to sit on a low chair that 
physically conveyed a clear position of inferiority compared to his Israeli counterpart 
(Nahmias, 2010). The same rationale holds true for the so-called ‘flag interaction’. As 
Faizullaev explains, ‘Diplomatic protocol has elaborated rules for utilizing flags in diplomatic 
intercourse. Diplomatic meetings require equality in the number and size of the represented 
state’s flags which corresponds to the idea of the equality of the states’ (2013, p. 98). In the 
picture below depicting the meeting between the Israeli and Turkish representatives, these rules 
have clearly been violated: the seating arrangements are asymmetrical and the absence of the 
Turkish flag on the table has also been interpreted a sign of disrespect for Turkey.  
 
This photo of the meeting between the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Daniel Ayalon, 
and the Turkish Ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, 
has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
Finally, while often taken for granted, the dress code is another symbolic element 
through which respect for the status and culture of the other is conveyed. The existence of the 
dress code in the international/diplomatic community signifies that the costume is a means 
through which one can express the acceptance of the prevalent norm of the community to which 
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one wants to participate. It implies the intention of the willingness to participate and accept the 
norms (Cohen, 1987; Ogoura, 2012, p. 45). Other scholars, such as Iver Neumann, point to the 
inadequacy of certain outfits that can cause reputational damage, such as in the case of the 
Norwegian Ambassador who wore the traditional Norwegian ostrich-feather cap thinking he 
was respecting the local culture but eventually created an outrage and was consequently fired 
(Neumann, 2008, p. 691).   
 
2.3.3.2. Communication and interaction in the room 
Having described, the ‘décor’ on the stage, I turn my attention now to the play itself – that is, 
to the dialogical interaction unfolding both during the formal meeting and informal activities 
organised in the framework of the meeting, such as dinners and excursions. I detail the different 
indicators related to the verbal and non-verbal communications that can possibly be interpreted 
as acts of recognition for institutional identity both in terms of distinctiveness and relevance.  
 
The dialogical interaction itself  
Regarding first the recognition of the ‘distinctiveness’ component of institutional identity, here 
are the different ways through which it can be sought and granted, or alternatively denied.  
One typical recognition-seeking behaviour consists of taking advantage of the dialogue 
first and foremost as an opportunity to ‘voice concerns’, ‘re-affirm priorities, values and 
interests’ in a way that cannot be ignored by the other side. This relates to the most basic sense 
of the word ‘recognition’ – from the Latin recognitio – which, in domestic and international 
law, has traditionally meant the legal permission to be heard. However, in the context of IR, 
recognition tends to convey the meaning of acceptance or acknowledgment of having 
something worth hearing – of being entitled to consideration or to attention (Doran, 1991). 
Typically, the recognition-seeker will emphasise the importance of ‘being heard’ and ‘being 
understood’ by the other, suggesting that one’s interests, values, or ideas have so far not been 
taken into account with due respect. Similarly, the recognition-seeker will go to great length to 
emphasise the value of a given approach to a problem – particularly so if this is a reflection of 
deeper values that are part of its institutional identity.  
An additional way through which the distinct aspect of institutional identity can be 
projected and performed during the dialogue is through the procedure of the dialogue itself. 
For instance, the practice of ‘turn taking’ can be exploited to reflect the whole diversity of 
views represented in the meeting itself. This is the case for the TLD whereby the chairman 
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makes a deliberate effort to give the floor to many different MEPs in order to reflect the 
composition of the European Parliament (Interview no. 2). The European sense of know-how 
in terms of dialogue is also particularly discernible in this anecdote. During the 77th TLD in 
Washington, many members of Congress unexpectedly left the room in the midst of the energy 
meeting to vote in their chamber, thereby interrupting the dialogue for more than an hour. This 
led the former President of the EP, Jerzy Buzek, who chaired this work group, to tell his 
American counterparts: ‘As you know, we are probably better organized in terms of 
parliamentary work. We know exactly at what time, on which days, many days before, when 
we have to vote. So, there are a lot of improvements to make on your side. We can even teach 
you if you need something like that. There is no problem. But we understand that voting is 
important’ (American Congress, 2015).  
As to the recognition of the ‘relevance’ component of institutional identity, it includes 
two different aspects that are often intertwined. The first one deals with ‘power’ in the sense 
of social status while the second one relates to the ‘relationship identity’ as described by 
Faizullaev (pp. 108-110). While ‘power symbolism’ is mostly focused on the characteristics of 
the actor itself independent from the others, ‘relationship identity’ defines the kind of 
relationship that it has with the interlocutor (including different degrees of enmity or amity, or 
relationships characterised by partnerships, for instance). These two aspects are intertwined 
because, to be recognised as a partner (relationship identity), the state/institution inevitably 
also needs to prove its relevance and expertise (related to power symbolism). By the same 
token, Bailes mentioned that ‘states can and do also recognize each other as “worthy 
opponents”, as dangerous competitors, as asymmetrical threats (“rogue states”), or as weaker 
brethren suitable for bullying and blackmailing’ (2015, p. 255). In what follows, I list the 
characteristics of the dialogical interaction interpreted as acts of recognition of the relationship 
identity as partners because it is the most dominant one in the case of the EU-US relationship.   
First, the interpretation of the rationale behind the meeting is very important. Here 
special attention is paid to the way through which the participants of the dialogue interpret 
what they are doing together. For example, advancing common objectives with the most 
ambitious aim of setting world-wide standards in terms of world governance clearly signifies 
that the interlocutors consider and recognise each other as partners bound by the same 
ambitious goal that sets them apart from the rest. This description of the aim/rationale of the 
dialogical interaction implicitly entails a strong affirmation of partnership and recognition of 
great power status in the case of the EU-US dialogue. In fact, in sociological terms, the status 
of great power is associated with rights and duties; one of them being to play a leading role in 
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determining the direction and shape of international affairs (Bull, 1995, p. 196). Therefore, 
framing the rationale of the interaction in terms of world governance is an implicit statement 
of recognition of a great power status.  
Secondly, the kind of discursive engagement that develops among the representatives 
also entails meaningful indications of the kind of relationship they maintain vis-à-vis each other 
and the sort of recognition they are granting and being granted in this process. For instance, in 
the jargon of diplomats, the very act of ‘strategizing’ – i.e. brainstorming, thinking together as 
one team of the best strategies to change the behaviour of a third actor – cements the 
relationship identity as partners. By contrast, a face-to-face interaction in which hectoring and 
hard-headed bargaining are the prevailing discursive style contributes towards creating a more 
confrontational relationship identity.  
By the same token, the degree of self-disclosure and openness prevailing in the 
dialogical interaction constitutes a vital symbolic element of the kind of relationship that both 
states or institutions – through their representatives – maintain. For instance, one can recognise 
friendship in international relations when ‘friends’ (i.e. representatives of states or institutions) 
expect each other to reveal more information to each other than to others, as well as display a 
higher level of tolerance towards ‘bad news’ (Oelsner & Koshut, 2014, p. 21).  
The quality of the discussion in terms of ‘flow’ is also an important element of the 
dialogical interaction that can be interpreted as a recognition for one’s relevance and positive 
relationship identity. The high quality of the exchange is often related to a high level of 
expertise and to a certain degree of complicity (possibly related to the same cultural 
background). The level of expertise displayed during the interaction on a variety of topics is 
not only considered essential for an effective discussion; it is also interpreted as a way to project 
the seriousness and competency of the institution represented. The more often the discussions 
are serious and to the point, the better the image of the institution represented, and the higher 
the chances for the counterparts to recognise the institution as relevant and competent.  
Finally, the tone of voice and the general atmosphere characterising the dialogical 
interaction can also play an important role in terms of recognition. These aspects are in fact 
highly symbolic and say a lot regarding the recognition dynamics at play during the dialogue 
itself. For instance, in her study of the Human rights dialogue with China, Kinzelbach (2015) 
reports that the Chinese delegates would laugh overtly over the demands formulated by the EU 
to make clear that they did not intend at all to cooperate on these issues. This attitude has 
probably been perceived by the EU as a blatant lack of respect and a clear statement regarding 
the lack of recognition for their authority. Similarly, in the case of Iran, some MEPs recall 
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particularly confrontational inter-parliamentary meetings reflecting the general state of the 
relationship characterised by tensions and distrust: ‘Compared to the US, with Iran it’s a very 
different kind of discussion. We have much more tensions and these meetings are extremely 
difficult. They are screaming at us, it’s terrible’ (Interview no. 6). 
 
Informal activities: on the importance of “sharing the coffee and the cookie”   
In many instances of dialogue, the interaction among the participants is not restricted to the 
discursive exchange taking place within the meeting room during the formal sessions only. In 
fact, there are also informal moments, such as coffee breaks, sophisticated dinners, and other 
social activities that are worth mentioning in our discussion about the recognition of 
institutional identity. While the informal activities do build trust among the dialogue’s actors, 
they are also perceived as an integral part of the performance in the quest for recognition.  
Informal activities in the framework of diplomatic meetings have mainly been associated with 
the mechanism of trust-building. Any activity in the framework of the dialogue allowing a 
strong degree of ‘liminality’ matters (i.e. the temporary dissolution of order creating a fluid, 
malleable situation that enable a different kind of interaction to emerge). In fact, research has 
shown that it is in these informal spaces that trust is most likely to develop, as different 
communicative and effective dynamics can unfold:  
Humans have developed various conventional practices of speaking and 
communicating. They differ according to specific local situations, institutions, 
traditions, rules, and norms that are framed by social positions of interlocutors and 
their personal interrelations These conventional practices of speaking or organized 
styles of communication differ in respect to how much they are conventionalized, 
how culturally fixed they are and what purposes they serve. In other words, each 
social situation requires a different style of communication (Markova, 2012, p. 8). 
 
Therefore, by breaking with the rigid framework of formal talks, new communicative 
possibilities open up – ones that are not necessarily seen as appropriate or simply possible in 
the regular official setting. This idea has already been well-exploited in all kinds of dialogical 
contexts, including the most high-level contentious ones as illustrated by this anecdotal account 
of the Oslo Agreements’ negotiations:  
  Abu Allah, the key Palestinian negotiator – used to recall a crucial moment in the 
negotiations – precisely when he and Uri Savir, the Director General of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, took a walk in the forest, encouraged by the Norwegian facilitator 
Larsen, who gambled “that a personal conversation outside the formal context of 
the negotiations would create a human relationship between us, and that some 
chemistry might have time to develop between us, which would help overcome 
whatever obstacles might have arisen” (Savir, 1998). 
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It does not matter whether the dialogical interaction takes place in the forest, on boats, or near 
the water fountain – the most important point is to have it outside the formal framework of 
exchange, because it is in this kind of context that the affective component of trust is most 
likely to develop. The trust developed during these informal moments matters because it 
contributes towards reinforcing the quality of the exchange back in the formal meeting room 
and thereby further enhances the relationship-identity component of institutional identity. 
Contrarily, distrust is a powerful mechanism of neutralising communicative efforts of the Other 
(Gillespie, 2012), thereby constructing a different kind of relationship-identity. Furthermore, 
the personal relationships developed during the informal moments are also very important 
because they have the potential to become institution-to-institutional relationships, practically 
anchoring the strong partnership identity. Indeed, the personal links forged during these 
informal moments are harnessed by the participants of the dialogue to thicken the institutional 
relationship once the formal dialogue is over (through consultation on a regular basis and other 
ad hoc informal meetings).  
 
The choice of informal activities in the framework of the encounter, including the type of wine 
served during the dinner, are never insignificant. They are all part of a performance designed 
to project a certain image and to grant or deny recognition for this identity. 
First, the activities on the ground planned during certain encounters can be used to 
prove the institutional relevance in certain fields in terms of its achievements and capability to 
deliver. The use of extra-gestures (such as an exclusive visit to a sensitive political or security 
site normally forbidden to the wider public) can also be interpreted as an implicit act of 
recognition for the relevance of the other and the trust characterising their relationship. For 
instance, the unique opportunity given to the MEPs to go to the balcony of the Speaker of the 
House (in the American Congress) that is normally closed/inaccessible was interpreted as a 
clear demonstration of exclusiveness and privilege (Interview no. 2).  
Secondly, particular attention has traditionally been given to the practice of ‘sharing 
meals’. Far from being a trivial practicality, sharing food has long been a meaningful 
diplomatic practice dating back to the times of Ancient Greece and the Bible, and being further 
enhanced in the age of the Renaissance (Constantinou, 1996, p. 128). Central to this practice 
is the concept of ‘commensality’ – from the Latin ‘the act of sitting at the table together’ – that 
creates commonality and a ‘bond of solidarity’ like the one created in the family unit, thereby 
strengthening ties and reducing antagonism (Chapple-Sokol, 2013, p. 162). In other words, 
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engaging in a ritual of joint eating reinforces the sentiment of togetherness between the hosts 
and their guests, and constitutes one of the oldest forms of ceremonial expressions of good 
relationships (Neumann, 2013, p. 45).  
More specifically related to the quest for recognition, the type of food being served can 
expressly signify the relative status of the honoured guest and be exploited to manifest one’s 
prestige (Chapple-Sokol, 2013; Morgan, 2012; Ogoura, 2012). For instance, in the case of the 
TLD, the European hosts clearly strive to honour their American guests through special 
gestures and fancy meals. During my fieldwork, I had the chance to attend a long discussion 
about the choice of the meal that would be offered to the American hosts for one of the IPMs, 
and the most favoured option was the most ornate one, i.e. lobster with wine of the best quality 
(Participant observation no.1). These practical details are not trivial: they are part of the 
diplomatic practices and gestures attributing respect. As Neumann reminds us, ‘Meals are like 
a display of crown jewels, where the point is to show distinctive character and grandeur’ 
(Neumann, 2013, p. 71). As such, these dinners literally ‘give the taste’ of the specific culture 
of the country in terms of its distinctiveness.  
 
2.3.3.3. After leaving the room: the celebration of recognition outside the room  
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the setting of the dialogue and on interactions behind 
closed doors, pointing to the various symbolic elements carrying a meaning in terms of 
recognition. The next question to address deals with the extent to which the recognition of 
institutional identity can be carried outside of the room. My argument is that recognition (of 
one type or another) inevitably unfolds during the dialogical interaction within the meeting 
room. Yet in order for this identity to be effectively anchored, the granted recognition must 
transcend the walls of the meeting room and be projected outside. In other words, because the 
recognition process unfolding within the meeting room is a very intimate experience, it needs 
to be externalised and publicised in some way in order for the institutional identity to be 
properly anchored. In this respect, I identify three different forms of anchors of institutional 
identity directly emanating from the dialogue: (1) visual; (2) discursive; and (3) practical 
anchors.  
First, visual images are particularly compelling and effective in anchoring institutional 
identity. They are more than illustrations and objective reflections of reality. They have their 
own agency in the sense that they can do things  (Lisle, 2016). In our context, images act as 
visual anchors of institutional identity. They are part and parcel of a ‘visibility strategy’ that 
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aims at making tangible an institutional identity. As Faizullaev rightly points out (2013, p. 
106), ‘Sometimes the symbolism of shaking hands, making bows or giving pats on the shoulder 
provides far-reaching indications of the state of the bilateral relations between countries’. 
These symbolic gestures clearly express willingness for joint endeavour and closeness 
(Ogoura, 2012). As such, they are worth being documented by the lens of the camera from the 
perspective of the dialogue’s actors. In the context of a high-level meeting, for instance, the 
signing ceremony is often visually captured as it symbolically represents the ‘culmination’ of 
the meeting, i.e. the fruit of a common endeavour. It portrays the two signatory parties as 
partners advancing common interests, and thereby captures visually their identity relationship 
as partners. The photograph below constitutes a great illustration of this point. The exact same 
number of European and American representatives in the picture, their respective flags 
displayed in the background at the exact same length as well as the honourable position in 
which they stand are all part of the same strategy of symbolic equalisation. Regarding the body 
language and the emotional expression of the EU chairman of the Delegation, they clearly 
project a positive emotion of pride, related to the solemn moment of the signature of the Joint 
Statement between the EP and the Congress. Lastly, the frame of the picture includes the 
famous chandelier of the Latvian parliament, featuring the coats of arms of cities in Latvia. 
This can be seen as a symbol of the cultural distinctiveness of the European country holding 
the presidency of the EU at that time. 
 
This photo of the Signature of the Joint Statement of the 76Th EP-US Congress, 26-27 June 
2015, has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
The photograph can also say a lot about the distinctiveness in terms of values of the actors in 
presence. For instance, in the case of the EU, which likes to define itself as a defender of human 
rights, this quote by a member of the European parliament in the context of the parliamentary 
dialogue with Iran is telling: ‘We had a meeting where we happened to be four women out of 
five MEPs to participate. It was very good for photos because the whole EU delegation except 
one was women. I was very happy because all the pictures on the Iranian newspapers were just 
‘women, women, women’. It was very good for Iranian women to see how we do politics, 
because in Iran only a few women are now in the parliament’ (interview no. 6). This is a great 
example of how normative power is being projected through the lens of the camera. Moreover, 
the fact that ‘family photographs’ are systematically taken at each single occasion and 
instantaneously publicised to the media (both traditional and digital) confirms their use as 
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anchors of institutional identity, that is as the evidence of the recognition that has taken place 
within the room. In this sense, the institution takes advantage of the ‘circulability’ inherent in 
the visuals: in fact, the main distinctiveness of the visual resides in the belief in its capacity to 
transgress linguistic boundaries. Visuals can be read by all and they can reach more audiences 
than words (Hansen, 2011, p. 53). This is particularly powerful in our post-literate world in 
which visual media are the main source of information about the world (Callahan, 
forthcoming).  While in the past, few people could observe diplomatic interactions with the use 
of symbols and rituals, this is now available for millions of television viewers and internet 
users. In the case of the EU, tremendous efforts have been made in recent years to increase the 
digital presence of the institution. Every single achievement is now automatically reported and 
disseminated across all kinds of social media platforms: from the official website of the EU to 
the Twitter of European diplomats/ MEPs and Facebook. 
 
 
 
 
 
This tweet by a MEP depicting the beginning of the TLD Session in the Hague, has been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
In addition to visual anchors, the dialogue also generates discursive anchors of institutional 
identity in the form of communiqués, joint statements, and other documents issued at the end 
of the interaction. As Oelsner (2013, p. 119) points out, ‘Institutional identity crystallizes in a 
series of normative and discursive statements that define what the institution is: what its 
purpose, goals and limits are; how it plans to achieve them’. Following this logic, the 
documents emanating from the dialogue capture the recognition process that has taken place 
and serve to anchor the institutional identity of the actors participating in the dialogue. In this 
regard, it is important to remember that these communiqués and other documents are often the 
result of a negotiation process and constitute a compromise resulting from a joint endeavour 
between the two parties. As such, these documents are particularly telling and highly symbolic. 
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The language of the statements – even in its most restrained and legalistic official form – 
expresses both bold messages and nuances that are important to decipher (Faizullaev, 2013, p. 
102; Neumann, 2012). For instance, particular attention needs to be paid to the wording of 
these statements: words of praise and congratulatory remarks are a way to give credibility to 
the other side and to recognise its achievements. They say a lot regarding the recognition 
process that has just taken place during the interaction and allow institutional identity to be 
anchored along the two dimensions previously mentioned. 
With regards to the ‘relevant’ aspect of institutional identity, the text usually serves to 
emphasise the commonality of values and interests between the actors present, revolving 
around a discourse of partnership and commonality. Insofar as these declarations are then 
disseminated and publicised in the world, they also aim at projecting a certain image of the two 
dialogical partners together (‘projection of the image of the two of us together’, as in the use 
of the visual photograph). In this respect, it is worth emphasising that these declarations 
stressing a ‘common agenda’ and presenting a ‘unified front’ are used by the institutions to 
send strong signals to third countries as well (Interviews no. 13, 23, and 24). 
Furthermore, these statements are the result of a negotiation process in which each 
institution attempts to integrate into the text the ideas and values that are the most crucial to 
them as part of their institutional identity. The insistence on having these ideas integrated to 
the declarations and their acceptance by the other party also constitute a way to reinforce and 
anchor the institutional identity. This is particularly visible when the actors of the dialogue 
demonstrate pride in having managed to impose their own interests and values, which might 
be different from the others. For instance, in one of my participant observations of the TLD, 
the American staff expressed great satisfaction for ‘having the EU jargon of multilateralism’ 
taken away from the text while the EU representatives celebrated that they had managed to 
negotiate an emphasis on the respect for human rights in the privacy debate (Participant 
Observation no. 2). This is not simply the result of a compromise. This negotiation around 
language is also a way to imprint its identity. Therefore, these discursive statements 
systematically issued at the end of the dialogues reiterate both the essence of the relationship 
between the parties as well as their respective specificity as institutions, thereby anchoring 
these two components of institutional identity. Similar to the use of compelling symbolic 
images, these discursive statements are also extensively disseminated, feeding into the 
institutional memory of the institution and anchoring the EU identity even further.  
Finally, the third way through which institutional identity is anchored is through 
practices that develop out of the dialogue as a logical step following the dialogue – or what I 
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call ‘practical anchors’ of institutional identity. Part of the anchoring mechanism is when the 
participants leave the room and immediately commit to re-convene for the next meeting as in 
‘let’s meet again soon’. In other words, they leave the room knowing that they will re-enter the 
room in a few months. In this sense, this specific dialogical interaction is different from 
negotiations that are supposed to come to an end. Here there is a continuous, on-going 
engagement that makes this anchoring mechanism potentially endless. This practice of 
immediate and unconditional re-commitment to the dialogue is enshrined in the final 
documents mentioned above, which explicitly call for another meeting of the same kind 
without any attached conditions. Another practice worth underlining is the ‘consultation reflex’ 
that develops as a result of the personal contacts created during the dialogue itself. This 
consultation reflex corresponds to the ‘Pavlovian habit’ to consult counterparts regularly and 
also involves the incremental formation of informal and ad hoc meetings in between the formal 
meetings. As one high-level American official put it, ‘Through these inter-personal 
connections, you want to create an institution-to-institution relationship’ (Interview no. 29), 
making clear the direct link between the individual and institutional level of relationship. This 
practice of ongoing and regular consultation in between the formal dialogues anchors 
institutional identity because it firmly establishes a partnership relationship in which both 
institutions are regarded as relevant and necessary interlocutors. It anchors the relationship 
identity as partners and equals. In the words of one American diplomat, ‘The dialogue is not a 
magical event; it is a self-sustaining relation’ (Interview no. 15).  
2.4. The outcome: recognition comes in different shades of equality  
Eventually, these three anchors contribute to the outcome of the dialogue in terms of 
recognition of institutional identity. This final part deals, therefore, with the outcome of the 
dialogue in terms of recognition of institutional identity. It is crucial to stress that this will only 
constitute an artificial summary of the process, as the dialogue is a repeated pattern of 
interaction and the quest for recognition on-going. There is a flow and it is in constant 
evolution. Thus, for the sake of this study, I will artificially stop this process and look at the 
outcomes of the dialogues so far, with a focus on the dialogues conducted under the Obama 
administration. 
The quest for the recognition of institutional identity along the two components of 
‘relevance and distinctiveness’ hides a deeper desire to eventually be recognised as equals in 
the sense of being respected for one’s social status (relevance) and respected in one’s 
differences (distinctiveness) through the treatment received. Yet the outcome cannot simply be 
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reduced to the dichotomy of ‘recognition versus non-recognition’. It is better conceptualised 
as different shades of equality taking the form of different kinds of relationships. These are not 
watertight categories but only expressions of equality with some overlap. First, equality can be 
achieved (or approached) by the suspension of hierarchy, as in a friendship or familial 
relationship. If the actors of the dialogue assess their interaction with their counterparts as a 
‘friendship relationship’ or talk about feeling part of ‘one big family’, it is fair to argue that 
they feel respected in who they are and what they stand for. Second, equality can also be 
achieved by mentioning equality within the hierarchy. The relationships of ‘partners’ and 
‘rivals/associated rivals’ are by themselves expressions of equality but within the hierarchy. 
Furthermore, what also differentiates partnerships from friendships relates to the degree to 
which the interaction between the actors is ‘result-oriented’: in the case of a partnership 
relationship, the emphasis is put on the idea of performance and concrete deliverable actions. 
In the case of a friendship relationship, this seems to be less the case: more time can be 
dedicated to informal moments, for instance, and less pressure is put on achieving a concrete 
actionable goal at the end of the interaction. In this section, I am therefore interested in the 
analysis of the prevailing discourse across the different stages of the process of recognition in 
order to assess the extent to which the participants of the dialogue succeeded in their 
recognition endeavour. Focusing on their subjective feelings and assessments of the 
interaction, I bring evidence as to: How do they feel about these encounters with their American 
counterparts? Do they express any sense of satisfaction or frustration? Would they have liked 
to achieve more? What kind of relationships do they feel they are in? In order to give a balanced 
and accurate perspective on the outcome of the dialogues, I also bring in the American 
perspective that should help determine the extent to which the European representatives ‘live 
in a bubble’ or if their impressions are confirmed by their American counterparts. In other 
words, I will consider the extent to which the American representatives better appreciate the 
EU’s institutional identity in terms of its relevance and distinctiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3.2:  Scheme of the identity-based dialogue 
Dialogue 
(as a specific form 
of interaction)   
Recognition 
process Identity entails anchors 
63 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the analytical framework which will be used in the analysis of the 
case studies. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand why the EU promotes and 
conducts more dialogues with third countries than any other political actor in the world. It puts 
forward a socio-psychological explanation according to which the practice of dialogue serves 
to anchor the EU institutional identity through an on-going and iterative process of recognition 
unfolding in the face-to-face interaction between representatives of the participating 
institutions.  
First, the chapter emphasised the particularities of the dialogue as a form of 
communication to explain why it constitutes such a rich setting favourable to the development 
of recognition processes among the actors present. More specifically, it showed that it is the 
temporal and spatial immediacy inherent in the dialogue that allows the participants to take full 
advantage of the emotional and other non-verbal cues and engage in a symbolic recognition 
game.  
With these basic features of the dialogical interaction in mind, the chapter then made 
the point that organizations – like states – are after the quest for recognition of their identities. 
This quest for recognition can be motivated either by socio-psychological factors related to 
self-esteem and ontological security, or by more materialistic considerations of prestige and 
reputation. In either case, institutions need to have a sense of ‘who they are’, i.e. of what their 
institutional identity is. Drawing on the literature on recognition, I differentiated between two 
main components of institutional identity: relevance and distinctiveness. While the former 
relates to the recognition of ‘social status’ and of a subsequent specific privileged relationship 
(identity relationship), the latter is about the need to have one’s distinctiveness as an institution 
recognised in terms of values, interests, and procedures.  
Thus, in order to gain recognition and anchor their institutional identity, institutions 
engage in regular dialogues in which they project their institutional identity. It is during this 
interaction that actors seek recognition for, and can possibly get, their institutional identity 
recognised by the other in a complex recognition game. In fact, these dialogical encounters are 
conceived as a performance in which the representatives of the institutions get to experience 
the other institutions and vice versa. Thus, actors seeking recognition go to great lengths to 
display the qualities that are part and parcel of their institutional identity and for which they 
wish to be recognised. Recognition is granted if the actors seeking recognition ‘feel that there 
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has been a match between their self-image and the treatment they deem appropriate to receive 
by the recognizing party’ (Lindemann & Saada, 2012, pp. 17-18). 
Therefore, the theoretical framework details the various cues – both verbal and non-
verbal – that can be interpreted as implicit acts of recognition. It does so along three crucial 
moments in the dialogical interaction: (1) the preparation of the dialogue and its setting; (2) the 
communication and interaction during the dialogue itself (including both the formal and 
informal moments); and (3) the stage where the participants leave the room and carry with 
them the recognition process that had taken place behind closed doors. It is at this stage that 
the anchoring of the recognition is clinched and projected to the world thanks to various types 
of anchors: visual, discursive, and practical. All this is possible thanks to the power of 
symbolism that links the micro-level of interaction to the macro-institutional level. Finally, the 
final part of the theoretical framework considers the overall result of the recognition process 
based on Lindemann and Saada’s definition and introduces nuances regarding the different 
shades of equality that can possibly be achieved: they can take the form of friendship or 
partnership relationships, or correspond to the relationship characteristics of family members 
or associated rivals in a more business/competition-orientated framework.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 
In order to answer the key research question at the heart of this research – namely, why does 
the EU promote and conduct more dialogues than any other actor in the world? – a suitable 
methodology has been devised. This short chapter aims at describing my methodological 
choices and at pointing out the merits of the chosen approach for my research question. It is 
divided into two parts: the first section details my data-collection strategy focusing on 
ethnographic data-collection tools while the second section turns to the specific method used, 
i.e. thematic analysis conducted with the support of the qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) computer software NVivo 11.  
 
3.1. Data-collection strategy  
In order to collect the relevant data necessary for my research, I used ethnographic data-
collection tools – specifically, qualitative interviewing and participant observation – as they 
best allow an understanding of social settings, relationships, and practices.  
 
Semi-structured interviews  
I used semi-structured interviews, consisting of open conversations around a set of core 
questions that were designed to obtain information on more specific and personal issues while 
leaving some room for dialogical dynamics in my own practice. The semi-structured interviews 
were conducted between December 2015 and July 2017 and the questions evolved slightly 
through the interview process, which stretched over more than 21 months. A few interviews 
were followed up with email and telephone contacts, and, in some cases, second interviews. 
As I honed the analysis, I re-contacted key participants to check my theoretical developments 
and changed my analysis based on their inputs in a cyclical fashion. Each interview lasted 
between 30-90 minutes. Nearly all of them were audio-recorded and fully verbatim transcribed 
afterwards (on average 6000 words per interview). They were conducted either in English or 
in French and an informed consent form was signed by all participants before the interview. 
To preserve the anonymity and traceability of the interviewees, interviews are numbered 
consecutively and referenced as interview no. X, description of the institutional role, place, and 
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date. Appendix 1 lists the number of interviews conducted by the author by location, date, 
institution, and frequency. 
Interviews are overall highly valuable for the purpose of my research, because they 
allow obtaining the participants’ perspectives on specific issues. The interview guide based on 
the research question and a comprehensive review of the literature had three sections dealing 
with: (1) the interviewee background; (2) the description of the process of dialogue in which 
they took part; and (3) the participant’s perception of the added value of the dialogue. More 
specifically, I drew upon Bogner et al.’s article on elite and expert interviews (Bogner, Littig, 
& Menz, 2009, p. 52), that advises researchers to articulate the topic guide around a set of core 
questions dealing with three distinct type of knowledge: first, ‘technical knowledge’ containing 
information about operations and events governed by rules that are specific to their field (in 
this case, practical information about the dialogues); second, ‘process knowledge’ relating to 
the specific process and practical activity in which the interviewee is directly involved; and 
thirdly, ‘interpretative knowledge’, corresponding to ‘the expert’s subjective orientations, 
rules, points of views and interpretations’.  
Overall, I carried out 45 semi-interviews with a selected representative sample of 
people participating in the dialogues under study. I used a combination of convenience, 
snowball, and purposive samplings (Coyne, 1997), which allowed my interview-based data 
collection to reach ‘theoretical saturation’ (Morse, 2004), which was basically the moment 
when additional interviews did not yield significantly new insights compared to what was 
learned in previous meetings. In terms of inclusive criteria, I interviewed actors that have 
attended, at least once, one of the dialogues under study. Furthermore, a deliberate attempt was 
made to reach out to a wide range of participants with different backgrounds in terms of 
experience in order to get as many perspectives as possible. As dialogue is an incremental 
process, the time dimension is extremely important. Therefore, in order to capture the effect of 
repeated interactions among the participants, I made sure to conduct interviews with both 
former staffers with great institutional memory as well as young people familiar with the most 
recent developments. Furthermore, my interviewees included both European and American 
participants of the dialogues (either diplomats, lawmakers, or civil society actors) to allow for 
the comparison of their respective assessments of the dialogue and others’ perceptions. As a 
way to anticipate criticism, I would like to stress that I am well aware of the vested interests of 
the interviewees – particularly in the case of elite interviews. They might give a certain account 
that matches their interest without reflecting the reality. Thus, by diversifying the experiences 
of the interviewees (from high-level MEPs to parliamentary assistants), I constantly tried to 
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probe discrepant views across my interviews and thereby had the opportunity for counter-
interpretations – which is also a form of triangulation in itself. 
 
Participant observation and video analysis: data collection beyond talk   
An additional method of data collection that I resorted to was participant observation. The main 
advantage of participant observation lies in the fact that it helps get a real sense of what is going 
on during the discussions, which is at the heart of my research. The data, translated into field 
notes, is ‘in-situ’, i.e. naturally occurring. In this sense, participant observation delivers insights 
not only on what the agents under observation ‘say’ but, most importantly, on what they do 
and how they do it. In fact, observing the very social interactions first hand as they occur gives 
valuable insights (in terms of the tone, setting of the meeting, behavioural, and emotional 
elements) that are not being reported in the protocols of the meetings, which focus exclusively 
on the content of the discussions. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, this non-verbal 
aspect of dialogue is what distinguishes it from other forms of communication, and as such is 
particularly important to take into account. In sum, participant observation enables the 
researcher to develop thick descriptions of social interactions5 and to capture practical, non-
verbal knowledge. Observation tries to understand practices, interactions, and events that occur 
in a specific context either from the inside as a participant or from the outside as a mere 
observer.  
Yet the main challenge in this respect deals with the official and often confidential nature 
of the dialogues that I wished to observe, thereby constituting a serious obstacle in terms of 
accessibility. In spite of this difficulty, I managed to attend key EU-US meetings at the inter-
parliamentary level, including the preparatory meeting of the D-US delegation of the EP in 
Strasbourg in December 2015 and the 78th Inter-Parliamentary Meeting in The Hague in June 
2016. I also analysed a session of one of the TLDs made available by the US Congress (video 
analysis)6. These cases were selected for their extrinsic validity (that is, as a case of a 
transatlantic dialogue). It allowed me to grasp both how European and American 
representatives interact with each other as well as how they think about these interactions and 
practices. As Burawoy (1991, p. 2) accurately put it, ‘it’s not just about how people act but also 
                                               
5 The concept of ‘thick description’ has been coined by Geertz (1973), who emphasized the crucial need to 
understand context and practices as people understand them.  
6 For a discussion about the advantages and limitations of video analysis, see Knoblauch et al. (2006)  
according to which ‘video allows studying minute details of a particular dialogue/meeting, serving as a 
microscope of interaction’.  
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how they understand and experience those acts’. Particularly insightful in this respect was the 
opportunity given to me to take part in the informal debriefing of the 78th TLD meeting in a 
pub with European and American staffers, just a few hours after the end of the formal meeting. 
It enabled me to grasp their own perception of the success of the dialogue they had been 
working on for months. Regarding my role during the dialogue themselves, I fall into the ideal-
type of the ‘pure observer’ described by Gold (1958) where the focus is on ‘non-
interventionism’ compared to a participant-observer taking part in the very activities under 
study. This status of observer allowed me to take field notes composed of three types of 
comments: running a rich description of what was happening in a chronological manner, 
analytical ideas of a more interpretative nature (‘why’ questions), and personal impressions 
related to my own feelings and reflexivity about my own positionality.  
 
Primary sources  
Last but not least, careful and balanced documentation is critical if the significance of the 
dialogues conducted by the EU is to be accurate. Therefore, evidence has been gleaned from 
the careful analysis of other primary sources. I collected a corpus of documents including the 
regular reports published by the EU and the United States, communiqués at the end of the 
meetings, written protocols/transcripts of the meetings when available, press releases, and 
newspaper articles to get as incisive a grasp as possible of the added value of the multiple 
dialogues under study. More specifically, for the study of the TLD, I used the Joint Statements 
published at the end of the meeting, the internal reports from the EU Secretariat, and the 
confidential dossier with background knowledge distributed to the MEPs beforehand, as well 
as newspaper articles, tweets on the account of MEPs depicting the dialogue, and video clips. 
As to the executive dialogues (between the EU commission/EEAS and the State Department), 
I dealt mainly with the official press releases on the internet but could not have access to the 
internal reports due to the ‘veil of secrecy’ surrounding these issues. Lastly, the analysis of the 
civil society dialogues covered the adopted resolutions and recommendations published online.  
The official documents released both by the European Union and the United States 
following the meetings of the dialogue under study have been scrutinised comparatively (pre-
and after-meeting material) and over time to evaluate the outcome in terms of policy output 
and to spot any continuity or change in the discourse.  An important comment is in order. I am 
fully aware that these official documents are far from being ‘objective information containers’. 
They are rather the means for constructing a specific version of an event or process and as such, 
cannot be considered as a bias-free data. Documents in institutions are mostly designed to 
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record institutional routines and at the same time to record information necessary for 
legitimising what and how things are done. This often explains the vagueness in documenting 
institutional practices (Flick, 2014, p. 357; Philippart, 2001, p. 58). Hence in my analysis of 
these documents, I carefully took into account who produced them, for what purpose, and with 
which implications. In addition, in order to counter the problem of authenticity, I managed to 
gain privileged access to the confidential material being distributed to MEPs before the actual 
meetings setting out the clear European position on a variety of issues as well as to the internal 
reports of the meetings written by the Chairman of the delegation. To complete this more 
subjective assessment of the dialogues, it was instructive to analyse unofficial documents, such 
as personal declarations of participants published in the press before and after the dialogue. 
This is a valid way to gain a better understanding of the expectations held by the participants 
and their reactions after the actual happening of the dialogue. The main basic idea here is to 
triangulate across multiple data stream to gain in validity, or what Denzin (1989) calls ‘data-
triangulation'.  
 
Visual data  
As data, images can provide a means of moving beyond written descriptions and provide a 
richer access to the people, places, and practices being studied. In this sense, they aid the 
creation of a ‘thick description’ of the setting and activities unfolding during the dialogues 
complementing and reinforcing the insights drawn from the interviews with the participants. 
(Gibson & Brown, 2009, p. 81). This type of data is particularly relevant in the context of this 
study on dialogues. As Neumann vehemently reminds us, ‘diplomatic meetings are 
documented in a variety of ways with visual images taking prominence amongst them. And yet 
most analysts of IR choose not to avail themselves to this material. That is indefensible, for 
any scholarly discipline is under an imperative to draw on as wide a sample of data as possible’ 
(Neumann, 2016, p. 120). Responding to his call and contributing to the emerging ‘pictorial 
and visual turn’ (Bleiker, 2015), I thus engage in the ‘deconstruction of the visuality of the 
dialogue’ by critically analysing the visual representation of these meetings between American 
and European representatives.7 Visual imagery is never innocent: it is always constructed 
through various practices, technologies, and knowledges (Gillian, 2012, p.17) and it is up to 
the researcher to decipher both the rational and emotional messages that these visuals convey. 
While Hansen (2011) looked at how ‘images speak security’ in her study on securitisation, I 
                                               
7 For more studies on the use of visual data in world politics, see Schim (2013) and Hansen (2011). 
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look at how ‘images speak recognition’. For instance, the visual representation of the 
asymmetry in terms of the number of participants, the majesty of the rooms in which the 
dialogues take place, and the relaxed and friendly atmosphere on the excursions in the 
framework of the TLD all constitute elements worth analysing in this context. Yet the sample 
rationale for the pictures has to be clearly articulated. As I am interested in the rationale behind 
the use of these dialogues by the EU, I mainly analysed the official pictures of the different 
dialogues that were made public on the website of the European Union to document these 
meetings (30 pictures analysed in total). I also included in the analysis the visual data of these 
meetings shared on social media by official participants in the forms of tweets (15 tweets were 
analysed). To conclude, the triangulation of data-gathering methods provides a check against 
the weaknesses of one specific approach and allows for comparison between data types, 
thereby reinforcing the validity of my findings.  
 
3.2. Method: thematic analysis  
 
After having specified the data-collection tools used, I turn now to the specific method by 
which I analysed and exploited the data, namely thematic analysis.  
 
Thematic Analysis of the data  
Thematic Analysis (TA) is a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of 
text through the systematic process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005). Put differently, it is a process for encoding qualitative information (Boyatzis, 
1998). Its ambition is to classify qualitative data through a transparent, coherent, and consistent 
coding strategy. In turn, these classifications allow researchers to capture the richness of the 
phenomenon under study in a systematic way.  Throughout this study, I rigorously applied the 
different stages of the thematic analysis, as recommended by Boyatzis (1998).  
 
a) Defining the units of analysis and the coding units: For the purpose of this study, my units 
of analysis were individual interviews, single official documents, pictures, and videos. As to 
the units of coding – defined as those parts of the units of analysis that can be interpreted in a 
meaningful way with respect to the categories – they were mainly sentences in the case of 
textual data and entire pictures for visual data. I then proceeded to the segmentation phase, 
meaning that I divided my material into units, such that each segment fits into one category of 
71 
 
the coding scheme. This stage is extremely important as it helps ensure that the entirety of the 
material is taken into account.  
 
b) Development of the coding scheme: To proceed further with the qualitative thematic 
analysis, I developed a coding scheme that reflects the essence of my study. It features 
categories based on existing theories and was built in a deductive way. Yet throughout the 
rigorous exploration of my empirical data, I added new categories and themes stemming from 
discovery emerging from the material itself. For instance, working with the transcribed 
interviews, I have coded all the segments of text that go under the specific categories of 
‘friends, partners, family’, etc. By oscillating between these two approaches, I came up with a 
mixed approach coding scheme featuring both theory-driven nodes and data-driven nodes. 
Dealing with another aspect of the coding scheme, it features themes of different natures: 
descriptive themes which entail little interpretation (at the manifest level) and interpretative 
themes (at the latent level). For each one of the themes, I applied Boyatsis’s criteria for a good 
code – namely a clear label, a definition, a description, inclusion/exclusion criteria, and 
examples drawn from the transcript are given to eliminate possible confusion (Boyatzis, 1998, 
p. 31). In order to make sure that my judgment was consistent and my findings reliable, I coded 
several passages of text at different points of time to see if I did it the same way.  
 
c) Main analysis - Identification of patterns within the cases and across cases  
As Boyatzis emphasises (1998), conducting a thematic analysis requires from the researcher 
an ability to see patterns in seemingly random information. I therefore paid particular attention 
to repetitions, similarities, and differences, and relationships both within and across cases.  
Following the systematic within-case analysis of the three different types of dialogues, I 
proceeded to the cross-case analysis advocated by Miles and Huberman (1994). This is a 
method that involves the in-depth exploration of a specific bound unit – the case – using 
multiple sources of evidence and the examination of similarities and differences across cases 
so to reinforce validity, support generalisability, and promote theoretical predictions. 
Following Bazeley and Jackson’s recommendation (2013), I used numerous query functions 
of the QDA NVivo 11 to help find patterns and to check initial ideas. More specifically, I ran 
text search queries for specific words or combinations of words and nodes, as well as word 
frequency queries to generate lists of the most frequent words in a particular source. The matrix 
query function also allowed me to generate interesting comparison depending on the attributes 
of the interviewees (such as the type of dialogue in which they participated or their nationality).  
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Within-case comparison  
In the framework of the single case study of the EU-US dialogues, I conducted ‘an intra-
case/within-case comparison’ across three types of dialogues occurring at different levels of 
representation and involving various issues. In order to capture the rationale behind the 
multitude of dialogues that the EU promotes with non-EU countries, it is necessary to scrutinise 
and compare the mechanisms and outcomes across this mega-structure of dialogues. Therefore, 
the three case studies correspond to different kinds of EU-US dialogues involving a variety of 
actors: (a) The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD) between European and American 
parliamentarians; (b) The ‘executive dialogues’ conducted by members of the EEAS/EU 
Commission and US officials from the State of Department; and (c) civil society dialogues – 
particularly the Transatlantic Business Council (TABC) and the Transatlantic Consumers 
Dialogue (TACD), which are the most active civil society dialogues today. They are composed 
of European and American business representatives and consumer organisations respectively. 
A critical reader might rightly question the lack of analysis of the dialogues at the inter-
governmental level (i.e. ministerial meetings). My decision not to delve into this level of 
analysis is motivated by several reasons but, primarily, it has widely been acknowledged in the 
literature that these very high-level meetings boil down to rubber-stamping of decisions taken 
at lower levels of representation and are important mainly due to their symbolic relevance  
(Steffenson, 2005). The micro-analysis of this format of dialogue is thus less interesting. In 
addition, gaining access to such high-ranking political actors (including the US president and 
President of the EU Commission) to get relevant data for the research constitutes a serious 
challenge.  
From a methodological point of view, the differences characterising this level of 
dialogue fits my research design. Drawing on Mill’s method of difference, I suspect that the 
absence or presence of representativeness of the EU in the dialogical interaction is key to 
understanding the absence of recognition dynamics. Therefore, the fact that the main actors are 
not formal representatives of the EU should lead to different results compared to the other 
dialogues studied: ‘If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an 
instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one 
occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the 
effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon’ (Mill, 1843, p. 455). 
Finally, ethical considerations have been central all through this study. Following 
Brinkman and Kvale (2008), ‘in order to grasp the ethical intricacies of qualitative research in 
the wider cultural and social context, a distinction between micro and macro ethics is relevant’. 
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According to their analysis, micro-ethics is the ethics of the concrete research situation and 
relates to issues like content and confidentiality. Macro-ethics, on the other hand, is concerned 
with what happens when the methodologies and knowledge produced circulate in the wider 
culture and affect people and society. Regarding the first aspect of micro-ethics, the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees have thoroughly been respected. I 
systematically required the consent of the people I interviewed and respected the legal 
regulations regarding data protection policy set by the LSE. As to the macro-ethics, I think that 
the findings of this research can only benefit the wider society in the sense that it draws 
attention to the importance of the socio-psychological dimension underpinning the dialogue 
and the valuable potential inherent in this practice if conducted in full respect with others.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The research question at the core of this study centres on exploring the added value of the 
dialogues being promoted and conducted by the EU with third countries. Thus, it appears that 
ethnographic data collection tools are the most appropriate to capture the thickness of the social 
setting, in which crucial relationships develop and practices unfold. The combination of semi-
structured interviews and field notes from participant observations, coupled with the collection 
of relevant visual data and other primary sources, have provided me with a solid corpus of 
relevant data to analyse. Methodologically, the thematic analysis of the data supported by the 
qualitative data analysis software NVivo 11 allowed me to systematically explore the 
subjective interpretation of the content contained in this precious material in a transparent and 
consistent manner. The analysis of the three case studies was conducted in full consideration 
of ethical concerns from the collection stage to the interpretation stage.  
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Chapter 4 - The quest for the recognition of 
institutional identity: the EU as a special case 
 
 
As explained in chapter 2, all social actors, including institutions, seek recognition for their 
identity in interaction with other entities. While the quest for the recognition of institutional 
identity is constant, it can nonetheless be more or less salient depending on the institutional 
identity’s stability, history, stage of development, and more. This chapter takes a closer look 
at the case of the European Union and explores the extent to which its recognition needs are 
different from other international actors. Drawing on the definition of institutional identity, 
proposed by Albert and Whetten as ‘consisting of the most central, enduring and distinctive 
traits about an organization’  (1985, p. 410),  the chapter shows that the EU constitutes a 
gripping and special case facing peculiar challenges in the recognition of its institutional 
identity. To back this argument, the chapter proceeds in four steps. First, it argues that the EU 
has a particularly complex and unstable institutional identity in constant flux that makes it 
difficult for non-EU countries to fathom. It highlights the EU’s unique hybrid nature as a 
political actor, its complex machinery of decision-making in constant evolution, and the 
ambiguity surrounding its end purpose as an institution. The second section zooms in on 
another unique aspect of the EU: that of an institution yielding a distinct kind of power with 
the practice of dialogue being its key signature as a foreign policy actor. It shows that the 
practice of dialogue has by itself a meaningful importance for the EU. The third section gives 
an overview of the internal and external challenges that the EU currently faces, making its 
needs for recognition even more acute. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
recognition needs of the EU’s institutional identity in the specific context of transatlantic 
relations.  
4.1. The European Union: “an unidentified political object” (Delors) 
 
First, the EU faces an acute challenge in terms of the recognition of its institutional identity 
due to the fact that it is not a traditional international relations actor. It is a hybrid actor in 
constant evolution and, as such, it is particularly difficult to grasp. In the words of Jacques 
Delors (2001, p. 2), the former president of the European Commission: 
[W]hat we (EU) are doing is trying to invent a form of political organization quite 
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which has identified its boundaries, form of organization and democratic rules. It is a 
permanent building site on which we should heed the sign ‘work in progress’.  
 
The EU complex machinery of decision-making is constantly evolving, the support by its 
constituting member states fluctuating not only over time, but also across policy issues. Within 
the multi-level governance structure of the EU, it becomes hard to locate not only the process 
which policy-making undergoes, but also which actors at the national or European level are 
relevant. The preeminent challenge for the EU on the international arena is the difficulty to 
clearly define the type of international actor that the EU constitutes; the EU is neither a state 
nor a non-state actor… neither a conventional international organization nor an international 
regime (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 342). Within a governance system where international relations and 
diplomacy is dominated by the Westphalian state, the EU is often perceived as alien.  
In a systematic study comparing the EU with other major powers, such as China, 
Russia, and the United States by Zielonka (2011), it becomes evident that the EU’s uniqueness 
lies in its  peculiar governance system as a kind of post-modern (or neo-medieval) polity with 
no centre of government but with a distinct ‘pluri-lateral’ or ‘polycentric’ structure of 
governance (Ibid, p. 288; Whiteman, 1998). The EU has a sui generis political structure 
corresponding to a combination of supra-nationalism and inter-governmentalism, which is 
arguably difficult to comprehend by external actors and constitutes a challenge for the EU in 
terms of its institutional identity. The European institutions themselves are well aware of this 
issue; as the European Commission’s White paper on the future of Europe testifies: ‘The EU 
is not an easy construct to understand as it combines both the European level and Member 
States. Who does what is not well explained enough’ (European Commission, 2017f).  
An additional aspect that makes the institutional identity of the EU difficult to fathom 
for others is its constantly evolving institutional structure. Indeed, since its inception with the 
creation of the EEC in the 1950s, the European project has not ceased to evolve, but rather has 
become more and more complex. Each treaty brings new institutional set ups and rules, with 
the last one being the Lisbon Treaty in November 2009 which introduced far-reaching changes 
in order to address the long-standing lack of continuity, coherence, and leadership in European 
foreign policy (Smith, Keukeleire, & Vanhoonacker, 2016, p. 4). This not only means that the 
institutional identity of the EU is in constant flux, but it also creates challenges vis-à-vis ‘the 
outside world’ that has a hard time making sense of this complex peculiar entity and identifying 
the relevant bodies and interlocutors. In the specific transatlantic context, for instance, Michael 
Smith explains that the contentious question of ‘who speaks for Europe’ has significantly 
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influenced the problem of perception that exists in the Euro-American relations, referring to 
the back then EEC as a ‘rapidly moving target’  (Smith, 1978, p. 35).  
The constant institutional development of the European Union is closely related to the 
‘existential discussions’ regarding its end purpose and raison d’être. The ontological 
uncertainty and raging debates between its member states about the long-term objectives of the 
EU adds another layer of complexity to its institutional identity. In fact, one of the components 
of institutional identity is the mandate and purpose of the institution itself.  Hence the absence 
of a shared vision regarding the final goals of EU integration makes the definition of the 
institutional identity difficult in the first place and its recognition by the others even more so. 
Andrew Schonfeld (1974) nicely captured this problem in the title of his book, Europe’s 
journey to an unknown destination. This controversial issue of ‘an unfinished union of states’ 
was then further developed in the framework of the ‘European finality debate’ (Serfaty, 2003), 
which continues to resonate. As Vimont (2017) argues, the EU still needs to define its ambition: 
EU countries do not manage to define what they plan on doing together in the future beyond 
the remit already acquired on the European level. In March 2017, the leaders of the European 
Union came together to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, reflecting on 
past achievements and debating what their shared future could and should look like. The 
comments of Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, regarding the informal 
meeting that took place before the event aptly convey the deep disagreements regarding the 
way Europe should be heading in the near future: ‘Some [Member States] expect systemic 
changes that would loosen intra-EU ties and strengthen the role of nations in relation to the 
community. Others, quite the opposite, are looking for new, deeper dimensions of integration’ 
(European Council, 2017). This happens in the backdrop of a multi-dimensional crisis 
experienced by the EU in recent years that potentially shakes the whole essence of the EU to 
its core (‘identity crisis’) and makes the EU’s need for recognition as a relevant power even 
more acute. In addition to being a misunderstood power and cumbersome organisation, it must 
now debunk the claims that it is a political organisation on the brink of disintegration. Indeed, 
the difficult recovery from the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone crisis,  the 
ensuing split between North and South on austerity, the rise of populism across Europe, the 
migration challenge and the split between West and East on refugees, and, as a coup de grace, 
Brexit  have led certain commentators to question the very future and continued existence of 
the institution  (Menendez, 2013; Tosun, Wetzel, & Zapryanova, 2014).  
This section has shown that the EU institutional identity in itself is particularly complex 
and unstable: the hybrid nature of the institution, coupled with its complex and constantly 
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changing decision-making process, and the uncertainty regarding its end purpose, make it 
difficult for others to fathom this institution. Due to its unique structure as an international 
actor, the components of the institutional identity – such as mandate and procedures – are more 
difficult to grasp and be recognised. Arguably, this complexity has turned the EU into a 
misunderstood power that needs therefore to dedicate a tremendous amount of time and 
resources to explain how it functions and what it stands for in an attempt ultimately to get 
recognition for its relevance both internally and in the eyes of other international players. 
4.2. The European Union as a different kind of power with a strong 
“dialogical component”  
 
The difficulty capturing the specific identity of the EU is also reflected in the breadth of the 
literature on the topic and in the multiple labels given to the EU to qualify it as an international 
actor. Alternately labelled as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne, 1972), ‘normative Power Europe’ 
(Manners, 2002), ‘ethical Power Europe’ (Aggestam, 2008), ‘Model Power Europe’ (Ferreira-
Pereira, 2010), or  ‘Market Power’ (Damro, 2012), the EU has been the focus of a plethora of 
studies that have attempted to characterise its nature as an international actor and the 
specificities of its foreign policy. Yet the majority of the research mentioned above interpret 
the EU as a relevant actor in international politics, whose power and influence are not so much 
based on military might and other coercive means as on the attractiveness of its example, 
reflecting such diverse practices, norms, and values as shared sovereignty, welfare-state 
arrangements, multilateralism, democracy, human rights, and environmental policies. From 
such a normative perspective, the promotion and institutionalisation of dialogue appears 
naturally to be the privileged option chosen by the EU in its interaction with the world because 
it stands in contrast to overt coercion and is in line with the ‘soft power’ that the EU is supposed 
to yield. Yet dialogue is not only a privileged means to promote normative goals. It is also a 
practice constitutive of the European Union itself, as will be shown below.  
 
4.2.1. Dialogue as the EU’s privileged foreign policy tool and as a distinct 
interaction style  
First, the European Union is a unique creator of dialogues. As will be explained in 
greater depth in chapter 4, it has an incredible ability to put in place dialogues with third 
countries on an extraordinary scale. In the early 1970s, when the EEC brought to life the EPC 
to deal with external affairs collectively, their diplomatic contacts were quite limited. Today, 
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40 years later, political dialogues have grown to a quite comprehensive set of institutionalised 
contacts, consisting at present of more than 100 different dialogues with almost all the countries 
in the world, as well as international organisations. This relates to the fact that when it  comes 
to the conduct of EU’s foreign policy, the EU has a clear preference for ‘soft methods’ based 
on joint ownership, engagement, persuasion, and cooperation rather than coercive methods, 
such as sanctions or military action, referring to Holsti’s (1995) famous continuum of foreign 
policy means. This proclivity for dialogue goes beyond the traditional framework of diplomatic 
negotiations and consultations. In fact, the EU has strongly promoted the idea and practice of 
inter-cultural dialogues (IDC) both within the EU and with its external partners, such as in the 
case of its Euro-Mediterranean policies, which put a strong emphasis on civil society dialogues 
(De Perini, 2018; Pace, 2007).  
Second, the literature on Normative Power Europe (NPE) introduced by Manner in 
2002, according to which the EU is distinctive from traditional great powers due to its 
normative character, implicitly portrays the practice of ‘dialogue’ as a crucial means to exert 
normative influence. Indeed, when one considers the different mechanisms through which 
normative influence is exerted, it becomes clear that they occur in a dialogical interaction, as 
this quote from Forsberg (2011) demonstrates: ‘The EU relies on normative power by 
activating existing commitments, and by persuading by referring to the general rules and 
practices, as well as to the future mutual gains, that are made possible through cooperation’. 
Similarly, when considering the different mechanisms of norm diffusion at the heart of 
Normative Power Europe, many of them unfold during the dialogues themselves (Manners, 
2013). Thus, even though no explicit reference is made in this literature about the practice of 
dialogue itself, it qualifies as a non-negligible tool for the exercise of normative influence, 
revolving around persuasion and arguing mechanisms. As Karen Smith puts it, political 
dialogues are the key forums in which the EU exercises persuasion  (Smith, 1998, p. 71).  
Furthermore, studies focusing on the EU as a diplomatic actor recurrently attribute to 
the EU a specific style of interaction with its partner countries when it comes to dialogue, 
depicting the EU as a ‘benevolent/ideal interlocutor’. In fact, the EU’s diplomatic power has 
been referred to as a ‘style of interaction’ relatively more engaging than dictating compared to 
other great powers (Chaban, Elgström, Kelly, & Yi, 2013, p. 245). Echoing this claim, Manners 
argues that ‘methods based on joint ownership, cooperation and dialogue in principle hedge 
against the dangers of imposing allegedly “universal” norms through sheer power and against 
the needs and desires of local populations in third countries. These methods are supposed to 
allow for and are driven by motivations which are empowering others’ (Manners, 2006). 
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Following the unexpected Arab uprisings in 2011, the European Union itself re-committed to 
‘switch to a listening mode’ that would take more seriously into consideration local voices in 
the different states of its Southern neighbourhood (Balfour, 2012, p.30). This recognition of 
the need to move from a ‘preaching mode’ to a ‘listening mode’, at least as far as the 
Mediterranean neighbourhood is concerned, is an additional testament to the fact that the EU 
is cautious and well-aware of the way through which it ‘talks’ with its partner countries. This 
aspect is important because research has shown that diplomatic style, as a diplomatic trade 
mark, contributes to international identity and diplomatic reputation (e.g. treaty-drafting skill, 
mediation, quiet diplomacy, and more) (Barston, 2006, p. 37).   
 
4.2.2. Dialogue as the DNA of the European Union  
Going a step further, more than simply being a privileged foreign policy tool or a distinct 
interaction style, it has been argued that the practice of dialogue is even part of the EU’s DNA, 
i.e., that it is constitutive of the EU. This argument relates to the reasons behind the EU’s 
pronounced preference for this mode of action. For staunch critics of NPE like Robert Kagan 
(2003), the EU systematically resorts to diplomacy less by choice but because of its structural 
weakness. For other scholars, however, the practice of dialogue in the European context is 
much more than a default option – indeed, it forms an integral part of the EU’s DNA (Mitzen, 
2006). Even policy-makers like to use this powerful metaphor to describe the inherent 
importance of dialogue for the EU. In the words of the former president of the EU Commission 
Barroso, ‘collective bargaining and consultation are part of Europe's DNA’ (Barroso in Andor, 
2013). In fact, before being used as a foreign policy tool, dialogue has first and foremost been 
the modus operandi of the European Union and of its constituent member states. Historically, 
it is through an intense process of dialogue that Europe eventually became a peaceful continent. 
In the words of Fernandez Sola ( 2009, p. 90), ‘Europe only was able to reach a durable peace 
through dialogue, mutual understanding, institutionalized cooperation, and through processes 
of bargaining and sometimes deliberative reasoning typical of a continental “multi-
perspectival” polity’. In its external relations, the EU acts consistently and also puts a great 
emphasis on processes of cooperation and interaction that occur at multiple levels and across 
the whole range of policy areas. Commenting on the transatlantic relations, a Commission 
official explained that ‘the logic of the New Transatlantic Agenda (i.e. institutionalizing the 
transatlantic relationship) is similar to the thinking behind the EU. If we are constantly talking, 
it is less likely that we will be fighting’ (Steffenson, 2005, p. 47).  
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The fact that the EU particularly cherishes this practice of dialogue is clearly shown by 
the way in which EU diplomats talk about it. For instance, one EEAS official highlighted that 
‘generally, in the EU, we are more talking because of a “talking mindset”: having a dialogue 
is important because of its symbolic value and everything …’ (Interview no. 23). Similarly, a 
high-level EU diplomat conveyed the idea that the United States very much dictates the 
intensity of the dialogue, while the EU unconditionally cherishes the practice of dialogue: ‘The 
intensity of our conversations in all of these dialogues depends on the extent to which the US 
thinks that they can use the EU to further its political objectives by having the dialogues with 
the EU. I’d like to say that we look at things in the same way – in other words that we step up 
or step down our commitment to certain dialogues in light of our priorities, but we do tend to 
see the utility of maintaining a constant dialogue with a largest part of the US administration’ 
(Interview no. 32).  
4.3. The European Union: a challenged and contested actor that 
constantly needs to prove its worth 
 
In addition to having an institutional identity of a complex kind, the EU must face a myriad of 
internal and external challenges that make the recognition of its institutional identity (in 
relevance terms) very important.  
Internally, the relevance of the European Union is regularly challenged both by the 
wider public of European citizens and by its constituent members, i.e., the 28 Member states. 
In fact, one of the challenges the EU must deal with relates to its legitimacy, not least due to 
the growing public aversion to the European Union and/or European integration 
(Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & De Vreese, 2011; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, 2010; 
McLaren, 2007; Vimont, 2017). The rise of ‘Euroscepticism’ in recent decades has been 
notable and it is now widely acknowledged that integration efforts hinge on support from EU 
citizens, who are increasingly sceptical about and disapproving of the EU (Hobolt, 2009). In 
this respect, the words of the former European Commission president, Romano Prodi, still 
resonate today and describe well ‘ordinary people’s widespread fears of a union that is 
allegedly not properly subject to democratic accountability, is centralist in nature, and includes 
very opaque decision-making structures’ (Prodi, 2002). According to a recent white paper by 
the EU Commission on the future of Europe, dated March 2017, ‘around a third of citizens 
trust the EU today, when about half of Europeans did so ten years ago’ (European Commission, 
2017f). Arguably, this disenchantment and lack of popular support for the European venture 
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make the institutional identity of the EU more fragile and exacerbates its needs to be recognised 
as relevant vis-à-vis the outside world.  
The ambivalent relationship of the European Member States constitutes an additional 
challenge for the institution’s projection of a strong institutional identity. The fact that member 
states often stand hypocritically vis-à-vis the EU by either support and/or scapegoating the 
institution(s) does not facilitate the creation of a homogeneous image that is supported by all 
European actors involved. This duality is not only used by third countries, such as China, which 
might adopt the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, but also by, for instance, the Big Three which 
will use the EU channels when it is in their advantage (Balfour, 2015, p. 3). The wide-spread 
practice of ‘blame-avoidance’ towards the EU by member states does not make the situation 
any better (Bickerton, 2016). Furthermore,  the fact that Europe sometimes ‘fail to act in unison, 
singing like a choir from the same hymn sheet and does appears more like a cacophony of 
different voices cancelling each other out’  projects the image of an actor that is neither unified 
nor effective in foreign and security affairs (Christiansen & Jorgensen, 2011). The disunity 
among the Member States in foreign affairs was well exemplified in the 2003 Iraq War (Menon, 
2004), or more recently in the case of intervention in Libya (Marchi, 2017). For Orenstein and 
Kelemen (2017), the current Ukrainian crisis shows that the EU is not yet able ‘to rein in 
Russia’s Trojan horses within the EU’; the EU still lacks the power to prevent member states 
from pursuing divergent pro-Russian policies, despite the strong sanctions regime that has been 
put in place. In addition to this specific problem of disaggregation, another trend has been 
observed in recent years, corresponding to a ‘mini-lateral drift’ running the risks of 
fragmentation in the long-term (Balfour, 2015).   
On the international scene, the EU has traditionally had difficulties translating its huge 
economic and financial clout into effective foreign policy. This has led Ginsberg to define 
accurately the EU’s performance as a foreign policy actor as ‘an economic giant, a political 
dwarf, and a military worm’ with limited influence in world politics (Ginsberg, 2001). There 
is indeed no doubt today that the EU has clearly acquired the status of economic power: The 
institution’s economic power and performance in the areas of trade and finance have warranted 
the EU the label of ‘formidable trade power’ and ‘powerful bargainer in the multilateral trading 
system’ (Debaere, 2014; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; Senti, 2002). As Nicolaïdis and Meunier 
(2006, p. 907) explain, ‘the sheer size of the single European market and its more than forty-
year experience of negotiating international trade agreements have made the EU the most 
powerful trading bloc in the world’. More recently, it is its global regulatory influence that has 
expanded, as testified by studies referring to the EU as the ‘global pacesetter’ in regulation 
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(Buck, 2007) and as the world’s ‘regulatory superpower’ (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 71). 
Moreover, the EU and its members states are the world’s leading aid donor, reaching €75.5 
billion in 2016 (European Commission, 2017c).  
Yet this economic clout has hardly been translated into foreign policy influence – and 
that is why the EU remains a ‘partially-developed’ international actor in the field of security 
(Ginsberg, 2001, p.9; Lehne, 2017). In spite of recent progress in foreign and defence policy, 
the persistence of institutional challenges hampers the EU from becoming a fully-fledged 
foreign policy actor. As such, its performance remains contested in this policy area, making its 
needs for recognition more acute in this field. In his famous article, ‘The capability-
expectations gap’, Hill pointed to the unrealistic expectations put on the EU’s role in the world 
and its incapacity to meet them successfully due to its actual capabilities in terms of its ability 
to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal (Hill, 1993, p. 315). More than 20 
years later, the EU’s capability-expectations gap has narrowed considerably, with remarkable 
improvements in terms of resource availability and instruments at his disposal. Therefore, for 
Toje (2008), the heart of the problem lies not so much in the lack of material capabilities but 
rather in the so-called ‘consensus-expectations gap’. According to him, if Member States 
sanction action, they do so by ‘cherry-picking’ those issues where consensus can be achieved, 
rather than where intervention might be most effective or necessary. This line of argumentation 
relates to the issue of the ‘lowest common denominator’ that can possibly be achieved in a 
situation where member states have typically different interests at stake. In other words, the 
lack of consensus among the different European actors – in particular the member states – when 
it comes to foreign policy decisions constitutes an institutional hurdle that continues to hamper 
the EU’s performance world-wide.  
The EU has also been frequently criticised for its lack of coherence in the management 
of its external relations, particularly when it comes to the implementation of sanctions or 
development aid (Carbone, 2008; Portela & Raube, 2012, p. 11). In a similar vein, the 
ambiguous application of the principle of conditionality has engendered strong accusations by 
third countries, which have reproached the EU for having double standards in the execution of 
its foreign policy, such as the enlargement process for instance (Grabbe, 2002). It is noteworthy 
that EU diplomats are well-aware of this problem and use the dialogue to counter these claims. 
For instance, in the words of an EEAS diplomat, ‘We do have a human rights dialogue with 
the United States in order to show to certain countries, like Russia or China that we have no 
double standards when it comes to the respect of human rights. We engage in such a dialogue 
with our allies as well’ (Interview no. 24). For Juncos (2017), the new operating principle of 
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EU foreign policy – called ‘principled pragmatism’ and detailed in the EU Global Strategy – 
is likely to generate more criticisms of double standards, as it practically encourages the EU to 
promote democracy and human rights while simultaneously doing so on a case-by-case basis.  
Finally, the wide-spread description of the EU as a ‘military worm’ deserves more 
attention. While certain observers tend to minimise the progress made by the EU on this front 
(Zielonka, 2011, p. 290), the EU clearly aims at strengthening its military/defence capabilities 
and seeks to be have these achievements recognised by others. In fact, over the past decade, 
the EU has acquired military capability and has become involved in several military/civil-
military operations around the world. There has also been a proliferation of various EU military 
institutions, such as its Military Committee, Military Staff, and the European defence agency. 
While it is true that these institutions remain small and individual EU missions have involved 
only small contingents of soldiers (Zielonka, 2011, p. 290), the more recent signature of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), described by the President of the EU commission 
Juncker as the ‘Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty’ (European Commission, 2017d), the 
increase to the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) budget, and Coordinated Annual Reviews 
of Defence (CARD) are all testaments to the fact that the EU aims at identifying potential for 
synergies and reinforcing the defence cooperation of its member states. The creation of the so-
called Defence Fund represents a historic push by the EU into a new phase of cooperation on 
military and security policy  (Barigazzi & Cooper, 2017).  
In a recent study, Youngs (2014) examines the legacy of the Eurozone crisis and its 
potential implications for the EU’s international role (or what he calls, ‘the external spillover 
of the crisis’). His nuanced assessment points to different trends at work. On the one hand, the 
crisis undermines even further the EU’s foreign policy capacity, tarnishes its normative power, 
and compels some Member States to focus on their own national-level policies. On the other 
hand, it is right to see this as an opportunity to enhance European cooperation, develop greater 
international ambition, and deepen the commitment to the values of the liberal world order. In 
addition to the changes in the field of CSDP, the recent European Global Strategy (June 2016) 
repositions the EU as a more pragmatic actor, willing and capable to face internal and external 
threats. All these changes make the recognition of the EU’s institutional identity as a relevant 
actor in foreign policy even more challenging.  
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4.4. EU-US relations:  a dialogue between equals or between 
“unequal equals?”  
 
4.4.1. An asymmetric relationship from day one   
In the specific context of the transatlantic relations, the quest for recognition of the EU as an 
equal power is all the more pronounced due to asymmetric military power and security 
dependence of the EU vis-à-vis the United States. In fact, since the birth of the European 
integration project, the massive imbalance in power and the strategic dependency by the 
Europeans on the Americans to ensure their security have become fundamental features of the 
transatlantic relationship  (Cox, 2012, p. 72). This has remained a constant feature in the 
backdrop of the remarkable transformation of Western European countries and of the EEC. 
Throughout decades of competition and cooperation (Smith, 1998; 2005), European 
institutions have tried to impose themselves as a relevant, distinct, and independent 
international actor. The desire to anchor institutional identity as an equal power has been 
reflected, for instance, in the emphasis put on the concept of ‘equality’ in many of the formal 
interactions between the two political entities: already under Kennedy, for example, a discourse 
articulated around ‘the transatlantic partnership of equals’ and the ‘declaration of 
interdependence’ emerged. This idea was taken up again in the introduction of the Transatlantic 
Declaration of 1990, stressing ‘a partnership on an equal footing’ and noting the European 
Community’s ‘own identity’ in economic and monetary matters, in foreign policy, and in the 
domain of security (Burghardt, 2013) . Similarly, in the 1998 Bonn Declaration, both sides 
explicitly committed themselves to a ‘full and equal partnership’ in economic, political, and 
security affairs, unequivocally conveying the aspirations of the EU to be recognised as an equal 
of the United States.  
This desire of the EU to be perceived as an equal of the United States has a special 
significance in the transatlantic context. In fact, the identity of the ‘recogniser’ is particularly 
important: depending on ‘who is the recogniser’, the whole process can have more or less 
significance. By introducing the concept of ‘circles of recognition’, Ringmar emphasises that 
some actors’ recognition matters more than others, particularly those considered to be friends 
(Ringmar, 2008). Applied to this study, it is vital for the EU as a whole (and for its distinct 
institutions) to have its peculiar identity recognised by the United States, as a fellow democracy 
and powerful traditional alliance-partner. Yet despite this equalising discourse, some 
asymmetries do persist across different policy areas, as mentioned in the sub-section below.  
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4.4.2. The EU as the economic equal and politically “would-be equal” of the US  
Standing on equal footing is not a given: distinguishing between the EU’s performance in the 
economic realm versus the political foreign policy fields is necessary so order to better grasp 
the intricacies of the transatlantic relationship. In economic terms, it has largely been accepted 
that the United States and the EU are now equals, as reflected in the description of their 
relationship as ‘a partnership of equals’  (Smith & Steffenson, 2005). Similarly, Elgström 
(2007, p. 954) argues that ‘the growing economic presence of the European Union has ensured 
that in many respects it can be regarded as a great power rivalling the US’ [emphasis added]. 
These different aspects include: (1) the ability to compete with the United States in 
international trade negotiations; (2) the size of their respective internal markets and their shares 
of world’s trade in goods and services; and (3) their ability to lead international regulatory 
governance.  
First, the EU’s capacity to catch up with the United States economically is partly due 
to the historical process of European integration that has been first and foremost focused on 
internal trade liberalisation and external trade policy. As a result, the sheer size of Europe’s 
single market combined with the collective character of European trade policy have enabled 
the EU to become a true rival to the United States in international trade negotiations beginning 
in the 1960s. As Meunier explains, until the birth of the European Community in 1958, the 
United States was the unchallenged hegemon in world trade. But the first two multilateral trade 
negotiations in which the Common Market participated as a single entity – the Dillon and 
Kennedy Rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 1960s – 
immediately established Europe as a rival to the United States in terms of market power and 
negotiating leverage. As the EU has become more coherent in the field of trade, it has been in 
a better position to compete with the United States (Wright, 2011).  
Secondly, the size of the EUs internal market – specifically, the market access that can 
be bargained away for both foreign direct investors and exporters from the rest of the world – 
is a key source of power that allows it to compete economically with the United States (Meunier 
& Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 908). Indeed, the economy of the 28-member EU is equal to that of 
the United States. While American per capita income is higher, in terms of human capital, 
technology, and exports, the EU is very much an economic peer (Nye, 2016). More 
specifically, in 2016, the EU share of the world trade in goods was 15.1 percent compared 
to 14.4 percent for the United States and the EU share of the world trade in services was 
22.6 percent compared to 17 percent for the United States. Overall, the EU’s share in world 
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trade in goods and services was 16.8 percent in 2016 while the US’s share was 15 percent 
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 24).  
 Third, equality has also been achieved in international regulatory governance.  
According to Evenett and Stern (2011, p. 83), both market size and institutional characteristics 
have made the EU and the United States leading and roughly equal powers in global as well as 
bilateral regulatory cooperation. For certain observers, the EU is even on the verge of taking 
the lead in this field and in shaping world standards at a speed that may leave the United States 
lagging behind. As ‘the EU-linked trade agreements are piling up (i.e. recently with Vietnam, 
Canada and Japan and soon with Mercosur), the US is retreating from the world stage with 
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to re-negotiate the North 
American Free Trade Agreement’ (Hanke, 2017).  
Yet the challenge remains in the political and military realm, where there is a persistent 
imbalance/asymmetry between the two actors. For Serfaty (2005, p. 13), ‘Europe stands as a 
power in the world, with capabilities that are competitive in most dimensions of power except 
for military force. Lacking the political unity and military capabilities for action when 
necessary, Europe is not, or not yet, the world power that it claims to be’. To give a rough idea 
of the relative American dominance in the military realm, ‘collectively, NATO Europe spent 
about 45 percent of what the United States does on defense. But even that disparity understates 
the difference’ (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004, p. 57). Certainly, the EU sometimes has a 
comparative advantage in certain fields of cooperation compared to the United States; this is 
true  when it comes to soft security issues such as conflict post-management and relations with 
Africa and more (Smith & Steffenson, 2005). In spite of the EU’s expertise in these areas, 
however, the EU is still struggling to be recognised as an equal actor when it comes to the 
political-security realm. According to a recent study on the perception of the EU and EU’s 
policies in the United States both at the elite and public opinion levels, the EU is widely seen 
as a rather effective, coherent, and visible actor in economic terms but less so in the political 
and security realms (PPMI, 2015; Eliasson, 2010). This point is confirmed by Allessandri 
(2012, p. 32) for whom a tendency to dismiss or denigrate Europe as a negative model and as 
the invariably weak partner has acquired a non-negligible dimension in the United States in 
recent years, particularly so during the Bush administration. By the same token, Serfaty (2005, 
p. 13) emphasises that some in the United States think that most of Europe is too old, too 
divided, and too compromised to be relevant; and in those few instances when it may be 
relevant, such as the war in Iraq, Europe is too hostile, too slow, and too weak to be helpful. 
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From Bush’s stance on ‘Old Europe’ to the Obama administration’s ‘new Pacific pivot’, 
the existing European fears about Europe’s ‘downgrade’ have been reinforced with the arrival 
of Donald Trump in power in January 2017. As journalist Ryan Heath put it, ‘while in the past 
American policy-makers may have wondered: who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?’ 
in reference to Kissinger’s famous locution, US President Trump today wonders, ‘Why should 
I call Europe at all?’ (Heath, 2017). The fact that Trump sees Europe as a ‘sick and ageing 
agent’ on the world scene rather than a privileged partner in the liberal world order (Bednarczyk 
& Whitworth, 2016) has led Federica Mogherini in her first visit to Washington to re-state 
explicitly the fundamental importance of the partnership between the United States and the EU. 
As she outlined, ‘it’s the first time that my visit to Washington focuses on the bilateral relations 
rather than crises we have around us – this is telling us the new era we are entering in (…) If it 
is necessary to recall the need for a friendship to be in place, the added value of the EU to the 
US, we are ready to do so’ [emphasis added] (Mogherini, 2017b). The emphasis on the 
necessity to remind the United States of the value of the transatlantic relationship, which was 
supposedly taken-for-granted, indicates that the quest for recognition of the EU vis-à-vis the 
United States is still very much relevant and that the processes of anchoring institutional 
identity during the dialogues might be even more visible. This is also the perception that many 
diplomats have when it comes to the current American administration: ‘We need to affirm even 
more forcefully our legitimacy vis-à-vis the United States under the leadership of Donald 
Trump who regularly questions the value of interacting with the European Union’ (Interview 
no. 24 and no. 23).  
Finally, it is fair to say that the EU faces a ‘reluctant/difficult recogniser’. The mixed 
perceptions held by the American people and elites relate to the wide-spread US self-image as 
a ‘superpower’ that sees itself as a global leader. In this scenario, the EU is imagined as a 
trusted partner, with similar values, but not the leading international actor. The role of an 
international leader resides – in the American public and elite perceptions – with the United 
States only. The US worldview, which has traditionally been inward-looking, is often 
characterised with a low interest in the outside world, the EU/ Europe included (report PPMI, 
2015). This insularity of the worldview also limits the consideration of EU ideas, experiences, 
and achievements, and as such makes the recognition of the EU’s institutional identity more 
challenging.  
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter has exposed the challenging features which makes the EU’s recognition needs in 
terms of institutional identity particularly pressing. First, the sui generis nature of the EU and 
its constant institutional evolution coupled with the lack of a shared vision regarding its ‘final 
destination’ constitute hurdles to reach a stable institutional identity in the first place. It makes 
its projection and recognition to the outside world even more challenging. Being in constant 
flux only reinforces the difficulty to project and to be recognised by outsiders. Another 
distinctive feature of the EU’s institutional identity relates to the peculiar type of power it exerts 
– i.e. normative power. It does so mainly through the practice of dialogue, that constitutes both 
one of the most privileged foreign policy tools of the EU and a strong component of its identity. 
The EU’s attachment to this practice is thus sometimes difficult to fathom by others – who like 
to depict the EU as a ‘talking head’ without understanding the importance it attributes to this 
practice. Beyond this inherent complexity of the EU’s construct, internal and external 
challenges make the recognition conundrum even more salient. While the EU does not 
internally benefit from the unconditional support of the European citizens nor from its 
constituent member states, it has also to prove externally that it is a relevant international player 
in the realm of foreign policy. Finally, the chapter has shown that these concerns resonate 
strongly in the transatlantic context. The special historical circumstances in which the 
European project was born created an asymmetry in the transatlantic relationship from the very 
beginning. While the EU and the United States are now widely considered on an equal footing 
economically, that is not yet the case when it comes to the political and security realms where 
the EU is arguably not yet the equal of the United States. As a result, the EU takes advantage 
of any single opportunity (including the multi-levelled dialogues established with the United 
States) to redress this situation and gets its institutional identity recognised and anchored. In 
the following chapter, I provide an overview of the practice of dialogue conducted by the EU 
across time.  
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Chapter 5 – From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe: an 
historical review and mapping of dialogues 
between the EU and the world 
 
 
While the European Union is well known for its marked preference for diplomacy, the 
remarkable growth of different kinds of dialogues covering an ever-increasing number of topics 
with a multitude of actors is not as well documented and hence less appreciated. The fact that 
the European Council regularly issues documents to EU Delegations around the world with 
instructions on how to better manage the multiplicity of political dialogues is yet another 
testament to this exponential increase of dialogues (Council of the European Union, 2008). 
However, capturing in a succinct and comprehensive way the complexity of the practice of 
dialogues conducted by the EU is admittedly not an easy task. Ideally, a typology of dialogues 
would consist of defining exactly how many dialogues of each sort formally exist today and 
how big the phenomenon is in real terms. It would require data as to the degree of 
representation of the actors involved (ranging from high level to non-official actors, such as 
civil society actors), the issue areas discussed, the size of the delegation attending the meetings, 
their frequency, and duration. Such a mapping exercise of all EU dialogues with the rest of the 
world in all its variants is a titanic and challenging work as the form, level, and frequency of 
contact with different countries is constantly changing. Therefore, rather than tracking every 
single change in the format of the dialogues, the aim of this chapter is to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the development of this entire ‘dialogue system’ (Monar, 1997, p.272) from the 
early days of the European Economic communities through today. The analysis revolves 
around three main axes: (1) time-wise, it follows a chronological order, stressing the different 
stages of the EC/EU institutional development as these have direct consequences on the 
conduct of external relations; (2) issue areas covered by the different types of dialogues; and 
(3) the initiation of the dialogue, looking at which actor requested to engage in these dialogues 
in the first place (the EC/EU or third country/regional institution).  
The chapter identifies key turning points in the development of this system of dialogues. 
While in the early days of the EEC, the dialogues set up were mainly functional and served to 
monitor and administer the trade agreements signed between the EEC and third countries, the 
situation started to change with the launching of the EPC in the 1970s. The two following 
decades of EPC (1970s and 1980s) saw the proliferation of political dialogues in a non-
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systematic and pragmatic manner, with the request coming mainly from third countries that 
saw in the economic strength of the EEC/EC an attractive partner and the EEC/EC initiating 
dialogues with regional institutions. With the Treaty of Maastricht, a third phase in the 
development of the dialogue system began, leading to an exponential increase in the number 
of dialogues enshrined in a more rigid institutional framework. At this stage, the EU clearly 
took the lead in the initiation of these dialogues by making ‘political dialogue’ a part and parcel 
of most of its agreements signed with non-EU countries and by setting up new kinds of 
dialogues covering a whole new range of issues including human rights and sectorial issues.  
To begin with, the chapter clarifies how the core concept of ‘dialogue’ has been used 
in EU parlance. Then, following a chronological approach, it traces the establishment of 
dialogues as a key component of the relations between the EC/EU and the rest of the world 
over three distinct periods: starting from the first days of the European Communities when its 
external relations were confined to the economic realm, moving on to the two decades of 
existence of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and finally looking at the 1990s and 
beyond. Last but not least, the chapter will conclude by giving a ‘visual snapshot’ of the system 
of dialogues as it stands today (February 2018).  
 
5.1. The notion of dialogue in EU parlance  
Before engaging in the overview of the EU dialogues with the world, it is first necessary to 
clarify how the term ‘dialogue’ has been used in EU parlance so far and to point to the kind of 
dialogues that this study is precisely investigating.  
As noted previously, we need to distinguish between ‘dialogue’ as a broad generic term 
for ‘partnership’ and a narrower definition of dialogue, corresponding to the specific instance 
of direct encounter involving face-to-face communication between participants in an 
institutionalised framework. Almost automatically, Dialogues (with a big D, as a broad 
framework for cooperation) are themselves composed of, or prescribe the setup of, many 
dialogues (with a small d) fulfilling different functions and covering various policy areas. In 
EU parlance, the term ‘dialogue’ is used in these two different contexts: while the so-called 
‘regional dialogues’, like the Euro-Arab dialogue, refer to broader frameworks of cooperation 
with grouping of states, the terms ‘political dialogue’, ‘economic’, or ‘sectorial dialogues’ 
designate more specific instances of face-to-face interaction in the form of actual meetings that 
are themselves supposed to be the motor of cooperation and the cement of the relationship.  
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The agreements signed between the EU and third parties are useful as they provide 
details on the contours of the framework of cooperation, its content, and procedures. They also 
generally prescribe instructions as to the specific convening of ‘dialogues’ (or regular 
meetings), understood in a narrower sense. In this respect, one needs to further differentiate 
between two sorts of institutionalised face-to-face interactions often specified in the EU 
agreements with third countries.  
First, there are dialogues specifically set up to manage the agreement and administer 
the relationship. These dialogues are created within the framework of the agreement and allow 
the parties to widen their relationship if they wish to do so. According to Flaesh-Mougin (1990, 
p. 29), ‘these joint institutions represent a constant in the external policy of the Community in 
so far as all the global agreements and even certain important sectorial agreements provide for 
them’. Yet these dialogues and their modes of functioning vary in terms of composition, 
frequency of meetings, internal organisation, and powers set under the agreements (Ibid.). In 
the transatlantic context, it is the Senior Level Group and the NTA task force that help drive, 
coordinate, organise, monitor, and implement the agenda of the EU-US summits (Steffenson, 
2005, p. 58). It is also in these high-level meetings that ‘history-decisions’ are taken and the 
scope for cooperation defined (Ibid).  
The second kind of dialogues covers matters of policy substance and are less 
administrative in nature. These dialogues deal with precise policy options and provide for 
important input to the upper level of dialogues as policy-shapers and setters (Steffenson, 2005). 
They can occur at different levels of representation and treat of economy and trade, political 
and security issues, cultural and social affairs and the like. For instance, many agreements with 
third countries feature the term ‘political dialogue’. In the terminology and practice of the EU, 
‘political dialogue’ covers major subjects of concern in the field of foreign and security policy. 
Depending upon the partner country, this may pertain to issues of conflict and crisis 
management, weapons of mass destruction, and political values such as Human Rights and 
democracy (Emerson, 2007, p. 9).  
 
5.2. Historical Review of the EU dialogues with the world  
 
5.2.1. Pre-EPC: regular meetings to monitor trade agreements   
First of all, it is important to underline that proper common European cooperation on matters 
of foreign policy emerged only in the early 1970s with the launching of the European Political 
Cooperation. Prior to this initiative, the European Communities’ external relations were 
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confined to the economic realm. In fact, the EEC had exclusive competence on external 
economic relations and concluded trade agreements with third countries as defined by the 1957 
Treaty of Rome, mainly providing a schedule for lifting trade restrictions on imports to the EU 
on a non-reciprocal basis, with no reference at all to any political issues (Nuttall, 2000, p. 87). 
In 1971, following a judgment by the ECJ that interpreted broadly the powers of the European 
Commission, trade agreements enlarged their scope to include ‘cooperation’ on other issues 
under Community competence such as transport and agricultural policy: this development gave 
birth to the so-called ‘trade and cooperation agreements’ (Smith & Webber, 2008, p. 76). A 
cursory examination of these types of agreements signed in the early days of the European 
Communities suggests that the only provision featuring a ‘dialogical configuration’ 
corresponds to the decision to establish ‘a joint committee’ to monitor the functioning of the 
agreement and to take stock of the progress made, bringing together representatives from the 
EC and from the governments of third countries. The direct contacts were, however, very 
limited: this mixed/joint committee was supposed to convene only once a year or more under 
extraordinary circumstances.8 The regular meetings set up in the framework of the trade 
agreements were therefore functional and did not have any wider significance in terms of the 
EC’s role in the world.  
 
5.2.2. EPC 1969-1990: “let’s talk politics in a non-binding flexible format”  
During the two decades of European Political Cooperation, an interesting trend emerged, 
namely the establishment of political dialogues with a growing number of states and regional 
organisations – based upon pragmatism, flexibility, and adaptability (Pilgaard 1993, p. 103). 
As there was at the time ‘no philosophy about how to organize relations with third countries, 
member states invented whatever procedures seemed most appropriate as each case arose’ in 
an ad hoc manner (Nuttall, 1992, p. 282). As a result, a multitude of formats and regular 
consultation procedures have arisen over the years (Regelsberger, 1991, p. 162), with no 
homogenous institutional set up recommended to conduct these talks on political issues. Over 
these two decades, the EPC engaged in regional diplomacy taking the lead in the initiation of 
group-to-group dialogues. When it comes to dialogues with individual countries, the EC 
became a particularly sought-after interlocutor in the 1980s with more and more countries 
requesting to engage in regular political dialogues. To reflect this shift, this section is sub-
divided between the first and the second decade of the existence of the EPC.   
                                               
8 See for instance Article 6 of the Trade Agreement signed between the EC and Israel in 1964 (EC, 1964).  
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5.2.2.1. The 1970s: Establishment of the first political consultations with the world 
The launching of the EPC did not generate clear provisions regarding the institutionalisation 
of dialogues with third countries on political matters. The EPC’s goals, as formulated in the 
Luxembourg Report (1970), were actually quite modest: they entailed regular consultations, 
coordination of national positions (harmonisation of views), and where possible common 
action. The first objective for the member states in this endeavour was ‘to provide themselves 
with ways and means of harmonizing their views in the field of international politics’ 
(Luxembourg Report, 1970). As Smith (2014) rightly observes, the founding document of the 
EPC did not actually state what member states intended to do together in foreign policy in 
terms of action directed towards the external world. At this early stage, European member 
states were mainly concerned with setting out the basic modalities of cooperation, coordination, 
and possible collective action among themselves and consequently did not invest much thought 
on the actual conduct of the relations with the rest of the world.  
The absence of provisions on the effective conduct of external relations persisted with 
the first codification of EPC practice in ‘the second report on the strengthening of European 
Political Cooperation in matters of Foreign Policy’, also known as the 1973 Copenhagen 
Report. While a few qualitative changes were codified concerning internal EPC procedures, 
the Copenhagen report did not provide any guidance regarding the conduct of the Twelve’s 
relations with the outside world in the 1970s (Regelsberger, 1991, p. 163). After all, only four 
years after the launching of the EPC, the acquis politique was still to a great extent immature, 
rendering difficult a more audacious and commonly agreed line of action. 
Yet the initial absence of clear provisions for the conduct of external relations did not 
prevent the ad hoc emergence of some remarkable dialogues (as partnerships) with a political 
dimension with a few countries and regional organisations. This political dimension is often 
referred to in the literature as ‘political dialogue’ or as ‘regular political consultations’. What 
is worth emphasising at this point is that unlike the economic agreements signed in the EC 
framework, the political dialogues established between European member states and third 
countries/regional groupings were not enshrined in any formal binding treaty basis. Indeed, the 
EPC had no legal basis until the Single European Act (SEA) (Dehousse & Weiler, 1991). The 
agreement with the third state concerned could take the form of an informal arrangement 
between the presidency and the third state or emerge out of a common understanding through 
an exchange of letters. Even a joint declaration at the end of a meeting could suffice to establish 
a political dialogue (Flaesch-Mougin, 1990, p. 30; Monar, 1997, p. 264). These arrangements 
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committed both sides only to more or less regular contacts at one or several levels – not to any 
common political position – and even the commitments made in respect to contacts could be 
handled flexibly according to interests and time constraints. Also, each dialogue could easily 
be intensified through additional ad hoc meetings, an increase in the number of regular 
meetings, or meetings at higher level – or alternatively, ‘frozen’ or ‘suspended’ with relative 
ease (Monar, 1997, p. 266). Thus, one can safely argue that at that stage, the institutionalisation 
of the dialogues was quite limited: the arrangements were usually confined to a few 
commitments on the regularity of meetings (every 12 or 18 months)9, their location (alternating 
between the two entities), and their level of representation (in general, at the level of foreign 
ministers with a representative from the Commission). In addition, the subject matter of the 
discussions was rarely fixed (Flaesch-Mougin, 1990, p.30), contrary to future human rights 
dialogues for instance, in which clear items had to be systematically discussed (European 
Council, 2001). In what follows, I provide greater details regarding the first interlocutors of the 
EC in the 1970s with an emphasis on the initiation of the political dialogue and the political 
topics discussed in its framework.   
 
In the very first years, member states in the framework of EPC talked mainly to 
‘friendly and allied states’ (Regelsberger, 1991, p. 166). From the launching of the EPC 
onwards, the first political contacts that the EC established with third countries can be divided 
into three main categories: (1) the countries that were formally recognised as potential 
members of the Community due to their geographical proximity (Norway, Turkey and Greece); 
(2) the United States; and (3) some NATO partners, such as Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and 
Portugal (Ibid).  
First, the Six gave their attention to the countries that could expect in the near future to 
become members of the Community. Almost from the beginning, the four candidate countries 
were closely associated with EPC (Nuttall, 1992, p. 283). For instance, in the case of Turkey, 
arrangements were made in 1972 for the Presidency to inform the Turkish Foreign Minister of 
developments in Political Co-operation. The bi-annual meetings of the EEC-Turkey 
Association Council was used for this purpose as well (Ibid). Second, at an early stage in the 
development of the EPC, relations with the United States came to the fore, making this dialogue 
one of the oldest. According to Nuttall (1992, p.284), the first occasion on which policies – 
                                               
9 The issue of regularity here is primordial as it is a clear indicator of the institutionalization of the 
dialogue (to be differentiated from ad hoc contacts or normal diplomatic relations).  
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rather than geography – obliged the Nine to give thought to the form of their dialogue with a 
foreign country was in 1973-74, following Kissinger’s ‘year of Europe’ speech. The EC and 
the United States had already established normal diplomatic relations in 1953. However, 
Kissinger’s complaint about the fact that he did not know whom to call to get the common 
European voice, combined with significant international events, prompted the United States to 
pressure the EC to institutionalise a proper dialogue. It was a very sensitive area because of 
European apprehension of potential US domination, so this pressure mainly resulted in 
irregular contact between the EPC and the United States, a constant dissatisfaction with 
Europe’s refusal to consult, and additional US attempts to get the most of its normal diplomatic 
and political contacts with the individual member states (Pilgaard, 1993, p. 105). In the 1980s, 
the situation incrementally developed against the backdrop of tensions between the two actors, 
leading to a new structure of dialogue in 1986 at the request of the Europeans this time, 
ultimately culminating with the declaration on Trans-Atlantic relations of November 1990, also 
named ‘the Transatlantic Love Letter’ (Nuttall, 1992, p. 286).  Last but not least, another group 
of ‘friendly countries’ with which the EPC started to develop structured diplomatic relations at 
a relatively early stage corresponds to the NATO partners (Regelsberger 1991, p. 167). 
 The first decade of the EPC also marked the first steps in regional diplomacy with the 
launching of the first group-to-group dialogues (or regional grouping dialogues)10, the three 
most prominent ones being the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the EEC/EC-ACP relations 
institutionalised by the 1975 Lomé Convention and the EEC/EC-ASEAN Dialogue. As Nuttall 
explains (1992, p. 288), the dialogues with regional groupings mainly came at the initiative of 
the then Twelve in response to specific international events but also because the Twelve saw 
themselves particularly well suited for this type of dialogue due to their own institutional 
experience. Moreover, in a world showing a growing tendency towards regionalisation, the 
EEC/EC realised that inter-regional cooperation was the best way to deal with global 
interdependence and at the same time to secure a greater consistency in the relationship to these 
countries than one would expect from bilateral relations (Regelsberger, 1990a, p. 11).  
 
 
The Euro-Arab Dialogue: the first “group to group” dialogue  
                                               
10 Regarding the definition of ‘group-to-group dialogues’, I follow Regelsberger (1991, p.14): groups can 
be ether deliberately organised to play an international role (e.g. the GCC or ASEAN) or loosely tied together 
for the sole purpose of dealing with the EC, like in the case of the ACP group.  
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The Euro-Arab Dialogue was the first regional dialogue established by the EEC/EC vis-à-vis 
the Arab countries which formed one block due to the Palestinian representation issue. 
Established in 1974 on the wake of the oil shock between the member states in the context of 
EPC and the 22 members of the Arab League, the Euro-Arab Dialogue has constituted a very 
particular form of dialogue from an institutional perspective. In fact, official EEC/EC 
documents placed the EAD in the section of the Community’s external relations while also 
referring to it in part on EPC. Most of the members of the Arab League were previously linked 
on a contractual basis with the European Community, whether through the EC’s global 
Mediterranean Policy, the Lomé Convention, or the Cooperation Agreement with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, dealing mainly with economic issues. Yet the commitment to cooperate 
in the EAD lacked a solid legal framework (i.e. lack of any treaty basis) (Regelsberger, 1990b, 
p. 63). It has therefore been described by the participants of the dialogue as an ‘informal 
political-economic dialogue’, conducted at both the Community and EPC level (Regelsberger, 
1990b, p. 57). The EAD is also interesting as far as its content is concerned. Indeed, after long 
and difficult negotiations revolving around the Arab quest and European reluctance to 
incorporate a strong political dimension to the dialogue, it was finally agreed to complement 
the initially limited approach and to establish a political dimension – almost 10 years later 
(Ibid., p. 60-64). Yet due to the staunch reluctance of some European Members – notably, the 
UK – to sit together with representatives of governments involved in terrorist activities, group-
to-group conferences at ministerial level were to be held only in exceptional cases while the 
regular dialogue should be conducted with restricted high-level participation (Regelsberger, 
1990b, p. 62). As to the composition of the Ministerial delegations, the meetings were to be 
held by the full representation of the 22 members of the Arab League and by the Troika for the 
European side. Besides the thorny issue of the existence and substance of the political dialogue, 
other deliberative bodies were created in the framework of the EAD, namely the General 
Commission and more than 50 working groups and sub-committees dealing with non-political 
issues (Ibid. p 62-63).  
EEC/EC-ACP countries: adding a political dimension to an exclusively economic dialogue  
Since 1975 the EC has had a close contractual relationship with the now 68 ACP countries in 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific in the framework of the Lomé Convention.11 The 
dialogue with the ACP countries had both an economic and political dimension. The political 
                                               
11 Beforehand, these states were linked with the EC through the Association Agreements of Yaundé I and II 
(1963 and 1969) and of Arusha (1968-1969) (Regelsberger, 1990a, p. 4).  
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cooperation started only from 1988 and referred to human rights and the fight against the 
Apartheid. Institutional arrangements were put into place so that discussions could take place 
in joint ACP-EC bodies at ministerial, ambassadorial, and parliamentary levels (Schmuck, 
1990, p. 50). More specifically, the ACP-EEC/EC Council of Ministers sets guidelines and 
decides on all matters affecting the framework of cooperation. The Council meets normally 
once a year alternatively in the EC and in one of the ACP countries. According to Article 269.6, 
it can institute committees or ad hoc working groups (Schmuck 1990, p.51). The ACP-EC 
Committee of Ambassadors meets at least twice a year, normally in Brussels. It supports the 
Council of Ministers and deals with every-day work (Ibid.). Last but not least, the ACP-EC 
Joint Assembly is composed of one parliamentarian from each ACP country and the same 
number of members from the European Parliament. It meets twice a year, alternately in the EC 
and in the ACP and constitutes a forum for the discussions of new ideas (Ibid.). Over time, 
significant changes have been put forward by the European Union to renew the partnership 
with the ACP countries. Compared to its predecessor, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
(CPA) features a deeper and wider political dialogue based notably on Article 8 covering a 
broad range of topics, most notably the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the 
rule of law, and good governance (Bossuyt, Rocca, & Lein, 2014).  
 
EEC/EC-ASEAN Dialogue: a success story   
By the end of the 1970s, the EC extended its relations to East Asia, embarking on one of the 
most successful regional dialogues with ASEAN that became an example for similar 
arrangements of a political and economic nature. The year 1978 is often referred to as the real 
date of the birth of this group-to-group dialogue, corresponding to the first ministerial 
conference between ASEAN and the EC/Nine (Regelsberger, 1988a, p. 253). Two years later, 
a formal EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement, a Joint Statement on Political Issues, and a Joint 
Declaration on the possibilities of economic and technical cooperation were signed in Kuala 
Lumpur (Mols, 1990, p. 6). The political dialogue between the EC and ASEAN has been 
singled out as one of the most extensive, mature, and valued – testified by the numerous fora 
of dialogue, their high level of representation, frequency of meetings, and the widened scope 
of meetings dealing with political and security issues (Mols 1990, p.68). The level of 
familiarity was so high that the German Foreign Minister dramatically suggested that in the 
ministerial talks between the EC and ASEAN, ‘an outsider could not distinguish whether a 
Foreign Minister from ASEAN or an EC country was talking’ (ASEAN Committee, 1988). 
Regarding the content of the discussions, the EC/ASEAN came to talk about East-West 
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relations, Disarmament and Arms Control, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. 
Yet one important topic of discussion was missing from the agenda, namely the human rights 
issue, which had otherwise been a strong factor in other EC-third countries discussions. The 
reason for the absence of dialogue on this issue deals with the fact that it would have focused 
the attention on a weak point in practically all ASEAN countries and antagonise the ASEAN 
countries that were deeply reluctant to let the Europeans interfere in their political internal 
affairs (Mols 1990, p.73). Yet eventually this thorny issue ended up being addressed at the 
inter-parliamentary level of dialogue, as the European Parliament – particularly attached to the 
respect of human rights – did not refrain from raising this sensitive subject and criticising the 
practice of certain states (Regelsberger, 1988b, p. 263).  
 
5.2.2.2 The 1980s: the EC becomes a “sought after interlocutor”   
This decade is characterised by a significant growth in diplomatic contacts between the Twelve 
and the rest of the world (Regelsberger, 1991, p. 162), materialised in the spectacular 
proliferation of dialogues (with a political dimension). This happened in the aftermath of both 
the 1981 London Report and of the Single European Act that led to increased requests from 
different partners in the world to enter into structured relations with the attractive European 
Community (Monar 1997, p. 267; Flaesch-Mougin, 1990, p. 30). Using a metaphor to describe 
this phenomenon, Nutall (1992, p. 282) argued that ‘the trickle of requests for dialogue started 
earlier became a flood after the London Report of 1981’.  
 While there was no formal mention of the conduct of the Twelve’s relations with the 
outside world in the 1970s, the situation began to change slightly over the 1980s. The 1981 
London Report, which codified the accretion of procedure since the Copenhagen report, 
constitutes an important benchmark as explicit reference was made to the actual interaction of 
the Twelve with the rest of the world. It was the first genuine EPC provision with an ‘outward-
looking’ character, i.e. oriented towards the world rather than internally. In fact, article 7 (Part 
II) of the report is entirely dedicated to the procedures for EPC/Third country contacts. Based 
on the belief that the intensification of the EPC was turning the Ten into an attractive 
interlocutor, the Foreign Ministers predicted that ‘third countries will increasingly express the 
desire to enter into more or less regular contact with them’. Thus, ‘it is important that the Ten 
should be able to respond effectively to these demands, in particular vis-à-vis countries of 
special interest to them’ (London Report, 1981). To achieve this aim, the report recommended, 
that the Presidency could respond to requests from third countries for contacts and organise 
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meetings with the Troïka12 or in the margins of EPC ministerial meetings (if necessary and 
with the previous agreement of the Ten). The limits of this prescription, however, are 
particularly striking: in fact, it deals only with the very first point of contact between the Ten 
and third countries, without giving any details on how these contacts should further be 
developed (from an institutional, legal, and substantial points of view).  
An additional institutional change occurred in 1987 with the coming into force of the 
Single European Act (SEA), which altered the legal status of the EPC and formalised further 
the existing EPC practice.13 Until then, the absence of legal foundation of ECP created doubts 
regarding the obligations and constraints accepted by member states as well as ambiguous 
relations with community activities and relations (Regelsberger, De Schoutheete de Tervarent, 
& Wessels, 1997). Focusing on the modalities of the conduct of external political relations with 
the world, particular attention needs to be paid to Article (30) of the Single European Act of 
February 1986 detailing the treaty provisions on European co-operation in the sphere of foreign 
policy. In fact, Article 30(8) specifies that the member states ‘shall organize a political 
dialogue with third countries and regional groupings whenever they deem it necessary’ 
(emphasis added). It was the first time that the term ‘political dialogue’ appeared in the EC 
official documents but it remained here again ill-defined: it contains no precise indications 
either on the procedures or on the content of these political dialogues. There is also a blatant 
lack of information regarding the conditions under which the EC should agree to enter into 
such a political dialogue. The phrase ‘when deemed necessary’ is indicative of the great leeway 
left to the discretion of the member states and thus further encourages an ad-hoc approach to 
political dialogues. This ambiguity coupled with a high level of demands coming from third 
countries led to the continuation of a ‘confusion patchwork’ of dialogues in terms of format 
and substance. (Nuttall, 1992, p. 283). 
The implicit invitation formulated in the London Report as well as the reference to 
‘political dialogue’ in the SEA were met with a steadily growing number of third countries 
requesting to enter into regular contacts with EPC (Nuttall, 1992, p. 292). Indeed, after 10 years 
of intense diplomatic activities taking the form of numerous diplomatic démarches and policy 
statements agreed upon by all members, the EPC started to appear as a valuable partner with 
which to consult and associate (Regelsberger et al., 1997, p. 3).   
                                               
12 The Troïka consists of the current Presidency and representatives of the preceding and succeeding 
Presidencies (Pilgaard, 1993).  
13 For a detailed analysis of the changes introduced by the Single European Act (SEA) to the EPC, see 
Dehousse and Weiler (1991).   
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From the perspective of third countries, it was worth entering into regular contact with 
the EC for several reasons. First, in an era of global interdependence, Europe’s backing of a 
foreign policy initiative is regarded as a positive asset by many third countries eager to preserve 
or even increase their international standing (India or Australia) (Regelsberger, 1991, p. 162). 
In this sense, they considered advantageous ‘to be seen in a formal dialogue with EPC’ (Nutall, 
p.1992, p. 282; Monar, 1997, p. 268). Secondly, those countries that are the target of the Twelve 
declarations or démarches may feel an increased need to enter into some sort of contact with 
EPC especially when this has involved criticism or condemnation by the EC (Regelsberger, 
1991, p. 162). In other words, third countries are keen to know what the then Twelve are 
thinking and may try to influence their positions in the framework of a dialogue. The 
multiplications of demands and increased pressure put on the EPC to play a greater role in 
international politics at a time when the EPC was not fully mature and functional had led some 
observers to portray EPC as a ‘victim of its own success’. In the words of Nuttall, ‘the member 
states found themselves having to run when they would have preferred to walk, and rather 
sedately’ (Nuttall, 1997, p. 20). In the next sub-section, I turn to the practice of political 
dialogues (or regular consultations) that developed during the 1980s. 
In the 1980s, major powers expressed their interest in entering into contact with the 
member states in the framework of EPC. In 1983, the EC established regular contacts with 
China, Japan, and India in the form of political consultations in the framework of the EPC at 
the ministerial level. The political dialogues established with these countries have followed 
different paths in terms of intensity: in the case of China, for instance, the high-level 
consultations were suspended for a significant period of time because of the authorities’ 
crackdown on student demonstrations in June 1989 (Pilgaard, 1993, p. 106). On the contrary, 
the dialogue with Japan has known a constant and steady intensification: starting from ad hoc 
basis political meetings, the European Members and Japan agreed to two annual meetings at 
ministerial level in the framework of EPC, which further evolved into more regular meetings 
at the level of Political Directors. The political relationship has gone through an additional level 
of institutionalisation with the Joint Declaration of 18 July 1991 (Bulletin of the European 
Communities, 1991, 7-8:109) that committed both sides to annual meetings between the 
President of the European Council, the president of the Commission and the Prime Minister of 
Japan (Pilgaard, 1993, p. 106). Finally, the case of India featured a rather difficult start in the 
development of its political dialogue with the European members. Following the Political 
Committee’s acceptance of the Indian request for regular political talks, a first meeting took 
place in 1985 at the Ministerial level. Since then, however, contacts have not been as regular 
101 
 
as foreseen (Ibid.) This irregularity in the frequency of the dialogues reflects the varying degree 
of interests that the European states had in talking with third states. In this regard, it is 
interesting to recall the peculiar way through which the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian 
dialogues were put in place. China was the first country to request regular contact with the EC, 
followed quickly by Japan and India. Due to their rivalry, Japan could not let China improve 
its ties with the EPC without reacting; the same dynamic was at play behind India’s request, 
aiming at countering the Chinese formalisation of contact with the EPC. On the one hand, this 
action-reaction phenomenon sheds light on the political value that the dialogues with the EC 
had already acquired but on the other hand, this delicate situation greatly reduced the EPC’s 
margin for manoeuvre and made it unable to decline India’s request (Pilgaard 1993, p. 106). 
During the same period, regular contacts were also established with some NATO partners, like 
Canada, but also Australia and the New Zealand, as well as with smaller states (Malta, Cyprus, 
and Switzerland), which were economically and politically very close to the then Twelve 
(Regelsberger 1991, p. 173). According to Pilgaard (1993, p. 108), the EU accepted because 
of factors such as equal treatment, therefore being ‘dragged’ into a dialogue with these 
countries to a certain extent. A European Community reinvigorated by the SEA also extended 
cooperation with the EFTA countries beyond the existing bilateral agreements and opened 
political consultations with the non-EC members of the Council of Europe in 1983 
(Regelsberger, 1990a, p. 5). Besides the multiplication of regular dialogues with third 
countries, inter-regional cooperation continued and entered an additional remarkable period of 
growth in the early 1980s (Regelsberger 1988, p. 253).  
 
The San Jose Dialogue with the Contadora Group: encouraging peaceful conflict resolution  
An important group-to-group dialogue initiated by the EC in the 1980s has been the dialogue 
with the six Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Panama). The ongoing economic and social deterioration in Central America 
coupled with the tendency to consider the Central American crisis as part of the East-West 
confrontation led the EC to propose a long-term solution to tackle the root problems of these 
countries (Nuttall, 1997, p. 32; Regelsberger, 1988b, p. 264). The result was the San José 
Dialogue, launched in 1984 in Costa Rica and composed of both a political and an economic 
dialogue. The overall agenda of the group-to-group dialogue has varied very little: its main 
characteristic was the linkage between progress in the intra-regional cooperation and 
democratisation on the one hand, and the EC’s economic commitment to Central America on 
the other hand (Grabendorff, 1990, p. 87). In terms of format, an annual meeting of the 
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Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EC and of the Contadora Group was institutionalised to deal 
with political issues while a mixed commission was created along with sub-commissions to 
prepare and implement the projects in the framework of the cooperation agreement of 1985 
(Ibid.). Contacts at parliamentary level have taken place since 1974 between the European 
Parliament and the Latin American Parliament (Regelsberger, 1988b, p. 265).  
 
Gulf Cooperation Council   
Responding to an earlier proposal by the EC, the GCC finally approached the EC in 1984 to 
start exploratory talks that eventually led to the conclusion of a cooperation agreement four 
years later, covering cooperation in the fields of industry, energy, environment, science, and 
technology (Regelsberger, 1988). In parallel, the political dialogue most favoured by the 
Europeans took shape and a Joint Political Declaration was passed (Nuttall, 1992). The 
Agreement provided for the creation of a Cooperation Council, annual joint 
councils/ministerial meetings (between the EU and the GCC foreign ministers), and for joint 
cooperation committees at senior official level (EEAS, 2015b). The political dialogue meetings 
are held in tandem with the annual meetings of the Joint Council and in addition, Ministers 
continue their tradition to meet for lunch in New York (Nuttall, 2000, p. 291). The political 
dialogue has remained limited, however, not going beyond strictly regional questions, with the 
Gulf pressing its case on Iran and the Palestinian issue (Rhein, 1990, p. 115).  
 
Eastern Europe 
Last but not least, contacts between the European Community and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) started in the 1970s, but it is only with the 
redefinition of global Soviet foreign policy in the mid-1980s that the relations became 
formalized in a very minimalist way though. Besides the conclusion of bilateral cooperation 
Agreements14, the joint declaration signed in June 1988 established official relations between 
the two organisations and mainly placed on a legal footing what had been practised for some 
time in the diplomatic realm. It did not provide for any institutions but referred only to ‘means 
of contacts and discussions’ between representatives of both parties. Furthermore, the level at 
which meetings might take place, as well as their frequency, was left open. The substance of 
                                               
14 Each one of the Cooperation Agreement signed provides for the establishment of a Joint Committee that 
meets at least annually to manage, discuss and develop all questions touched on by the Agreement 
(Lippert, 1990, p. 27). 
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the discussions also remained very vague and limited; both parties should ‘develop cooperation 
in areas which fall within their respective spheres of competence and where there is common 
interest’. In light of these limitations, some observers have called the essence of the EC’s 
dialogue with the CMEA nothing more than ‘normalization’ (Lippert, 1990, p. 125). However, 
in hindsight and bearing in mind the enlargement process, the progress has been rather 
spectacular.  
To sum up, when the member states established the EPC, they focused on setting up 
the framework for coordination of their foreign policy, and little thought was given to the need 
for formalised relations with third countries (Pilgaard 1993, p. 104). It is only in the 1986 
Single European Act that the idea of ‘political dialogue’ with third countries and regional 
groupings were formally endorsed, albeit with little precision as to its use and format. In 
parallel, political dialogues were actually taking place but constituted no systematic and 
binding practice at all. Political dialogues were optional and most of the time came at the 
request of partner countries that were interested in establishing contacts with the EC to advance 
their own interests. In this sense, the political dialogues of the 1970s and 1980s were mostly 
‘optional’ for third countries. It is also important to bear in mind that over this period of time, 
the economic relations continued to flourish between the EC and the member states, with the 
conclusions of further trade and cooperation agreements. The political dialogues described in 
this part could precede or complement these intensified economic relations but were not 
directly linked one to another (Monar, 1997, p. 266). As Flaesch-Mougin explains (1990, p. 
31), the existence of a dialogue on economic issues did not automatically entail the existence 
of a political dialogue – and even if the dialogues were conducted in parallel, they were not 
always adjusted.  
 
5.2.3. The 1990s and onwards: the EU taking the lead in the institutionalisation 
of dialogues  
 
The 1990s marked a further important shift in the evolution of the dialogues put in place by the 
EU in its dealing with third countries. This section depicts and analyses two notable 
developments in this context that emerged under the EU impulse: first, the systematic 
institutionalisation of political dialogues on a legal mandatory basis and, second, the creation 
of new kind of dialogue, namely the ‘human rights dialogue’ and sectorial dialogues. Before 
turning to each one of these distinctive trends, I provide a short background on the changes 
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operated by the CFSP as they are important to understand the following institutional 
developments.  
 
5.2.3.1. Institutional development at the EU level: from ECP to CFSP  
With the end of the Cold War, European integration entered a decisive phase marked by the 
signature of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) that brought into being the successor of 
EPC, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union (Nuttall, 1997, p. 19). For 
a few observers, the collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
experience of the European response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991 had 
definitely precipitated ‘the New European Structure’ in the form of the Maastricht Treaty 
(McGoldrick, 1997, p. 139; Nuttall, 2000). The scale and rapidity of these events proved too 
great for the machinery of EPC to master and therefore new institutional arrangements became 
absolutely necessary (Nuttall, 1997, p. 22). In parallel, there was a growing  understanding that 
the EC approaching the 21st century, could not afford to retreat into itself:  its economic weight 
demanded that it plays a commensurate political role in world affairs (Regelsberger et al., 1997, 
p. 3).  
However, according to Smith (2004, p. 176), ‘the specific institutional reforms of EU 
foreign policy that materialized in the creation of the CFSP largely reflected endogenous, path-
dependent processes. Rather than a decisive break with the past, the CFSP represented a 
natural, logical progression both by clarifying what had been achieved by the EPC and building 
only a few truly innovative goals and procedures onto that mechanism’. To him, CFSP should 
always be considered part of an on-going, evolutionary process of institution building, based 
on the EPC, and some informal practices that had grown up between the SEA and the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) (Smith 2004, p. 177).15 In the words of McGoldrick (1997, p. 140), 
‘CFSP is thus evolutionary rather than revolutionary’. Maastricht actually established a single 
institutional framework to govern all the policies, whether involving the Supranational 
Community Method (for foreign economic policy) or the intergovernmental methods 
(EPC/CFSP) and Trevi/Schengen (for Justice and Home Affairs, JHA). One of the main 
rationales behind this tri-partite architecture introduced by the Maastricht Treaty was to 
improve the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external relations. This involved the 
application of multiple EU external policy tools or competencies (such as development aid, 
                                               
15 For a comprehensive analysis and comparison of the provisions of the EPC and CFSP, see Michael E. 
Smith (2004), chapter 7: towards governance: The Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
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tariff concessions, and political dialogue) towards a single external goal, and therefore stronger 
linkages between the economic and political dimensions of cooperation with third countries 
(Smith, 2004, p. 209). This point is particularly relevant for the following discussion on the 
legal institutionalisation of political dialogues. 
 
5.2.3.2. Political dialogues become “compulsory”: formalisation of political dialogues   
The 1990s heralded the EC/EU’s shift from an incremental pragmatic approach to political 
dialogues without a clear blueprint towards a much more systematic framework for holding 
political dialogues with third countries. Political dialogues as such cannot be found in the TEU 
but are established on the basis of general association treaties, decisions, declarations, or simply 
on the basis of an exchange of letters. Since the entry into force of the TEU, political dialogues 
take place in the framework of CFSP. They are seen as a means of attaining the objectives in 
Article 11 of the TEU16 and may cover:  
- an exchange of views and information on political questions of mutual interest;  
- the identification of areas suitable for an enlarged cooperation on the basis of a greater 
confidence between the different actors on the international scene;  
- the adoption of joint positions and actions in relation to existing international problems 
(Wessels, 1999, p. 114).  
In the post-Maastricht era, the term obtained a formal meaning and was only used by the Union 
if three conditions were fulfilled: (1) there had to be a formal decision by the Political 
Committee and/or the ministers to engage in a ‘dialogue’; (2) there had to be a formal 
agreement with the third state(s) concerned, which could take the form of an informal 
arrangement between the Presidency and the third state(s) of a common understanding through 
an exchange of letters (e.g. Australia) or a joint declaration (e.g. Japan) or a formal treaty 
obligation (e.g. ‘Europe Agreements’ with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe); (3) 
the dialogue had to provide for regular political contacts at one or several levels, in addition to 
the normal diplomatic relations (from the highest level of the Presidency, ministerial level, the 
                                               
16Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union defines the following five objectives of the CFSP: (1) To 
safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter; (2) To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 
(3) To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, 
including those on external borders; (4) To promote international cooperation; (5) To develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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level of political directors, the senior official or expert level, and the parliamentary level)  
(Wessel, 1999, p. 114–115). As Monar mentions, these conditions show that the dialogues had 
become a quite specific form of contact with third countries that went beyond occasional 
meetings and normal diplomatic business (1997, p. 264).  
More importantly, a new trend has been to include obligations to enter into political 
dialogue in association treaties concluded with third countries (Monar, 1997, p. 270). In other 
words, the provisions for regular political dialogue have become part and parcel of a growing 
number of agreements signed between the EU and third countries – both in the case of previous 
agreements upgraded or innovative ones launched with new partners around the world. All of 
the EU’s political dialogues, both bilateral and regional are supposed to cover issues relating 
to human rights and democratisation (Smith, 2014). In some cases, a dedicated sub-committee 
on human rights can be formed under the rubric of an agreement with the third country, as in 
the case of Cambodia, Egypt, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, the Palestinian 
Authority, Tunisia, and Vietnam (European Union, 2011, p. 13). This should not be confused, 
however, with the ‘structured human rights dialogue’ on which I will elaborate later. To back 
the claim according to which political dialogues have become ‘unavoidable’ for third countries, 
I list the different types of agreements that include the ‘compulsory’ provisions for political 
dialogues.  
 
Association Agreements (AA) 
For instance, one way through which political dialogues have further been institutionalised and 
put on a legal basis has been their systematic inclusion in the Association Agreements signed 
by the EU with third countries (under Title 1: Political Dialogue). In terms of the multiplication 
of Association Agreements (and their subsequent provisions for political dialogues), one can 
mention several outstanding developments. First, in the mid-1990s, in the context of the 
Barcelona Process, a series of Association Agreements have been progressively signed 
between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean neighbours, all of which covered substantial 
political issues (Pieters, 2006, p. 403). In the 2000s, an Association Agreement was signed 
with Chile (European Commission, 2015a). And more recently, at the regional group level, the 
EU and six Central American countries concluded Association Agreement negotiations in 
2010, during the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid. They included Costa Rica, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (Panama joined the talks as full member at the end of the 
process) (EEAS, 2015a). According to the Council Conclusions on the Management of external 
commitments at Ministerial level dating back to 2000, (doc. 9548/00, p. V), ‘there were more 
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than 80 regular ministerial level meetings with third countries per year – most of them under 
cooperation and association agreements’.  
 
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs)  
Another kind of agreement signed between the EU and third countries that obviously features 
a mandatory political dialogue corresponds to the Stabilization and Association Agreements 
(under Title II: Political dialogue). It is offered exclusively to the Western Balkans countries 
in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process. The particularities of this 
agreement are the incorporation of the ‘evolution clause’, which confirms the status of a 
potential candidate country and the emphasis on the regional cooperation in Western Balkans. 
All SAAs entail a political dialogue chapter. As of today, Croatia (2005), Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (2004); Albania (2009); Montenegro (2010) have signed such SAAs 
(EEAS, 2015f).    
 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)  
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) also encompass provisions for political 
dialogues (Title II: political dialogue). Such agreements were signed with partners such as 
Russia in 1997 and Central Asian countries – among them, Armenia (1999), Azerbaijan (1999), 
Georgia (1999), Kazakhstan (1999), Kyrgyzstan (1999), Moldova (1998), Ukraine (1998), and 
Uzbekistan (1999) (European Commission, 2015b). More recently, a recent Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed between the EU and Iraq in 2012 (EEAS, 2015e).  
 
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA)  
In the framework of the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement with South Africa 
signed in 1999, a regular political dialogue was established on subjects of common interest, 
both at bilateral and regional levels, which is within the framework of the EU's dialogue with 
the countries of southern Africa and with the group of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) countries (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)  
In 2016, a political dialogue and cooperation agreement (PDCA) was signed between the EU 
and Cuba. It includes three main chapters on political dialogue, cooperation, and sector policy 
dialogue as well as trade and trade cooperation (European Commission, 2016).  
Regional partnerships with a political dialogue component  
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In addition to bilateral reinforced dialogues, new regional dialogues have and are still being set 
up – among them, one counts the Andean-Community-EU dialogue (Joint declaration on 
political dialogue dating back to 2003), the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit that 
institutionalised political dialogues (28/29 June 1999), the 1995 Mercosur Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement (Article 3 on political dialogue), and the San Jose 
Dialogue (political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community 
and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Panama (Doc 14855/03, 03/12/2003). Besides the development of political dialogues with 
Latin America, the recently launched dialogue between the EU and the League of Arab States 
(LAS) is notable (Johnansson-Nogues, 2015). In fact, since the Arab Spring, the EU’s relations 
with the Arab League have entered a new phase of constructive engagement and cooperation, 
signalling a strong willingness to tackle jointly important regional challenges facing the 
common neighbourhood. Like the Cairo Declaration envisioned in 2012, the new intensified 
relationship is based on ‘structured political dialogue based on regular meetings at all levels’ 
(Cairo Declaration, 2012, paragraph 1). This call is being heeded, as testified by the launch of 
the EU-LAS strategic dialogue in 2015 and the commitment to multiply instances of dialogue 
at other representational levels (EU-LAS Joint Statement, 2016).  
 
5.2.3.3. A distinct kind of dialogue: Human Rights Dialogue  
The number of dialogues between the EU and non-EU countries has further increased with the 
establishment of a distinct kind of dialogue, i.e. the Human Rights Dialogue. In fact, following 
the UN Commission on Human Rights’ inability to address well-documented violations of 
human rights in China, several countries (such as Canada, Australia, and Norway) and the 
European Union decided to set up a formal bilateral Human Rights Dialogue (Wouters, Basu, 
Lemmens, Marx, & Schunz, 2007). The EU issued its first guidelines on human rights 
dialogues in December 2001 which announced that they were an instrument of the Union's 
external policy and, as such, not only ‘one of a range of measures which the EU may use to 
implement its policy on human rights’ but also ‘an essential part of the European Union's 
overall strategy aimed at promoting sustainable development, peace and stability’ (European 
Commission, 2001, p.1). The guidelines also aimed at strengthening the coherence and 
consistency of existing EU dialogues (European Commission, 2001, p. 3). The wording of the 
guidelines also suggested that the EU was expecting even more dialogues to be set up in the 
turn of the century, mentioning the ‘prospect of increasing numbers of dialogues’ (Ibid, p.9).  
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This type of dialogue differs from the political dialogues of a rather general nature 
based on regional or bilateral treaties agreements. Indeed, these structured human rights 
dialogues have the particularity of being focused exclusively on human rights. They thus allow 
an in-depth examination of certain human rights issues with a given third country, thereby 
further expanding the scope of topics being addressed by the EU in its dialogues.17 The 
initiative to launch such a dialogue can either emanate from the European Union or from a third 
country presenting a request (European Council, 2001). Furthermore, it is important to stress 
that the Human rights dialogues are established in accordance with the EU Guidelines on 
Human Rights dialogues, which are not legally binding; these dialogues are not enshrined in a 
legally binding treaty. They are legally detached from other agreements in which a third party 
is a signatory and, to the best of my knowledge, there is no conditionality involved in these 
specific human rights dialogues.  In terms of content, the issues covered in each dialogue are 
decided on a case-by-case basis but certain topics are systematically on the agenda, including 
the abolition of the death penalty, the signing, ratification, and implementation of international 
human rights instruments, combating torture, eliminating all forms of discrimination, 
advocating for children’s rights, women’s rights, freedom of expression, the role of civil 
society, and more (European Council, 2001). As to the nature of the participants in these 
dialogues, the discussions generally take place at the level of senior officials. Dialogues involve 
officials responsible for human rights (including representatives from relevant departments and 
agencies, such as ministries of justice and the interior, police and prison authorities, 
ombudsmen, and national parliaments) (European Council, 2001). 
Over the last 20 years, there has been a proliferation of Human Rights dialogues, mostly 
at the initiative of the EU: since the first Human Rights Dialogue launched by the EU with 
China in 1995, several other regular and institutionalised dialogues devoted solely to human 
rights have been put in place between the EU and third countries. Another country with which 
bilateral discussions on human rights were organised is Russia. As of today, the EU conducts 
such ‘structured human rights dialogues’ with countries like Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran (dialogue suspended since 
2004 though), and, more recently, Vietnam (European Union, 2010) and Malaysia (Chevallier-
                                               
17 To avoid any confusion, it is important to emphasise here the different terminology used to differentiate 
between human rights dialogues conducted between the EU and third countries that have normally serious 
HR issues and human rights consultations conducted with countries such as Canada, EU member candidates 
countries, Japan, the United States, New Zealand, and Russia which insisted to have the term consultations 
used instead of dialogue, as they did not want to be put in the same category as China and Iran (Wouters et 
al., 2007).  
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Govers, 2011). The establishment of official human rights dialogues is also now an option with 
Mongolia, Singapore, and even Cuba. In addition, human rights dialogues are also conducted 
with regional organisations, such as the African Union, and the EU currently is working to 
develop additional regional Human Rights mechanisms with the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Arab League (LAS), 
and even the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (EEAS, 2015g).   
Several human rights dialogues have been suspended over the years due to political 
issues. To give just a few examples of the suspension of dialogues used as ‘sticks’ by the EU 
or as a retaliatory measure by the third country, one can recall the fact that the Human Rights 
dialogue with Iran has been suspended since Iran’s cancellation of the 5th round of HRD in 
2004. Indeed, following harsh criticism from the EU both on the lack of progress regarding the 
human rights situation in Iran and on Iran’s nuclear dossier, the Iranian government decided to 
review its interactions with European countries and suspended the dialogue (Mousavian, 2008, 
p. 216). Despite many requests since then from the EU, Iran has not resumed this dialogue 
(EEAS, 2015d). A few human rights dialogues with China have also been regularly postponed 
for technical and political reasons (Kinzelbach, 2015).  
 
5.2.3.4. Multiplication of sectorial dialogues: strategic partnerships  
Finally, as the cooperation at the European Union level has extended to many different fields 
(including for instance Justice and Home Affairs), it has also become able to deal with these 
issues in its external relations. As a result, many additional dialogues have been created in order 
to deal with the range of issues around which the EU and non-EU countries cooperate. This 
trend is best exemplified by the 10 EU strategic partnerships18 that include an impressive 
number of dialogues, ranging from agriculture to terrorism to customs or intellectual property 
rights. A significant amount of ambiguity surrounds the new EU foreign policy instrument, 
called strategic partnerships. The concept was adopted by the EU in the late 1990s-early 2000s 
but it was only in September 2010 that the European Council discussed for the first time the 
EU’s strategic partnerships as a foreign policy concept (Renard, 2011, p. 1). Experts have come 
to characterise these strategic partnerships either as ‘essentially political agreements between 
parties interested in increasing cooperation with each other’ or as ‘instruments of soft law used 
                                               
18 The ten EU Strategic partners include Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea, and the United States (Smith, 2014, p. 55). 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by the EU to complete and re-define the framework of relations with selected partners’ (Cîrlig 
2012, p. 2). In this sense, a strategic partnership might contribute to the development of further 
areas of cooperation and possibly lead to the conclusion of new legally binding (framework) 
agreements, thereby creating additional forums of dialogues. The proliferation of technical 
meetings between the EU and some of its strategic partnerships is well documented and 
illustrated by Vivet and Lalande’s study (2014).  
5.3. Dialogues today: a snapshot from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe  
To conclude this chapter, I propose to give a snapshot of the EU political and human rights 
dialogues with third countries, as it stands in 2018 in the form of a world map (see p.116 and 
appendix 2). The map, generated with the software Tableau, is based on a review of all the 
countries in the world and the type of agreements linking them to the EU. A quick glimpse to 
the map is enough to realise how widespread the EU practice of political dialogue with third 
countries is: almost the totality of the map world is coloured in blue. As I have already 
extensively covered the different countries and regions currently engaged in political dialogues 
with the EU, it is worth examining here the few countries coloured in yellow on the map – 
representing the countries with which no such political dialogue exists to date – and the reasons 
thereof. To start with, the EU does not hold political dialogues with certain countries due to 
political reasons. This is the case of Venezuela, Thailand, Equatorial Guinea, and Russia. 
Regarding Venezuela, bilateral relations between the EU and Venezuela are not governed by 
any bilateral legal framework, unlike other Mercosur countries (Dominguez, 2015). EU 
relations with Venezuela were initially going to be governed by the Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Andean Community signed in 2003, but this 
has not been the case since the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community in 2006 
(European Commission, 2018). In the case of Thailand, the EU has negotiated with this state a 
Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that would provide a comprehensive framework 
and dramatically increase cooperation between the two parties. However, due to the military 
coup that occurred in May 2014 in Thailand, the EU has refused to sign the PCA until the 
country has a democratically elected government in place. This means that an old agreement, 
signed in 1980, continues to be the framework for relations between the EU and Thailand, and 
that agreement did not contain any provisions regarding political dialogues (EEAS, 2018).  
Another reason that the EU does not currently hold political dialogues is that there are 
no provisions in place for political dialogues in the framework of cooperation. This is the case 
for Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Taiwan, all of which have cooperation 
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agreements with the EU – encompassing economic dialogues, for instance – but no 
institutionalised discussion about political issues. With Brunei and Singapore, however, this is 
about to change because both countries are currently negotiating PCAs with the EU (EEAS, 
2016).  
Conclusion  
 
The analysis of the historical development of the dialogues established between the EU and 
the rest of the world leads to several important conclusions. First of all, there is no doubt that 
over the years the EU has come to develop an extensive set of ‘dialogical interactions’ – 
covering an ever-increasing range of issues with an exponential number of states around the 
world. This phenomenon is without precedent in terms of its quantity and variety. Secondly, 
the process leading to the establishment of these dialogues has been neither regular nor 
systematic. It has developed in an incremental way aligned with key developments at the EU 
level and with the codification of EU diplomatic practice. In this regard, the chapter has 
identified three main turning points. While in the first days of the EEC, there were only very 
limited regular contacts to monitor the smooth implementation of trade agreements in the 
framework of joint institutions, the European member states became more engaged in 
dialogues in the 1970s with the launch of the EPC, which added a political dimension to the 
EEC/EC’s external relations. During this intense period of introspection and preoccupation 
with constitution reform and the single market, the development of political dialogues was 
remarkable. The pressing demand for dialogues with the EC come mainly from individual third 
countries, which saw in the EC an attractive interlocutor while the inter-regional dialogues 
were mainly set up at the initiative of the EC. At the beginning of the 1990s, the number of 
dialogues further increased. But this time, it occurred mainly under the impulse of the EU, 
which insisted to institutionalise political dialogues in a more systematic way. Political 
dialogues, for instance, have become an integral part of many international agreements (notably 
AA), thereby being almost automatically ‘imposed’ on country partners. This trend has been 
further reinforced with the emergence of another specific kind of dialogue, i.e. human rights 
dialogue, which is devoted entirely to human rights issues. Last but not least, beyond the 
political realm, the ever-widening spectrum of policy areas requiring cooperation between the 
EU and third parties/groups has also made necessary the establishment of new dialogues to 
tackle these issues from a functional perspective (cyber dialogues, environmental dialogues, 
technical dialogues, etc). Following this general overview of the dialogues conducted by the 
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EU with the world, I turn now to the specific case of the EU-US dialogues and focus on its 
peculiar development and features.  
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Chapter 6 - The evolution of the EU-US 
dialogues in historical perspective  
 
 
 
The United States is the largest and most important interlocutor of the EU in the international 
system. Indeed, the EU-US bilateral partnership features an intensity and frequency of 
consultations unparalleled in the diplomatic relations of either partner and in the history of 
diplomacy writ large (Ginsberg, 2001b). In fact, over the last few decades, a whole architecture 
of dialogues has been put in place, dealing with a full array of policy areas including the 
traditional issues of trade, competition policy, and regulatory cooperation. But these issues 
increasingly include internal and external security issues, involving different kinds of actors 
(Pollack, 2014, p. xv), from the level of civil society to the highest ranking European and 
American political representatives. Before delving into the actual analysis of the dynamics and 
added value of these dialogues in the next chapters, it is first necessary to provide an updated 
review of the multi-layered architecture of EU-US dialogues standing at the core of this study.  
In order to generate meaningful insights on the role of dialogues in the transatlantic 
context, I propose to analyse the evolution of the EU-US dialogues within the wider context of 
the transatlantic relations and to identity the changing patterns of initiative and consultations 
over time. The literature is replete with analyses emphasising the dual nature of the transatlantic 
relationship, oscillating between ‘cooperation and competition’, ‘convergence and 
divergence’, or ‘alignment and decoupling’. While there is no shortage of secondary literature 
about the ‘ups and downs’ of the transatlantic relations from a broader perspective, not enough 
attention has been given to the specific evolution of the practice of dialogues against this wider 
political backdrop. Therefore, a key question addressed in this chapter is whether the dialogue 
is affected by, affects, or is partially insulated from the state of transatlantic relations. The 
chapter suggests that the dialogue does not drive the state of the transatlantic relations. Rather, 
the overall state of the transatlantic relations influences the ease with which the dialogues are 
initiated and established in the first place. Once institutionalised, however, these dialogues are 
not easily dismantled and actually become partially insulated from the turbulence at the macro-
level. If anything, during these times of crisis and uncertainty, they become even more valuable 
pockets of deliberation in which disagreements can be explored.  
To back this argument, this chapter proceeds chronologically, highlighting the 
evolution of the dialogues between Europeans and Americans within the broader context of 
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transatlantic relations in order to provide a more fine-grained analysis. The first part focuses 
on the 1950s and 1960s, when the first diplomatic contacts between the European Community 
and the United States were officially established, with both actors equally engaged in the 
process. The second section, spanning from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, documents the 
difficult establishment of the first consultations on political matters between the EC and the 
United States in the framework of EPC. These first political contacts, convened initially at the 
demand of the United States and later the EC, revolved mainly around a question of control 
over the other in a period when there were many conflicting interests and disagreements. 
Moving to the post-Cold War era, the third section shows the remarkable development of the 
architecture of dialogues covering an ever-increasing range of issues at different levels against 
the backdrop of improved relations. Finally, the last section covers the new millennium and 
demonstrates that even in times of turbulence, like during the Bush presidency or currently 
with the Trump administration, the dialogue continues and becomes even more relevant than 
ever.   
6.1. 1950s-1960s: First EC-US diplomatic contacts in the backdrop of 
good relationships 
 
This first section shows that the good relationship characterising transatlantic relations in the 
1950s – and to a lesser extent the 1960s – drove the establishment of the first diplomatic 
contacts between the EC and the United States. The contacts at that time, equally desired by 
both sides, were restricted to the field of competence under the community and did not relate 
at all to political and security matters.  
 
1950s: Truman and Eisenhower – a period of close relations with staunch American 
support for comprehensive forms of European integration  
 
Regarding the very first years following the end of the Second World War and through the 
early 1960s, there is a broad consensus in the literature about the close relationship between 
the United States and Western Europe, whereby the Atlantic framework is put in place and 
everyone tacitly agrees that Europe belongs to America’s sphere of influence. In fact, due to 
strategic reasons – notably the ‘double’ containment of the Soviet Union and Germany – the 
United States actively favoured the creation of a supranational Europe with its own political 
bodies provided that a more united Europe would remain friendly to the United States 
(Lundestad, 2003, p. 37). The American support was welcomed by the Western European 
countries that needed economic assistance as well as military support to guard against Soviet-
117 
 
communist expansion, leading Lundestad to argue that the Europeans de facto ‘invited’ the 
Americans to become involved (2003, p. 55). The 1950s and the 1960s are therefore commonly 
described as a period in which the relationship between the United States and Europe were 
close, with the Americans taking the leadership of the Western camp (for example, the Truman 
doctrine, Marshall Plan, creation of NATO) and supporting the various European initiatives in 
terms of integration (support for the ECSC, EDC and for the idea of the common market) 
(Hanhimmmäki, Schoenborn, & Zanchetta, 2012, p. 44).  
This positive state of the relations is reflected in the creation of the first diplomatic 
contacts between the United States and the nascent European community. On 11 August 1952, 
the United States became the first non-member state to recognise the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which was formed on 23 July 1952. The following year, in 1953, 
diplomatic relations between the two entities were initiated when the first American observers 
were sent to ECSC. This paved the route for the opening of a formal mission to the ECSC in 
Luxembourg in 1956 that eventually became the US Mission to the European Communities in 
1961. This move was reciprocated on the European side with the establishment of an 
embryonic version of what would become the Delegation of the European Commission to the 
United States in Washington, DC, at a later stage. In fact, Monnet and some of his American 
friends played a key role in the launching of a Community Information Office run by two 
Americans, but financed by the High Authority (HA) of the ECSC in 1954 (Winand, 2001, p. 
128). After the launch of the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic 
Energy Community (EAEC) in 1958, the ECSC information office changed its name to 
European Communities Information Service. It is only in 1972 that the European Communities 
Information Service was granted full diplomatic status thanks to legislation approved by both 
houses of Congress and signed into law by President Richard Nixon. The office was then 
known as the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to the United States 
(Delegation of the EU to the US, 2018). It is important to note that the exchange between these 
bodies corresponded only to matters under Commission (community) responsibility. 
Deliberations were held with US administrations by the Commission. Topics related to defence 
and foreign policy issues were discussed between the State Department and the individual 
European embassies in Washington but by no means at the European collective level (Kotsonis, 
1997, p. 195).  
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1960s: Kennedy and Johnson (1961-1969): “beginning of uneasy period” in transatlantic 
relations 
During the Kennedy administration, several factors challenged the Atlantic framework 
(dominance of the United States) and gave rise to the first serious tensions between Europe and 
the United States (Lundestad, 2003, p. 120). Nevertheless, the American government did not 
alter its unwavering support for European integration (supra-nationalism). This continuous 
support for European unity and integration was mainly due to the preponderance of political 
considerations related to the fight against communism and to the understanding that Europe 
was necessary to keep the United States growing economically (Brinkley & Griffiths, 1999).   
One of the key factors that helped challenge the ‘Atlantic stability’ was the growing 
independence of European countries vis-à-vis the United States, especially France and 
Germany as reflected in the rejection of British membership of the EEC, the French-German 
Élysée Treaty, and later in the French rejection of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 
withdrawal from military integration through NATO (Lundestad, 2003, pp. 128-129). The 
wide-spread criticism in Europe relating to the Vietnam war and détente after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis threatened to change the very foundation of the Atlantic unity that had been 
forged to face the Soviet threat in the first place.  
In light of Europe’s renewed strength and recognition of significant economic 
weaknesses in the United States, Kennedy made the idea of the Atlantic Partnership as the 
cornerstone of his Grand Design. In his famous speech in Philadelphia in 1962, after arguing 
that the Declaration of Independence continued to inspire struggles for freedom around the 
world, Kennedy claimed that ‘the United States will be ready for a Declaration of 
Interdependence’ with a united Europe. He insisted that ‘the US is prepared to discuss with a 
united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually 
beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the Old American 
union founded here 175 years ago’ (Lundestad, 2003, p. 121). For Smith (1984, p. 15), the 
proposed Atlantic Partnership corresponded to a political alignment that would go beyond the 
limits of conventional alliances and which would rely upon a relatively equal bargain between 
the United States and an expanded, integrated Europe. More specifically, in Phillipart’s view, 
the Kennedy’s proposal in 1962 was the equivalent of a trading partnership between two giant 
markets on either side of the Atlantic. Yet it did not get support from the EEC, as Jean Monnet 
was wary of American intentions and argued that a more efficient Atlantic action community 
covering economic and political realms would only come about when Europe was sufficiently 
strong enough to be a full partner of the United States (Phillipart, 2001, p. 35). During the 
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Johnson administration, the United States continued to support European integration despite 
concern that the EEC was not becoming the outward-looking institution the United States 
favoured (Lundestad, 2003, p. 134). Eventually, by the end of the 1960s, ‘a partnership in 
which one partner effectively dominated the other had been replaced by a kind of adversarial 
partnership’ (Smith, 1978, p. 33). According to Mally, the relationship at that time could best 
be described as ‘one of ambivalence involving a partner-rival syndrome: the resurgent Europe 
competing with the United States for a position of preponderance in the economic domain, 
while remaining largely dependent on the American nuclear umbrella for its ultimate security’ 
(Mally, 1974, p. xv). Smith describes the state of the relationship by the end of the 1960s in 
even harsher terms: ‘Far from constituting a partnership or a community, transatlantic relations 
by the end of the Johnson administration seemed to form a battleground’ (Smith, 1984, p. 15).   
6.2. 1970s-1980s: arduous establishment of EPC-US political 
consultations in a period of transatlantic turbulence   
 
While the 1970s and 1980s constituted a turbulent phase in the history of transatlantic relations, 
it was also at this time that the first consultative mechanisms on political issues between the 
United States and the EC began in the framework of the EPC. Yet the establishment of these 
first contacts was arduous and difficult, as they were mainly motivated by a logic of ‘control’ 
over the decisions taken by the other side. In fact, at the beginning of the 1970s, surprised by 
the growing assertiveness of the Europeans on the international scene in the framework of EPC, 
Kissinger insisted the United States should be consulted in the early stages of decision-making 
at the collective European level. A decade later, in light of Reagan’s growing unilateralism 
with far-reaching consequences for Europe, it was the EC that time that came to request an 
upgrade in the political consultations with the United States. As explained below, the negative 
backdrop against which these contacts were initiated led to a non-systematic consultative 
framework and the consultations when they did occur were not linked to explicit policy 
objectives (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 305).  
 
6.2.1. 1970s: Nixon-Kissinger’s insistence to enter into consultations with the 
EPC 
The transatlantic literature generally depicts the 1970s as a turning point and even as a major 
time of crisis in the relations between Europe and the United States. In the words of Kaiser 
(1974) writing during this turbulent phase, ‘The present crisis is more fundamental since it 
appears to threaten the essence, indeed the survival, of cooperation both within European and 
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in the Atlantic world’. More than 40 years later, scholars continue to describe this period as 
‘one in which the Atlantic Ocean seemed to grow wider’ (Hanhimmmäki et al., 2012, p. 87). 
For Smith, what differentiates the period of the 1950s and 1960s from the 1970s is the degree 
of stability in expectations and perceptions of commitment that both sides had for each other 
(Smith, 1978, p. 43).  
The deterioration of the transatlantic relationship during this period has mainly been 
attributed to the change of attitude in the Nixon-Kissinger era, which indicated less support for 
supra-nationalism in Europe compared to their predecessors. This new approach towards the 
European integration project was part of a broader change in US policy and strategic thinking 
whereby Nixon and Kissinger advocated a ‘new structure of peace’, in which major power 
centres would interact in a way reminiscent of the classical balance of power. In this structure, 
the European allies were to play a full and responsible part (Smith 1984, p. 16). This re-
appraisal of European integration came from the realisation that the US economy was facing 
severe difficulties, as well as from the sense that, to paraphrase Nixon, ‘the Europeans were 
having it both ways’ – that is, both enjoying American protection on the military front while 
creating difficulties on the political and economic fronts. (Lundestad, 1998, p. 102). In short, 
the administration had become ambivalent about the whole objective of a united Europe and 
questioned the compatibility of the goals of a supranational Europe and a US-dominated 
Atlantic Community (Hanhimmmäki et al., 2012, p. 78).   
The administration’s ambivalence to the EC had an impact in terms of communication 
between both sides. While Smith (1978, p. 34) mentions an erosion of the channels of 
communication, other commentators go a step further, arguing that bilateralism and the lack of 
consultation became a characteristic of Nixonian foreign policy. The United States continued 
to meet with European national leaders but did not engage with the Commission (Lundestad, 
1993, p. 177). Nixon reportedly argued that since it would take some time before the Europeans 
would learn to act as a group, ‘we have to work with the heads of governments in the various 
countries and not that jackass in the European Commission in Brussels’ (presumably Nixon 
meant Commission President Sicco Mansholt) (FRUS, 1972, p. 265). This propensity to bypass 
the Commission and to privilege direct communication with the member states led to serious 
complaints by the US Ambassador to the EC, Robert Schaetzel (1966 to 1972), but the reports 
of his mission were mostly ignored by Washington. Similarly, the delegation of the 
Commission in Washington, DC, also experienced difficulties getting the Americans’ attention 
at that time (Winand, 2001, p. 130).  
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Later, however, in light of the development of the EPC, the Americans had the feeling 
of being left out of control over the political process taking shape in Europe and were concerned 
that this could lead the Community to take common decisions in the realm of foreign policy 
opposed to the interests of the United States (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 301). In particular, the United 
States was caught by surprise when EPC made its international debut in 1973 by taking a 
common position at the CSCE talks – to which the United States had to adapt (Ginsberg 1997, 
p. 304). It is in this context that the initiative of the Year of Europe – which would soon be 
named the ‘Year of the Debacle’ – emerged. On 23 April 1973, Kissinger called upon the West 
Europeans to subscribe to the new structure of peace and to accept a ‘New Atlantic Charter’ 
that would form the basis of a new community within the crucial Atlantic framework (i.e. under 
the dominance of the United States) (Smith 1984, p. 17). Yet the new Atlantic charter that 
Kissinger proposed, coupled with his hectoring tone, irked the Europeans. He pointed out that 
‘while the US had global responsibilities, the Europeans only had more regional ones’ and 
emphasised the linkage between the maintenance of the American security guarantee and a 
European quid pro quo in the economic sphere and with regard to military burden-sharing. In 
response, the EC’s draft agreement stressed the political equality of the EC and the United 
States and refused to recognise the linkage between security, political, and economic problems 
(Lundestad, 2003, p. 183). As to the idea of a comprehensive New Atlantic Charter, it was 
reduced to a declaration of principles and then divided into two separate documents, which 
were in turn stripped of all substance (Kotsonis, 1997), thereby inflicting upon Kissinger yet 
another defeat.  
Eventually, after lengthy negotiations among the European member states themselves 
and with the United States, both sides finally agreed on the so-called ‘Gymnich Formula’ in 
April 1974. In essence, the agreement was that the United States was to be kept informed by 
the presidency of the EPC’s plans in sufficient time for the United States to react if it had 
serious objections (Nutall 1997, p. 27). However, this agreement was far from what the 
Americans had hoped for initially, namely the institutionalisation of contacts ‘à dix’ at the level 
of the Political Directors, or as Ginsberg (1997, p. 304) put it, not less than ‘a seat at the EPC 
table’. In fact, the Americans put forward the request to be consulted before final positions 
were adopted by the Europeans. They also required that the text in which the form of 
consultations was to be fixed should be concluded, on the European side, by the member states 
acting separately and not collectively (Nuttall, 1997, p. 27). This is because the United States 
had been alarmed by European attempts to make the presidency their sole negotiator and were 
concerned that this development would restrict their access to individual states, reducing the 
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possibility to intervene in the EPC process (Ibid). As a result of the Gymnich formula, in 1974 
the EC Commission and the US Cabinet initiated bi-annual ministerial meetings, and EC and 
US foreign ministers initiated ad hoc consultations. These patchwork consultative meetings 
were not related to any overall strategy of bilateral political ties and tended to focus on the 
sharing of views rather than on the unification of policies (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 304).  
The European reluctance to the far more reaching US propositions mainly reflected the 
French position opposed to the institutionalisation of the consultations with the United States 
out of fear that reinforcing consultations would mean giving the Americans a quasi-permanent 
'droit de regard' over the Community's affairs and an opportunity to exert greater influence on 
the decision-making of the Nine. Nonetheless, the arrangement was still important for 
providing for the continuation of bilateral contacts and serving as a basis on which to build 
EPC-US consultations. The Americans were now to adopt a maximalist approach with regard 
to the agreement, playing off the Nine on both fields by making full use of bilateral channels 
while trying to open the EPC door wider (Pilgaard, 1993).  
While the establishment of consultations between the United States and the EPC 
encountered difficulties, new channels of communication were put in place between the 
American Congress and the European Parliament. In fact, in 1972 the first US congressional 
delegation came to the European Parliament – starting what was about become the oldest inter-
parliamentary dialogue in diplomatic history. This happened under the initiative of former 
Representative Sam Gibbons. The first congressional visits to Brussels were arranged by 
Members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and focused mainly on issues such as 
agriculture subsidies, steel tariffs, anti-dumping initiatives, and general trade-related issues. 
These initial parliamentary contacts were first known as the United States-European 
Community Inter-parliamentary Group, before being renamed at a later stage the Transatlantic 
Legislators Dialogue (Archick & Morelli, 2013, p. 2).  
Under the Ford and Carter administrations, there was a slight improvement in the state 
of the transatlantic relations (Hanhimmmäki et al., 2012, pp. 90–91; Lundestad, 2003, p. 203). 
President Ford demonstrated less rigidity than his predecessors regarding the relationship with 
Europe, a topic that did not rank high on his agenda anyway. If anything, the most memorable 
act of Ford’s European policy was the signature of the Helsinki Accords on 1 August 1975 
along with the representatives of all European states except Albania, as well as the USRR and 
Canada. This marked the high point of détente (Hanhimmmäki et al., 2012, p. 91). As to Jimmy 
Carter, he fiercely criticised Nixon-Kissinger for their neglect of their European allies and was 
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determined to improve relations. For instance, in April 1977 he proclaimed: ‘I strongly favor, 
perhaps more than my predecessors, a closer interrelationship among the nations of Europe, 
the European Community, in particular’.  Whereas Ford had agreed to consult regularly only 
with the chairman of the European Council, representing the national governments, not with 
the European Commission, Carter went a step further.  In a symbolic move, he embarked on a 
visit to the European Commission in Brussels in January 1978, the first such visit by a US 
president. He promised that the United States would give ‘unqualified support’ to what the 
Community was trying to accomplish and welcomed the participation of the Commission 
President in the G-7 summits (Lundestad, 2003, p. 202).   
 
 
6.2.2. 1980s: Reagan’s unilateralism and EC requests to upgrade consultations 
with the US 
  
Under the Reagan administration, transatlantic relations became strained once again (Ginsberg, 
1997, p. 304; Kotsonis, 1997; Nuttall, 1997, p. 22). They were mainly characterised by acute 
frictions over a wide range of foreign policy issues: from the US bombing in Libya to American 
support for the Contras in Nicaragua through disagreements over the Venice Declaration or the 
EPC-backed Contadora peace process, to cite just a few (Dobson & Marsh, 2001, p. 62).  
Under the Reagan administration, the United States pursued far-reaching policies in a 
unilateralist manner that would prompt the Europeans to improve the EPC-US consultations. 
Similar to the logic behind Kissinger’s requests a decade earlier, it was the sense of a loss of 
control and fear of the consequences of US unilateral decisions for their own interest that led 
the EC to upgrade the consultations with the United States.19 In fact, many commentators have 
described this decade as one of uncertainty and dramatic changes in American foreign policy: 
while the first years of the Reagan administration signalled the end of détente, the last ones 
were characterised by an extraordinary rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the 
possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons on the European continent. As Kotsonis put it, 
‘Within the course of a decade the European pendulum had swung from concern over 
superpower collision to concern over superpower collusion’ (1997, p. 146) (emphasis added). 
In light of the significance of these changes for the European countries, the reluctance of 
                                               
19 For more details on transatlantic tensions during this period see Neil Winn, European Crisis 
Management in the 1980s, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996.  
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Washington to consult with its European allies became more and more unacceptable. As a 
result, the Western European countries insisted to improve the transatlantic dialogues to avoid 
being faced with faits accomplis in areas that directly affected their interests (Kotsonis, 1997, 
p.1, Nutall, 1997, p. 28). They hoped that improved communication would lead to a better 
understanding between the two sides and greater European influence over American decision-
making. 
Following the European request for an upgrade of consultations, modest changes were 
introduced in the mechanisms of the EPC-US contacts: the new measure provided for ad hoc 
contacts between the Troïka of Political directors and their American counterparts. The first 
meeting of this kind took place on 30 September 1982 while another followed on 11 February 
1983. Following that meeting, contacts between the Political Cooperation Troika and the 
United States (in the person of the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) were 
further institutionalised and started taking place at regular intervals: once a year on the margins 
of the meeting of the UN General Assembly in September (Gardner, 1997, p. 9). In September 
1986, further structure was added to transatlantic consultations through the Brocket Hall 
agreement: the United States and the EC agreed that the foreign Minister of the country holding 
the Community’s Presidency would visit Washington at the beginning of each year and that 
the political directors’ Troika should meet during each presidency with their US counterparts 
at the Under Secretary level, thereby doubling the frequency of such contacts (Schwok, 1991, 
pp. 32–35; Nutall, 1992, p. 286; Ginsberg, 1997, p. 306). In addition, regular contacts between 
the American administration and the diplomatic mission of the Twelve in Washington needed 
to be reinforced (Kotsonis, 1997, p. 194). This trend continued: one year later, in 1987, another 
measure was introduced – namely a working dinner on the margins of the September UN 
General Assembly in New York between the EC Foreign Ministers, EC Commissioner for 
external relations, and the US Secretary of State (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 306).  
            In parallel, the inter-parliamentary dialogues continued but the topic of the discussions 
also became more political than what they had been in the past. Indeed, given the evolving 
nature of the transatlantic relationship, and the changes taking place within the EU itself, the 
purpose and focus of the Congress–EP inter-parliamentary exchange gradually turned more to 
a foreign policy agenda dedicated to issues involving the Cold War and the development of the 
European Union. By the mid-1980s, the responsibility for arranging the US-EP meetings in the 
US Congress and the formation of the congressional delegations to Europe shifted to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee (Archick & Morelli, 2013, p. 2).  
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To sum up, while in earlier years it was the Americans who had taken the initiative to 
deepen the American-European relationship (Kennedy’s famous interdependence speech in 
1962 and in Kissinger’s ‘Year of Europe’ in 1973), things began to change in the 1980s with 
more requests emanating from the European side. Interestingly, this period of disagreement 
under Reagan was actually a period of institutionalisation of relations. Yet by the end of the 
1980s, only a messy patch of consultations had been put in place with no general policy 
objectives. Things were about to change with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a 
new era of structured and comprehensive consultations between the EU and the United States.  
 
6.3. 1990s: “Talking about everything and on a regular basis”: 
structured and comprehensive dialogue in the post-Cold War era  
 
The end of the Cold War marked a real turning point in the history of the transatlantic 
relationship and this is reflected in the beginning of a formal structured bilateral dialogue 
between the United States and the EU from 1990s onwards (Steffenson, 2005, p. 25). At the 
end of the 1980s, the state of the transatlantic relationship dramatically improved and, against 
this backdrop, it was much easier to set up a proper framework for consultations (compared to 
the previous two decades).  
 
6.3.1. Bush administration: equal desire to institutionalise a proper EU-US 
dialogue 
Overall, transatlantic relations improved markedly under President George HW Bush 
(Lundestad, 2003, p. 241). While Reagan tended to get personally involved in the economic 
disputes between United States and EC, Bush was more focused on the overall political 
relationship that he was determined to improve. In a famous statement, he made the following 
point: ‘What an absurdity it would be, if future historians attribute the demise of the Western 
alliance to disputes over beef hormones and wars over pasta’, implying harsh criticism of his 
predecessor (Ibid. p. 241).  
Yet besides the different personalities of the American leaders, other factors were at 
play in the rapprochement between the United States and Europe. Already by 1989, the United 
States had begun to show greater interest in Europe, given the economic prospects of European 
integration (‘Europe 1992’ programme, completion of the Single European market) and the 
unprecedented political changes in Central and Eastern Europe that were to have implications 
on the Atlantic relationship (Devuyst, 1990). Eventually, it was mainly the international 
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context characterised by the end of the Cold war that motivated both the EU and the United 
States to seek new mechanisms for consultation and cooperation. While the EU wanted to 
demonstrate its abilities as a foreign policy actor, the United States was concerned that the 
Community might develop policies and institutions incompatible with American interests if 
the process of European integration was not accompanied by improved transatlantic dialogue 
(Gardner, 2001, p. 85). In addition, the United States welcomed the prospects of burden-sharing 
in light of being the only superpower (Steffenson 2005, pp. 25-50). For Ginsberg (1997, p. 
305), the end of the Cold War also removed many of the tensions associated with earlier 
disagreements centred around East-West dynamics, paving the way for more cooperative 
relations based on pragmatism. Finally, beyond this interest-based explanation, the end of the 
Cold War also had a very strong symbolic dimension for the United States and Europe. 
According to the former EU Ambassador to the United States, Günter Burghardt, ‘The fall of 
the wall symbolized the greatest achievement of the US and Europe: it was partly the result of 
the successful combination of US power and determination and of the attraction of the 
European integration to the people under communist rule’ (Burghardt, 2013). It was thus 
logical to assume a kind of shared governance for the new world order was about to emerge.  
The November 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (TAD) was thus a balanced effort with 
the Germans taking the initiative in close cooperation with DC (Lundestad, 1993, p. 265). After 
long months of negotiations, both sides signed the Transatlantic Declaration, which has been 
described as a ground-breaking move to create a structured dialogue (Steffenson, 2005, p. 35) 
and as a source of innovation in terms of regularity, frequency, degree of formality, and the 
level of meetings between US and EU officials (Phillipart & Winand, 2001, p. 394). Signed on 
23 November 1990, this short document sets out the common goals, principles of the US-EU 
Partnership, and institutional framework for consultation pertaining to transatlantic 
cooperation. A series of common goals were identified, such as support for democracy, 
promotion of peace and international security, achievement of a sound world economy, and 
promotion of market principles (TAD, 1990). More specifically, the partners recognised mutual 
interest in pursuing economic liberalisation, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation 
and in addressing transnational challenges, such as fighting international crime, terrorism, and 
environmental degradation (TAD, 1990).  Most importantly for this study, the central principle 
on which EU-US cooperation has been based is that of ‘mutual information and consultation 
on important political and economic matters of common interests so as to bring their positions 
as closer as possible, without prejudice to their respective independence’ (TAD, 1990) 
(emphasis added).  
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This mutual desire to engage in regular consultation on a wide range of issues required 
the creation of a vast framework of dialogues at different levels and in different formats. For 
Stefensson (2005, p. 32), it is the creation of this impressive institutional framework for 
consultation that gives the TAD a real significance – though less its content, which has been 
described as cosmetic (Featherstone & Ginsberg, 1996), superficial (TPN, 1999), minimalist 
(Peterson, 1996), and lacking in substantive innovations (Devuyst, 1990). In fact, the TAD 
formalised a set of bilateral meetings between different levels of policy-makers:  
(a) bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, 
on the one side, the President of the European Council and President of the Commission 
and on the other side, the President of the United States (EU-US Summits);  
(b) Bi-annual consultations between the European Community of Foreign Ministers, 
with the Commission on the one hand, and the US Secretary of State, on the other;  
(c) Bi-annual consultations between the European Commission and the US government 
at Cabinet level;  
(d) Ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika and 
the US Secretary of State  
(e) Briefings by the Presidency to US representatives on EPC meetings at the 
Ministerial level (TAD, 1990).  
It was assumed that this framework for consultation would open lines of communication, create 
networks, result in information-sharing, and hopefully reduce the impact of disputes in 
transatlantic relations (Steffenson, 2005, p. 33). In this regard, the TAD was perceived as a 
stepping stone for the creation of further fora for exchange: it clearly stipulates that ‘both sides 
are resolved to develop and deepen these procedures for consultations as to reflect the evolution 
of the European Community and of its relationship with the United States’ (TAD, 1990). 
According to a senior US diplomat, the mission of the TAD in this sense has largely been 
accomplished: ‘Clearly, the ever-expanding architecture of dialogues reflects the extraordinary 
development of the EU-US relations’ (Interview no. 38).  
Yet TAD also presented important shortcomings, with one of them being the 
ineffectiveness of the mechanisms it introduced. Regarding the summits, for instance, they 
tended to be isolated events that did not build on one another and showed no clear line of 
progress (Steffenson, 2005, p. 34). As to the consultations at the expert and political 
directors/assistant or deputy assistant secretary level, they were criticised on the American side 
for being mere briefings for their counterparts for which they obtained little in return (Gardner, 
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2001, p. 89). This is an interesting claim that it is worth re-examining in the framework of this 
study almost 20 years later. 
 
6.3.2. Clinton administration: reinforcing the foundations of the dialogue at the 
EU’s request  
 
During the Clinton administration, the transatlantic relations went through several difficult 
phases, as the two sides squabbled over the crisis in the Balkans and trade wars over agriculture 
subsidies, beef, bananas, oilseeds, canned fruits, and Airbus. There were also pronounced 
disagreements regarding the pace of NATO and EU enlargement, which the United States 
wanted to accelerate as opposed to the more measured approach favoured by the Europeans 
(Van Oudenaren, 2010, p. 33). The distant relationship was already notable at the very 
beginning of the Clinton administration but both political entities eventually engaged in a 
pragmatic and incremental learning process leading to more cooperation by recognising the 
differences of the other ( Smith & Woolcock, 1994). It was only in 1994 that President Bill 
Clinton clearly proclaimed his support for the EU and for Europe’s development of stronger 
institutions of common action. Clinton soon saw himself as more pro-European than his 
predecessors. In his own words, his administration, unlike earlier ones, has ‘not viewed with 
alarm … the prospect that there could be greater European security cooperation between the 
French and the Germans and between others as well’ (Lundestad, 2003, p. 257). Thus, in spite 
of trade disputes, the transatlantic relationship under Clinton saw an evolution that 
strengthened, rather than weakened, pre-existing patterns of cooperation and dialogue 
(Hanhimmmäki et al., 2012, p. 141) 
Indeed, in terms of dialogues, calls were made from the European side to further develop the 
system of consultation put in place in the TAD (Lundestad, 1993, p. 265). Indeed, it was widely 
accepted that the TAD had failed to revolutionise the relationship, and that its limited 
institutional framework was unable to contain new emerging tensions (trade disputes, lack of 
transatlantic unity concerning the Gulf war, the war in the Balkans) (Stefensson 2005, p. 36). 
The Europeans also wanted to guard against the domestic emphasis of Clinton administration 
after the end of the Cold War, signs of the United States reducing its role in Europe, and 
Washington’s apparent concentration on Asia (Lundestad, 2003 p. 265).  
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The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the Joint Action Plan (JAP)   
As a result, the EU and the United States agreed to significantly upgrade their relations by 
launching the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) on 3 December 1995 in Madrid, which would 
further solidify and complement the arrangements of the TAD (Van Oudenaren, 2010, p. 32). 
The NTA did not only produce a dedicated agenda, thereby adding substance to the 
transatlantic relationship, but it also introduced new institutions to administer the policy-
making process (Steffenson, 2005, p. 35).  
In terms of substance, the NTA basically elaborated on the TAD goals. The common 
objectives were much more detailed and were ordered under four distinct chapters whereby the 
partners could pursue deeper cooperation and identified priorities. These chapters were further 
detailed in the adjoining Joint EU-US Action Plan (JAP, 1995).20 In addition, the EU and the 
United States committed to cooperate and produce so-called ‘deliverables’ in the form of joint 
agreements, statements, and initiatives (Steffenson, 2005, p. 37). This new emphasis on 
‘deliverables’ is noteworthy because it indicates a wish to shift from mere consultations as in 
the TAD to more significant joint actions (Phillipart and Winand, 2001) to address one of the 
critics levelled at the TAD. This term corresponds to diplomat-speak for attaining specific 
outputs of coordinated or joint action in order to demonstrate the utility of, and time spent by, 
the highest levels of government in the transatlantic dialogue (Ginsberg, 2001b, p. 182).  
In terms of structure, the NTA introduced two new important mechanisms to administer 
the relationship, i.e. to help coordinate and focus the whole process of cooperation: the Senior 
Level Group (SLG) and the NTA Task Force. They were created to help drive, coordinate, 
monitor, and implement the agenda for the EU-US summits (NTA, 1995) and have been 
described as a force of focus and continuity (Steffenson, 2005, p. 58).  
In addition, the widening scope of cooperation covered by the NTA led to the creation 
of a new mosaic of consultations and additional structures of dialogues: whereas in the past, 
consultations used to focus on contentious bilateral trade issues, now the areas covered by the 
agreement include security, environment, health, education, humanitarian assistance, and 
more.  The emergence of new security threats, such as international terrorism, the proliferation 
of WMD, and regional conflicts such as the Balkan wars also enhanced the need for more 
transatlantic cooperation and hence for the creation of specific instances of dialogues. Thus, 
more than 170 issues of transatlantic, international, or global scope were prioritised with an 
                                               
20 The four chapters of the NTA include: (1) promoting peace, stability, development, and democracy around 
the world; (2) responding to global challenges; (3) contributing to the expansion of world trade and 
promoting closer economic relations; and (4) building bridges across the Atlantic (NTA, 1995).  
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emphasis on practical approaches to these questions (Phillipart & Winand, 2001, p. 17). The 
different dialogues put in place are shown in the table below, according to broadly defined 
policy areas. It is important to note that the work in the framework of the political and security 
dialogues feeds into the twice-yearly EU-US sub-cabinet meetings (senior cabinet American 
officials and EU commission counterparts) and EU-US Foreign Affairs Ministers meetings. 
Decisions on EU-US political relations and the scope and content of policy cooperation and 
coordination occur at these levels and are rubber-stamped at the summits of the EU Council by 
the Commission Presidents and the US President during each EU Presidency (Ginsberg, 2001b, 
p. 182).  
 
Policy Areas, representations and 
frequency 
Dialogues  
Economic  
 
• involving the EU Commission 
and its relevant DGs  
• frequency: either annual or bi-
annual 
 
• The Informal macroeconomic dialogue 
• High-level Regulatory Cooperation Dialogue 
• The High-level meeting on the enforcement of 
competition laws Dialogue 
• The Joint Customs cooperation committee (Vivet 
& De Lalande, 2014) 
Political and Security 
 
 
• bi-annual  
• involving the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European 
Affairs and the EC equivalents 
referred to as ‘political directors’ 
 
 
• EU-US Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
Ministerial 
• EU-US JHA Senior Officials meetings 
 
•  Political dialogues on:  
o Africa (COAFR) 
o Consular affairs (COCON) 
o Western Balkan region (COWEB) 
o Development dialogue 
o Human rights (COHOM) 
o Humanitarian assistance 
o Middle East and North Africa (MENA)  
o United Nations (CONUN), 
o Counter-terrorism,  
o Chemical biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) risk mitigation 
o Non-proliferation and disarmament  
o Conventional arms exports 
o Enlargement (COELA) 
o Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) 
o Latin America and the Caribbean (COLAC) 
o Public International law (COJUR) 
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Sectoral dialogues  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Joint Committee on Higher Education and 
Vocational Education and Training 
•  The GPS-Galileo Satellite Cooperation 
•  US-EU Space Dialogues (Civil Space and Space 
security) 
• the Steering Committee on Countering Violent 
extremism 
• The Steering Committee on migration and 
refugee issues,  
• EU-US platform for cooperation on migration 
and refugee issues 
• The Joint Technical Group on nuclear 
technology research and development,  
• The Dialogue on Drugs 
• The Working Group on Cyber-security and 
Cyber-crime 
• The Working Group on employment and labour-
related issues 
• The informal financial markets regulatory 
dialogue 
• The chemicals regularity dialogue 
• The Technical Commission on energy efficient 
labelling programs 
• The Consumer product safety cooperation 
• The Transport Security Working Group 
• The Joint Committee for Air Transport and Air 
Safety 
• The high-level regulatory trilateral EU-US-China 
meetings  
• The Joint Senior level working group on 
development  
(see the scheme by Vivet & Lalande, 2014) 
 
Added at a later stage:  
• EU-US high level dialogue on Fisheries and 
Ocean governance 
•  EU-US Information Society Dialogue  
• EU-US Innovation and Investment in the Digital 
Economy Dialogue   
• EU-US joint consultative group (JCG) meeting 
on science and technology cooperation  
 
(source: document from the State Department)  
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Finally, the proliferation of dialogues under the impulse of the NTA also relates to its fourth 
chapter focusing on ‘building bridges’ across the Atlantic. Its aim was to broaden science and 
technology cooperation, people-to-people links across the Atlantic, information and cultural 
exchanges, and parliamentary links (NTA 1995; JAP 1995). Among its main flagship 
achievements, one counts the creation of interest group ‘dialogues’ such as the transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD), the transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), the transatlantic 
Environmental Dialogue (TAED), and the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD). The 
strengthening of the parliamentary ties through the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue is also a 
product of the NTA and of its ambition to boost transatlantic relations at all levels (Jančić, 
2014, p. 49; Steffenson, 2005, p. 38). Last but not least, there is also a wide range of informal 
dialogues that emerged at approximately the same time – albeit not government-sponsored, 
such as the Transatlantic Policy network, the Transatlantic Dialogue on Aviation and Climate 
Change, and the Transatlantic Donor Dialogue (Jančić, 2014, p. 6). In sum, the NTA opened 
the way to an ever-expanding edifice of dialogues, to which building stones even now continue 
to be added. 
 
The Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) and other initiatives  
In 1998, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was launched in order to intensify and 
broaden both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in trade and investment issues. More 
specifically, it committed the two sides to an ambitious programme of regulatory co-operation 
designed to reconcile – if not eliminate – regulatory barriers to trade and regulatory conflicts 
between them (Pollack & Schaffer, 2001, p. 907). It also aimed at tackling technical barriers 
to trade through the expansion of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA). Similar to NTA, 
the TEP was complemented and further detailed by the TEP Action plan, which set a more 
specific agenda and included target dates for actionable actions. In terms of new dialogue 
structures, the TEP Action plan added the TEP Steering Group, charged with monitoring, 
implementing, and reviewing TEP objectives and established specialised TEP Working groups 
at the expert level (Steffenson 2005, p. 44). The Transatlantic Partnership on Political co-
operation (TPPC) agreement was also announced at this occasion, representing a commitment 
to intensify consultations for more effective political cooperation and establishing a new set of 
principles for applying economic sanctions (Ibid).  
Last but not least, the inter-parliamentary dialogue was also reinforced at the 50th inter- 
parliamentary meeting on 15-16 January 1999 in Strasbourg when both delegations decided to 
launch the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD), the formal response of the EP and the 
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US Congress to the call in the New Transatlantic Agenda for enhanced parliamentary ties. 
Subsequently, TLD activities expanded in order to include video conferences, special working 
groups on subjects of particular interest, and a facilitative role for direct exchanges between 
legislative committees of the European Parliament and the US Congress (European Parliament, 
2017). 
To sum up, under the Clinton administration the architecture of dialogues between the 
EU and the United States became significantly thicker. During this period of ‘transatlantic 
integration’, key channels of communication were established at all levels of representation to 
facilitate and promote cooperation across an impressive array of issues, covering nearly all 
realms of international politics.  
6.4. 2000s onwards: “talking through thick and thin”  
 
6.4.1. Bush administration: overall deterioration of the relationship but 
persistence of the dialogue  
While there is a wide consensus in the literature that the transatlantic relationship significantly 
deteriorated under the administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009), disagreements persist 
among scholars regarding the severity of the crisis and the extent of the damage done to the 
relationship. Some compared the crisis to a ‘transatlantic divorce’ (Daalder, 2001), while others 
were much less alarmist and recalled the many crises previously experienced and overcome by 
the EU and the United States (Lindberg, 2005). A notable debate evolved in this respect with 
Michael Cox and Vincent Pouliot on opposing sides. On the one hand (the more pessimistic 
side), Cox argued that the EU and the United States reached a critical tipping point, not 
necessarily because of the Iraq War or the Bush style of leadership, but rather due to the 
development of fundamental and deep-rooted differences between many European countries 
and the United States (Cox, 2005, 2006). On the other hand, Pouliot (2006) affirmed that in 
spite of the major divisions arising from the Iraq War, the Atlantic Community was ‘alive and 
well’, thereby downplaying the depth of the crisis.  
 
“A game of two-halves” 
After a brief period of rapprochement between the United States and Europe following the 9/11 
attacks, deep disagreements resurfaced over the Bush’s administration conduct on the ‘Global 
war on terror’ and over other issues such as commitments to multilateralism, climate change, 
and security institutions more broadly, exemplified by the dispute over the International 
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Criminal Court (Groenleer, 2016). During the second Bush administration, transatlantic 
relations slightly improved due to its attempts to re-engage with European allies, but the 
damage had already been done. He continued to push policies such as missile defence and 
NATO enlargement to which Europeans were opposed (Lynch, 2013, p. 424).   
Interestingly enough, despite the high tensions between the United States and the 
European Union at that time and the ‘disdain’ of some American officials towards the European 
preference for diplomacy,21 the machinery of consultations/dialogues continued to work and 
additional dialogues were even created during this rocky period. This is particularly true for 
President Bush’s second term (2005-2009). According to a high-level US diplomat working 
closely with Bush at that time: 
When the President was re-elected in 2004, there was a conscious strategic decision on 
his side. He realized that trying to create a coalition of the willing was less effective 
than trying to work with the EU as a whole. So, he came to Brussels in January 2005. 
There was at that time a huge emphasis on these dialogues. In fact, it became clear that 
we (US) needed to try to find mechanisms to work with the EU. A lot of these 
mechanisms had been set up but we continued to set up more dialogues (Interview no. 
29). 
 
Echoing this point, Wyles (2008) argued, ‘Bush’s legacy to his successor will be a much more 
broadly developed dialogue with the European Union than he inherited’. For instance, this was 
the case in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, in which political and operational cooperation 
on counter-terrorism particularly flourished and gained momentum after the terrorist attacks 
on 11 September 2001 (Aldrich, 2004; Burghardt, 2013) (Burghardt, 2013). US-EU 
cooperation against terrorism has fostered dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security 
issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions with individual EU member states. Indeed, 
contacts between US and EU officials – from the cabinet level to the working level – on police, 
judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. The 
Secretary of State, US Attorney General, and Secretary of Homeland Security meet at the 
ministerial level with their respective EU counterparts at least once a year, and a US-EU 
working group of senior officials meets once every six months to discuss police and judicial 
cooperation against terrorism. In addition, the United States and the EU have developed a 
regular dialogue on terrorist financing and have established a high-level policy dialogue on 
                                               
21 On the eve of war with Iraq in 2003, a senior official in George W. Bush’s administration was heard to 
complain bitterly about Europe’s preference for diplomacy and engagement over action: ‘The only thing 
Europeans were really good at, he said, was convening meetings’ (Stephens, 2010, p. 45).  
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border and transport security to discuss issues such as passenger data-sharing, cargo security, 
biometrics, visa policy, and sky marshals (Archick, 2016, p. 8).    
In addition, the transatlantic institutional architecture has been further built up in the 
economic realm, as well as leading to the creation of further dialogues. For instance, during 
the 2008 US-EU Summit, Bush, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso signed the Framework for Advancing 
Transatlantic Economic Integration, which created the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). 
This has become the primary plenary forum for economic dialogue between the United States 
and the EU. Meeting at least once a year, the co-chairs of the TEC – the White House Deputy 
National Special Advisor for International Economic Affairs and the European Commission 
Vice President for Trade – promote dialogue and agreement to further integrate the transatlantic 
economies (US Department of State, 2017). Within the TEC, the High-Level Working Group 
on economic growth and Job Creation led by DG TRADE on the European side played an 
instrumental role in recommending the launching of a comprehensive trade agreement in 2012, 
known today as TTIP (Archick & Morelli, 2013, p. 2). Yet with the launching of the TTIP 
negotiations under President Obama a year later, the TEC lost quite a bit of its relevance 
because many issues related to trade have been discussed in the negotiation framework 
(Interview no. 32).  
At the inter-parliamentary level, dialogues continued to take place twice a year and 
became especially important during this time of crisis. As an MEP member of the EU 
parliamentary delegation to the United States recalls: ‘When I entered the parliament in 2004, 
there were tense EU-US relations in the backdrop of the Iraq invasion. I was one of the people 
thinking that it was a huge mistake but I believed that it was not thoughtful to turn our back to 
the US and this is the reason why I have been so much involved in the work of this important 
delegation’ (Interview no. 4).  
In short, this section showed that despite turbulences at the macro-level (i.e. the poor 
state of the transatlantic relationship), once the dialogue structures have been established, they 
are very difficult to dismantle. In times of crisis, they become not just valuable, but necessary.  
 
6.4.2. Obama administration (2009-2016): appeasement and proliferation of 
dialogues  
A brief review of the transatlantic literature under the Obama administration reveals again a 
wide consensus about the positive change brought about in the state of the relationship during 
that time. In fact, since the beginning of his Presidency, Barack Obama made very clear his 
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promise to restore the transatlantic relationship that was damaged after eight years of the Bush 
Presidency. On 3 April 2009, Obama held an important speech at the 60th anniversary of 
NATO in Strasbourg, emphasising that he ‘saw an opportunity for the US and Europe to renew 
the strongest alliance that the world has ever known’ (Stephens, 2010). Taking stock of the 
mistakes of the past, American officials reiterated their commitment to repair the relationship 
and to approach the new global agenda in a genuinely cooperative, rather than domineering, 
manner. As US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Philip Gordon, put it in 
Brussels during one of his visits, ‘As we look around the world and think about which partners 
can help us deal with challenges like Iran, Afghanistan, climate change and the global financial 
crisis... nowhere are there greater or more important partners than in Europe and the European 
Union.’ He continued, ‘It’s not just understanding that we need strong partners, but dealing 
with them in a way that we hope shows some humility... and respect for the positions of 
others...’ (Budd, 2010, p. 35). This renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship was 
warmly welcomed by the Europeans who perhaps a bit hastily decided to award Obama the 
Nobel Peace Prize.  
Yet for many commentators, despite the fine rhetoric there was not any substantial 
change in Obama’s policy. According to Nielsen (2012), the main difference between Obama 
and his predecessor derived from his diplomatic skills and tone. Echoing this line of argument, 
Csanyi (2014, p. 222) argued that Obama pursued transatlantic relations in a manner that was 
quite similar to George W. Bush in his second term of office: he continued to disappoint 
Europeans on climate change and expressed the ongoing and constant American dissatisfaction 
with regards to European contributions to NATO capabilities in Afghanistan. In addition, it 
would be a mistake to consider Obama as a ‘natural Atlanticist’: his foreign policy paid 
relatively little attention to Europe, as his agenda was clearly dominated by the ‘pivot to Asia’ 
and the ‘reset policy’ with Russia.22 However, a whole array of new challenges required a high 
degree of cooperation between the EU and the United States: from the threat posed to the 
transatlantic economic space by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, to the events 
collectively dubbed ‘the Arab Spring’ in 2011 through the continuing rise of the Rest 
(Hanhimäki, 2012, p. 5).   
As a result, in addition to the dialogues that were already set up and still very much 
active, more was added to the architecture of dialogues, such as the Energy Council in 2009, 
the EU-US Cyber Dialogue in 2014, and the most recent EU-US Security and Development 
                                               
22 For a variety of views about Obama’s European legacy, see the article in Politico (Politico, 2016). 
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Dialogue. The dialogue on counter-terrorism has also been strengthened with US and EU 
officials now engaged in expert-level dialogues on critical infrastructure protection and 
resilience, as well as on preventing violent extremism (Archick, 2016, p. 8). The contacts and 
exchanges between the EU and the United States on such a wide range of issues have become 
so intense that high-level European and American officials in charge of the relationship confess 
they are having a hard time keeping track of all of them (Interviews no. 32 and 29). Yet the 
dialogue – or rather the absence thereof – that has obviously attracted most of the attention has 
been the cancellation of the EU-US Summit scheduled for May 2010 in Madrid over the 
decision of Obama not to attend it (Lynch, 2013, p. 424). Offering the pretext that it was only 
a scheduling issue, Obama apparently did not judge his participation necessary or important 
enough to attend yet another summit with the Europeans. In reality, according to officials close 
to the US President, ‘Mr. Obama felt that the previous major American-European summit 
meeting, last June in Prague, was a waste of time’ (Erlanger, 2010) and he was ‘fairly 
unimpressed’ with this summit  when all 27 leaders lined up to shake his hand (MacAskill & 
Watt, 2010). Considerations of domestic politics were also cited to explain his refusal to attend. 
In any case, Obama’s decision to skip the meeting was experienced as a kind of ‘insult’ by the 
Europeans, who were expecting a different type of treatment commensurate with their identity 
as ‘key partners’ of the United States. Reports described the reaction of the Spanish Prime 
Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, as angry and embarrassed. In the same vein, his close 
ally and governing Socialist Party’s spokesman in the Spanish parliament affirmed, ‘I think the 
US administration is and must be aware of what Europe is’ (Ibid.), hinting once again that some 
Europeans felt the United States takes its relationship with the EU for granted.   
 
 
6.4.3. One year into the Trump Presidency: “business as usual in terms of 
dialogue” 
Following Donald Trump’s disparaging remarks on the future of Europe23 and his election in 
November 2016, many commentators were quick to announce the demise of the transatlantic 
relations, while sensational headlines in international newspapers talked about a profound 
change on the horizon. Even top level European officials, such as the President of the European 
Commission, warned that, ‘Trump risked upsetting the EU-US relations’ (The Guardian, 
2016). In a way, the current crisis is reminiscent of the Bush years, in which the prevailing 
                                               
23 That included among other things:  cheering on Brexit, stating that NATO is obsolete, and questioning 
the very need for the European bloc (Collinson, 2017).  
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discourse was all about the ‘the end of the West’.  Thus, the same old question arises again: to 
what extent are the fundamentals of the transatlantic relationship in jeopardy? Is it simply 
another family quarrel or does it herald deeper structural changes in relations between Europe 
and the United States? While it may be too early to say, a few points can be made regarding 
the enhanced importance of dialogues in this new era of unpredictability and inconsistency 
associated with Trump.   
Indeed, noteworthy is the inconsistency of Trump’s position when it comes to US 
relations with Europe. While the change of tone of the President during the election and after 
taking office has been notable, it continued to shift regularly over Trump’s first year in office 
as well, sowing immense confusion. In fact, on the one hand, shortly after the elections the 
Trump administration sent signals it will continue to work with the EU. For instance, during 
his visit to Brussels in February 2017, Vice President Mike Pence pledged a ‘strong 
commitment’ to the EU in an attempt to reassure the Europeans (Pence, 2017). A few months 
later, Trump said during a press conference with the Italian Prime Minister in the White House 
that a strong Europe is, ‘very, very important to me as president of the United States and it's 
also in my very strong opinion… important for the United States,’ adding that the United States 
would help the EU ‘be strong’ (Elzas, 2017). On the other hand, Trump continues to perceive 
Europe in transactional zero-sum terms, with a heavy emphasis on economic nationalism. Just 
recently, he engaged in escalatory trade war rhetoric against the European Union, adding 
further strains on the relationship (Smith, 2018). As a result, Europeans are deeply frustrated 
with the Trump administration’s mixed messages, making it difficult for them to know how to 
react or even distinguish between policy and rumination (Karnitschnig, 2017b).   
In this context, the continuation of the dialogues institutionalised over the years is of 
paramount importance in order to clarify these issues and avoid any severe misperceptions or 
misunderstandings between both sides. While Europeans admit they have been struggling to 
make sense of his foreign policy, they also highlight the utility and value of the channels of 
communication well-established beforehand that allow them to ask directly their American 
counterparts for more information and clarification in these times of unpredictability 
(Interviews no. 23, 38, and 39). In this sense, the relevance of the dialogue has therefore 
increased rather than decreased.  
More specifically, at the level of the executive dialogues, no substantial change has 
been reported, if any. In the early months of the Trump presidency, many European diplomats 
complained about the difficulty to identify the new American counterparts at the time of the 
transition, which did not go as smoothly as expected (Interviews no. 23 and 24). The general 
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confusion and lack of clarity have transpired in the first meetings between the European 
ambassadors and their counterparts. According to one Eastern European Ambassador 
commenting on these discussions, ‘The policy was often unclear and the problem is that people 
don’t know anything. They are quite open about it… It doesn’t matter what level. It is all levels’ 
(Birnbaum & Jaffe, 2017). Apart from that, both European and American diplomats report that, 
‘The channels of communication that have been established over the years are still in place and 
the next dialogues on the agenda are being prepared as if nothing had changed’ (Interviews no. 
23, 38, and 39). As one US diplomat explained to me, ‘If we don’t get the very explicit 
instruction to lower or stop a dialogue with the EU, it will just keep going’ (Interview no. 38). 
This suggests that once in place, the consultative mechanisms are difficult to dismantle, even 
if the state of the relationship at the macro-level is not at its best. Examples of recent high-level 
dialogues that took place in the first months of the Trump administration include the meetings 
of the Energy Council in May, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial dialogue in Malta in 
June 2017, and more recently the 15th EU-US Information Society dialogue in February 2018 
(Kostaki, 2018).  
However, one notable exception of a change of policy that had direct negative 
implications on the dialogues has been the suspension of the negotiations regarding TTIP. 
Indeed, following Trump’s decision regarding TTIP, a new forum of dialogue was instead set 
up between the EU and the United States, namely the Joint Task Force. This body is now 
responsible for making progress on trade while the negotiations are put on ice. According to 
the President of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘The Joint Task Force will serve 
as a forum to exchange points of view because we (US-EU representatives) estimate that there 
are too many divergences in approach and analysis between these two big economic blocs 
when it comes to trade matters’ (Vincenti, 2017).  
At the inter-parliamentary level, the dialogues keep taking place at the same pace, i.e. 
twice a year – albeit with a more assertive American voice than before (Interview no. 19). In 
the debriefing session of the 80th IPM after Trump’s election, the chairman of the EP delegation 
to the United States emphasised: ‘We came back from Washington with a clear understanding 
that our relationship transcends elections. We conveyed and received a message of continuity 
and unity and we need that in this new context, we – as lawmakers – have to go out and to 
explain the importance of the relationship to our respective administrations more than ever’ 
(Video no.2). Interestingly enough, one of the MEPs directly asked the American Ambassador, 
Anthony Gardner, who was present at this same meeting: ‘How do you think that the Europeans 
can improve their image in the US to be better appreciated by the Administration?’ To this 
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direct question, which revealed the recognition conundrum of the EU in a very blunt way, the 
US Ambassador answered: 
To counter the possible bilateral transactional basis that the Trump administration is 
likely to take, you need to prove and explain that that the EU is capable of delivering. 
As lawmakers, you clearly have a play to role in that. You need to couch your 
arguments in terms of what EU-US relations can do for the US. This is the language 
that resonates. Talk less about values and more about how it makes sense in terms of 
US interests if you want to convince them (Video no.2). 
 
As will be demonstrated in the empirical analysis, this is exactly what the Europeans are trying 
to project during the dialogues with their American counterparts.  
As to the civil society level, dialogues between businesses and consumer groups across 
the Atlantic continue as usual and are closely working out propositions to improve transatlantic 
relations in spite of the suspension of the negotiations. On the consumer side, a report was 
recently released dealing with what TACD considers to be a consumer-friendly trade 
agreement (TACD, 2017). As one of the members explained, 
We worked on this “vision paper” to take advantage of the break in TTIP negotiations 
and not to waste time. Instead of focusing on all the things we think are wrong with 
trade agreements and being perceived as critical of that-  we’ve decided to take a 
different approach and present what consumers would like to see, this is what we think 
should be a good trade agreement. With the suspension of TTIP now, we paradoxically 
find that EU officials are very interested in hearing from the consumer side more ideas 
about how moving forward. This break should not be considered as “TTIP is over – but 
rather as a good opportunity to reflect on what can be done better in the future” 
(Interview no. 43). 
 
The same forward-feeding vision is present in the work done by the Transatlantic Business 
Council: thinking about how they can make progress in light of this new situation (Interview 
no. 40).  
Last but not least, an interesting phenomenon is currently emerging, namely the 
reinforcement of direct ties between US cities and states with Europe, bypassing the Trump-
era White House altogether. According to the California Governor, Jerry Brown, who was 
received at the European Parliament last November, ‘Contacts between US states and other 
countries can be helpful and important, because you have to keep talking. This business of 
yelling at each other across the ocean is not good’ (Birnbaum & Jaffe, 2017).  
To conclude, this last section has shown that in spite of the alarming headlines 
trumpeting a serious deterioration in transatlantic relations, the whole machinery of dialogues 
that has been set up over the years keeps working at full steam. What transpires in the headlines 
is just the tip of the iceberg while the bulk of the intense cooperation between the EU and the 
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United States goes unnoticed. In this sense, I tend to agree with Smith and McGuire, who 
argued 10 years ago that, ‘The continuing political dialogue that characterizes the Euro-
American system will not allow for an easy divorce or separate development’ (2008). In 
today’s particular circumstances, the exchanges and dialogues between non-state actors in the 
transatlantic context takes on a new importance.   
Conclusion  
 
This chapter does not claim to do justice to all the subtleties of the transatlantic relationship 
given the immensity and complexity of Euro-American relations. Yet by taking a more focused 
approach on the evolution of the dialogues within the wider context of the transatlantic 
relations, it has highlighted the changing pattern of initiative and consultation in Atlantic 
affairs.  
First, in broad terms, there has been a remarkable proliferation of dialogues established 
between the EU and the United States over the years at different institutional levels and dealing 
with a wide range of issues. When compared to the paucity of the first political consultations 
in the 1970s and 1980s, when both sides were only reluctantly and cautiously engaging with 
each other, today’s architecture of dialogues, which has almost taken a life of its own, 
constitutes an extraordinary development.  
Secondly, the analysis has shown that the state of the transatlantic relationship affects 
the dialogue more than the other way around, but only when it comes to dialogue initiation. 
Indeed, it is important to properly differentiate between the initiation of the dialogue in the first 
place and its continuation and further development. The state of the relationship generally 
influences the ease with which the dialogues are established in the first place. This is 
demonstrated by the contrast between the difficult initiation of the political consultations in the 
1970s and 1980s, when both sides were animated by the ‘question of control’ or more precisely 
the fear of a lack of it, and the impressive institutionalization of the dialogues in the 1990s in 
the backdrop of improved relationships. Once established, however, dialogues are not easily 
suspended or interrupted. The channels of communication remain open and become partially 
insulated from the turbulences at the macro-level. They become even more important and 
useful in these times when clarifications and better understanding are tremendously needed.  
This conclusion therefore confirms the solidity of the transatlantic edifice whose glue 
could be called ‘dialogue’, thereby echoing Michael Cox’s (2012)  idea that ‘the transatlantic 
relationship is too big to fail’. While alarming headlines often portray a very bleak picture of 
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the transatlantic relationship and its future, it is important to be aware of the fact that this is 
only the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Much more is going on ‘under the surface’, with channels of 
communication established at all levels and covering almost all possible issues. Their extensive 
use keeps the relationship alive and kicking. 
Finally, the New Transatlantic Agenda remains today the most significant transatlantic 
policy document: it sets out a comprehensive framework within which EU-US relations have 
constantly developed. The mega-structure of dialogues that has emerged out of these 
successive agreements (TAD, NTA and the TEP) has been described by some scholars as a 
‘whole system of governance’, i.e. as an effective decision-making system at different levels, 
involving different types of actors, fuelling one level to another (Pollack & Schaffer, 2001; 
Steffenson, 2005).  
However, key questions regarding the development of the architecture of dialogues in 
the transatlantic context and their added value remain unanswered. First of all, for the above-
mentioned studies conceptualizing the mega-structure of dialogues as a system of governance, 
the main function of these dialogues is to promote cooperation in the liberal institutionalist 
vein. In fact, taking as the starting point the mandates of these institutions, these studies assess 
the extent to which the actors deliver the outcomes expected from them on the basis of the 
decisions taken in the framework of these deliberations. A close examination of the practices 
unfolding within the meeting room that goes beyond the rationale assessment of the results 
obtained will provide additional insights on the added value of these numerous dialogues that 
have been proliferating over the years. Secondly, while this chapter has shown that dialogues 
were most likely to be initiated in times of transatlantic congruence, more light needs to be 
shed regarding the rationale behind the continuation of the dialogues even in times of 
turbulences. For historical institutionalists for instance, the persistence of the dialogues 
(understood as specific institutions) might well be explained by the vested interests of the actors 
taking part in them (Fioretos, 2011). But is it really the case? Can we point to another reason 
related to non-material considerations that would justify the development and persistence of 
these multiple pockets of deliberation among European and American actors?  
As Chapter 4 has shown, the EU is in a dire need to get recognition for its institutional 
identity and particularly so vis-à-vis the United States. This important insight needs to be 
explored when considering the development and persistence of the transatlantic dialogues over 
time. In fact, as it has been explained at length in chapter 2, the practice of dialogue can serve 
to anchor states’ or institutions’ identities through an on-going and iterative process of 
recognition, achieved in the face-to-face interaction between representatives of participating 
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institutions.  The analytical framework presented in chapter 2 details the process through which 
the anchoring of institutional identity occurs at the micro-level with implications at the macro-
institutional level thanks to the power of symbolism. It suggests that these dialogical encounters 
are conceived as a performance in which the representatives of the institutions get to experience 
the other institutions and vice versa. As such, actors seeking recognition go to great lengths to 
display the qualities that are part and parcel of their institutional identity and for which they 
want to be recognized. Recognition is granted if the actors seeking recognition ‘feel that there 
has been a match between their self-image and the treatment they deem appropriate to receive 
by the recognizing party’ (Lindemann & Saada, 2012, p.17-18). Thus, the theoretical 
framework provides various cues – both verbal and non-verbal- that can be interpreted as 
implicit acts of recognition along three critical moments of the dialogical interaction: (1) the 
preparation of the dialogue and its setting (2) the communication and interaction during the 
dialogue itself (both formal and informal moments); and (3) the stage where the participants 
leave the room and carry with them the recognition process that has taken place behind closed 
doors. It is thanks to the use of visual, discursive and practical anchors that recognition is 
clinched and projected to the world.  
In the three following chapters, this analytical framework is applied empirically in an 
attempt to bring a more nuanced understanding of the added value and function of the multiple 
EU-US dialogues that have resisted the test of time and of political crises. The in-depth 
investigation of the constellation of practices related to these dialogues, as well as the 
perceptions held by European and American participants of their added value will determine 
the extent to which these dialogues fulfil also an additional important function related to 
identity matters and recognition. More specifically, the huge edifice of dialogues will be 
disaggregated in a few of its constituent parts. The analysis will thus focus on three different 
formats of dialogues with unique advantages and constraints: The Transatlantic Legislators’ 
Dialogue (TLD), the executive working groups involving the EEAS, the European 
Commission and the US Department of State, and two transatlantic dialogues involving non-
governmental actors (TABC and TACD). While recognizing that each institution (whether it 
is the European Parliament, the EEAS, the Commission or the non-governmental actors) has 
its own specific vested interests and distinct organizational cultures, I expect all of them to play 
a role in the quest for the recognition of the EU’s institutional identity– albeit with different 
degrees. One variation to be established through the application of the theoretical framework 
is the level of salience of the recognition processes which occur between the governmental, 
parliamentary and non-governmental forms of dialogue. 
144 
 
Chapter 7 – The Transatlantic Legislators 
Dialogue: a dialogue among friends 
 
 
The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD) – regularly bringing together members of the 
European Parliament and representatives of the American Congress since the early 1970s – 
constitutes an important albeit unknown forum of transatlantic dialogue. In the spirit of 
equality, the declaration on the TLD specifies that the bi-annual inter-parliamentary meetings 
shall take place alternately in the United States and in Europe. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine both the discursive dynamics and constellation of symbolic practices unfolding during 
the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue at the granular micro-level in an attempt to gauge its 
added value and implications at the macro-institutional level. While such instances of 
parliamentary diplomacy have been critically defined as ‘tourist diplomacy’ (Herranz, 2005), 
the main argument developed here suggests that far from being merely a ‘talk shop’, the regular 
inter-parliamentary meetings (IPMs) between members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
and American congressmen allow the representatives of the European Parliament to seek 
recognition for and anchor the EU’s institutional identity.  
The chapter is structured as follows. I first contextualise the TLD in the wider context 
of ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ as increasingly practised by the European Union in recent years. 
The theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two is then applied to the case of the TLD, 
emphasising the importance of the socio-psychological dimension of the dialogical interaction. 
Put differently, the empirical analysis brings evidence to the mechanism of recognition and 
anchoring of institutional identity at play during the three main phases of the dialogue (i.e. 
entering the room, communication in the room, and leaving the room). The third part of the 
chapter is dedicated to the assessment of these identity dynamics by European representatives, 
which is then contrasted with the American perspective. Finally, I discuss the relevance of 
other dynamics unfolding simultaneously during the dialogue. The empirical data used in this 
chapter relates to three Inter-Parliamentary Meetings (76th IPM in Riga in June 2015; 77th IPM 
in Washington, DC, in November 2015; and the 78th IPM in The Hague in June 2016) that took 
place under the Obama administration. The analysis is based on 25 semi-structured interviews 
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conducted with MEPs and American congressmen who participated in these dialogues, as well 
as on field notes taken during two participant observations.24  
 
7.1. The TLD in the context of parliamentary diplomacy  
7.1.1. Emergence of parliamentary diplomacy at the EU level  
Before delving into the analysis of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, it is important to put 
this initiative in perspective, i.e. as an instance of ‘parliamentary diplomacy’. According to 
Jančić (2014, p. 43), parliamentary diplomacy is an international politico-legal phenomenon 
that relates to the significant growth in the number of international or transnational 
parliamentary bodies. It corresponds to a generally increased parliamentary input in global 
affairs. Parliamentary diplomacy includes a variety of international activities by various 
parliamentary actors (individual parliamentarians, political parties, and parliaments as a whole) 
at various levels (intrastate, interstate, intra-regional, inter-regional, and international) (Fiott, 
2011, p. 2). It can take a wide variety of forms ranging from multilateral international 
parliamentary bodies to involvement in the monitoring of elections in third countries (Stavridis, 
2002). 
In the EU context, parliamentary diplomacy has also taken root as part of a wider 
process whereby the European Parliament has come to play a more important role in the 
external relations of the EU – leading some scholars to designate this phenomenon as the 
‘ongoing parliamentarization of external relations’ (Raube, 2012). The need to democratise EU 
decision-making both in internal and external affairs has been the main factor behind this 
development, and parliamentary democracy has prevailed as the instrument for achieving this 
goal (Jančić, 2014). By regularly resorting to ‘democratic blackmailing’ and by emphasising 
the lack of democratic accountability, the EP has managed to gain additional powers in the 
EU’s decision-making (Jančić, 2014, p. 41; Raube, 2012, p. 67). Two main instruments of 
power available to the EP in external affairs have traditionally been mentioned in the literature: 
the assent procedure that gives the Parliament veto powers over international agreements with 
the exception of agreements which are exclusively part of the CFSP (‘consent power’) and the 
‘power of the purse’  (Raube, 2012,  p. 67), whereby the Parliament has the final say in regards 
                                               
24 I chose to focus my analysis on these three TLD meetings, as I gained access both to the full range of documents 
(both public and confidential) recording them and to some of the meetings themselves. I am fully aware that they 
all correspond to inter-parliamentary meetings that took place under one single US Democratic administration. 
The implications of a new administration on the quality of the dialogues will be discussed in the conclusion of the 
thesis.  
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to the community’s expenses for external relations that fall under the general budget (Ripoll 
Servent, 2014; Wisniewski, 2013, p. 84). 
Importantly, apart from these instruments that relate to the internal institutional 
functioning of the EU, the EP also engages directly on the international scene in multilateral 
and bilateral inter-parliamentary forums engaging in inter-parliamentary diplomacy (Jančić, 
2014, p. 41).25 This intense diplomatic activity is reflected in the fact that one counts today a 
total of 40 EP delegations classified in four main categories: ‘Delegations to Parliamentary 
Assemblies; Delegations to Joint Parliamentary Committees; Delegations to Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committees and Delegations for relations with third countries and external 
entities’ (Jančić, 2014, p. 47), with one of them being the EU parliamentary delegation for 
relations with the United States.  
 
7.1.2. A long tradition of EU-US inter-parliamentary dialogues   
The EU parliamentary delegation for relations with the United States is special in the sense that 
it has a long historical tradition of dialogue with the American Congress. In fact, the inter-
parliamentary relationship between the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress is the 
longest and most intensive in the history of the European Parliament (European Parliament, 
n.d.). Bi-annual EU-US inter-parliamentary meetings were set out as early as 1972, when a 
group of members of the U.S.  House of Representatives, led by former Representative Sam 
Gibbons of the House Ways and Means Committee, travelled to Brussels for the express 
purpose of meeting and exchanging views with the European Parliament. These initial 
parliamentary contacts became known as the United States-European Community Inter-
Parliamentary Group (Archick & Morelli, 2013, p. 2). Yet it was only on 15-16 January 1999, 
on the occasion of the 50th inter-parliamentary meeting, that the EU and US delegations 
decided to set up a Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue in order to implement the call made 
four years earlier to enhance transatlantic parliamentary ties by the NTA26 (Jančić, 2014, p. 
51). As of the time of writing (March 2018), 81 inter-parliamentary dialogues between the EP 
and the Congress have taken place.  
                                               
25 For a discussion on the legal basis of the European Parliament’s international ‘diplomatic’ action, see 
Jančić, 2014, p. 46. 
26 In the NTA, the EU and the United States emphasise that ‘[they] attach great importance to enhanced 
parliamentary links and that they will consult parliamentary leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding 
consultative mechanisms, including those building on existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our 
transatlantic partnership’ (NTA, 1995).  
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7.1.3. Objectives of the dialogue: democratic oversight, harmonization, and early 
warning  
The official objectives of the TLD are both ambitious and limited at the same time. According 
to the 1999 Joint Statement on the establishment of the TLD, ‘the aim of the TLD is to 
strengthen and enhance the level of discourse between European and American legislators’. It 
further stipulates that the ‘TLD would develop into a powerful tool to add a new level of 
democratic oversight to the expanding transatlantic partnership’ and ‘to assist in the 
development of more harmonized approaches to issues of joint concern and in preventing 
disputes in sensitive areas before they occur’ (European Parliament, n.d.). It is worth noting, 
however, that through this cautious wording, American and European executive branches 
stopped short of any invitation or promise of direct legislative involvement in their policy for 
obvious reasons linked to the separation of power (Philippart, 2001, p. 403). Furthermore, these 
objectives can also be categorised as inward- and outward-looking. Internally, the dialogue is 
designed to address deficiencies in terms of transparency through the reinforcement of 
democratic oversight over the transatlantic relationship, thereby fostering the democratic 
element of EU international relations. Externally, the objective of ‘leading to a convergence of 
positions’ suggests the possibility to influence and convince the other side. As to the early-
warning function, it refers to the privileged position of the parliaments to avoid backlashes and 
low points in the relations. While these objectives might be reached with varying degrees of 
success (Jančić, 2016), my contention in this chapter is that the TLD serves an additional 
purpose related to identity matters – i.e. it helps the EU to gain recognition and anchor its 
institutional identity. In what follows, I demonstrate precisely how this process of recognition 
and anchoring of institutional identity comes about in the framework of the inter-parliamentary 
meetings.  
 
7.2. The process of recognition 
 
The chapter will show that in the case of the TLD, there is a striking asymmetry in terms of 
commitment and engagement in the dialogue between the EU and the United Stated. From the 
preparation to the follow-up phase, MEPs are much more invested in this dialogue than their 
American counterparts. While the way in which the dialogue is conducted makes particularly 
visible this asymmetry, it presents at the same time an opportunity for the EU to gain 
recognition and proves its American counterparts that it is worth investing in this dialogue. In 
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fact, the analysis shows that MEPs approach the dialogue as a performance in which they have 
the opportunity to project the different dimensions of the EU institutional identity, both in terms 
of relevance and distinctiveness. Based on the MEPs’ positive perceptions of the treatment they 
receive during the dialogue, the chapter shows that recognition is granted during these meetings 
and, as such, they help anchor the institutional identity of the EU.  In this section, I outline the 
process of recognition unfolding at the micro-level and its ramifications at the macro-level 
thanks to the power of symbolism. Put differently, I focus on what actually occurs step-by-step 
during the dialogical interaction of the IPMs bringing empirical evidence for each one of the 
stages outlined in the theoretical chapter (i.e. entering the room, communication in the room, 
and leaving the room). I show how the spatial immediacy and emotional display inherent in 
the dialogical interaction are exploited in order to seek and grant recognition for the 
institutional identity of the actors in presence.   
 
7.2.1. Entering the room: preparation and setting  
The desire of the EU to be recognised by its American counterparts as a relevant, ‘serious’, and 
unified interlocutor is already manifest in the preparatory phase of the dialogue whereby the 
EU takes the lead in the preparation of the dialogue and puts a heavy emphasis on the internal 
preparation of its ‘team performance’, à la Goffman (1959, p.47), aimed at maintaining a 
certain impression upon others.    
While each TLD lasts in reality no more than a day and a half, its preparation involves 
long months of reflection and intense preparation, particularly on the European side. On the 
European side, it is the Secretariat and the Bureau of the Parliamentary Delegation for the 
relations with the United States that are at the forefront of the TLD preparation, working closely 
with the EU Delegation to the United States and with the European Parliamentary Liaison 
Office (EPLO)27 in Washington. On the US side, no similar structure exists. The USTLD has 
no dedicated staff in the House of Representatives but relies on the Foreign Affairs Committee 
Staff to prepare the TLD meetings (Archick and Morelli, 2013, p. 15). As the TLD is just one 
event among many others they need to set up, the United States traditionally has less time and 
resources to dedicate to the preparation of the TLD compared to their European counterparts 
(Interview no. 16).   
                                               
27 The European Parliamentary Liaison Office was created in April 2010, by the then-President of the EP, 
Jerzy Buzek. Among many other functions, EPLO monitors US legislative activity and relays information 
about it between both sides. It also assists the visits by MEPs and has the potential to play a great role in 
facilitating the EU-US parliamentary dialogue (Jančić, 2014, p. 57).  
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Even though the EU and the United States formally have the co-responsibility to 
prepare the TLD bi-annual meetings, in practice the EU often takes the lead in the preparation 
of these meetings in an attempt to make the most of them and to appear as a reliable and serious 
interlocutor. Two specific aspects are crucial in this regard: the choice of the topics on the 
agenda to be discussed and the drafting of the Joint Statement. Usually, each TLD meeting 
tackles three to four main topics of common interests highly relevant to both Europeans and 
Americans, covering political as well as economic issues. The topics for discussion are often 
proposed by the staff of the Secretariat and further discussed with the Chairman and Vice-
Chairmen of the delegation, as well as with MEPs who are also invited to raise topics they 
would like to tackle directly with their American counterparts (Interview no. 3). In line with 
the idea of ‘joint consultation’, the American representatives are also consulted on a regular 
basis and, ultimately, both sides agree on a suitable agenda that reflects their common 
interests.28 Thus, the American counterparts are also involved in the preparation phase but they 
often play a minor role, mostly reacting to the proposals put forward in the first place by the 
European delegation. In the words of a close observer of the TLD on the American side, ‘the 
initiative comes mainly from the EU – they are in the driver seat while for the Americans, this 
is much of a reactionary thing’ (Interview no. 21). 
In addition to the choice of the topics on the agenda, the drafting of the Joint statement 
setting out the positions agreed upon by both delegations is also an important part of the 
preparation of the dialogue. In this regard as well, the EU tends to take the lead. Normally it is 
the host that drives the drafting of the joint statement. Yet recently there have been instances 
in which the EU has taken the lead even when the meeting took place in the United States. As 
a US official mentioned, ‘the last meeting that was in DC, they (Europeans) had a lot of 
initiative and they got to draft the statement before we got to do it. That was fine, we then 
added our comments but normally it is more balanced’ (Interview no. 9). This strong sense of 
initiative is not innocuous. It can be seen both as a subtle way to exert more influence on the 
parameters of the dialogue and on its outcome (i.e. formulation of the Joint Statement), as well 
as to project the image of a highly committed and competent partner in this common endeavour. 
                                               
28 Very often, the selected topics correspond to ‘hot issues’, related to high-profile events that require timely 
consultation between American and European legislators. Looking at past TLD meetings’ topics, one gets a 
clear sense of the issues agitating the world at each specific point of time: in 2007, for instance, the 
discussions of the 63th TLD in Las Vegas tackled mainly the situation in the Middle East linked to the 
nuclear threat posed by Iran, and the future status of the Kosovo (63th TLD Joint Statement, 2007). By 
comparison, in the 76th TLD held in Riga, MEPs and congressmen talked at length about the Dialogue with 
Russia, the situation in Syria, and the refugee crisis (76th TLD Joint Statement, 2015).  
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For instance, the comparison of the joint statements with the non-papers distributed to MEPs 
ahead of the meetings shows that several topics particularly relevant for the Europeans have 
made their way to the final document. This includes the question of Russian propaganda, the 
need to enhance the cooperation on refugee issues or the necessity to incorporate the energy 
issue under TTIP (Participant observation, 2016).  
The preparatory phase of the dialogue is also used by the European participants to work 
on their ‘team performance’ in an attempt to come across during the interaction with the 
Americans as a relevant and unified actor. The high level of preparation of the MEPs is 
instrumental in order to make a good impression on their US counterparts and to project a 
positive image of the EP. Indeed, a recurrent theme that has clearly emerged from my analysis 
is the high level of preparation done by the EU and the high degree of preparedness of its 
members compared to their American counterparts: for instance, one MEP in a key position in 
the TLD mentioned that ‘generally, the Europeans are more prepared. We really read the non-
papers, we plan everything, and we generally understand the United States better’ (Interview 
no. 6). In the same vein, another high-level European figure mentioned: ‘Our secretariat does 
a lot of excellent preparatory work, so you know the result is that our guys are quite well-
informed in these meetings and they are quite realistic about what to expect from the US side 
because it is clear that it does not really happen over here (in the US)’ (Interview no. 8). The 
rationale behind this high level of preparation is to prove to the Americans that it was worth 
talking to Europeans, that is was worth coming to Europe, and, in short, that Europe is relevant: 
‘Meeting for the sake of meeting is not good enough so we really need to bring some added 
value to convince Americans members to travel. We really have to make sure that it is 
worthwhile and that members will not regret that they travelled and hosted’ (Interviews no. 1, 
18).  
There is indeed a lot of pressure on MEPs to coordinate before the dialogue among 
themselves but also with other EU institutions such as the EEAS in an attempt to counter the 
recurrent criticism addressed against the EU on its lack of coherence as an actor. In order to 
achieve this high level of coordination and expertise, the Secretariat takes several steps. First, 
after jointly agreeing on the topics to be discussed in the next TLD, the EU and the US 
parliamentary delegations ought respectively to form so-called ‘working groups’ with lead 
speakers, which will then be in charge of the corresponding working sessions during the TLD 
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itself.29 On the European side, these working groups are composed of committee liaison 
persons (MEPs) that have to keep abreast of legislative developments at the committee level 
and facilitate early intervention to avoid disputes (Jančić, 2014, p. 54). These working groups 
are composed respectively of around five to six MEPs of different political affiliations but 
sharing a common expertise on a specific topic. They are responsible for drafting the so-called 
Non-papers about the specific topics that have previously been selected with the American 
side. A TLD Non-Paper is defined by the EP as ‘an unofficial, not binding document, written 
in preparation and as a means to encourage discussion in the inter-parliamentary meeting with 
the US Congress’ (internal document, EP). These TLD non-papers traditionally summarise the 
EP position on these issues by recalling previous relevant parliamentary resolutions and 
recommend a series of considerations for discussions. They ensure that all the participating 
MEPs are well informed about the position of the EP on the specific topics that will be 
discussed- representing the broad ‘European position’. (Interview no. 3).  
In addition, a few weeks (or even days) before the actual TLD, the European delegation 
holds a preparatory meeting in Strasbourg to ensure that Members are fully aware of the latest 
developments in the areas touched upon in the discussions. This sometimes includes a briefing 
of an important relevant actor, such as the EU TTIP Chief Negotiator Mr. Garcia-Bercero, who 
talked about the latest state-of-play on the negotiations before the 76th TLD in Riga (European 
Parliament, 2015). In addition, each member participating in the TLD gets the heavy 
dossier/reader with useful information and documents put together by the EP Secretariat: they 
contain both the non-papers and additional briefing background material provided by the 
EEAS, DG TRADE, and the EP Liaison Office in Washington to ensure that everybody is on 
the same page (EEAS, 2015 and interview no. 3). Echoing the theoretical framework (p.48), 
this process of preparation and coordination helps cement a common European position and 
reinforces the institutional identity of the EU by clearly stating the values and interests they 
stand for as an institution. As several MEPs mentioned, ‘The preliminary meetings are very 
important, we try to figure out what our positions are, what’s important for us. It is quite 
difficult to find a Joint European position and it requires often compromise but it is necessary’ 
(Interview no. 1). In the same vein, another MEP emphasised, ‘In the preparation phase, we 
really try to coordinate ourselves as much as possible in order to avoid sending contradictory 
messages to the Americans during the meetings’ (Interview no. 2). Therefore, the efforts and 
                                               
29 This requirement emanated from a Joint Agreement between the EU and the US dating back to 2011 (Jančić, 
2014).   
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thoughts invested in the preparation of the dialogue itself are a clear indication of the high 
importance the EU attributes to the dialogue as an opportunity to project an image reflecting 
its institutional identity vis-à-vis their American counterparts.  
I turn now to the setting of the inter-parliamentary meetings themselves in terms of 
frequency, attendance, and place, including the location and design of the venue as well as 
seating arrangements. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, all these elements are important 
as they constitute part of a whole arsenal of symbols that can be used to seek and grant 
recognition of the institutional identity of the other side during these dialogical interactions.  
 
Frequency: when and how often?  
While finding a suitable date for these meetings with American representatives is not always 
an easy task due to the tight schedule of politicians on both sides of the Atlantic and other 
constraints related to vital national political events (interview no. 2), this practice goes 
relatively smoothly compared to other political dialogues conducted by the EU. In fact, in the 
framework of other dialogues with the rest of the world, setting a date can turn out to be a much 
more complicated matter, due to the reluctance of the third partner country to fully and 
willingly participate in these meetings. This point is nicely exemplified in the case of the EU-
China Human rights dialogue, whereby Chinese authorities have traditionally posed numerous 
problems in fixing a date with their European interlocutors. According to an EEAS official 
closely involved in these dialogues, ‘The Chinese representatives use to systematically propose 
the dates of the 26th of December and of the 2nd of January of each year’ to hold these dialogues 
(Interview no. 7), obviously well aware that these dates could hardly be approved by their 
European counterparts, busy at that time in the midst of end-of-year celebrations. At least in 
the transatlantic case, such callous proposals and time-consuming negotiations around the 
specific date for the meeting are not common place. This relative ‘easiness’ through which 
meetings are set up between the EU and the United States is a testament to the willingness of 
both parts to engage in this dialogue on a regular basis.  
 
Attendance: a blatant asymmetry between European and American participation  
A second aspect of the meetings carrying a particular symbolic significance deals with the size 
and composition of the delegations. Traditionally, the large size of a delegation and/or the 
presence of high-level personalities have been interpreted as a sign of recognition of the 
relevance of the interlocutors. In fact, the physical presence of delegates demonstrates the 
interest and importance attributed by a party for a particular event, conveying the tacit message 
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that it is worth attending, hearing the other side, and engaging with it. With this understanding 
in mind, the attendance to the TLD reflects once again a striking asymmetry between MEPs 
and representatives of the US Congress. While theoretically the number of representatives on 
both sides should be equal, there is a strong asymmetry in the level of attendance in practice, 
with consistently more European representatives attending the IPMs, be it in Brussels or 
Washington. For instance, in the 76th IPM, 17 MEPs participated versus only eight 
representatives of the US Congress (EPLO, 2015). This asymmetry becomes all the more 
visible during the dialogue itself thanks to the spatial proximity of the participants, as 
exemplified in the 77th IPM that I attended. During the meetings, there were only five American 
representatives in the room facing a row of 20 MEPs sitting in front of them. This led one MEP 
to joke that at lunch time every single table would get one American guest for five European 
participants (Participant Observation., 2016). How can one explain this discrepancy? While it 
is true that the US Congress has neither a strong institutional structure nor significant resources 
similar to the EP when it comes to parliamentary delegations, the difference in the level of 
participation also hints to different political priorities,30 sending a clear message in terms of 
recognition. While on the European side, the EU parliamentary delegation to the United States 
is one of the most prestigious delegations for which many members compete to be a part of 
(Interviews no. 4 and 5), on the American side it is up to the chairmen of the delegation to 
convince as many members as possible to participate to the IPMs with their European 
counterparts [emphasis added] (Interviews no. 12, 19; Archick & Morelli 2013, p.15). This is 
not surprising given the fact that until recently, many congressmen were not even aware of the 
existence of this delegation to the EU (Interview no. 4). Today, even when congressmen do 
agree to participate in the IPMs in Washington, they do not stay for the entire duration of the 
dialogue, except for a small number of committed members (Interview no. 1). They pick and 
choose the topics they are interested to discuss but do not stay for the duration of the TLD. 
Even during the session itself, congressmen are constantly entering and leaving the room when 
the dialogue is held in Washington (video of the 77th IPM, 2015), demonstrating that other 
priorities take precedence over the meeting with MEPs. In terms of composition, the Europeans 
make a deliberate effort to compose their delegation in a way that reflects the relative power 
of each political group in the parliament at any given time in order for the ‘Americans to 
understand who we are as a parliament’ (Interview no. 2). In addition, while the EUTLD has 
                                               
30 Many interviewees mentioned overriding domestic concerns dealing with the issue of public opinion 
(Interviews no. 11, 12, 16, 21).  
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representation from most of its key parliamentary committees in order to inject as much 
expertise as possible in the debates, the USTLD is not structured to guarantee the inclusion of 
members from all major congressional committees (Archick & Morelli, 2013).  
 
Place of the meeting: “let us show you how diverse Europe is”  
In a spirit of equality, the declaration on the TLD specifies that the bi-annual inter-
parliamentary meetings shall take place alternately in the United States and in Europe. This 
decision is highly symbolic in the sense that it gives equal weight and status to both sides. 
When these meetings are held in the European Union (EU), they usually take place in the 
capital of the country holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union (European 
Parliament, 2017). This is a way for the host country to raise its profile in the eyes of the 
Americans but also to show to the American counterparts that the EU is not reduced to Brussels 
only (Interview no. 3). Put another way, this practice serves to emphasise the diversity of the 
EU. For instance, the 78th TLD meeting took place in The Hague in June, as it was the 
Netherlands that assured the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half 
of 2016. The year afterwards, the TLD took place in La Valette in Malta, which is the smallest 
member state of the EU, supposedly largely unknown by Americans (Gallup & Saad, 2004). 
Regarding the IPMs taking place in the United States, they used to take place in different places 
each year, such as San Francisco or Florida, but due to the poor attendance of these meetings 
by American representatives, it has been decided to meet in DC for practical reasons 
(Interviews no. 12 and no. 16).  
 
The venue and arrangement within the room: “please take a seat” 
Regarding the meeting room, efforts are generally made to hold the working sessions in elegant 
and historical venues, conveying a deep sense of respect both to the hosts and to the meaning 
of the visit. As mentioned in the theoretical part, the splendour of the ceremony and of the 
building are important to project might, status, and specific cultural characteristics. The 
pictures of the halls in which the last TLD meetings took place in Europe are a testament to 
this fact. Every detail in the room matters. The idea of equality and respect is materialised by 
the presence of two co-chairmen – one from the EU and one from the United States – who 
would typically sit side-by-side on a perfectly equal footing during the working sessions. While 
the chairs occupy a central place at the table, the two delegations sit around a large table, facing 
each other: on one side the European representatives and on the other the American ones 
(Interview no. 2 and fieldwork notes, 2016).  The flags of the EU and the United States are of 
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course part and parcel of the meeting room and are positioned in a way to reflect again perfect 
symbolic equality as demonstrated in the photography of the 76th IPM in Riga below.  
 
 
This photo of the 76th Inter-Parliamentary meeting in Riga, has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
In sum, analysis of the preparation of the dialogue and the setting of the room shed light 
on several important elements. First, a key theme running through this first stage is the blatant 
asymmetry in terms of commitments and efforts put into this dialogue, with European 
lawmakers being much more engaged than their American counterparts. This transpires both 
in the preparation process, whereby the EU clearly takes the lead, and in the rehearsal of its 
‘team performance’ through preparatory meetings aimed at making sure to come across as a 
relevant, competent, and coherent actor vis-à-vis the United States during the dialogue itself. 
While cementing and coordinating a common unified European position ahead of the dialogue, 
the institutional identity of the EU is reinforced in this process as it forces members to clearly 
define core elements of their institutional identity, particularly in terms of values and interests. 
Secondly, the specific setting of the meeting room acts both as ‘a visual representation’ of the 
asymmetry between the two sides and as an opportunity for the MEPs to seek recognition in 
terms of relevance and distinctiveness. This is where the spatial proximity inherent in the 
dialogical interaction becomes particularly salient. 
7.2.2. In the room: communication and interaction  
In this sub-section, I look at the essence of the meeting in terms of communication and 
interaction, as these aspects are packed with symbolic meaning related to the recognition of 
identity. While it is true that the exchange is merely based on the exchange of information and 
arguments as the liberal and constructivist approach would suggest, the very characteristics of 
this exchange carry also a message in terms of identity and recognition. I first focus on the core 
of the IPMs which consists of working sessions and talks with experts. Each inter-
parliamentary meeting generally encompasses three working sessions revolving around the 
issues previously agreed upon. On average, each working session lasts around two hours 
(Interview no. 3). In between these formal discussions, a whole set of informal activities take 
place as well, such as dinners and visits on the ground. As this informal component is also part 
and parcel of the dialogue, it too will be analysed in order to shed light on the elements relating 
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to the recognition of institutional identity. Finally, the IPM culminates with the negotiation and 
signature of the joint statement based on the exchanges that have been taking place during the 
working sessions. For each one of these moments, I show how the verbal and non-verbal cues 
available in the dialogue are used by the participants to seek and grant recognition for the 
institutional identity of the other and vice versa. I specifically address the two main components 
of institutional identity outlined in the theoretical framework: (1) distinctiveness and (2) 
relevance.  
 
The core of the visit: working sessions and talks with experts  
In line with the theoretical framework, I argue that the content of the exchange is also a way 
for the EU to emphasise its distinctive and unique features as an institution (i.e. as one 
dimension of institutional identity) and to gain recognition of them.  
First, as outlined in the theoretical chapter, this desire to be recognised as ‘different and 
unique’ in a dialogical context requires first of all to have the opportunity to voice particular 
concerns and more importantly to be heard by others. The analysis of the data clearly shows 
that the European participants of the IPMs very much value this possibility inherent to the 
dialogue. Indeed, many interviewees mentioned the opportunity offered by the dialogue to 
express their concerns: ‘There have been a lot of opportunities to try to raise some questions. 
For instance, we have repetitively voiced in this context our concerns about Guantanamo and 
the ugly secret prisons’ (Interview no. 4). Dealing with the burning issue of energy dependency 
and of the importance of LNG exports from the United States, an EU official emphasised that, 
‘Thanks to the dialogue, the Americans hear the need of the Europeans and can try to make 
pressure in the Congress afterwards’ [emphasis added] (Interview no. 2).  
Secondly, the contribution of the different MEPs to the working sessions is supposed 
to reflect the particularities of the European Parliament in terms of the plurality of political 
views it represents. Hence, a strong indicator about the importance attributed by the EU to 
expose the whole range of opinions represented in the EP lies in the rules for taking turns to 
speak. The chairmen have the prerogative to give the floor to their participants on their 
respective sides. Usually, the lead speakers of the working groups kick off the discussions. 
Then as the dialogue develops, the chair on the European side should give priority of speech 
to the representatives of the most influential political groups, although he can also deviate from 
this rule if he thinks that another MEP might be better positioned to join the dialogue at a 
specific moment, given its expertise. Overall, the European chair aims at giving the opportunity 
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for all MEPs to express their views, the ideal being to have the European Parliament in all its 
political diversity represented while preserving the relative power of force (Interviews no. 2, 
3, and 4).  
This display of diversity is somewhat unusual for American lawmakers, who are not 
particularly familiar with the nuances of the different European political parties. While the lack 
of cohesion on the European side (despite efforts to have a unified stance) might sometimes 
create confusion for the American participants, they also expressed great appreciation of the 
given opportunity to be exposed to the rainbow of views represented by the EP: ‘Thanks to the 
dialogue, the American congressmen are exposed to hear new and original political views from 
Europe, with which they are not familiar at all. Because when they negotiate – US and EU – 
it’s more like centre-right centre-left. The commission is much more centrist and so that was 
interesting for the Congressmen to see this diversity of views’ (Interview no. 11). This 
appreciation on the American side is well understood by the Europeans, as testified by this 
MEP: ‘It’s true that we are supposed to portray the position of the EU, of the parliament but 
this does not mean that we may not to be able to expose divergences that we have. We have 
done it and sometimes and I think that this is appreciated by the Americans because they 
understand that we are not a uniform parliament. The beauty of the exercise is to see the 
different positions and the nuances that characterize our parliament’ (Interviews no. 1 and 4). 
This is a great illustration of how the dialogue turns into a performance in which the 
distinctiveness of the institution being represented becomes more tangible for the other side 
thanks to the deliberate and concerted efforts of the members to project this identity.   
Turning now to the second component of ‘institutional identity’, I show that the idea of 
being ‘relevant’ constitutes an integral part of the institutional identity of the EU. A way 
through which the EU proves its relevance is through the type of relationship identity both 
sides maintain towards each other as friends. In this regard, the content and nature of the 
interaction itself reflect to a large extent the particular identity relationship linking the two 
political entities.  
First of all, the fact that the rationale guiding the discussion corresponds to the 
advancement of a common project in terms of world governance reinforces the sense of ‘being 
relevant’ and important. It helps strengthen the feeling among EU representatives that they are 
part of an important common endeavour with the United States, whereby both entities are 
leading the world as partners and part of the Western liberal order. The insistence on the 
common project in terms of world governance amounts to the recognition of the EU 
institutional identity as a relevant actor. For many participants of the dialogue, one of the key 
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reasons motivating their presence in this specific delegation, is indeed their commitment to 
advance together a common vision of the world based on shared values and principles. For one 
leading US congressman, ‘The US and EU synergy and our collaboration are critical to the 
continuing success of the western world (…) Between the two of us, we have over 850 million 
people that reflect the world’s largest economies. All those countries combined share common 
western values, such as the respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. So, when 
you look at the totality of what the US and the EU represent, I still believe that it’s the beacon 
of light for the rest of the world - where you still have dictatorships, undemocratic regimes’ 
(Interview no. 17). On the European side, it is the same story: ‘I have been very participative 
in the TLD because I really believe that the EU-US relations are extremely important for world 
governance’ (Interviews no. 4 and no. 5). During the dialogues themselves, many ideas 
discussed – notably around trade – refer back to the ambition of ‘setting the gold standards so 
that the others can follow’ (Participant Observation, 2016).  
Secondly, contrary to other dialogues very much characterised by the use of threats and 
distrust (i.e. dialogue with Iran), the flow of the dialogue is very much appreciated by the MEPs 
and their American counterparts because they confirm a certain relationship identity whereby 
both sides are part of the same community and recognise each other as such. In fact, the 
exceptionally good quality of the exchange between American and European lawmakers has 
directly been linked by the participants themselves to the common political and cultural values 
that unite them. The smoothness and good understanding that characterise these dialogical 
interactions are attributed to the fact that the interlocutors belong to democracies sharing the 
same basic values. For instance, in the quick overview of the 77th TLD meeting, the EU 
Chairman of the delegation reported that ‘the members of Congress evoked “it was pleasant to 
deal with countries where you don’t have to deal with human rights”’. European MEPs, 
regularly involved in other parliamentary delegations with third countries, echoed the same 
idea. Drawing a comparison between the inter-parliamentary dialogues between the EU and 
the United States, and the EU and Iran, an MEP mentioned that culture was the most significant 
factor influencing the quality of the discussion: ‘With the American[s], you speak the same 
language – of how decisions are made and also the systems of checks and balances. For 
instance, we all understand – MEPs and congressmen – that if you have a plan and you cannot 
find a majority, it’s not your fault. Basically, you understand it instantly. In a dictatorship, this 
is not that easy’ (Interview no. 6).  
Moreover, the high level of mutual disclosure and frankness characterising these 
exchanges arguably amount to the recognition of the EU as a valued and trusted partner, and 
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even as ‘a friend’. For Oelsner & Koshut (2014, p. 20), this is even a mark of friendship in IR, 
as friends will expect each other to reveal more information to each other than to others, as 
well as display a higher level of tolerance towards ‘bad news’. In other words, actors can be 
particularly candid towards each other because they fundamentally care. This habitual routine 
of amity has been strongly underlined by the interviewees both on the European and American 
sides: ‘It’s not a dialogue of the deaf. On the contrary, it is a dialogue between friends. For 
instance, an Estonian MEP told Republican members of Congress that the roots of the conflict 
in Syria lie in climate change and the subsequent drought etc… I am happy, as a European, that 
we can be frank with them (American lawmakers) and tell them why we think that they are 
wrong sometimes. If we would agree with everything they say, we wouldn’t behave like 
friends. We need them and they need us’ (Interview no. 2). The same interviewee further added 
that during one of the working sessions, an American congressman explicitly admitted the 
partial responsibility of the United States in the turmoil in the Middle East and the subsequent 
refugee crisis, noting: ‘This is a real conversation between friends because he would not say 
necessarily say such a thing outside of the dialogue’ (Interview no. 2). This ‘confession’ has 
been very much appreciated by the European participants of the dialogue, who feel as a 
consequence in a privileged relationship where this kind of mistake can be openly admitted. 
Conversely, European representatives feel at ease to talk openly with their American 
counterparts. As an MEP recalls, ‘When the Snowden revelations came up about the NSA, 
there was a deep mistrust in Europe about the US – and it was good for us to tell this to the 
Americans. Because they sometimes thought that we were a bit immature or over-reacting. 
Then it’s better to say it face-to-face and not via the media, not via distance. But really to say, 
“Look guys, we have a real problem here, the relationship between the EU and the US is 
suffering as a result of you guys not addressing this”. And I think for them it is very useful to 
hear directly that in principle, we believe in the transatlantic relation, so we are not destructive 
by default or being difficult for the sake of being difficult. But we are each other’ counterparts’ 
(Interviews no. 4 and 6).  
 
Outside of the formal meeting room: social activities  
The TLD is noteworthy in the sense that it features a skilled blend of official working sessions 
and diverse ‘social’ extra-activities taking place outside of the formal meeting room. These 
include coffee breaks, lunches, and official dinners in sophisticated locations, as well as visits 
on the ground that are often related to the specific topics under discussion in the form of fact-
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finding visits. Examples taken from the last TLD meetings include: a visit to a NATO basis in 
Estonia (76th TLD), a visit to the Rotterdam Harbour and Europol (78th TLD), or to the naval 
operations to fight human trafficking in the Mediterranean (80th TLD). While it is true that 
these social activities contribute to build trust among participants, as widely argued in the 
literature on dialogues, I contend that they also play an important role in the recognition game. 
Indeed, these site excursions in the framework of the TLD are also used in order to project an 
image of a ‘relevant, capable and efficient’ institution as key institutional identity features.  
As explained in the theoretical framework (p.56), the fact of being in a different context 
changes the discursive dynamics between the participants of the dialogue and allows a less 
formal kind of communication to develop, thereby bringing people closer and building trust. 
This is definitely the case regarding the TLD. According to a European staffer of the TLD, 
‘Throughout the dialogue, we are also engaging in “team building”: we have lunches together, 
we get mixed. In Riga, for instance, we took the Americans to a NATO base and we had a 
lunch with the American troops stationed there. We really mixed ourselves, all together: MEPs, 
Congressmen and the American troops; it was great’. Emphasising the benefits of sharing 
experiences, he added, ‘Instantaneously, the fact of being together in a different country had a 
great effect. It matters a lot and it is part and parcel of the dialogue’ (Interview no. 2). Indeed, 
the analysis of the visual data of this visit to the NATO basis shows a display of positive 
emotions, and a certain sense of excitement and discovery shared by both the American and 
European participants of the dialogue (Appendix 5). This day on the NATO base remains 
equally anchored in the minds of the American participants, as a particularly good memory 
(Interview no. 16).  During the interview, the chairman of the EP delegation to the United States 
even enthusiastically showed me the pictures he took on his iPhone, portraying him, with his 
American friends and soldiers, on the very same day, observing NATO’s weapons (Interview 
no. 1).  
 
 
 
This photo of the 76th IPM, Joint visit to the Adazi military base where Latvian and American 
forces conduct joint military exercises under NATO Operation Atlantic Resolve, has been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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Clearly, for many participants the best parts of the dialogue are the ‘less formal sides – 
having dinner, having lunch together. This is when people can be blunter and more honest and 
give a clear perspective on how they feel about trade. So, the members can really share their 
perspectives more on a one and one level and – without a big microphone in their face to talk 
across a big table’ (Interview no. 16). In the same vein, another American commented that, 
‘The most fruitful conversations are not in the formal meetings or presentations but on the 
boundaries’ (Interviews no. 19 and 25). The development of closer inter-personal relations 
during these informal moments goes hand-in-hand with more candid discussions: ‘They [MEPs 
and Congressmen] would start sharing things in common outside of their work, talk about their 
family, fishing … they have time to have this social discourse during the dialogue. Once you 
get to know your counterparts more personally, you can feel more comfortable talking to them 
about important issues in a less structured manner, in more informal discussions’ (Interview 
no. 12).  
More importantly, the empirical data is replete with evidence of how discussions spill 
over from the intimate conversations to the official rooms of the meetings and vice versa, 
indicating the benefits of having in this case ‘two different spaces of dialogue’ – one formal 
and the other informal. For instance, during the observation of the 78th TLD meeting, many 
participants of the dialogues referred in the formal sessions to casual discussions they had 
during the different breaks (Participant observation, 2016). In sum, as one of the European 
interviewees succinctly put it, ‘It’s really about being here, sharing the coffee and the cookie. 
And this cannot happen in a video conference’ (Interview no. 2). This suggests that trust is 
essentially built outside and then brought inside. Put another way, there is an interweaving in 
and around the room that could not have been possible without the spatial and emotional 
immediacy allowed by the dialogical interaction.  
Apart from the fact that these social interactions out of the formal meeting room help 
build trust and thereby reinforce a positive relationship identity, my contention is that they also 
carry symbolic meaning and are used by the organisers to seek, get, and grant recognition for 
their institutional identity, particularly in terms of relevance.  
First of all, due to the typically low attendance of American representatives of the 
Congress to the IPMs taking place in Europe, the EP secretariat strategically considers the 
different options for extra-curricular activities aiming at motivating their American 
counterparts to cross the Atlantic. As the chairman of the EP delegation himself explained, ‘We 
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always go to the country who is chairing the Council and do something interesting there. 
Because if we say Brussels, a lot of Americans would say: Brussels? We have been in Brussels? 
Why should we travel to Brussels? So, this year, we thought we could do something with 
NATO. The Americans are always interested in NATO’ (Interview no. 1). The fact that 
Americans are not easily willing to come to Brussels – which is after all the heart of European 
power – is confirmed by the Americans themselves: ‘Sometimes it’s attractive to go, sometimes 
it’s not, so if you are going to Prague, you might get a big group. (…) I remember the one year, 
the meeting was in Rome so it was very easy for the co-chairs of the TLD to get 12 members 
to sign up and go to Rome. In fact, there were even more and they had to tell me no! That was 
really good’ (Interview no. 12). In this sense, the informal activities are used as a strategic 
choice to gain recognition for one’s relevance.  
Secondly, the on-site excursions when they happen in Europe are also interpreted by 
the Europeans themselves as a way to ‘prove’ to the American participants that they are able 
to deliver. They aim at showing to the Americans the achievements of the European Union that 
are too often unknown or underestimated. A good illustration of that point is the visit to Europol 
and to the harbour of Rotterdam that took place during the 78th TLD in the Netherlands. As a 
senior figure in the EU parliamentary delegation to the United States explained, ‘This visit to 
Europol serves our agenda. I think that if the Americans see how serious the work Europol is 
doing is, they may not just think Europe is letting all the terrorists run free. This is “how politics 
work”. You shape the program to your advantage: I don’t even have to say a word but I hope 
that the impact will be that when they will see what is happening in Europe, they will be calmer 
– and will not be so aggressive and tell us we are naïve’ (Interview no. 6). Reinforcing this 
rationale, another prominent actor of the TLD emphasised: ‘We plan to go to the port of 
Rotterdam so that they (Americans) can see on the spot the security measures that we take in 
the Harbour to limit trafficking or to make sure of the security installations. We really want 
them to learn something on the ground’ (Interview no. 18). This is well understood by the 
American side: ‘Going forwards, there is going to be a meeting with Europol and counter-
terrorism … this is something that our side at least is willing to learn about and see exactly 
what kind of procedures are in place to tackle terrorism and understand the concerns as 
well. Yes, I think that they want to show “hey… we are beefing up…” There is a misperception 
that there are open borders and that everyone can come in to Europe. Europol will show that 
this is not the case obviously’ (Interview no. 16).   
Therefore, what happens in the room in the case of the TLD is that, clearly, the EU 
displays recognition-seeking behaviour, using a variety of (verbal and non-verbal) cues in order 
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to project its institutional identity both in terms of relevance and distinctiveness. This 
recognition-seeking behaviour is not limited to formal interaction but extends also to the more 
informal parts, like the site visits for instance, which are designed in part to ‘prove the relevance 
of the institution’ and bring concrete evidence of its achievements in certain policy areas. 
Moreover, the extensive informal moments embedded in the TLD programme allows the 
development of interpersonal relations and strong bonds of trust that cannot be achieved in any 
other format of interaction (neither email nor video conference). The emotional display 
cultivated in this context is crucial as it contributes toward anchoring a positive relationship 
identity as friends – not least by improving the quality of the exchange back to the formal 
meeting room.  
 
7.2.3. After leaving the room: communication and interaction with the outside 
world  
In line with the theoretical framework, this sub-section shows how the recognition process that 
took place during the dialogue is celebrated outside the ‘room’ and projected to the world. The 
analysis of the use of the different types of anchors carrying the recognition of institutional 
identity out of the room reveals yet again an asymmetry between MEPs and American 
representatives. Europeans are much keener than their American counterparts to project, 
publicise, and disseminate the existence and results of these meetings. This suggests a profound 
desire on the European side to use all the possible outcomes of the dialogue to anchor its 
institutional identity – thereby confirming the main argument developed here about the EU’s 
quest for recognition throughout the dialogue.  
 
Visual anchors of institutional identity: “Every Picture Tells a Story” 
Echoing the theoretical framework, photographs (i.e. the visual representation) of specific 
events can become important carriers of symbolic messages to the outside world. This is true 
for the TLD as well. While the traditional ‘family picture’ of the European and American 
delegations might escape notice or simply be considered as a routine component of the 
protocol, I argue that it fulfils a crucial function in terms of anchoring the EU institutional 
identity as a relevant actor. One can distinguish between two types of photographs capturing 
both formal and informal key moments of the meetings. In the first category, one finds the 
visual representation of the two delegations standing side-by-side in a spirit of equality and 
cooperation, with the landmark building in the background to easily recognise the meeting 
depending on its location. This ‘family picture’ serves not only as the ‘official portrait of the 
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relationship’ but also as a vivid record of who was present but also of who was absent. It is 
also common currency to ‘immortalise’ the meaningful culmination of the signing of the joint 
statement and the subsequent handshakes between the European and American chairmen 
(Appendix 5). These staged photographs are telling in terms of recognition: the participants are 
always positioned in a way to convey equality and solemnity. On the more informal side, there 
are also pictures of activities on the ground, as well as interviews and videos (European 
Parliament, 2015).   
Beyond the photographs and videos of the activities themselves, what really matters for 
our discussion is the extent to which these anchors of institutional identity are disseminated 
and the rationale behind it. Noteworthy here is the difference between the European and 
American parliamentary delegations in the way they publicise the dialogue towards their 
domestic constituencies and wider international audiences. On the one hand, the European side 
pro-actively publicises the TLD using a wide variety of media channels: TV, radio, and social 
media. One of the dialogues that attracted the most media coverage was the 76th TLD meeting 
in Riga because the Latvian government was interested in using the visit of the American 
representatives to raise its profile and the awareness to the specific challenges it faces in terms 
of security (Interview no.1). But generally speaking the meetings and visits in the framework 
of the TLD are much more advertised on the European side than on the American side: The 
website of the European Parliament's Delegation for relations with the United States of 
America (D-US) as well as EPLO are replete with pictures and other relevant information about 
the meeting whereas there is no equivalent of this kind on the American side.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This photo of the 76th IPM, where a MEP gives an interview to the press, has been removed 
as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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Similarly, individual members of parliament make these pictures enter the public domain by 
tweeting and posting images of their meetings with their American counterparts on social 
media (Appendix 5). These efforts by MEPs can be interpreted as a way to ‘show to the rest of 
the world’ that they are talking with the American Congress, which in turn serves to reinforce 
their sense of relevance on the international stage. On the American side, however, the story is 
completely different. No particular efforts are made to put the TLD under the media spotlight 
and many American participants rather mention the negative attitude of their public opinion 
regarding these trips to Europe, considered as ‘luxury distractions’ compared to more domestic 
burning issues: ‘Because Europe is seen as luxurious, when members and staff travel there, this 
is perceived very negatively by the public. They are hanging out in London, Paris and the 
perception is that it is on the back of the taxpayers. Members of Congress and staffers always 
have this in mind’ (Interviews no. 11, 16, 19).  
 
Discursive anchors of institutional identity  
Following the same logic, another practice that serves to anchor the recognition of institutional 
identity is the drafting and dissemination of the joint statement, which is the only collective 
tangible outcome of the inter-parliamentary meetings. Even though this document can be 
viewed at first sight as ‘trivial’ due to its non-binding nature and vague formulation – his 
symbolic value should not be underestimated. Indeed, the careful analysis and comparison of 
the joint statements over time (76th, 77th, and 78th TLDs) reveals interesting findings in terms 
of recognition, both along the ‘relevance’ and ‘distinctiveness’ dimensions of institutional 
identity. In fact, certain ‘elements of recognition’ present in the meeting room are directly 
‘imprinted’ on the document. This point matters as the joint statements serve as the main 
documents of reference when it comes to the inter-parliamentary cooperation between the 
European Union and the United States (Interview no. 2).  
Regarding the ‘relevance’ dimension of institutional identity, the idea of a common 
world governance project and the ‘relationship identity’ emanating from it is repeatedly 
enshrined in the joint statements in a systematic manner. For instance, in the opening 
paragraphs of the Joint Statements, there is a constant reminder of the common values and 
principles tying the two political entities: ‘Building upon the strong foundation of our common 
values and shared principles, we discussed ways to further strengthen our relationship’ (Joint 
Statements of the 76th, 77th, and 78th TLDs) [emphasis added]. In the same vein, the emphasis 
is often put in the formulation of the joint statements on the EU and US’s identity as shapers 
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and guarantors of the current world order. For instance, at the time when the negotiations on 
TTIP were going on, several joint statements reiterated the fact that ‘the EU and the US were 
unique strategic partners’ working on a transatlantic trade agreement that shall among other 
things, ‘establish modern global trade rules’ (78th IPM, Joint Statement) (emphasis added). 
Echoing this idea, a similar extract of the document mentions: ‘We maintain the conviction 
that a multilateral system founded on universal rules and values is best suited to address global 
crises, challenges and threats and we stress that the transatlantic partnership must remain a 
crucial pillar of this global rules-based system’ (Ibid). In a more recent visit of the Bureau of 
the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the United States, the European 
parliament published a short press release, outlining that ‘the main message of the members of 
European Parliament to Members of Congress, the US Administration and civil society focused 
on the importance of continued and ever-strengthened EU-US relations through concrete steps, 
such as the setting of high standards, the promotion of common values and leading forward the 
global order’ (EPLO, 2018). Moreover, while the dialogue and joint statement arguably serve 
the ‘liberal institutionalist’ function of monitoring and registering progress on common areas 
of cooperation, I contend that this exercise carries also a symbolic dimension in terms of 
recognition. Indeed, the explicit insistence (and acceptance) on having the achievements and 
progress done by the EU incorporated in these statements – which were eventually signed by 
the US Congress – is an implicit acknowledgment on behalf of this institution of the 
efficiency/relevance of the EU. Put differently, it contributes to the recognition of the EU as 
an ‘efficient’ partner able to deliver.  
As to the ‘unique and distinct’ dimension of institutional identity, its recognition is also 
enshrined in the joint statement as a testament to the fact that the American participants 
understand and accept the specific concerns of their Europeans counterparts. For instance, in 
an internal report circulated by the European chairman of the delegation to the totality of its 
members, a great sense of pride was perceptible due to the success of the EU to have the United 
States accept their concerns on human rights and their willingness to consider the issue of 
refugees as a matter of shared responsibility (Internal report European Parliament, 2015). This 
corresponds in a way to the process of reinforcing institutional identity through the reification 
of differences. In the words of a high-level EU official, ‘When we have to defend our values 
as Europeans, it makes us feel more Europeans’ (Ripoll, 2018).   
Similar to the extensive use of various channels of communication to publicise the 
pictures of the TLD, the same rationale is at play regarding the dissemination of the joint 
statements. Particularly telling in this regard is the importance attributed to the Joint Statement 
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in the form of the intense follow up on the European side compared to the American side. As 
a first stage, the European administrators of the dialogue draft an internal report about the 
‘minutes’ of the meetings and the Chairman of the delegation writes a personal note sent to all 
the D-US members. In addition, the Joint Statement, which constitutes the document of 
reference, is distributed to a much larger circle, namely to all the members of the D-US 
delegation, members of all the committees (Interview no. 2), and the EU Commission as well 
(Interview no. 3). Simultaneously, the EU Delegation in Washington reports to the EEAS and 
to the European Parliament. According to the EEAS guidelines of July 2015, the Head of the 
EU delegation in Washington reports to the EEAS with emphasis on the outcome of the visit, 
particularly as regards the assessment by the host country (EEAS, 2015). The staffers of the D-
US delegation like to emphasise the value that the joint statement enjoys compared to the 
outcomes of other dialogue’s institutions. For instance, a European staffer insisted on the 
unique value of the joint statement in that it can be effectively used by the EU commission 
during the current trade negotiations as a solid document stating where the positions of the two 
parliaments stand (Interview no. 2). This is indeed crucial in light of the ratification power that 
both chambers hold. On the other side of the pond, much less attention is given to the Joint 
Statement, which is even not systematically disseminated among the relevant actors. According 
to current and former US staffers in charge of the TLD, ‘The joint statement is put in the 
Congressional record but we do not disseminate it to the other committees’ (Interview no. 9); 
‘On the American side, no one really reads it. We do not publish the Joint Statement and we 
don’t refer to them’ (Interview no. 25). There is, however, a close follow-up by the US State 
Department that has a representative present in each one of the TLD meetings. It is responsible 
for writing a report that is then sent to the FA committee to make sure that they did not miss 
any important point (Interviews no. 25 and 16).  
 
Practical anchors: “talking the talk and walking the walk”  
Finally, the last way through which the recognition of institutional identity is carried out of the 
room is through the continuation and intensification of the dialogue as a symbol of the 
relevance of the partnership emanating from the dialogue itself. First, the dialogue itself 
automatically re-commits the members to meet again in the future, irrespective of the 
disagreements that might have arisen in the meetings and free of any conditionality attached to 
the progress that could be done in the meantime. In fact, it is interesting to note that 
systematically at the beginning and at the end of each Joint statement, both parties recall the 
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previous meeting in these terms: ‘following up on previous discussions…’; ‘we re-affirm the 
conclusions of the previous IPM’; and insist that ‘our conversations have convinced us of the 
need to strengthen and deepen our relations. We will continue the policy-oriented approach in 
the TLD (…) in a spirit committed to enriching our valuable partnership. We look forward to 
achieving progress on these by our next meeting’ (76th TLD, 77th TLD, 78th TLD Joint 
statements). These lines are important because they emphasise the importance of the continuity 
and continuation of the dialogue.  
What is all the more striking is that this commitment to the continuation of the dialogue 
is unconditional. No matter how deep the disagreements between the two sides might reveal 
themselves to be, what ultimately counts is the continuation of the dialogue. As this quote from 
a senior European figure clearly shows: ‘Equally important is the commitment to pursue the 
dialogue, even in the midst of disagreements that become sometimes more apparent during our 
exchanges’ (Interview no. 1). This idea is confirmed by a majority of the TLD participants, 
who expressed great satisfaction in light of the possibility offered by the dialogue to disagree 
without damaging the relationship: ‘With the Americans, the dialogues are always friendly, 
even though we do not always agree on TTIP or the future of carbon emissions’ (Interview no. 
19). The same assessment is shared on the American side, as exemplified by these quotes: 
‘Regardless of the result, the process itself is important: American representatives get another 
perspective on issues of common interests and this is what matters’ (Interview no. 21). By the 
same token, the commitment to pursue the dialogue remains intact irrespective of any progress 
made by both sides: the joint statement does not specify the precise steps to be taken until the 
next meeting by the two parliaments nor any benchmarks to assess subsequent progress.  
Last but not least, a whole constellation of contacts and exchanges take place in 
between the formal inter-parliamentary meetings among representatives of the two parliaments 
ignited by the contacts established during the TLD. These intense exchanges, which are 
initiated in the first place thanks to the physical meetings, are tangible proof of the recognition 
granted to the EU in terms of relevance. In other words, the establishment of these channels of 
communication and their active use constitute practical anchors of institutional identity. The 
very act of consulting each other on matters of common interest and organising/proliferating 
further meetings reinforce the institutional identity of the EP as a relevant partner with whom 
it is worth engaging. The recognition that takes place during the physical dialogue among the 
representatives as qualified and relevant interlocutors extend beyond the meeting rooms. While 
the dialogue provides the opportunity to representatives to get to know each other and to 
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identify their relevant counterparts, the recognition of the relevance of the EU is carried out in 
the form of further consultations.  
The fact that following the dialogue, representatives on both sides are willing to consult 
each other strengthens the sense of being ‘worth talking to’ and therefore relevant. As a US 
staffer put it, ‘The real benefit is that the members of Congress make contacts and put faces to 
names. Throughout the months in between the two dialogues, lots of time they reach out to 
each other: “This is what we are considering over here. What do Europeans feel about this? 
What is your view about this? The parliament is talking about this” etc. It’s really the 
relationships more than the actual meetings themselves’ (Interview no. 9). This is confirmed 
by another US staffer, for whom ‘building a relationship is one of the most important things. 
My boss (a congressman) can just pick up the phone, call, or email someone in the parliament 
because he has a relationship with them. Ultimately, the added value is to figure out how we 
can work together to advance our shared goals’ (Interview no. 16). On the European side, this 
is the same story: ‘In the field of financial regulations, both sides know each other well and 
understand that there are indispensable partners. So, they do communicate and talk finance 
issues on a regular basis’ (Interview no. 18).  
As a matter of course, these inter-personal links provide not only the opportunity to 
consult later on but also act as a catalyst in the creation of informal interactions (and possibly 
institutionalised ones at a later stage) thereby reinforcing the institutional identity of the other 
as relevant. Echoing this claim, a former US staffer mentioned that ‘the dialogue was about 
MEPs and congress members getting each other, understanding each other on different things, 
developing contacts, and turning them into ad hoc meetings here or in Europe when people 
travel. That’s the value and it is valuable. No question about it. The fact that there is money 
appropriated and spent each year is an indication that there is value from most people’s point 
of view’ (Interview no. 25). In essence, the formal dialogues act as multipliers of other formats 
of discussions and exchanges. According to a high-level official in the EP, there are all sorts 
of visits involving parliamentarians besides the IPMs, such as committee delegations, EP’s 
rapporteurs who visit the United States on fact-finding missions and get in touch with 
congressmen, members coming as political groups, or members coming individually to meet 
their counterparts with whom they have become personally acquainted (Interviews no. 18 and 
4).  
To conclude, this section showed how the recognition process taking place within the 
room transcends the meeting rooms and is being projected to the outside world. While the EU 
tends to extensively use visual anchors in the forms of widely-disseminated photographs to 
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anchor its institutional identity, the United States is less inclined to do so. The discursive and 
practical anchors emanating from the face-to-face interaction are crucial in ‘clinching’ the 
recognition process of the EU institutional identity – in particular, the positive relationship 
identity linking the EU and the United States.  
7.3. The outcome: a dialogue among friends  
Finally, this last section examines the prevailing discourse across the different stages of the 
process in terms of equality in order to assess the extent to which the members of the EP feel 
their institutional identity has been recognised and anchored. This assessment is then contrasted 
with the American perspective to see if there is any discrepancy between the views of both 
sides.  
 
7.3.1. EU perspective: overall satisfaction with recognition – but persisting 
frustration  
First, there is no doubt regarding the challenge the European Parliament faces as it tries to 
attract the attention of the Americans. The profusion of metaphors in the empirical data is 
unequivocal: ‘We [EPLO] seek to put the European Parliament on the map, here in 
Washington’ (Interview no. 8); or ‘Our refusal to ratify ACTA created a “bip” on the radar 
screen of the Americans’ (Interview no. 2); in short, ‘We try to increase the visibility of the EP 
parliament in Washington, DC. We want to be seen and we want to be heard’ [Emphasis added] 
(Interview no. 18). With this aim – which amounts to the quest for recognition – in mind, the 
analysis shows that despite the persistent frustration on the EU side associated with the lack of 
a stronger commitment of the Americans, the prevailing discourse is overall positive and does 
express progress in terms of recognition of the EU institutional identity. Bearing in mind the 
definition of recognition provided in the theoretical chapter, according to which ‘recognition 
is granted when there is a match between the self-image of the actor seeking recognition and 
the treatment it deems appropriate to receive by the recognizing party’ (Lindemann & Saada, 
2012, p.17-18), I provide below a few indications for the progress in terms of recognition that 
has been made:  
Even from the very first stage of entry in the room, the ‘relatively’ high level of US 
congressmen attending the meetings is perceived as a success for European delegates because 
it is perceived as a statement about the importance of the relationship and of the EU. In fact, 
the European chairman of the US delegation and its staffers usually define the success of a 
IPMs as a function of the American presence to these encounters: ‘Most important in the end, 
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is to get the American side involved […] And I think that in the last meetings that I have 
chaired, we had good American participation. I mean, if you get ten Americans coming to 
Europe, it’s a huge achievement’ (Interview no. 1). Contrary to what could have been expected 
in such a highly institutionalised relationship, the American presence in these dialogues is not 
taken for granted and, as such, their very participation in the meetings constitutes one of the 
most important criteria for measuring its degree of success, regardless of the discursive 
dynamics and actual outcomes of the encounter itself. It is clearly a sign of recognition for the 
relevance of the EU, for which it is worth taking the time to engage. Recently, another 
achievement for the European delegation to the US Congress has been the increased 
involvement of members of the Senate to the official TLD Programme, which is very unusual 
in this context. The European chairmen of the delegation expressed great satisfaction in this 
regard as the Senate has constitutionally and traditionally taken the lead in the Congress in FP. 
More specifically, its Foreign Relations Committee has been highly regarded and regularly 
drawn upon by the Executive for advice (Dobson & Marsh, 2001, p. 9). As such, the fact that 
the Chair of the US Senate Sub-committee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, 
Senator Ron Johnson, personally dedicated time to meet with the delegation of MEPs during 
the 77Th IPM in Washington in 2015 has been interpreted as a great sign of respect and honour 
for the European participants and their institutions (Interviews no. 1, 2, and 3). This 
interpretation is largely confirmed by the American participants of the dialogue as this quote 
illustrates: ‘The very presence and attendance to the dialogues is a way to show commitment 
to the value of the dialogue and the relationship as a whole: It is important not to neglect the 
fact that the Congressmen are coming because they see value in these dialogues - otherwise 
they wouldn’t come! They are definitely committed’ (Interviews no. 21, 16, and 19).   
Secondly, regarding the assessment of the dynamics within the room, a vast majority 
of MEPs consider the dialogue to be effective in helping the Americans better understand the 
distinctiveness and uniqueness of the European Union as an actor, thereby granting recognition 
for this dimension of institutional identity as well through the demonstration of empathy. This 
point is all the more important when one considers the very limited knowledge of certain 
American lawmakers about the EU’s functioning, interests, and achievements. In fact, both 
Europeans and close American observers have noticed the gap in terms of knowledge about 
the other’s respective achievements. For a high-level EU official involved in the dialogue, 
‘Sometimes the dialogue can be very pedagogical for us, but Americans benefit from it the 
most’ (Interview no. 2). In the same vein, several legislative assistants of American 
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congressmen substantiated this claim by admitting that ‘they (congressmen) even don’t know 
what the treaty of Lisbon or the Schengen area are (…) Or when you ask them to talk about 
European energy security, they have absolutely no clue’ (Interview no. 19). Because of this 
asymmetry in terms of knowledge about the other, many European participants are convinced 
that thanks to the dialogue, they help Americans better understand Europe’s concerns and 
positions on a variety of important issues. On privacy for instance, an MEP recalled, ‘At the 
time, they (the US) were trying to put these X-ray machines in airports that keep your photos 
naked, and we had doubts about the compatibility of that with our data protection. The dialogue 
was an eye-opening opportunity for us and for the Americans. They clearly saw that there are 
limitations. Their data protection system is far away from ours. They also realised many of the 
dangers and why we were so concerned. It’s a mutual learning process’ (Interview no. 4). On 
trade issues, a European staffer expressed a similar view: ‘I think they (the United States) 
understand now better how important these geographical indications (GIs) are for Europeans. 
A third of all food quality product are GIs. For Americans, it’s ridiculous but now they better 
understand’ (Interview no. 3).  
This important feeling of being understood and recognised in one’s difference comes 
about with the demonstration of empathy for the concerns of the other part. In this regard, most 
of the interviewees who actively participated in the TLD expressed some degree of satisfaction 
regarding the demonstration of empathy coming from the American side, i.e. the degree to 
which they took their concerns into account seriously. A participative MEP of the D-US 
delegation mentioned that, ‘On plenty of issues, we saw that some American colleagues really 
responded to our concerns and helped work out solutions’ (Interview no. 4). In sum, as this 
high-level European parliamentarian figure put it, ‘There is recognition, they recognise now 
who we are. I remember 10 years ago in my previous functions in the Parliament when I used 
to come to Washington, we had to repeat in each meeting “who we were, what was the 
European parliament”. They had no clue of what is was. Now we don’t have to go through all 
this anymore. So, I would say – one of the biggest achievement is that, even if we (EU and US) 
don’t agree always on everything, we are discussing on an equal-to-equal basis and I think that 
this is great progress’ [emphasis added] (Interview no. 18).  
Thirdly, the subjective feeling of being recognised as relevant is also related to the 
‘extra gestures’ done by their American counterparts to honour their European guests. When 
the EP delegation gets to travel to the United States, they appreciate the symbolic gesture that 
their American counterparts make by giving them privileged access to specific places, for 
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instance: ‘The little bonus we [EU] got when we were in Washington during the last meeting, 
is that the Americans took us to the balcony of the Speaker of the House, with a very beautiful 
view. It’s nice, they let us go through “secret” corridors not open otherwise to the public. These 
little things are part of the meetings and help build the relationship’ (Interview no. 2). The 
sensitivity of the European participants to this ‘differentiated treatment’ is telling and shows 
yet again that the dialogue is about gaining recognition for one’s relevance.  
 
7.3.2. US perspective: recognising – and learning from – the EP as an institution  
The American perspective is in line with the prevailing sense of recognition felt by European 
members. In other words, the Europeans are not living in a bubble disconnected from reality.  
First, a majority of American participants acknowledge and appreciate the high level of 
preparation and expertise displayed by their European counterparts during the dialogue. 
Europeans come across as well prepared and very professional, as this quote testifies: ‘On the 
European side, they are traditionally very well prepared, lay the background on an issue, they 
usually have very good and substantive presentations. It’s great to work with them’ (Interviews 
no. 12, 16, 21, and 25). In addition, the data analysis of the American interviewees reveals that 
there is a better understanding of the relevance of the EU, amounting to more recognition for 
the EP on the American side. This assessment of the increased recognition of EU relevance is 
widely shared among American interviewees, who admit that, 
Over the last maybe 10 years or so, members of Congress have begun to realise that 
members of the European Parliament do have legislative authority. The EU all the 
sudden had become an important and relevant legislative institution – even though it 
was not the institution of a country, but this ‘union thing’, which is something that 
people are still trying to grasp. I think that now we better understand the powers of the 
Parliament and we’d better start talking to the EP because it does things that can 
negatively impact what happens here and vice versa (Interviews no. 12 and 11).  
 
More specifically, the American participants recognise they learn a lot from the 
Europeans, which confirms the perceptions of the Europeans themselves. This is particularly 
true on Justice and Home Affairs issues. The thorny topic of the protection of privacy vs. 
security has often been referred to as an area of fruitful conversation, in which the American 
participants sympathised with the concerns voiced by their European counterparts: ‘Two years 
ago, we had very good exchanges on X-ray machines at the US airports and there were some 
concerns on the part of the European parliamentarians of “what kind of data showed up on the 
screen”?; “What you could see and couldn’t see?” In other words, how you protect the privacy 
of an individual looking for a specific gun or knives. We also addressed the question of health 
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risks for people who would go through these machines and get a full body blast with x-ray and 
whether there was an option for people not to go through that machine’ (Interview no. 12). 
Another US participant added, ‘Whenever Europeans talk about privacy, we learn a lot of them. 
We have now developed a better understanding of this issue and we now realise that it is more 
complicated on the European side when it comes to data. (Interview no. 16).  
It is interesting to note that there is even a sense of empathy from certain Europhiles 
members of Congress who would like to see an even more equal type of partnership.  Certain 
American participants (though this is a minority view) are themselves very aware of the 
frustration generated by the low level of American engagement with the European side. Indeed, 
a few American interviewees have themselves voiced harsh criticism regarding the disrupted 
and unengaging way in which the American representatives oftentimes behave during the 
working sessions, suggesting that it might seem disrespectful to the Europeans. These 
observers on the American side even ‘felt sorry for the MEPs that are not treated with the same 
care/honour, as when they are hosting the Americans. I see the power dynamics. These 15 
MEPs that are treated like kings in the European Parliament and when they come here… it’s 
tough’ (Interview no. 19). Echoing the exact same feeling, another American participant of the 
dialogue said about the inter-parliamentary meetings: ‘It’s not about domination but the 
perceived sense of importance is unequal. The way MEPs perceive themselves and are 
perceived in Brussels is that they are at the top. Facing the American Congress, they are treated 
like junior partners, even unconsciously. Typically, the role that Congress occupies exults 
power” (Interview no. 11).  
 
7.4. Alternative explanations: what else is going on during the 
dialogues?  
 
While the bulk of this chapter shed light on the recognition processes at play during the 
dialogue, some consideration needs also to be given to the counter-hypotheses developed by 
the other IR theories outlined in the theoretical framework (p.32-37). In the case of the TLD, 
the discursive dynamics developing during the dialogue do not correspond to the hard-
bargaining kind of communication attempting to coerce the actors. What happens though more 
predominantly is an exchange of information in the pursuit of cooperation that allows to dispel 
some stereotypes and misperceptions. There is no strong evidence of persuasion processes 
either, whereby participants ultimately revise their beliefs to come up with new shared 
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understandings. This strongly indicates that the real added value of these dialogues resides not 
so much in the quest for security or profit but more clearly in the quest for recognition.  
First, the case of the TLD did not display any instance of bargaining during the 
dialogue, as realist scholars would expect. In fact, the analysis showed no evidence of the 
exchange of threats or promises following a give-and-take bargaining kind of mechanism, 
characteristic of a ‘coercive type of dialogue’. This is hardly surprising given the finality of the 
TLD meetings: the participants are not expected to come up with a precise binding agreement 
on a specific topic – contrarily to negotiators at other levels of dialogue. Even the participants 
of the dialogue explicitly mention that the dialogue is not about negotiations: ‘We don’t 
negotiate anything but really the aim is serious political discussions on real issues that matter 
to the members the moment they meet. We are really trying to go beyond what they read in 
newspapers, brief papers and achieve a real personal exchange between legislators’ (Interview 
no. 18). However, an attentive observation of the dialogue reveals that there is a process of 
negotiations ongoing during the TLD itself, but it takes place on the margins of the working 
sessions and is not at the heart of the discussions. Surprisingly enough, it does not involve the 
main participants of the dialogue (i.e. congressmen and MEPs) but rather the European and 
American staffers who negotiate between themselves with the representatives of the political 
groups the final joint statement to be signed by the two chairmen at the end of the TLD. This 
process of negotiation takes place in a very limited period, which gives no room for any 
meaningful persuasion processes. As I observed by myself in the last TLD in The Hague 
(Participant observation, 2016), the staffers were under time pressure to find a common 
agreement: they were constantly going in and out of the hall in which the working session was 
taking place, consulting with political groups representatives and running back to their staffer 
counterparts. Later the same day, reflecting about the negotiation process with the American 
staffers, they admitted that ‘it had been tough this time. We had no time and just decided to 
delete the word “multilateral”, as the American staffers were not willing to commit on that’. 
The phenomenon at play here corresponds to the creation of ‘incomplete agreement’, where 
compromises are found based on the ambiguity of the language, without involving any 
significant persuasion processes (Steffek, 2005). The fact that the joint negotiation of this 
statement – which is the only ‘deliverable’ and collective tangible outcome of the TLD – does 
not stand at the core of the Inter-parliamentary meeting is a strong indication that its added 
value resides elsewhere. 
Second, in line with the institutional liberal theory, the TLD serves indeed as a forum 
for the exchange of information in the pursuit of cooperation. The type of information being 
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exchanged corresponds mainly to ‘taking stock exercises’, whereby members update the other 
side of what has been done on a particular issue and give their advice on future prospects related 
to further cooperation. Surprisingly enough, however, most of the information and views being 
exchanged are neither ‘exclusive nor confidential’ in nature. There is no crucial asymmetry of 
information that the dialogue is supposed to address. On the contrary, most of the information 
and arguments being exchanged during the working sessions are made available in the public 
sphere long before the meeting and even included in the ‘dossiers’ that the participants must 
read. An American observer who was also closely involved in the preparation and attendance 
of the TLD meetings reinforced this point by noting that, ‘There is no surprise because the 
Europeans and Americans on these committees are following these issues on the other side of 
the Atlantic and they know that there is no agreement on geographic indications and the 
Europeans know that they will talk about defence issues. These things are very public and they 
will come up – there is nothing secret’ (Interview no.11). What the dialogue allows, though, is 
a better understanding of the interests behind the positions advanced, as reflected in the claim 
that the dialogue helps dispel stereotypes and misperceptions (Interviews no. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 
and 16). While recognising that the dialogue fulfils its role as an engine promoting cooperation, 
my argument developed above made the point that the exchange of information has an 
additional function in terms of identity. The way the exchange of information unfolds is not 
neutral: the level of disclosure displayed, the efficiency of the meeting, and the high level of 
connivance contribute to anchor a positive relationship identity beyond the mere rational utility 
that the exchange of information brings.  
Finally, the analysis does not point to any effective persuasion processes: the actors of 
the dialogue do not fundamentally change their minds following this intense exchange of 
views. This is quite striking given the conventional view in the literature about the EU, that has 
long praised its so-called ‘persuasive power’ in its dealing with third countries. At the inter-
parliamentary level between the EU and the United States, at least, this is not the case, as this 
extract from an interview testifies: ‘There will be no life-changing take-away from these 
dialogues’ (Interview no. 11). Two important points deserve to be highlighted in this regard. 
First, a majority of lawmakers involved in the TLD expressed no readiness to profoundly revise 
their beliefs about certain topics: ‘Generally, I think it would be rare that there is a massive 
change after one conversation. I’d like to think that I think very long and hard about my points 
of views and that they develop over the years. So, it hardly ever happens that I meet anyone 
who can instantly change my mind’ (emphasis added) (Interview no. 6). Secondly, for many 
participants of the TLD, the conversion of one to another’s beliefs is not the objective of these 
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meetings. There is even no deliberate attempt to persuade the other side – partly because the 
participants do not think that it is a realistic expectation. When asked about any processes of 
persuasion, MEPs commented, ‘No, this does not happen. It is too ambitious’ (Interview no. 
5); and, ‘You know, it’s not one or two meetings with Europeans that they will change their 
minds… it’s quite ideological!’ (Interview no. 2).  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter offered a new perspective on the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue by ‘inviting 
the reader to enter the room of the dialogue’ –i.e. by analysing the nitty-gritty details of the 
discursive interaction at the micro-level in an attempt to understand its added value and 
implications at the macro-institutional level. It highlighted how the regular inter-parliamentary 
meetings between European and American lawmakers serve to seek recognition and anchor 
institutional identity – particularly so for the European side. In fact, the thorough analysis of 
the symbolic elements omnipresent in the dialogue as well as their interpretation by the 
participants on both sides of the Atlantic support this argument very well.  
The first section, which described the preparation of the dialogue and the setting of the 
room, revealed a striking asymmetry in terms of commitment to the dialogue between 
European and American representatives. At this early preparatory stage, great efforts are made 
on the European side to work out a good ‘team performance’ that will allow MEPs to project 
a positive image of the EU as a relevant, serious, and coherent actor, in line with its institutional 
identity during the dialogue itself. This entails the selection of MEPs experts in certain areas 
to lead the working sessions, the cementing of a common European position in the framework 
of preparatory meetings, and coordination with other EU institutions. Regardless of the 
dynamics at play during the dialogue to follow, the preparatory phase in itself contribute to the 
reinforcement of the EU institutional identity.  
Then the analysis of the interaction between European and American representatives 
during the formal and informal sessions exposed the recognition-seeking behaviour of the 
MEPs vis-à-vis their American counterparts and indicators of recognition for the positive 
relationship-identity as friends. The rationale behind the exchange aiming at setting global 
rules for the years to come, the high level of openness among the participants, as well as the 
flow of the conversation were all interpreted as indicators of the strong relationship linking 
both institutions, thereby reinforcing the ‘relevance’ component of the EU institutional 
identity. Particularly important at this stage are also the informal activities taking place ‘outside 
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of the official meeting room’. They allow for the development of inter-personal relationships 
and solid bonds of trust that not only reinforce the quality of the interaction back to the room 
but also constitutes the basis for the thickening of the relationship at the macro-level.  
In the third stage corresponding to the moment when the participants leave the room, I 
showed that European representatives manage to take advantage of the visual, discursive, and 
practical anchors emanating from the dialogue to clinch the recognition of their institutional 
identity and project it to the outside world. The extent of the dissemination of the tangible 
outcomes of the dialogue is particularly telling in this regard as it reflects the acute need of the 
EU to have the recognition of its institutional identity also seen by others.  
 Last but not least, this chapter demonstrated that there is overall a positive sense of 
progress in terms of recognition from the European perspective. This assessment being shared 
by the American participants, the dialogue definitely appears to be of added value when it 
comes to identity matters. This overall thesis does not deny the fact that other discursive 
dynamics are at play during the dialogue as mentioned in the last part of this chapter. The 
liberal institutionalist approach conceptualising the dialogue as a forum for the exchange of 
information in the pursuit of cooperation is valid in this context. However, my contention was 
that the way through which this exchange takes place is meaningful in terms of recognition as 
well.  
In the next chapter, another set of transatlantic dialogues will be scrutinised, involving 
official representatives of the executive branch, namely from the US State Department and the 
EEAS/Commission on the European side.  
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Chapter 8 – The Transatlantic Executive 
Dialogues: a dialogue between partners 
 
 
 
Exploring further deliberative pockets of the transatlantic architecture of dialogue, this chapter 
is dedicated to the working practices and added value of the political and sectoral dialogues at 
the executive level. These dialogues involve representatives from the EEAS and EU 
Commission on the one hand, and diplomats from the US State Department and other relevant 
bodies on the other hand. While it has been argued that it is at this level of dialogue that the 
bulk of the cooperation between the EU and the United States is conducted (Steffenson, 2005), 
little is known regarding the practicalities of these encounters and its added value in the eyes 
of the actors of the dialogue. Considering the objectives of these dialogues, a liberal 
institutionalist analysis would mainly emphasise the cooperative functions of these encounters 
(reviewing progress, identification of common ground, etc). Yet a close examination of the 
practices and discourse surrounding the experiences of the EU and US participants of these 
dialogues reveals subtler and more profound dynamics at play related to the quest of 
recognition by the EU for its institutional identity.  
The key argument advanced here suggests that the recognition of the EU as partners of 
the United States should not be taken for granted: it is part and parcel of the diplomatic work 
in which European diplomats engage. In this respect, the executive dialogues provide 
meaningful instances whereby the EU gets recognition of – and anchor its institutional identity 
as – a competent partner of the United States. The aim of this chapter is thus to reveal the acts, 
behaviours, or statements interpreted as recognition by the European Union’s representatives. 
From the preparation of the dialogue to its follow up, the analysis abounds with evidence that 
the EU seeks and gets recognition for its distinctiveness and relevance vis-à-vis the United 
States. Beyond the recognition process unfolding during the dialogues themselves, its 
celebration outside the room is particularly meaningful. Indeed, against the backdrop of 
intense, informal, and often unseen processes of communication between the EU and the 
United States, the formal executive dialogues serve to make the extent of the cooperation 
between the EU and the United States more visible and tangible.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. It first provides a short background on the objectives 
of these dialogues among diplomats and their institutional outreach corresponding to the more 
classical type of diplomatic dialogues. The second section sheds light on the process of 
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recognition and anchoring of institutional identity at play during the three main phases of the 
dialogue (i.e. entering the room, communication in the room, and leaving the room). The next 
part of the chapter is dedicated to the assessment of these recognition dynamics by the 
European representatives, which is then contrasted with the American perspective. Finally, the 
other discursive dynamics at play during the dialogue are considered and contrasted with the 
added value of my own explanation.  
The empirical analysis is based on 13 semi-structured interviews conducted with 
representatives from the EEAS and their American counterparts in the US State Department. 
While the number of interviewees is not very high in absolute terms, the sample is nevertheless 
representative of the ‘population’ of EU and US officials currently taking part in these 
dialogues due to the small number of participants overall. Indeed, the formal EU-US 
political/sectorial meetings are not big gathering events: only five representatives on average 
for each side usually attend this kind of meetings. On top of that, each representative is 
responsible for several policy or geographic areas and therefore gets to organise and to attend 
a wide variety of dialogues, both in terms of issues covered and levels of representation. For 
instance, one same US official from the State Department can get to regularly attend Ministerial 
meetings on JHA issues as well as dialogues on Africa, drugs, and human rights at the working 
level, thereby attending in average 12 meetings over a period of four years. As a result, each 
interviewee has a broad vision of these dialogues and of their different dynamics. In the 
selection of the participants, I also made sure to interview American and European 
representatives that attended the exact same meetings to better contrast their perspectives on 
these dialogues.  
Within the panoply of the EU-US political dialogues (Appendix 3), the analysis deals 
specifically with the dialogues that are the most active: namely, the EU-US High-level 
Dialogue on Non-proliferation, Disarmament, Arms Control, the dialogue on the Balkans, 
human rights consultations, the migration dialogue, and the Justice and Home Affairs Dialogue 
at the Ministerial level. For triangulation purposes, I also systematically analysed the official 
texts emanating from the dialogue – mainly in the form of joint press releases and proceedings 
available on the websites of the EEAS and of the US State Department, as well as visual data 
related to the meetings, i.e. official photographs of the meetings disseminated on social media. 
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8.1. Background on the transatlantic executive dialogues: classical 
diplomacy  
 
8.1.1. Objectives of the dialogues: fostering cooperation  
Most of the political and sectoral dialogues conducted between the US State Department and 
the EU were established in the 1990s as a way to foster cooperation in all the relevant policy 
areas mentioned in the TAD, NTA and notably its joint EU-US action plan (1995). In fact, in 
almost all the sections of the Joint EU-US action plan, the text reiterates the same formula: 
‘We will reinforce existing dialogue and cooperation on consolidating democracy, stability, 
and the transition to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe. To this end, we will 
hold annual high-level consultations’ (NTA, 1995). In specific fields such as development and 
humanitarian activities, more details are given regarding the specific functions of these 
consultations: ‘We have agreed to coordinate, cooperate and act jointly in development and 
humanitarian assistance activities. To this end, we will establish a High Level Consultative 
Group to review progress on existing efforts, to assess policies and priorities and to identify 
projects and regions for the further strengthening of cooperation’ (NTA, 1995) (emphasis 
added). The same holds true for more recently established dialogues, such as the EU-US Cyber 
Dialogue announced at the 2014 US-EU Summit: ‘It will formalize and broaden EU-US 
cooperation on cyber issues and constitute the platform for close U.S.-EU coordination on these 
matters’ (White House, 2014). As the analysis of these formal documents shows, the official 
function of these dialogues is to promote cooperation through a regular process of policy 
assessment, involving reviewing progress, identifying areas that need to be strengthened, and 
suggesting ways to move forward. According to Ginsberg (2001, p. 182), it is during these 
discussions that ‘decisions on EU-US political relations and the scope and content of policy 
cooperation and coordination occur’. This statement is however not fully accurate as the issues 
discussed and topics agreed upon in the framework of these dialogues need to make their way 
through the EU institutional machinery both before and after the dialogue.  
 
8.1.2. The dialogue’s outreach: how do the EU-US “executive” dialogue fit into 
the wider structure of decision-making?  
To fully understand the reach and significance of the EU-US dialogues conducted by the 
EEAS/EU commission, the US State Department, and various US agencies, one needs to situate 
these dialogues in the wider institutional structure of decision-making. On the European side, 
the EEAS follows the instructions given by the European Council, the Council of Ministers as 
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well as the Political and Security Committee and the Working groups (i.e. the European 
Council and the Council hierarchy). It basically means that the EEAS presents only positions 
and solutions previously agreed among the Member States. On the American side, however, 
the story is more straightforward as the US State Department, which is mostly responsible for 
organising and conducting these dialogues, is itself part of the executive branch.  
On the European side, the main institutional actor directly engaged in the dialogues 
with the Americans is the EEAS. More precisely, the transatlantic dialogues fall under the remit 
of the United States and Canada Division of the EEAS, which works in close cooperation with 
the EU Delegation in Washington (EUDEL)31. As the EEAS shares certain portfolios with the 
EU Commission, such as DG for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement (DG 
NEAR), DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), DG for trade (DG 
TRADE), and DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG 
ECHO) (Duke, 2014), EU Commission officials are also taking part in specific dialogues with 
the Americans. This is the case, for instance, regarding the Justice and Home Affairs dialogue 
in which certain areas of expertise are under the remit of the Commission as the words of one 
EU interviewee makes clear: ‘The Commission is the “home owner” of this topic’ (Interview 
no. 37). Similarly, in the case of development dialogue, for instance, different commission 
services are present in the meeting: ‘It always depends on the agenda items but we had 
representatives of the EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG HOME covering certain items’ (Interview 
no. 36).  
The Treaty of Lisbon has mandated the EEAS to support the High Representative/VP 
in fulfilling his/her key tasks in the field of Foreign Policy. More specifically, the EEAS needs 
to assist the HR/VP (1) in conducting the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defence policies (CSDP); (2) in contributing by proposals 
to the development of these policies, carried out as mandated by the Council; (3) in putting into 
effect the CFSP and CSDP decisions by the Council (Treaty of the European Union (TEU), 
Article 18(2); Art. 24(1)); and (4) in ensuring the consistency of the EU’s external action (TEU, 
Art 18(4)). Hence the ‘core’ of the decision-making process lies heavily on the European 
Council (i.e. representing the EU Member States): the EEAS is authorised to advance certain 
policies only if they have received the previous green light by the MS. In the context of the 
EU-US dialogues, it theoretically implies a high degree of cooperation between the 
                                               
31 For more details about the work and history of the EU Delegation in Washington, see chapters by 
Winand (2001) and Maurer (2015).  
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EEAS/European commission on the one hand and the European Council on the other (notably 
the working Group on Transatlantic Relations, COPRA). As one EEAS official mentioned 
regarding the preparation of the JHA dialogue, ‘We prepare the skeleton of the meeting, it then 
goes to the Council working parties and comes back to the EEAS’ (Interviews no. 37 and 24). 
The bottom line is that the participants of the dialogue need to follow the decisions taken by 
the European Council. As a result, when the EU representatives enter the room of the meetings, 
they know exactly their leeway for action and the points they have to promote vis-à-vis their 
American counterparts.  
On the American side, the institutional story is different and more straightforward. The 
political dialogues under study fall mainly under the responsibility of the Bureau of European 
and Eurasian Affairs of the US State Department. The  State Department – as the formal foreign 
office of the United States - has primary responsibility for forming, implementing, and 
articulating US foreign policy. Yet in practice, it is in constant rivalry for control over foreign 
policy with the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Adviser (NSA) situated 
within the Executive Office of the President in the White House (Dumbrell, 1997, p. 93). The 
influence and status of the State Department varies depending on the president in power. It is 
very much the President who determined how to conduct Foreign policy (Dobson & Marsh, 
2001; Dumbrell, 1997). In sum, as Smith and McGuire (2008, p. 52) explain, there is a 
mismatch in the policy-making relationship between the EU and the United States in that both 
actors do not have the same resources and capabilities to mobilise them: while the United States 
possesses a full federal government that can mobilise the resources of US society over the full 
range of external action, the same cannot be said with the complex distribution of power at the 
EU level.  
8.2. The process of recognition  
 
The fined-grained analysis of the political dialogues at the executive level reveals a high degree 
of symmetry in terms of the commitment and engagement between the EU and the United 
States. Yet this does not preclude the EU from engaging in the recognition game in each 
opportunity given. Indeed, as mentioned in the theoretical framework, the quest for recognition 
of institutional identity is constant and never-ending. Once recognised, players have to live up 
to the expectations and understandings forged with and by others. The analysis shows that in 
every part of the dialogical interaction, the EU strives to come across as an efficient and 
competent player in line with its identity relation of ‘partners’ of the United States.  
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While the idea of ‘partnership’ between the EU and the United States is often evoked 
in public statements (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 302), it does not exempt the EU from living up to this 
image/expectations in the framework of the dialogue. The rhetoric of the US President, Barack 
Obama, about the importance of Europe is telling in this regard. In an opinion article published 
in the New York Times in November 2010, Obama stated: ‘With no other region does the United 
States have such a close alignment of values, interests, capabilities and goals’. Later, on a visit 
to Britain in 2011, the US president portrayed the upcoming decade as one of opportunity for 
the transatlantic alliance and denied that globalisation and the rise of new world powers would 
lead to a decline of the United States and Europe. Instead, he stated: ‘The time for our 
leadership is now’ (Lynch, 2013, p. 424). This chapter will show that these ideas about the 
transatlantic relationship in terms of partnership transpire in the way the dialogue is conducted 
at the micro-level between both sides, with the EU under pressure to live up to this description 
as a strong partner on the world stage. 
 
8.2.1. Entering the room: preparation and setting  
The preparation of the executive dialogues constitutes a well-balanced process between 
American and European officials under the signs of equality, reciprocity, and partnership. 
There is, however, one key difference in the American and European approach to the 
preparation of the dialogue: EU officials clearly attribute more importance to the high level of 
preparation of the dialogue, perceived as indispensable for the effective projection of the EU’s 
image as a ‘capable, relevant, and competent’ player. On the American side, by contrast, the 
absence of reference to the ‘pressure to be well-prepared’ suggests that the stake in terms of 
institutional recognition is not as relevant.  
To begin with, it is worth highlighting that the setting of the date and agenda of the 
dialogue is done in a spirit of equality whereby the other’s expertise gets recognised. Indeed, 
in the description of the preparation of the dialogues, a large majority of European interviewees 
emphasise the smooth and balanced process through which key parameters of the dialogue are 
decided, i.e. the date and the agenda (Interviews no. 23, 24, 32, 35, 36, and 37). Typically, a 
few months before the next upcoming dialogue, the relevant policy officials in the EU and in 
the United States start coordinating its setup: ‘We typically start fixing a date, who is going to 
attend, and the agenda which is the most important part’ (Interview no. 24). In this regard, both 
the EU and US participants are well-aware of the importance of not having one side dominate 
the other. Therefore, the convention is that the host country proposes the agenda but there is 
always room for the other side to suggest other options: ‘Generally, it’s adding up things – and 
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then you get too much, so you need to see how you can re-concentrate again. It’s a give and 
take thing. It’s really a joint undertaking’ (Interview no. 23). Staffers on both sides insist that 
no party imposes topics of discussion on the other and that they generally go at great length to 
incorporate the counterparts’ demands (Interview no. 24 and 37). This is confirmed by US 
officials who mention that, ‘We (US) make sure that the concerns of the Europeans are 
incorporated on the agenda even if we don’t want to talk about that’ (Interview no. 39). This 
willingness to tackle issues important to the Europeans can be read as a sign of recognition for 
their distinct concerns related to their institutional identity. Yet as one EU diplomat astutely 
noticed, even if both sides agree on putting an issue on the agenda, there is still a certain leeway 
regarding the degree of cooperation and exchange of information during the dialogue itself: ‘If 
this was not a priority topic that the other side wanted to discuss, then the participants can 
decide to be more or less open in the amount and nature of information that it chooses to share’ 
(Interviews no. 23 and 24).  
Furthermore, there is also a form of recognition for the achievements and expertise of 
the other in the choice of the lead speakers for the different dialogues. The lead speakers are 
fixed in advance and depending on the topic of discussion, the choice can be very telling. For 
instance, in the realm of development policy, the European Union likes to describe itself as a 
‘reliable superpower for peace and human development’ (Mogherini, 2017a). In practice, the 
EU has indeed developed a wide-ranging and highly institutionalised set of relationships with 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) and has a comparative advantage over the 
Americans on this matter as a ‘development superpower’ (Smith & Steffenson, 2005, p. 353). 
By letting the Europeans lead this dialogue, the Americans implicitly recognise the EU’s 
leadership and expertise in this realm. Other examples include the dialogue on 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, in which ‘it is clear that the US will take the lead on this issue due to 
their heavy involvement in this region’ (Interview no. 23), while the contrary is true when it 
comes to the sanctions on Russia where the EU is at the forefront. Describing the dialogue, a 
high-ranking US official recalls: ‘We think together of who is the best actor to lead on a certain 
issue, who should be the one to engage? For instance, on Russia it was clear that the EU would 
lead as France and Germany are already very engaged’ (Interview no. 39).     
A key difference in the preparation stage between European and American 
representatives concerns the ‘self-imposed’ pressure of the EU to come across as a competent 
partner vis-à-vis the United States. Indeed, a shared understanding has emerged among EU 
officials about the necessity to ‘deliver’ in order to gain recognition as a competent/relevant 
partner vis-à-vis the United States. Many put the emphasis of the ‘outcome-oriented’ attitude 
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of their American counterparts: ‘The Americans are very clear about that: as long as they take 
something out of the meetings, they will participate- otherwise, dialogue dies off. They don’t 
have the time to spend – half day and all the preparation time for that – if it is not worth 
something’ (Interview no. 23). Developing this idea further, this European diplomat 
emphasises: ‘From the Americans’ perspective, you just don’t have a dialogue to have a 
dialogue with somebody like the EU, considered a normal and trusted partner –– you have a 
dialogue to accomplish things’ (Interview no. 23). In the same vein, another EEAS diplomat 
mentioned, ‘The US tries to engage with players which are effective in achieving their goals’ 
(Interview no. 37). This is largely confirmed by the Americans themselves, who equate the 
continuation of the dialogue with the notion of efficiency: ‘So what we said to the Europeans 
was “let’s make sure that these dialogues are useful and effective and that we are not meeting 
just to have meetings you know. We are not just gathering around’ (Interview no. 39). In a 
similar way, a high-level US official in the State Department emphasised that ‘a successful 
dialogue is one in which the topic is not exhausted; we want to continue the conversation 
because we have more to do together and it’s moving forward’ (Interview no. 38) (emphasis 
added).  
Therefore, all too aware of the fact that the Americans ‘have no time to waste’ 
(Interview no. 23), a majority of EU diplomats mention the pressure they put on themselves to 
‘be ready and well-prepared’ for these dialogues, suggesting the need for the EU to live up to 
the high expectations set by their American counterparts: ‘With the US, you have a player that 
puts a lot of demands on your homework. You have to be well-prepared because the other side 
will be’ (Interviews no. 35, 32, and 37). Echoing the same idea, another EEAS official 
highlighted that ‘there is certainly pressure because nobody wants to go to an outside partner 
like the US without having done homework or prepared these dialogues properly’ (Interview 
no. 36). The heavy European emphasis on the need to be well prepared and ‘deliver’ vis-à-vis 
their US counterparts is a strong testament to the fact that the dialogue is an instance in which 
the EU has the opportunity to show that it can live up to the image of a competent partner.  
Moreover, European participants understand that if they want to be taken seriously by 
their American counterparts, they need to send a unified and coherent message to their US 
interlocutors. This has typically been a challenge for the EU due to its complex institutional 
arrangements (chapter 4), thus the dialogue is interpreted as an opportunity to correct this 
negative perception of the EU.  As explained by an EU official, ‘Typically, on the EU side we 
will get all the relevant services together and discuss what we want to get out of that, what the 
187 
 
issues are and so on. So that we can also come across as a unified player, this is very important 
to us’ (Interviews no. 36, 37, and 32).  
As was mentioned in the theoretical framework (p.49), the necessity to come across as 
a unified player requires a serious coordination among the different EU institutions and as such, 
the dialogue acts as a ‘bureaucratic catalyst’: it sets the entire bureaucratic machinery in motion 
in order to coordinate and achieve the desired goals ahead of the dialogue. Almost all the 
participants of these dialogues mentioned this effect of the dialogue related to its institutional 
function (Interviews no. 23, 35, 36, 37, and 47). For instance, according to an EU official, ‘The 
formal dialogue makes for an overview of a wide range of topics where the whole 
administration is working behind toward a certain date to get things ready for decisions’ 
(Interview no. 23). Echoing the same idea, another EU official working in the EEAS mentioned 
that ‘agreeing a day and a venue for the meeting helps consolidate processes in DC and Brussels 
to finalize the agenda in the advanced stages, particularly when there is a lack of momentum. 
So, if we agree on a date of a dialogue for a particular agenda, we have a reason to go around 
and to mobilize the relevant actors, including the Member States if their involvement is relevant 
for the topic. In this regard, this formality or regularity is important and useful’ (Interview no. 
35). The bureaucratic catalyst is also crucial in the sense that it reinforces the EU institutional 
identity, regardless of the upcoming interaction with the Americans. It forces all the relevant 
players to come to a common position and to reaffirm the values and interests at the heart of 
their identity as an institution. In the words of an EEAS official, ‘the dialogue is also a useful 
exercise for us to get ourselves at the same table, to get consolidated from our side’ (Interview 
no. 36), and ‘we really need to think about the main points we want to make and how we are 
going to present them to the Americans’ (Interview no. 24).  
 
Frequency: formality for the sake of visibility   
It is essential to make a clear distinction between formal and informal dialogues. The formal 
dialogues at the heart of this study normally occur once or twice a year but it varies according 
to the specific dialogue. In the words of an EU diplomat familiar with these dialogues, ‘We 
have a variety of formats: for the non-proliferation dialogue, we have bi-annual dialogues while 
for the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, we do not have any formalized dialogues but rather a lot 
of meetings all the time. As to the dialogue on the Balkans, there is yet another format, i.e. a 
“quint format” and we meet every three months’ (Interview no. 23). While the different 
dialogues are not supposed to be formally/officially convened exactly with the same frequency, 
a common feature to all is the high degree of flexibility in terms of the informal meetings that 
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take place in between. According to another EU official, ‘Even though there is a regularity 
foreseen in these dialogues in the way it is set up, it does not mean that it must meet if there is 
no agenda or that it cannot meet more times if needed. If something needs to be done urgently, 
we are not going to wait for the next formal dialogue but we have informal meetings’ 
(Interviews no. 35, 36, and 37). Therefore, the formal meetings are important in order to take 
stock of the progress made and more importantly to give visibility to the process of cooperation 
that goes on ‘unnoticed’ in the form of informal meetings. This high degree of flexibility and 
ongoing dialogue in the form of informal dialogues fit very well with the relationship identity 
as partners. Indeed, in a relationship of partnership, it is to be expected that the interaction loses 
its rigidity as both sides need to be able to reach out to the other with relative ease in order to 
achieve their common goals more efficiently.  
 
The composition and size of the delegations: high level and exclusive   
The high level of representation of the participants of these dialogues is by itself a telling 
indicator of the recognition of institutional identity: the higher the representation, the more 
recognition is granted is terms of relevance. Typically, both delegations are led by one or 
several high-level officials, accompanied by three to four colleagues either from the EEAS in 
Brussels and from the EU delegation in Washington or from the US State Department and US 
mission to the EU on the American side. In total, there is normally around the table of 
discussion seven people on both sides (Interviews no. 13 and 23). In the case of the EU-US 
JHA Ministerial dialogues, the US delegation is usually led by the US Attorney General and 
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security on the US side, and by the Commissioner for 
Migration, Home Affairs, and Citizenship and Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and 
Gender Equality on the European side (The United States Department of Justice, 2016).   
While the level of representation has to be strictly respected on both sides, the rule is 
not as rigid regarding the number of participants. Seven people on both sides is normally the 
rule but in practice, ‘There is often more participants on the host side, particularly experts that 
want to benefit from the conversations’. This can lead to very asymmetric meetings in terms 
of attendance: for instance, in the last EU-US high-level Dialogue on Non-Proliferation, 
Disarmament and Arms Control, there were only four representatives on the EU side and 
twenty on the US side (Interview no. 23). This asymmetry is not perceived as a negative feature 
by the European participants for whom the presence of so many American experts rather 
indicates a high level of interest in the dialogue. In addition, the prestige associated with being 
part of the EU delegation to the United States in these dialogues conveys the importance that 
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the United States has for the EU. According to an EEAS official, they (EU diplomats) feel 
flattered to be part of the delegation to the United States, to meet with the Americans, or 
participate in this type of dialogue. This is related to the huge power of attraction that the United 
States benefits from: everybody wants to go there, have the feeling of being well treated by the 
Americans, get a picture in the White House (Interview no. 24).  
 
Place of the meeting: reciprocity and flexibility  
It is important for the EU to be recognised as an interlocutor of equal importance with their US 
counterparts. As such, the EU conventionally puts a strong symbolic emphasis on the logic of 
equality and reciprocity in the design of its dialogues. This includes the alternative convening 
of the meetings once in Brussels and once in Washington. But here again, there is also a certain 
degree of flexibility on the matter due to practical concerns (Interview no. 13). For instance, 
the last EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial meeting took place in Malta in Valletta 
in June 2017 under the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the EU (Council of the European 
Union, 2017).  
 
Arrangements within the room in perfect symmetry and dress code fully respected 
In this type of official diplomatic dialogues, perfect symmetry is aimed for even if numerical 
symmetry is rarely achieved. In fact, tremendous importance is given to the seating 
arrangements around the table reflecting a perfect symmetry between the two parties (see 
picture below) – the way the official picture has been framed conveys perfectly this idea. 
Typically, the participants do not sit too far away from each other, thereby creating an intimate 
atmosphere, facilitating the exchange (see picture below). This detail is not innocuous, 
considering other dialogues conducted by the EU, where the host country deliberately designed 
the seating arrangements in order to create more distance. As an EEAS official recalls: 
‘When we were in China for the human rights dialogue, our Chinese hosts invited us to 
seat in a huge room where we were very far away from each other; there were at least 
five meters between us and them. We were not sitting around a table all together but 
behind two tables facing each other. It was very formal and sent a clear message that 
they were not really willing to engage with us (Interview no.7). 
 
As this quote demonstrates, the spatial immediacy characteristic of the dialogue can be 
exploited to send powerful messages in terms of recognition of the other. In addition, based on 
the picture below and on other visual data (Appendix 5), American and European participants 
of these executive dialogues cannot be differentiated from each other as they are all typically 
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dressed the same way, i.e. in a plain business manner proper to the ‘Western countries’. This 
detail is visually striking and hints to the same cultural background shared by these groups.  
 
This photo of the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs High Ministerial meeting in Washington, 
November 2014, has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
To sum up, the analysis of the preparatory phase of the executive dialogue shows that both 
sides are equally involved in the organisation of the dialogue in a spirit of partnership and 
equality. The high importance attributed to the dialogue (and hence to the relationship with the 
other) by both sides is symbolically and visually reflected in the settings of the room. The main 
difference among European and American participants of these dialogues, however, is the high 
pressure felt by the Europeans to perform well during vis-à-vis their American counterparts – 
suggesting the need to impress their American counterparts and live up to the high expectations 
held from a trusted partner.  
 
8.2.2. In the room: communication and interaction  
The core of the meeting  
First, the dialogue is used by the European officials to gain recognition for the EU’s 
distinctiveness in terms of its objectives, interests, values, and approach to international 
politics. The data analysis reveals that the exchange of information and arguments 
characterising the executive dialogues does not only serve the institutional purpose of review 
and coordination. It also helps the parties to re-affirm the priorities, ideas, and values that are 
the most important and defining them institutionally. Reminiscent of the ‘desire to be heard’ 
in the framework of the TLD, there is ample evidence here as well of the EU’s need to be well 
understood by the other side and have its concerns given due consideration: ‘The objective for 
us [EU] is to remind the Americans of certain priorities that we have and that are important to 
us, such as closing Guantanamo. We are not necessarily talking about issues regarding which 
we lack information, but issues we want to draw their attention to’ (Interviews no. 24, 32, and 
36). The fact that these specific issues are raised during the dialogue itself gives the matter a 
higher degree of importance and raises the expectation on the European side that their 
American counterparts will act upon these matters: ‘For instance, if you mention the specific 
case of a prisoner in the framework of the Human Rights dialogue – the very fact that you put 
your finger on this matter, you know that there will be a follow up because they understand 
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that it is important and that we might put pressure on them’ (Interview no. 24). This suggests 
that the Europeans are willing to use the dialogical interaction in order to emphasise their own 
interests and priorities characterising their institution and expect some degree of empathy from 
their American counterparts. In this sense, the dialogue constitutes an exercise in ‘empathy’, 
as reflected in this telling quote: ‘You force both sides to get through the other’s one head to a 
certain point’ (Interview no. 23). Thus, the dialogue enables the understanding and acceptance 
of the concerns and constraints of the other side and as such provides a forum in which implicit 
act of recognition of the other’s institutional identity can be performed. 
The dialogue is also perceived as an opportunity for the EU to make its specific 
approach to certain international issues clear and thereby projecting one key feature of its 
institutional identity related to ‘how we do things’. For instance, in terms of counter-terrorism, 
the EU has traditionally adopted a comprehensive strategy, tackling both the short and long-
terms root causes associated with this phenomenon (Porter & Bendiek, 2012). The same 
encompassing approach, which is a key signature of the EU, holds true for migration policy as 
well. Commenting on the EU-US migration and development dialogue, a European diplomat 
emphasises that the dialogue gives the EU a chance to explain its specific approach: 
There are obviously certain issues on which we would like to see the US more active 
both in thematic and geographic areas. We would like to inspire them on certain issues, 
to push them for instance to have a more comprehensive approach to migration, 
encouraging them to work more on the long-term, like we do (Interview no. 36) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The dialogue is therefore a way to make explicit the distinctiveness of the EU when it comes 
to its approaches to specific international problems.  
The recognition of the others’ key differences is all the more vital as it helps move the 
discussion forward and find possible agreements. During the dialogue, the actors go at great 
length to explain the rationale behind their positions on certain issues in an attempt to find a 
common ground. This ability to dig deeper and shed light on the interests between specific 
positions is a sine qua non condition for coming to a win-win agreement (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 
2012). Several EU officials in particular describe very well this process at play during the 
dialogue: ‘What you do is that you understand and explain things, you understand where the 
others come from, why they do what they do. You understand their rationale and this is very 
valuable in itself’ (Interviews no. 23, 35, and 36). Giving a more concrete example, another 
EU official involved in the humanitarian dialogue mentioned that: 
The Americans explain why they are generally going for direct goods’ support in the 
delivery of aid whereas the EU is going for cash support. Thanks to the dialogue, it is 
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easier to identify opportunities for cooperation and common points because you better 
understand where they come from and how they think. So, the dialogue is particularly 
useful. You can’t do that per email. Through video conference, it is much more 
cumbersome (Interview no. 36). 
 
This last point reinforces the relevance of the spatial and temporal immediacy inherent in the 
face-to-face interaction that allows more in-depth explanations and therefore increases the 
quality of the exchange.  
Secondly, the features of the interaction unfolding during the meetings provide many 
verbal and non-verbal cues, indicating the type of relationship that both sides maintain with 
each other thereby addressing the ‘relevance’ component of institutional identity. The rationale 
guiding the discussion and the very practice of thinking together about how to best achieve 
common objectives (touching upon virtually all the realms of international affairs) are by 
themselves strong indications of a relationship identity as partners. Similarly, the level of 
openness and trust transpiring in the meetings as well as the feeling of being part of the same 
community of knowledge all contribute to the recognition of the EU as a competent partner of 
the United States, thereby strengthening the ‘relevance’ component of its institutional identity. 
In what follows, I address each one of these characteristics of the executive EU-US dialogues.  
 
Rationale guiding the discussion: advancing a common project in terms of world governance 
The dialogues are geared towards advancing common objectives, therefore the discussions 
naturally focus on topic on which there is enough agreement and contentious topics are pushed 
aside. This point is best captured by this quote from an EEAS diplomat: ‘What is going on is 
that you understand where both sides come from, and then whether or not the positions are too 
afar. When this is the case, you focus on issues where agreement can be easily found. You 
leave the difficult contentious points apart. There is no point to argue about disagreements but 
rather focus on the areas where you can agree and move forward’ (Interview no. 23). An 
American State Department representative echoed exactly the same point: ‘We are coming to 
the table to talk and push the cooperation forward, not to argue – this is not the place for 
disagreements’ (Interview no. 39). In this process, the EU and the United States enhance their 
identities as partners constructing a collective identity in a configuration reminiscent of Kishore 
Mahbubani’s famous phrase: ‘the West versus the Rest’. In this regard, the words of this 
diplomat involved in the cyber dialogue are telling: 
We (Americans and Europeans) are realizing that if we do not manage to agree on the 
norms of behaviour in the cyber space, it is the other countries with less democratic 
values that will set the norms for everyone. So, during the dialogues, we really try hard 
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to think together of our strategy in this regard. Even the fact that the EU and the US 
talk together about this issue sends a message to other countries on the planet that might 
have different opinions’ (Interview no. 47).  
 
“Strategizing”: thinking together of the best way to achieve common goals  
In order to achieve these multifarious common objectives in terms of global governance, EU 
and US officials engage in the discursive act of ‘strategizing’, i.e. thinking together about the 
best strategy to reach these common goals together, thereby reinforcing their relationship 
identity as partners. For instance, discussing the EU-US non-proliferation dialogue, an EEAS 
official mentioned: ‘It’s about strategizing: proliferation is a very multilateral topic and as such, 
it has a lot to do with the different multilateral forums, treaties, and conventions. So, we 
strategize, asking questions such as: how do we deal with this upcoming international 
conference? Who do we try to take on board? What are the topics that we want to achieve over 
the next couple of meetings?’ (Interview no. 23 and no.13). At the implementation level, the 
same need for coordination exists: referring to the newly-created climate change working group 
within the EU-US Energy council, a high-level EU official emphasised that ‘this dialogue will 
constitute an effective forum where we will discuss how we can push forward the 
implementation of the Paris agreement’ (Interview no. 32), or in a different context, ‘how we 
can best advance the sanctions regime regarding Russia’ (Interview no. 38).  
It is worth underlining here that these brainstorming exercises deal first and foremost 
with the different approaches to reach a common objective agreed beforehand. The focus of 
the discussions is mainly on strategies and not goals, which echoes one of the fundamental 
descriptions of the EU-US relations whereby both actors share generally the same objectives 
in foreign policy but display differences over the means to tackle them  (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 
312). In the words of an EU diplomat, ‘We think a lot about how to get to a certain point that 
we both agree on. Oftentimes, we have different assessments, we want to do things differently, 
but we think together, brainstorm together and propose things, and sometimes we realize that 
maybe this approach makes more sense than not’ (Interview no. 23). The interviewee 
continued: 
For a long time, we were discussing the question of how to move forward the reform 
processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU had typically favoured a gradual small-step 
approach going through economic and legal reforms- whereas the US thought that a 
bigger overarching change – at the constitutional level needed to be done. In the end, 
the EU convinced the US not to push for that because it would have been too unsettling 
of the whole structure of the country. So, this case is a good example of the EU winning 
the argument. But there was from the start a full alignment on the goals and objectives– 
it was on the way to get there that we differed (Interview no. 23). 
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The regular exchange of best practices as part and parcel of the dialogical interaction is 
yet another practice confirming the relationship identity of the two sides as partners. As this 
diplomat enthusiastically underlined, ‘We really do a lot of sharing of best practices. For 
instance, regarding the migration and refugee crisis in Europe, we looked at the US readmission 
and refugee programmes and identified if they were lessons that could be learnt to share with 
our European interlocutors, and vice versa. We do this kind of things all the time’ (Interview 
no. 39).  
 
High level of trust and openness  
As a matter of fact, for these strategizing exercises to be efficient a high level of trust and 
openness towards the other is necessary. In the words of this senior EU diplomat: 
‘Inevitably, there is a different degree of confidence in how and how much they (US) 
exchange on third parties and other players. Both sides have many other relationships 
with other players as well. You can always choose to be transparent about the other 
players or not. You feel that when there is a lot of trust, they are very open about how 
they deal with other partners, what are the problems they encounter etc. So, I would 
say, the closer you get, the more you get this inner information. That is where the value 
of the repetitive dialogue comes in, you build trust, you build the relationship. It is 
worth it (Interview no. 23). 
 
It is crucial to mention that the exchange of these precious information is substantially 
facilitated by the spatial and temporal proximity of the participants (that is, the dialogical 
setting) and under the cover of confidentiality. As several diplomats argued, ‘This type of 
information is only transmitted during the dialogues and much less in an exchange of emails’ 
(Interview no. 24).   
The high level of trust and informality characterising the dialogues is an additional 
indicator of the identity relationship as partners. For an EEAS official, 
Our relationship with the US is rather different from other countries because it is much 
more informal and we are generally basically trying to achieve similar things in terms 
of trade, global human rights etc. Therefore, the nature of the conversation that we have 
with the US is different than if we are talking about China, Russia or India or – smaller 
countries as well. With the US, the nature of the conversations is a much more open 
one (Interviews no. 32 and 36).   
 
Conversely, based on the diplomatic experience of interviewees who have dealt with 
interlocutors other than the United States, in the absence of trust, both sides are more likely to 
fall into the category of ‘coercive’ dialogues in which the prevailing discursive dynamic comes 
down to an exchange of threat and hard-core bargaining, thereby creating another type of 
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identity relationship based on enmity and confrontation: ‘With the US, there is a trusting 
relationship so we are not using threats at all with them – compared to other countries like 
China for instance’ (Interview no. 24). This point is confirmed by another EEAS official 
regularly involved in the human rights dialogues with China: ‘The dialogues can get very 
heated. Our Chinese counterparts shamelessly lie to us, sometimes they get very angry and 
even threaten to leave the room and interrupt the dialogue. This is very confrontational, 
unpleasant and reflects the state of the relationship we have with them when it comes to the 
defence of human rights. They also don’t like to feel dominated by the EU’ (Interview no.7). 
In this case, the negative emotions are clearly on display thanks to the physical immediacy 
provided by the dialogue: whether real or fake, the anger expressed by the Chinese 
representatives sends a strong message of rejection to the Europeans, who feel disrespected as 
well.  
 
The flow of the dialogue  
Another factor that strengthens the identity relationship of the EU and the United States as 
partners is the excellent flow of the dialogue, which reflects a high degree of ‘transatlantic 
connivance’ in terms of common knowledge and shared understanding (i.e. expertise). Talking 
about the quality of a dialogue in the realm of drugs, a US participant enthusiastically reported: 
‘The Europeans said to the US counterparts, “Everything you are telling us is music to our 
ears”, and the Americans answered, “Everything you are telling us is music to our ears”. This 
was so positive, upbeat, and such a great example of collaboration in areas that most people 
even don’t realize we are working on together’ (Interview no. 39). In a similar vein, 
commenting on the non-proliferation dialogue between the EU and the United States, an EU 
diplomat put the emphasis on the ‘rapidity and depth’ with which the participants of the 
dialogue covered the issues on the agenda due to their expertise. The same observation has 
been made for the Balkan dialogue: ‘It is an area with very close coordination anyway, so the 
dialogue goes very fast through all the details. Literally, we coordinate to the same degree, and 
with a deep preciseness that is incredible’ (Interview no. 24). In sum, this remarkable ‘joint 
performance’ whereby both sides display their expertise and capability to work so well 
together, reinforces their relationship identity as partners. This high connivance on certain 
dossiers32 is amplified in the dialogical setting (compared to other forms of communication), 
                                               
32 This point is particularly valid for the dialogues that are the most technical and the less politicized 
(Interview no.23).  
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because it is in itself a very challenging exercise to cover so many issues with such rapidity 
and a high degree of expertise. As such, the face-to-face interaction proves once more 
particularly valuable to make these features more salient.  
 
The tone of the dialogue: hectoring style, superiority and humiliation  
While most of the interviewees report positive experiences of their dialogues with their 
American counterparts, there were a few exceptions worth underlining, as they all referred to 
the ‘arrogant attitude’ of some of the US officials. In line with the theoretical framework 
emphasizing the importance of emotions in the process of recognition (p.30), it is interesting 
to note here that the perception of not being adequately treated by their US counterparts 
generated negative emotions of anger and humiliation, revealing a lack of recognition in this 
specific instance. Several interviewees expressed negative memories over the way certain 
dialogues were conducted, precisely because they did not feel they received the proper 
treatment to which they were entitled. For example, a European diplomat recounted a Justice 
and Home Affairs Dialogue (JHA) that was particularly ‘difficult’ because the American side 
brought to the table of discussion two very qualified lawyers to make their case. This ‘surprise’ 
related to the unexpected nature of the participants has been perceived by the Europeans as a 
violation of the rule of the games and of the principle of equality in the dialogue. It left the 
Europeans with a bitter feeling of being treated with arrogance and superiority, as they 
interpreted this American move as a rejection to play equal as equal. Bringing the best lawyers 
of the country in this field to the dialogue was also read by the Europeans as signalling a very 
offensive approach to the dialogue, which eventually turned out to be the case (Interview no. 
37).  
In a similar vein, other European participating in completely different dialogues 
mentioned the recurrent feeling of being treated with ‘arrogance and a sense of superiority’ by 
their American counterparts. For instance, an EEAS official emphasised the uncomfortable 
position in which the Europeans find themselves when the United States starts ‘preaching’ 
them about the most appropriate migration policy to adopt: ‘Frankly, the EU representatives 
would never dare saying the same kind of things or behaving the same way towards the US. 
The Americans would tell us for instance: “We are contemplating sending to France 
representatives of our administration to monitor how well you manage the integration of 
refugees in your suburbs in Paris”. Could you imagine us [EU] telling them: “Well, we will 
also send inspectors in your own suburbs in Chicago to oversee the police response to racial 
violence there”? This kind of statement would without any doubt infuriate them. We don’t do 
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it but they feel entitled to behave in such a way with the others. This is very awkward’ 
(Interview no. 24). For others, these dynamics do not quite reflect a dialogue among equals: 
I think the Americans see themselves a bit above us. It’s up to us to equalize the 
perspective. The US is quite often an over-confident player on the world scene as we 
all know. This comes to the level of the administration, how they come across and how 
they see themselves. Our job is precisely to make sure that there is a dialogue among 
equals and we are working on that (Interview no. 36). 
 
This quote is particularly telling as it shows how the power dynamics at the macro-level 
strongly reverberate at the micro-level in the dialogical interaction itself.  
 
Informal activities: coffee breaks and dinners  
In the framework of these dialogues as well, there are a few opportunities to socialise outside 
the formal meeting room, albeit to a lesser degree compared to the TLD, for instance. Long 
meeting days in particular typically include a few coffee breaks, a working lunch, and possibly 
a dinner (Interviews no. 23, 24, and 39). As one EEAS official put it, ‘Despite the time pressure, 
there is always a social dimension and this is the most important part’ (Interview no. 32). In 
fact, these informal moments are deemed particularly important as they nurture personal 
relationships and bonds of trust that in turn influence the quality of the formal dialogue, thereby 
reinforcing the relationship-identity as partners. As will be shown in the last sections, these 
personal relationships developed during the informal moments become at a later stage 
institution-to-institution relationship, practically anchoring the strong partnership identity of 
the EU with the United States.  
First, while many interviewees talked about the strong personal relations established 
after years of communication on a daily basis with their American counterparts (Interviews no. 
23, 24, and more), it is essential to recall here that the dialogue gives the platform for creating 
these personal relationships in the first place and particularly so during the informal moments. 
Indeed, the rotation policy of the EU foreign service and the change of staff induced by the 
regular change in American administration makes the face-to-face encounter particularly 
valuable in fomenting these bonds of trust: ‘The regularity of the dialogue is good because 
people change and you need to have these face-to-face meetings and interactions to get to know 
well your counterparts’ (Interview no. 29). In light of current change in American 
administration, the same official maintains, ‘All these dialogues will be important opportunities 
for the EU to meet the new people in the new administration. The networking effect of these 
meetings is important because it is where you get close relationships with your counterparts. 
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It’s a real function that impacts the quality of the dialogue afterwards’. Echoing the same idea, 
a high-level European diplomat also made the point that, 
With the rotation policy of the EEAS, people are supposed to move to another job after 
four years. People change and this is the same on the American side. Therefore, what 
we do thanks to the dialogue is a continuous process of building relations. Lunches, 
dinners, breakfast –all these less formal moments are very important for this. It’s 
basically over a lunch or dinner table that we will try to build these relations (Interview 
no. 32).  
 
Secondly, as explained in the theoretical chapter, it is easier to develop these close 
relationships during the informal parts of the dialogue, which are deemed particularly 
important as they open the space for more personal interactions and franker side conversations. 
These informal moments are valuable in allowing both sides ‘to experience together’ thereby 
breaking the dynamics of the formal regular discussions. For this European diplomat, 
‘Sometimes the most important achievement of the meeting is not on the meeting agenda at all. 
It’s taken on the side discussions, it happens quite often’ (Interview no. 35). Concurring with 
this point, another EU diplomat amusingly even referred to the experience of ‘smoking 
together’ as allowing more fruitful conversations: ‘The most important things sometimes are 
made on the corridors based on the bilateral more personal discussions. I understood with 
experience that you should start smoking to get something sometimes’ (Interview no. 37). 
Linking back the development of these close bonds during informal moments to the meeting 
room and the quality of the discussion ensuing, this European heavily emphasised: ‘You realize 
that in the non-proliferation case – where they (US and EU) had very good and trustful 
relationship – literally you don’t have to convince people – if they say they are going to do it, 
you know that they will do it. They know each other very well and it definitely changes the 
nature of the dialogue’ (Interview no. 24).  
In short, this sub-section highlighted the particular features of the face-to-face 
interaction within the meeting room characterising the EU-US executive dialogues. It showed 
that the EU takes advantage of this opportunity to assert its distinctive values and interests, 
hoping that their American counterparts will be inclined to take these seriously as a sign of 
thick recognition for the institutional identity of the EU. More importantly, both the rationale 
and the quality of the exchange in terms of trust and expertise contribute to anchor the 
institutional identity of the EU as a competent and relevant partner of the United States. As to 
the few informal moments shared outside the formal meeting room, they prove crucial in 
establishing relevant contacts and emotional bonds of trust that are instrumental in the 
thickening of the relationship as partners.  
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8.2.3. After leaving the room: celebrating recognition outside of the room  
The cooperation and communication between the relevant EU and US officials unfolds on an 
ongoing basis and with a remarkable intensity, as this comment from an EEAS official 
exemplifies: ‘There is not a day that goes by without having an EU official sitting down and 
having a chat with a US administration representative. It is a very intense relationship and this 
happens at all levels’ (Interview no. 32). In fact, many other interviewees mentioned the 
constant communication between EU and US officials (Interviews no. 23, 24, 29, 32, 35, 36, 
and 37) along these lines: ‘I am in touch with US staffers from the State Department three or 
four times a day, it’s a perpetual (on-going) exchange. In the political section of the delegation, 
we all have these constant interactions with our American counterparts’ (Interview no. 23). 
These exchanges developing out of the formal dialogues are ‘hidden’, go unnoticed and unfold 
with such an intensity, that even the highest-level officials are struggling to keep track of all 
the informal meetings and daily conversations going on across the Atlantic. To ‘visually’ make 
this point, a high-level official in the EEAS North American division showed me a scheme 
representing ‘all the dialogues that have been proliferating over the last years’ (Interview no. 
32 and appendix 4). In this sense, one can argue that the formal executive dialogues play an 
important function, namely making this intense and rich relationship visible and more tangible 
to all. In this context, it is of paramount importance for the EU to celebrate the recognition of 
its institutional identity using all kinds of anchors – visual, discursive, and practical. Clearly at 
the executive level, the dialogue helps formalising the process when control seems sometimes 
to be lost. 
 The first way through which the recognition process is clinched is through the use of 
visual anchors. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, photographs are powerful 
representations and carriers of symbolic messages. Whenever it is possible, the EU and US 
representatives participating in the dialogues do not miss an opportunity to capture their 
‘physical coming together’, thereby giving a tangible, visual expression of their cooperation 
and relationship identity as partners. The same logic applies regarding the recording of press 
conferences following the dialogues at a high level of representation. These symbolic and 
emotional images become not only part of institutional memory but are also used by the 
institution to project a positive image of its recognised identity – in this case, as an effective, 
competent partner of the United States. The European delegation to the United States is 
particularly active in tweeting these symbolic images as can be seen below, for instance.  
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This tweet by the EU Delegation to the US of the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial 
meeting in Malta in June 2017, has been removed as the copyright is owned by another 
organisation. 
 
The second way through which the recognition of the EU institutional identity is completed is 
through the use of discursive anchors. Following the same logic as the pictures, the 
dissemination of the press releases – corresponding to the only collective tangible outcome of 
the meeting – serves as an additional anchor of institutional identity. It is indeed the only 
collective tangible outcome available to the public and contains key messages in terms of 
institutional identity.  
First, the relevance of the EU as an international player is often mentioned in the 
proceedings and joint declarations publicised. For instance, in one of the last Justice and Home 
Affairs ministerial meetings, there has been an emphasis on the fact that, ‘the US delegation 
highlighted the excellent operational cooperation at the EU level with Europol’ (September 
2016, Bratislava, 12385/16). Using the same kind of congratulatory wording, the proceedings 
mention that, ‘the US applauded the efforts of the Member States to cope with the difficult 
situation related to the migration flows to Europe’. By the same token, dealing with the 
exchange of best practices, another paragraph of the declaration stresses that, ‘The US 
delegation was interested to learn from experiences of EU Member States – in particular on 
how to empower credible voices within local communities’. Through these declarations, the 
United States is discursively giving credit to the hard work and competency of the EU. The 
fact these remarks are written in black and white on the paper and accessible to all definitely 
contributes to anchor the EU institutional recognition as a competent international actor.  
Secondly, a heavy emphasis is systematically put on the common values and objectives 
linking the EU and the United States (i.e. reiteration of common values, portraying the two 
actors as partners). For instance, consider the very first lines of the Joint Press release of the 
high-level dialogue on Non-proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control that took place in 
2015: ‘In his opening remarks EU Special Envoy Bylica declared: "This year brought yet 
another important proof that the United States remains the EU's key partner in successfully 
dealing with global proliferation challenges through diplomatic means". Assistant Secretary of 
State Countryman said that "the EU-US partnership is essential to preserving the achievements 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to creating the conditions for further progress in 
disarmament”’’ (EEAS, 2015h). It is interesting to note here the reciprocity explicitly 
expressed in the appreciation of each other as partners.  
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Related to this point, the press releases capturing the strong relationship identity of the 
EU and the United States as partners serves also to send a signal to stakeholders and to third 
countries. In the diplomatic jargon of the EU-US officials, this so-called ‘joint messaging’ 
further anchors the image of the EU and the United States standing together (the West against 
the Rest) (Interviews no. 13, 24, and 47).  
Finally, the last way through which the recognition of institutional identity is carried 
out of the room is through the continuation and intensification of the dialogue.  
First, the dialogue has an internal/built-in forward-feeding mechanism. The fact that 
the dialogues always encompass the forward-feeding stage in which the next steps for 
cooperation are being discussed ensures that a follow-up meeting will take place. As several 
interviewees recount, ‘After having reviewed examples of good cooperation and expressed our 
mutual appreciation of the good cooperation, we typically address remaining issues that need 
to be worked on, or things for the future that we would like to do’ (Interview no. 37), and ‘we 
always agree on the work that has to be taken forward, on the next steps – it’s an integral part 
of the dialogue’ (Interview no. 23). This commitment to keep working together and to 
reconvene is then enshrined in the joint press releases, such as in the case of the EU-US JHA: 
‘Underlining the progress made and the continued need to face terrorism and crime together, 
the European Union and the United States of America remain committed to continue common 
work and meet again in the first half of 2018 in Sofia, Bulgaria’ (European Commission, 
2017d). The participants of the dialogue therefore leave the room with a date on their agenda 
for the next meeting with a reinforced sense of institutional identity.  
Furthermore, in line with the theoretical framework, the dialogue provides a strong 
practical anchor by transforming the personal relationships built during the interaction at the 
micro-level into a strong institution-to-institution relationship outside of the room. As this 
interviewee accurately describes, ‘I really think that the dialogue is not a waste of time because 
there is relationship-building and the relationship-building becomes important when someone 
has a problem and they pick up the phone to call the counterpart. What you want is to create 
an institution-to-institution relationship. The formal dialogue serves the important function to 
build the relationship well-beyond the formal dialogues’ (Interviews no. 29, 23, and 32) 
(emphasis added). Similarly, another diplomat mentioned, ‘It’s all about the relationship, when 
you have to make a telephone call because something happened, you already have this 
friendship basis and can easily contact your counterparts. It’s the basis of diplomacy’ 
(Interview no. 39).  
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In sum, this sub-section has shown that in the case of the executive dialogues where the 
communication between EU and US officials is ongoing and often happens ‘off the radar’, the 
formal dialogues generates different types anchors that allow the EU to make this intense 
relationship visible and thereby to further anchor its institutional identity as a competent partner 
of the United States, i.e. as a relevant player on the international scene. Besides the use of 
visual and discursive anchors, the institutional identity of the EU is strongly anchored through 
the inter-personal, micro-links created at the individual level that becomes institution-to-
institution relationships.  
8.3. The outcome: “We are partners”  
This last section examines the prevailing discourse among European participants to assess the 
extent to which they feel that their institutional identity has been recognised and reinforced. 
This assessment is then contrasted with the American perspective to see if their perception is 
aligned with the reality. I show that the executive dialogues between the EEAS/European 
Commission and the US State Department largely contribute to reinforce and anchor the EU 
institutional identity, particularly in terms of its relevance as a competent partner of the United 
States. 
 
8.3.1. EU perspective: “We want to equalize the US and are getting there” 
For many EU officials, the dialogue serves among other things to equalise the United States, 
to make sure that the EU remains relevant in its eyes. In fact, one outspoken ambition of the 
EU is clearly to be recognised by the American other as a relevant actor. In the words of an 
EEAS diplomat, ‘For the EU, there is always an element of wanting to show a greater profile, 
to be recognized as an equal partner because the US is a stronger power and the EU is after all 
a young organization in foreign policy and always in competition with its biggest member 
states. Clearly, there is an issue on the European side with being relevant and being seen as 
relevant’ (Interviews no. 23 and 24). Echoing this comment, the head of the America desk in 
the EEAS explicitly mentioned that, ‘The overall objective of these dialogues for the EU is to 
continue to ensure that the US sees the EU as the most relevant partner in world affairs’ 
(Interview no. 32). Put in even blunter terms, another EU officials argued: ‘Our aim is to 
equalize them” (Interview no. 36). 
With this aim in mind, the analysis of the data reveals a general sense of satisfaction 
regarding this issue, denoting some progress in the ‘right direction’, i.e. towards a more 
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egalitarian/equal kind of relationship. I provide below empirical support to this claim. First, 
many European interviewees perceive a clear improvement regarding the importance that the 
United States ascribes to the EU in terms of its relevance: ‘There is a growing appreciation on 
the American side of what we can do as the EU. Ten years ago, the situation was different. 
Now the Americans ask more automatically this kind of questions; how can we engage with 
the EU? What do the Europeans think of that specific issue? Etc’ (Interview no. 23). Re-
enforcing this point, another EU diplomat expressed confidence in the fact that, ‘With the 
restructuration of the European foreign service, they (Americans) now better understand why 
it is in their interest to deal with the EU’ (Interview no. 24).  
Yet at the same time, Europeans point to certain instances in which the United States 
still fails to fully appreciate and hence recognises the EU’s distinctiveness. In this regard, a 
sense of frustration is palatable among certain EU interviewees. Often taking the form of 
complaints, European diplomats point to the lack of basic knowledge about the subtleties of 
the European Union and the specificities of its individual societies. As one EEAS official 
involved in the Human Rights Dialogue with the United States recounts, 
Even though we have a very strong dialogue with the US, I think that they (US) don’t 
know the European Union well enough. The lack of understanding of certain subtleties 
related to the European political culture, its ideas and traditions is sometimes very 
striking. This is the case for example regarding the concept of “laicité”. Even at the 
level of the administration, the staffers – who are supposed to be well-versed in 
religious affairs – do not manage to grasp the meaning of this concept, arguing that 
laicité is simply the negation of religion. This is quite disappointing (Interview no. 24). 
 
Based on the realisation that many EU’s achievements were not yet well recognised by their 
American counterparts, several EU officials perceive the dialogue as an opportunity to rectify 
that. In the field of foreign affairs and defence issues for instance, ‘It is still pretty much the 
case that what the EU does in ESDP is not known by the US administration. Obviously, the 
EU is not a big military player but there is a lot of security, stabilization activities that the EU 
does that’s oftentimes overlooked on the US side so there is a lot of explaining, informing and 
liaising that has to do with that in the framework of the dialogue’ (Interview no. 23, 24, and 
36).  
 
8.3.2. US perspective: “the Europeans are definitely key partners”  
The general European perception of a positive development in terms of recognition is matched 
by American commentators. First, the multiplicity of the formal dialogues as well as the intense 
trans-governmental communication characterising the current state of transatlantic relations is 
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interpreted by the Americans as a testament to the EU’s relevance as a key player for the United 
States: ‘The evolution from the first budding institutional relationships established by the 
dialogues in the 90s to the proliferation of informal dialogues and intense communication that 
we are witnessing today is impressive and it shows that Europe is really our partner for many 
endeavours’ (Interview no. 39). The same idea was reiterated by several other US state 
department officials: ‘This high level of coordination and consultation are characteristic of 
these self-sustained relationship and mature relationship that partners normally entertain’ 
(emphasis added) (Interviews no. 20, 21, and 28).  
Drawing on his rich institutional memory, the former head of the European Affairs 
division in the State Department equates the prolific development of the dialogues with the 
importance the EU has gained as an interlocutor in the eyes of the Americans. Recalling the 
1990s, he mentioned: 
For a long time, the European Union was knocking on the door in Washington, trying 
to get the US government as a whole to take the EU as a serious political actor. By 
1995, the process got a bit of traction: these dialogues were established very 
consciously as a way to begin a discussion between various agencies and the US 
government on the one hand and their counterpart organizations in the EU on the other 
hand. It was a huge success, we proliferated these dialogue beyond belief (Interview 
no. 29). 
 
Further comparing the situation ten years ago, he insists: ‘I used to pull teeth to get people to 
go to these meeting. They hated it, asking constantly: “Who is the EU? Never heard of them! 
What do they do? Seriously, I meet with Brits and Germans all the time. Why should I meet 
with the people from Brussels?” Then they realized that it was necessary to manage the 
relationship with Brussels as well’ (Interview no. 29).  
What makes the proliferation of these dialogues and their continuation so meaningful 
in the transatlantic context is the fact that the Americans are less inclined to ‘talk for the sake 
of talking’ than their European counterparts. In other words, the renewed commitment to the 
dialogue must not be taken for granted, as the Americans use to make very clear that if the 
dialogue turns out to be a ‘waste of time’ (i.e. if it does not achieve anything concrete), then 
the dialogue might die off. This resonates with old complaints voiced in the mid-1990s by US 
participants according to which consultations were in reality briefings for their counterparts for 
which they obtain little in return (Gardner, 2001, p. 89). Today such complaints are not being 
voiced. On the contrary, most of the US interviewees praised the EU participants for their level 
of preparation, expertise, engagement, and capability to deliver, as this quote from an American 
diplomat testifies: ‘The dialogue triggers more desire to work with the EU because it proves 
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that it is effective. We learn a lot from the EU’ (emphasis added) (Interview no. 14). Previous 
research has shown that the diplomatic corps of the US delegation are generally educated and 
possess the relevant expertise in the areas they are responsible for (Winand, 2001, p. 135). The 
finding, according to which they are also rated as extremely professional by outsiders, is 
confirmed by my own data. The data is replete with comments on the positive perceptions that 
Americans have of European diplomats, describing their engagement and competence 
(Interviews no. 13, 14, 38, and 39). In the account of this US diplomat, the Europeans’ honesty 
– and even perhaps assertiveness – as partners is very much appreciated: 
Our European partners have been fantastic in the fact that they have been so cooperative 
and efficient. What I appreciate the most is that when there is a problem or 
disagreement, they would let us know. I really like this honesty and their high degree 
of engagement. I never went to a dialogue where I felt that any counterparts were not 
less than 150% engaged – this is really what makes this dialogue so worthwhile for us. 
In this sense, the dialogue is really an opportunity to sit down with your partners 
(Interview no. 39). 
 
For another US official, there is no doubt that ‘the EU is our key partner for solving global 
problems’ (Interview no. 13).  
Finally, judging by my material, the American participants acknowledge they better 
understand the specific characteristics of the EU thanks to the dialogue (in terms of recognition 
of the EU’s distinctiveness as an actor). Certain diplomats openly confess that indeed, ‘there 
are a lot of moving pieces and it is not always easy to follow the EU. But the dialogue allows 
a better understanding of how complex the EU machinery is’ (Interviews no. 14 and 47). While 
this type of comment can arguably be seen as an effective exchange of information, it is also a 
testament to the fact that the American participants better appreciate the complexity of the 
European Union and the way it functions, elements that are part of its identity as an institution. 
As such, this exchange of information and the impact it has on the Americans’ understanding 
and appreciation of the EU amounts as an implicit act of recognition of the EU’s identity.  
To sum up, the analysis shows that overall the dialogue contributes to anchor the 
institutional identity of the EU – particularly as a competent and trusted partner of the United 
States. While certain challenges persist when it comes to the understanding and recognition of 
certain subtleties of the values of the EU, there is generally a sense of progress towards more 
equality in the relationship. This is largely confirmed by the American participants who 
emphasise how their perceptions of the EU positively evolved, pointing to the extraordinary 
intensity of the exchanges as a testament of their recognition of the EU as a competent partner.  
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8.4. Alternative explanations: a short discussion  
As mentioned in the theoretical framework (pp. 32-35), besides the quest for recognition, 
dialogues can also be used to fulfil different roles in international relations- including the quest 
for security in the realist vein and the quest for profit and progress according to the 
institutionalist liberal and constructivist approaches. In this section, I briefly discuss the 
alternative explanations proposed by the traditional IR theories outlined in the theoretical 
chapter.  
Considering the coercive type of dialogue envisioned by the realist school of thought, 
the analysis showed no evidence of the exchange of threats or promises following a give-and-
take bargaining kind of mechanism. As mentioned earlier, when asked about this specific 
aspect of the dialogue, interviewees dismissed it all together and rather emphasised the fact 
that this kind of discursive engagement is not something that happens with their American 
counterparts (at least in the framework of the EU-US political dialogues).33 By contrast, they 
often mention the occurrence of such “threatening speech acts” with other partners, such as 
China, with which the interaction is much more confrontational: ‘With the US, we have a 
trustful relationship, so we don’t need to threaten them. But with China, we would typically 
emphasize that if they don’t do enough to tackle (this) specific problem, they will have to bear 
the consequences for it’ (Interview no. 23). The same idea resonated on the American side, 
whereby ‘most people (i.e. US diplomats) approach the meeting as talking with strong partners, 
you don’t come with your frustration, finding enemies or negotiating hard on your positions’ 
(Interview no. 39).  
The most relevant alternative explanation of what is going on during the dialogue 
corresponds to the liberal institutionalist take according to which dialogue is basically a forum 
for the exchange of information allowing the promotion of cooperation (pp.33-25). In fact, 
many participants emphasise the important role that the dialogue plays as an exercise in policy 
assessment, whereby the progress made is reviewed and the next steps planned (Interviews 
no.13, 23, 24, 36, and 37). In line with a key idea of the institutional liberal approach, the 
dialogue is also appreciated for the opportunity it gives to redress information asymmetry 
between the two cooperating agents: ‘The dialogues are useful particularly when there is a clear 
                                               
33 Obviously, in a different context such as the rounds of discussions about TTIP, we could expect to see 
more of these bargaining dynamics at play due to the ultimate goal of the interaction, which is to negotiate 
a far-reaching trade agreement. 
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asymmetry of information: we use to share the information on both sides and as a result, we 
come to a better perspective on the situation in a specific country’ (Interviews no. 13, 23, 24, 
38, and 39). Finally, the added value of the dialogue – characterised by spatial and temporal 
immediacy – comes to the fore as well in this context. First, the display of emotions is 
instrumental in recognising the level of importance attributed to an issue, and therefore 
influences the actors’ behaviour in conditions of uncertainty. Referring to the shadow of the 
future, this EEAS diplomats explained very well the importance of body language in this 
context: 
In the EU-US relationship, we are not talking about a one-time transactional 
relationship but about an ongoing long-term relationship where things you are doing 
today affects decision and actions down the line. So, there is always an issue with things 
that you don’t want to do to the other because you want to keep the good and 
cooperative relationship. In this respect, the face-to-face interaction is helpful because 
you feel if this is very important to them (for instance through the tone they take to 
speak about it, their determination…), you understand that it’s better to accommodate 
and vice versa’ (Interview no. 23). 
 
Secondly, the temporal immediacy is also appreciated for allowing less rigid types of 
interaction: ‘There is always value in sitting down and in having these conversations – we 
shouldn’t underestimate the value of simple engagement with one another because the dialogue 
allows this space where you can ask for clarifications, follow up on what the others have just 
suggested; there is a lot of value just in talking. We really build the relationship by talking’ 
(Interview no. 38).  
As to the constructivist take on the dialogue, according to which the dialogue allows 
the emergence of shared understandings through processes of persuasion and arguing, it does 
not feature in a prominent way in the analysis of the data. Indeed, I found that persuading the 
‘other’ of the rightfulness and validity of his/her positions does not apparently constitute the 
primary goal of the participants, as both sides are well aware of the low probability of success 
of such an endeavour. Consider for instance this quote by an EU official addressing this issue: 
‘You don’t enter the meeting room thinking that they (US counterparts) will change their mind 
as a result of the discussion’ (Interview no. 24). Similarly, when asked how much convincing 
was happening in these dialogues, another European official simply answered: ‘You almost 
never convince somebody if he has the opposite opinion. The dialogue is not about convincing, 
it’s not about a full-change of position – this is something that almost never happens” 
(Interview no. 23). This is confirmed on the American side, as this quote suggests: ‘The 
dialogues do not change our opinions but it definitely helps shaping the process’ (Interview no. 
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13). At the same time, however, there are instances in which ideas and arguments are genuinely 
exchanged and have an impact on the position of the other. In this account of the Western 
Balkans dialogue, an EEAS diplomat recalled: 
For a long time, we were discussing the question on how to move forward the reform 
process in Bosnia Herzegovina. The EU had typically favoured a gradual small-step 
approach going through economic and legal reforms whereas the US thought that a 
bigger overarching change at the constitutional level needed to be done. In the end, the 
EU convinced the US not to push for that because it would have been too unsettling for 
the whole structure of the country. So, we decided to try first the gradual approach and 
see how far we could get with the institutional reforms in the first place. In this case, 
the EU won the argument (Interview no. 23). 
 
This kind of occurrence seems, however, to be the exception rather than the norm – as only 
one interviewee out of 15 referred to this kind of dynamic in the dialogue.  
To conclude, among the alternative explanations/takes on the added value of the 
dialogue, it is the liberal institutionalist approach that describes the best what is going on during 
these face-to-face encounters, in the specific context of the EU-US political dialogues. The 
findings show that the dialogue also serves the purpose of promoting cooperation thanks to the 
intense exchange of information. My contention however is that the dialogue cannot be reduced 
to the mere exchange of information between rational actors. The way the exchange of 
information proceeds is indicative of the type of relationship that the actors in presence 
maintain towards each other. In the case at hand, the interaction characterised by a high degree 
of trust, shared understandings, and an outcome-oriented nature acts as a mechanism 
reinforcing the relationship identity as partners. It is this socio-psychological aspect of the 
interaction that this study unravels – without, however, dismissing all together the alternative 
explanations.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shed a new light on the executive political dialogues conducted between the EU 
and the United States by focusing on the subtle dynamics of recognition and anchoring of 
institutional identity at play during these face-to-face exchanges. Beyond the institutional 
function of the dialogue – consisting of furthering cooperation through a review of the progress 
made and identification of common grounds – the analysis has shown that from the EU’s 
perspective, it is also the recognition of the EU as a competent partner of the United States that 
is at stake during these dialogical encounters. The recognition of this part of their identity is 
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part and parcel of the diplomatic work. Therefore, through their performance during the 
dialogue, European diplomats need to live up to the high expectations that the United States 
holds from the EU in this respect. This is why so many European diplomats refer to the 
‘pressure’ they feel to be well prepared and to come across as a competent and unified actor 
vis-à-vis their American counterparts.  
In practice, the analysis demonstrates that the EU achieves this goal to a great extent 
during the dialogues: already in the preparatory phase, the process is perceived as being well-
balanced and there is no blatant asymmetry in terms of engagement between both sides. 
Moreover, during the interaction itself, the spatial and temporal immediacy of the setting 
allows the display of verbal and non-verbal cues that confirm the relationship identity of the 
two entities as partners: whether it is ‘strategizing’ vis-à-vis other actors, or enjoying the high 
level of connivance and trust among themselves, all these implicit acts of recognition do matter 
and contribute to the perception of ‘being treated adequately by the other side in line with one’s 
self-image’. Yet a few cases were reported in which the arrogant attitude sometimes displayed 
by the American participants generates anger and frustration as emotional cues of lack of 
recognition.  
The celebration of the recognition outside the meeting room fulfils a particularly 
important function in the context of the executive dialogues because it gives visibility to the 
intense communication and cooperation linking both political entities that go unnoticed in 
between the formal dialogues. Put another way, the visual and discursive anchors emanating 
from the dialogue give a concrete expression to the strength of the relationship and to the 
identity of both actors as partners – the aim being ‘to be seen talking together’.  
In sum, this chapter demonstrated that there is a positive sense of progress in terms of 
recognition from the European perspective. The general feeling among Europeans is that 
thanks to the dialogue – the EU is better understood by the United States and perceived as a 
relevant partner. This assessment is shared by the American participants, who recognise the 
shift that has occurred from the mid-1990s until today in their understanding and realisation 
that the EU matters. In the next chapter, we turn to another type of dialogue, namely the 
transatlantic dialogues taking place at the civil society level.  
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Chapter 9 – Transatlantic Civil Society 
Dialogues: a case of indirect institutional 
recognition  
 
TABC as a dialogue among “associated rivals” and TACD as a dialogue 
among one big family 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at another type of dialogue – namely, the transatlantic dialogues at the civil 
society level created by the European Union and the US government in the mid-1990s. Among 
the myriad existing transatlantic civil society dialogues,34 this chapter focuses on the 
Transatlantic Business Council (TABC),35 previously known as the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD), and on the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD) established under 
the impulse of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995. These two dialogues deserve 
particular attention as they have been the most active civil society dialogues in transatlantic 
relations since their creation (Bignami & Charnovitz, 2001; Green Cowles 2001). These 
transatlantic civil society dialogues have originally been designed to fulfil two official 
objectives. First, they provide input to, and support for, the decision-making process as a result 
of regular dialogues and consultations with representatives from the EU and US government 
officials in the framework of a ‘quadrilateral negotiation forum’. Secondly, these dialogues 
have the mission of nurturing transatlantic bonds among civil society actors on both sides of 
the Atlantic in the form of regular dialogues between business groups on the one hand and 
consumer groups on the other hand (NTA, Title 4, 1995). These regular dialogues, organised 
among working groups and policy committees, refer to the preparation stage whereby members 
of civil society first develop their positions and discuss strategies before entering into 
consultations with EU and US official representatives.  
The specific format of these transatlantic civil society dialogues featuring participants 
who are not EU officials as such provides interesting and compelling insights regarding the 
overall argument about the quest for institutional recognition of the EU developed in the 
                                               
34 For a comprehensive review of the different types of transatlantic civil society dialogues, see Bignami 
and Charnovitz (2001, p. 256).  
35 The Transatlantic Business Council (TABC) was created as a result of a merger between the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD) and European-American Business Council (EABC) in January 2013.  
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previous parts of the thesis. First, the analysis of the dialogical interactions among European 
and American members of the civil society provides a different picture in terms of recognition 
compared to the previous chapters where formal EU representatives were the main actors of 
the dialogues under study. In this case, the quest for recognition of institutional identity is much 
less acute as the participants of the dialogues (i.e. CEOs, businessmen and representatives of 
consumer organisations) have their professional identities already well anchored in another 
framework.  In other words, for most of the participants, belonging to TABC and TACD are 
not defining features of their identity. As we will see, participation in these dialogues is not as 
symbolically meaningful as it is for the representatives of the EU institutions who are much 
more focused on gaining recognition of their relevance vis-à-vis their American counterparts. 
In this specific case, the participants come together in order to advance a common cause (either 
business/profit or defence of consumer’s rights, which takes precedence over their being 
American or European). However, this does not preclude the fact that interesting identity 
dynamics are at work in these interactions. The analysis shows that TABC members establish 
and maintain a relationship identity as ‘associated rivals’ while TACD members interact in a 
way more reminiscent of the relationships among ‘members of a big family’. Another 
particularity of this chapter is that the analysis takes into account not only the physical meetings 
but also virtual and online dialogues, as they are the most dominant forms of interaction 
whereby most of the work in these frameworks (TABC and TACD) is done.  
While adopting ‘Mill’s method of difference’ to emphasise the difference in the type of 
actors participating in the dialogue and the link to the quest for recognition, the main question 
remains: Why has the EU institutionalised these transatlantic civil society dialogues? The 
chapter shows that the dialogues at the civil society level indirectly reinforce the EU 
institutional identity. By creating these dialogues in the first place, the EU makes itself even 
more relevant and indispensable in the eyes of the civil society at large – and not just in the 
eyes of diplomats or other politicians from other countries. The chapter therefore presents this 
dialogue as a case of indirect recognition through the less-normatively charged involvement of 
non-state actors. These non-state actors (NSA) indirectly contribute to the recognition of the 
European Union as a distinct and competent institution because their involvement in the policy-
making process captures the EU’s attachment to the value of democracy and ensures that the 
EU enacts more efficient and acceptable policies.  
To substantiate these lines of argumentation, the chapter proceeds in three main 
sections. It begins with a short background on the specificities of these dialogues involving 
non-state actors and on the context of the emergence of these groups. It then highlights the 
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different dynamics and parameters of the civil society dialogues to show that in this dialogical 
interaction, the actors are not primarily motivated by the quest for recognition compared to the 
previous dialogues involving EU actors. The fine-grained analysis covers the different phases 
of the dialogue: preparation/entering in the room, the exchange itself, and the leaving of the 
room. It reveals that both in the case of TABC and TACD, European (and American) 
participants are neither primarily concerned with getting recognition for their relevance nor for 
their unique traits as distinctively European or American members (i.e. the distinctive 
component of institutional identity) during their dialogical interactions. Finally, the last section 
explains how these transatlantic civil society dialogues serve to legitimise and reinforce the 
relevance of the EU.  
The empirical data used in this chapter has been collected through 18 semi-structured 
interviews with the organisers (staff members) and participants of the TABC and TACD (i.e. 
representatives of companies and representatives of consumers groups) on both sides of the 
Atlantic. When deciding who to interview, I specifically targeted the chairmen and participants 
of the most active working groups in the TABC (i.e. the Trade WG and the Information and 
Communications Technology WG). The same rationale applies for the interviews conducted 
with TACD. I collected insights from American and European members of the Steering 
Committee as well as the chairmen and participants of the most active policy committees (i.e. 
the Information Society Committee (InfoSoc), the Intellectual Property Committee, and the 
Food Safety Committee). The analysis also relies on official documents issued by these 
organisations, including resolutions and recommendations, as well as visual data (i.e. pictures 
and videos of these meetings when available).  
 
9.1. Background on the TABC and TACD: a hybrid form of 
diplomacy 
 
9.1.1. The involvement of civil society groups in the transatlantic decision-
making process  
 
What is particularly remarkable in the case of the Transatlantic civil society dialogues is the 
involvement of non-state actors explicitly sponsored by governments to provide inputs into the 
policy-making process. In fact, the active cooperation and deliberation of these civil society 
groups across the Atlantic – with their respective European and American counterparts – 
suggests a new form of diplomacy (Cooper & Hocking, 2000; Langhorne, 2005; Pigman, 
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2010). In order to understand the necessity of involving these new actors in the diplomatic 
process, one needs to return to the context of the 1990s, in which these dialogues were created. 
In this new era of globalisation, business-government relationships have started to dramatically 
change as the trade agenda expanded significantly to embrace not merely traditional trade 
issues but also ‘behind-the-border’ issues areas, such as competition policy and environmental 
protection. This increased the number and nature of stakeholders related to the development of 
the EU-US relations and led to the emergence of the so-called ‘triangular diplomacy’ (Strange, 
1992), in which the lines between public and private sectors became increasingly blurred. It is 
in this rapidly changing environment that the transatlantic civil society dialogues have emerged 
in the transatlantic context.  
 
9.1.2. Official mandate: formulating policy recommendations for the EU and US 
government and building bridges across the Atlantic  
In the specific context of the transatlantic relationship, the creation of the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue in 1995 reflected the understanding by the US government and the EU that 
in order to promote their pro-liberalisation economic agenda and gain wide support in its 
favour, they needed input from the business community, on both sides of the Atlantic, which 
had higher stakes in this endeavour than before (Hocking & McGuire, 2002). Thus, from long 
being the ‘silent partners’ of the transatlantic relationships (Sbragia, 1996), EU and US 
corporate stakeholders came together to become a real policy machine with the creation of the 
TABD, which was established under the impulse of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 
the mid-1990s. The TABD, which has subsequently merged with the European-American 
Business Council (EABC) becoming the Transatlantic Business Council in 2013, is a business-
driven process designed to provide input from business leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to 
governments on how to enhance the transatlantic economic relationship, with the ultimate goal 
of the TABC being to create a barrier-free transatlantic market between the United States and 
the EU (TABC, 2017). More specifically, it corresponds to a group of European and American 
Chief Executives Officers (CEOs) who aim to promote integration between the EU and the 
United States by providing policy recommendations indicating when Europeans and American 
businesses feel cooperation is necessary and feasible. Subsequently, they exert pressure on the 
relevant officials to follow up on their recommendations (Green Cowles, 2001b; Pollack, 2005, 
p. 914; Steffenson, 2005, p. 73). The criterion for membership is theoretically straightforward 
and requires that the CEO is pro-liberalisation and pro-trade, represents a transatlantic 
company, and is deemed constructive to the policy process (Coen & Grant, 2001, p. 39). 
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However, in practice, the membership to the TABC is quite exclusive in nature. Indeed, 
according to an official document issued by the institution itself, TABD membership is by 
invitation only at the discretion of the two co-chairs (European and American) who seek to 
secure a strong membership base, geographical distribution, mix of sector activities, and 
representation of small- and medium-sized businesses. The choice is often also made in order 
to ensure the ‘blue chip membership’ of TABD (Interview no. 42). In terms of funding, 
representatives of companies pay fees to be part of this dialogue and all related activities 
(Interviews no. 30 and 31). In a way, they ‘buy’ the privilege to sit on the dialogue while 
covering the expenses of the organisation.  
As a way to counter-balance the most influential TABD, another civil society dialogue 
was pushed by the European Commission to balance the interests of the process by bringing 
the concerns of the consumers into the equation. It is in this context that the Transatlantic 
Consumer Dialogue (TACD) was established in 1998. The clearest statement about such a 
commitment comes in the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, in which the parties agreed that 
the TACD will ‘feed into the TEP process’ (statement, section 15; Action Plan, art. 3.8). TACD 
membership is open to all EU or US consumer organisations36 working on a national and/or 
international level that are independent of business and political interest (TACD, 2017). Since 
its formation in 1998, TACD has developed into a thriving network of over 75 leading 
organisations. Consumer organisations apply to become members and then typically take on 
responsibilities on a volunteering pro-bono basis (Interview no. 43). The dialogue has survived 
a series of financial difficulties and disagreements to become a relatively effective body in 
facilitating networking between US and EU consumer organisations and the establishment of 
joint positions on key issues within the TACD’s various working groups (Pollack, 2005, p. 
914). Similar to TABC, TACD attempts to influence the transatlantic decision-making process 
in favour of its own agenda. It develops and agrees on joint consumer policy recommendations 
to the US government and European Union to promote the consumer interest in EU and US 
policy-making (TACD, 2018a). It describes itself as ‘championing the consumer perspective 
in transatlantic decision making’ and aims to ensure that EU/US policy dialogue promotes 
consumer welfare on both sides of the Atlantic and is well informed about the implications of 
policy decisions on consumers (Ibid).  
 
                                               
36 For the whole list of members, see TACD (2018).  
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9.1.3. Parallel organisational structures: secretariats, executive body, and 
working groups/policy committees 	
 
Both dialogues are organised in a similar way due to the fact they fulfil the same function. As 
they are expected to give inputs in the form of concrete actionable recommendations to official 
governments, both organisations need to speak with one authoritative voice representing the 
business and consumer transatlantic communities, respectively, if they are to be effective. This 
inevitably requires as a first step an intense process of dialogue among the members of these 
two distinct communities before entering into consultation or other kinds of lobbying activities 
addressed towards decision-makers.  
In respect to TABC, the executive board is composed of all member company 
principals, it operates by consensus, and sets the TABC’s annual policy priorities, work 
programme, and the funding structure. It normally meets twice a year and its decisions 
regarding the policy priorities determine the topics of the working groups at the expert level. 
The TABC is led by rotating chairs, one European and one American, in an effort to mirror the 
transatlantic nature of this endeavour. As to the secretariats, they are based both in Brussels 
and in Washington and are responsible for organising the scope of contacts with the European 
Commission, US government officials, MEPs, and US Congress. They also take responsibility 
for organising the annual conferences and act on a day-to-day basis as a contact point for the 
US/EU working group chairs (Coen & Grant, 2001, p. 39). These basic responsibilities have 
remained constant in the history of the TABD through today in the framework of the TABC. 
Following the agenda determined by the board, TABC members discuss strategies and forge 
joint policy recommendations on a wide variety of issues before submitting them to official US 
and EU decision-makers. The TABC policy work has typically been facilitated by a working 
group structure, reflecting the policy priorities previously determined by the Executive Board. 
While some of the topics covered by the working groups have remained constant, others have 
been created in light of new challenges and recent political and economic developments. For 
instance, a new Working Group on Brexit has just been set up in July 2016 in order to follow 
real-time developments related to Brexit and to prepare comments to share with EU-UK and 
US officials on issues affecting member companies (TABC, 2016).  
A similar structure exists for TACD. TACD’s strategic direction is led by a Steering 
Committee that has monthly calls or meetings. The steering Committee is composed of four 
representatives of US Consumer Organizations and four representatives of EU consumer 
organisations. As of today (March 2018), the two co-chairs of the Steering Committee are 
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Monique Doyens from BEUC and Ed Mierzwinsky from P.I.R.G. on the American side. Twice 
a year, the two policy chairs of the various policy committees (one American and one 
European) meet with the Steering committee in the framework of the so-called ‘policy chairs 
meetings’. It represents an opportunity for the chairs to present to the Steering Committee an 
overview of what each committee plans to do for, and discuss, funding strategies (Interview 
no. 11). Another important institution of the TACD is the Secretariat based in London,37 which 
is tasked with the organisation of the annual multi-stakeholder conference, meetings with 
decision-makers, and the main point of contact between the different policy committees 
(Interview no. 43). Finally, the substantive work of the TACD is done in the framework of five 
Policy Committees dealing with: Food Safety, Intellectual Property, Information Society, 
Financial Services, and Product Safety and Chemicals (this group has recently expanded the 
remit of the nanotechnology policy committee). Here as well, each policy committee is co-
chaired by an American and European representatives of consumer organisations (Interviews 
no. 11, 33, and 43).  
As this background section clearly shows, the composition of these dialogues is 
fundamentally different from the previous dialogues studied in chapters 7 and 8, as they 
involved members of the civil society – be they businessmen or representatives from 
consumers organisations – and not EU and US officials. As we shall see, this will have 
consequences for the dynamics at work during the interaction. In fact, the analysis reveals that 
the participants of these dialogues are not as much seeking the recognition of their institutional 
identity compared to the EU formal representatives participating in the other dialogues. This is 
the case because their professional identities are not anchored in the EU governance and neither 
of them identify with the EU. These quotes from TABC and TACD participants are telling as 
they reveal the secondary ‘role’ and minor importance that the involvement in the dialogues 
has compared to their main professional activity: ‘We are part of a virtual organization that is 
very easy to forget in everyday life as we are all busy with our own jobs and activities. The 
dialogue does not reside in the heads of its members that much’ (Interview no. 46). A similar 
sentiment is echoed on the TABC side when even the co-chairmen of the working groups are 
not always very active: ‘I might attend two events a year, and participate to the development 
of written comments or letters – maybe twice or three times in the two years that I have been 
involved in the TABC but this is not my job, I can’t dedicate to this too much time’ (Interviews 
                                               
37 It is interesting to note that there is no similar ‘counterpart/office’ in Washington. This is mainly due to 
the fact that Consumers International, which is based in London, has taken the lead as the main coordinator 
of TACD (Bignami & Charnovitz, 2001, p. 261).  
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no. 45 and 40). In addition, the fact they come together in order to achieve a common objective 
that transcends their respective identity as Europeans or Americans also explains why the quest 
for the recognition of identity is in this case much less salient.  
 
9.2. The most different case: when the recognition of one’s 
institutional identity is not at stake  
 
This section analyses the dialogical interactions among European and American members of 
civil society in the framework of the TABC and TACD. It looks at two different formats of 
communication used by the participants of these dialogues: (1) the virtual and online dialogues 
conducted regularly during the year ahead of the annual meetings; and (2) the dialogue in its 
face-to-face variant bringing American and European participants together for the annual 
meetings. 
Two important insights emerge from the analysis. First, it appears that in neither 
framework of interaction (neither TABC nor TACD) are the participants interested in gaining 
recognition for their relevance as Europeans or Americans. What matters to them in these 
physical and virtual ‘comings together’ is the advancement of their common cause in an 
action/result- oriented manner. Secondly, differences exist in the dialogical dynamics among 
TACD members on the one hand, and TABC members on the other hand. While the TACD’s 
dialogical interactions point to a case of genuine cooperation at a profound level where no 
competition at all is discernible among members (‘like in a big family’), the same cannot be 
said for TABC, which appears more like a place of hidden competition and more superficial 
cooperation among ‘associated rivals’.   
 
9.2.1. Entering the room or the virtual space  
First, the specific format of interaction in the framework of these dialogues is worth 
emphasising: it mainly consists of virtual exchanges through emails, phone calls, and only 
occasionally physical meetings. Indeed, with respect to TABC, the day-to-day policy 
development work is steered by senior-level company representatives who mainly interact with 
the members of the working groups via emails and conference calls (approximately three times 
a year), and only occasionally face-to-face (once a year during the annual conference). Most 
of the drafting process of the recommendations is done via email. But when it is difficult to 
find an agreement based on the written comments (or if any clarification is needed), a working 
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group call can be arranged (Interview no. 26).  
It is interesting to note the hybrid aspect of this ‘online communication’ at the working 
group level, which entails simultaneously elements of virtual and physical meetings. Indeed, 
the members of the working groups come together simultaneously in Brussels and in 
Washington and then call their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic through a video 
conference; this happens around three times a year. The representative members who cannot 
be present at the physical meeting are invited to dial in to participate in the transatlantic 
conversation (Interview no. 30). In the words of one of the TABC participant, ‘We have a 
physical exchange regionally and a virtual one across the Atlantic’ (Interview no. 40). The 
process is similar in the case of the TACD: there is one annual physical meeting with all the 
members, either in Brussels or in Washington, and regular monthly meetings at the steering 
committee level. Apart from that, the communication over the year among the members is done 
via emails. Video conferencing is less common than in the case of TABC (Interview no. 11).  
 What drives the choice for this mode of communication is mainly pragmatism, deprived 
of any symbolic significance. The fact that the bulk of the dialogue is done virtually and not 
physically is compelling in itself: no symbolic importance is attributed to the physical presence 
of the American or European members in this kind of framework and this is reflected in the 
lack of comments on this aspect by nearly all of the interviewees. Most of them emphasise the 
high costs related to the meetings and the unavailability of members to attend as the main 
reasons for not setting up more meetings: as a few interviewees commented, ‘unfortunately not 
a lot of people meet in between the annual conferences because of funding problems’ 
(Interviews no. 11, 22, and 33), and, ‘It’s really a question of not having enough funding’ 
(Interview no. 43). At the same time, however, they acknowledge and appreciate the value of 
a more direct, verbal form of communication when it comes to contentious issues – indeed, 
one that requires clarification through a more instantaneous follow up between the interlocutors  
and is not easily done in written form: ‘Meetings are very expensive and the communication is 
not the most cost-effective way to achieve results because nowadays, you have web-seminars, 
video conferences, so this is a good solution’ (Interview no. 44). Thus, typically, they would 
pick up the phone or set up a video conference in which more substantial discussions need to 
take place (Interviews no. 22, 30, 31, and 43). In this sense, the communication aspect being 
privileged here is the temporal immediacy allowed by a verbal oral discussion in exceptional 
cases where key problems related to the advancement of cooperation cannot be solved 
otherwise. Less importance is attributed to the spatial and emotional immediacy that would be 
involved in a physical meeting.  
219 
 
Second, already at the preparation stage there are telling indicators suggesting that the 
civil society participants of these dialogues are not especially looking for the recognition of 
their relevance/distinctiveness in the eyes of their counterparts. Indeed, I found no evidence of 
any form of pressure whereby one side tries to make good impression over the other or to live 
up to high expectations to avoid disappointing the other side. While in the other dialogues 
studied, the European side is particularly concerned with being well prepared ahead of the 
meeting vis-à-vis their American counterparts – including rehearsing their team performance 
– in this case, the preparation is by itself a joint endeavour in which the decisions and drafting 
are done in full collaboration among European and American members.  
Both in the case of TABC and TACD, once a relevant topic for policy-making has been 
identified and enough interest demonstrated by the members, a ‘back and forth’ of policy 
recommendation drafts starts among two leading co-drafters and the rest of the working groups 
and policy committees, mainly via emails. In the case of TABC, it is either the chairmen of the 
working groups or a lead company that drafts the first paper before circulating it to all the 
members of the group (Interview no. 26). Similarly, for TACD the responsibility for drafting 
the first version of the resolution falls upon the EU and US chairmen of the policy committees 
or upon a volunteer organisation (Interview no. 20). In any case, strict rules need to be 
respected: ‘For all our policy positions, we must have two lead drafters – one EU and one US 
– to make sure that we have both viewpoints covered’ (Interviews no. 43, 33, and 40). Then, 
all the representatives are invited to make written comments via track-changes and to send 
them back to the chairs, who then do their best to incorporate their demands into the final text 
(Interviews no. 30 and 31). It is at this stage that ‘hybrid’ video conferences and phone calls 
are sometimes necessary to clarify or explain different points that cannot be easily resolved via 
emails (Ibid.). The revised version is then sent back for validation to all the members both in 
TABC and TACD (Interviews no. 28 and 33).  
In addition, contrary to other transatlantic dialogues such as the TLD, no symbolic or 
crucial importance is attributed to the attendance of the American participants to either the 
virtual phone calls or the meetings. The issue of attendance is not a big deal. Indeed, even in 
the case of relatively low attendance by American representatives to these important virtual or 
physical meetings, the situation is not perceived as a sign of disrespect or a lack of interest and 
recognition for the relevance of their European counterparts. Rather, as mentioned earlier, the 
rarity of the face-to-face meetings and of the (sometimes) low level of participation in these 
activities are associated by most of the interviewees with the very practical constraints linked 
220 
 
to funding problems.38 In the same vein, European staffers of these dialogues do not strive to 
design appealing programs with the aim of attracting and persuading their American 
counterparts to participate in these important activities – unlike in the Transatlantic Legislators 
Dialogue. In sum, the physical presence in these encounters is not considered to be relevant 
and thus does not have the same symbolic value as in the dialogues involving representatives 
of official institutions like the EU. The fact that the participants are not attributing any symbolic 
meaning to the attendance of these dialogues proves that they do not need the dialogue to 
reinforce their sense of identity and that the added value of the dialogue between themselves 
lies elsewhere. They attribute importance to the success of their common endeavour but do not 
emphasise the relative presence of more or fewer European representatives.  
In terms of setting, during the physical interaction itself, no particular importance is 
attributed by the participants to the ‘fanciness’ of the dinners or to the elegance of the location 
– elements that in other contexts would signal a strong message in line with the status of the 
guests. All what matters here is the functionality of the meeting rather than the fancy ornaments 
that typically accompany formal meetings among official representatives. In a different 
symbolic way, an informal setting is being created along the lines of a ‘home’s living room’ in 
the case of the TACD. Commenting on the social activities following the internal meetings 
among TACD members, a staffer mentioned: ‘We had a screening of a documentary at BEUC 
– it was so nice. Small meeting rooms, we ordered pizzas, all the members came together. It 
really created a nice atmosphere’ (Interviews no. 33 and 34). In the TABC context, due to 
financial constraints it is often the member companies that host the internal meetings ‘as they 
have fairly large offices compared to our secretariat’ (Interview no. 31) (emphasis added). Here 
again pragmatic thinking seems to prevail.  
Another notable practice deals with the seating arrangements during the meetings 
among representative members. These plans are not meant to convey any sense of hierarchy. 
Contrary to the other, more formal, types of dialogue, in which typically all the European 
members would face their American counterparts (Interviews no. 33 and 34), the idea is rather 
to ‘have everybody randomly sitting around the table. We even don’t make name tags so that 
it is easier for people to interact without being impressed by others. That’s the way we like to 
                                               
38 The European Commission has traditionally been the most important funding resources for the European 
consumers’ organisations but its contribution remains modest, while the US government has not been 
significantly contributing to the TACD endeavour because it does not generally fund the private sector 
(Bignami & Charnovitz, 2001, p. 263).   
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go’ (Interview no. 43). This idea of equality in status and respectful attitude among all members 
is highly appreciated by the participants: ‘I would never have thought this would be the case. 
These people are all directors of their organizations, very high profile and influential in their 
fields and yet they are so nice, approachable and down-to-earth’ (Interviews no. 43 and 33). 
The emphasis in the case of TACD is put on the functional nature of the dialogue, and on the 
down-to-earth and close-to-normal personal style.  
 
9.2.2. In the room and on the net: communication and interaction  
During the communication and interaction within the room, European and American members 
downplay their differences and emphasise above all their unity of purpose. In fact, they stress 
much more their commonalities rather than their distinctiveness and do not seek specifically 
the recognition of their achievements in the eyes of their counterparts, reinforcing my argument 
that they are not seeking the recognition of their institutional identity. Rather, what emerges 
from the interviewees’ comments is their staunch willingness and determination to advance 
their common cause, transcending the European and American divide.  
Many participants insist on debunking the myth according to which disagreements 
emerge only along European and American fault lines during the dialogues. For a TABC 
official, ‘An important thing to underline is that it is not the EU and the US disagreeing with 
each other, that’s not the case at all. The disagreements actually emerge much more often across 
different sectors and even within sectors’ (Interviews no. 26, 28, 40, and 42). The same holds 
true for TACD. One prominent member emphasised the existence of deep disagreements 
among TACD policy committees themselves when they have to tackle the same issue through 
different perspectives: 
Let’s take the example of “wearables” like the Apple watch – these devices collect all 
our data when we walk. For the privacy protection group, this is clearly a problem 
whereas for public health, this is considered as a great opportunity to make progress in 
this field.(…) But at the end of the day, we all want a better world and we find a way 
to solve these issues (Interview no. 22).  
 
It is not only that divisions exist across different sectors, within companies, or working 
groups challenging the European-American dichotomy. For some interviewees, it is 
particularly important to stress that there are actually no critical differences between American 
and European groups. In the case of TABC, the transnational character of the businesses is by 
itself telling: the fact that companies have such considerable investments in both American and 
European markets make difficult the conceptualisation of their interests as purely domestic in 
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nature (Green Cowles, 2001b, p. 216). For a senior TACD participant, ‘The EU and the US do 
not disagree at all. We might have different tactical approaches but on the rest, we are much 
more alike than different. There is absolutely no question about that: the consumer groups are 
completely with each other: we all want safe food, cheaper affordable drugs that are safe and 
safe toys for our children’ (Interview no. 27). Echoing this claim of unity of purpose and 
downplaying the differences among EU and US groups, another TACD observer noted: ‘We 
all want the same thing and a better world – it’s just how we go about it that might be different’ 
(Interviews no. 22, 33,34.).  
These comments are testament to the fact that the recognition for the particularities of 
European and American groups (as consumers or businesses) is not at stake here. To further 
substantiate this point, it is also striking to notice the lack of expressions conveying the 
importance of ‘being heard’, or of having the chance to express one’s concerns, compared to 
the two other dialogues where this affirmation for one’s values, positions and achievements 
was particularly important from the standpoint of the participants. It is notable that no European 
or American participant of these dialogues take pride in any achievements according to their 
belonging on the basis of their ‘Europeanness’ or ‘Americanness’. In other words, no one 
among the interviewees of either dialogue hinted that one side was more successful than the 
other, more prepared than the other, or brought more added value to the dialogue and joint 
endeavour. On the contrary, they like to highlight that they really learn from each other during 
these interactions: 
On food safety and privacy for instance, the Americans want to duplicate the European 
model as the standards are higher but on other issues such as toys safety or the safety 
of medical devices, we want to copy them (US): the way they control the safety of these 
products is at a higher level and corresponds better to the consumer’s expectations. In 
short, we really learn from each other. What matters the most is defending the 
Consumer’s interests rather than the EU or the US models (Interview no. 33). 
 
Reinforcing this view, another participant emphasised: ‘We don’t try to perpetuate the image 
that you often see in the media according to which the EU is more advanced and the US is bad 
when it comes to consumer protection. There are also a lot of things that the EU could learn 
from the Americans, we are recognizing that and it is a great opportunity for us as well’ 
(Interview no. 34).  
Finally, the analysis at this level of dialogue features no expressions of complaints or 
frustration related to a feeling of being treated with arrogance or with a sense of superiority 
coming from the other side. The only nuance one could add to this point though is the remark 
formulated by a few European participants that highlight the very different style of interaction 
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characterising Americans in general. For instance, in the words of one European TABC 
participant, ‘When we dial to our American colleagues, the style is very different. The 
Americans are much straighter forward than Europeans. The emails are also very direct and 
blunt. They would for instance write us: “Do this as soon as possible”’ (Interviews no. 30 and 
31). Similarly, another TABC participant that has been involved for years in the dialogue also 
mentioned that, the ‘US side usually adopts a more confrontational approach in the dialogue 
whereas the Europeans are more geared towards consensus-building’ (Interview no. 40) 
(emphasis added). For both of them, however, this direct style of interaction is not interpreted 
as a sign of disrespect or arrogance. It is either considered as ‘a more efficient way to 
communicate and get things done’ (Interviews no. 30 and 31) or as a feature related to the 
political culture prevailing in the United States (Interview no. 40). Most of the interviewees, 
however, describe a friendly work atmosphere (Interviews no. 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45).  
TABC as “associated rivals in the quest for profit” and TACD as “one big family” 
defending consumers’ rights  
 
So far, I have pointed to the commonalities between the interactions among these two distinct 
groups. Yet, while the quest for recognition is not at the forefront of these dialogical 
interactions, more nuances can be introduced to characterise the dialogical interaction within 
these two different groups. For example, on the one hand there is TABC, as a dialogue among 
associated rivals, and on the other hand, TACD as a dialogue among family members.  
In the case of TABC, the representative members are clearly in the quest for profit and 
as a result, their interaction reflects an image of ‘associated rivals’. What matters the most to 
them is to reach an agreement to hopefully maximise their profit in a business-oriented manner 
in the global transatlantic space (i.e. interest-based membership in making profit). While 
certain interviewees talk about their motivations to be part of TABC as an expression of their 
passion for the transatlantic relationship, analysis of the discourse reveals a more 
economic/profit-based approach to the question: As one TABC interviewee mentioned, ‘Being 
a member needs to be worth it, otherwise there is no point being there’ (Interview no. 28). For 
another TABC staffer, ‘We really need to make sure the companies are happy – otherwise they 
might quit’ (Interview no. 31). This relationship of patron/client between staffers and 
representatives is also expressed in one of the latest comments of Tim Bennett, the former CEO 
of TABC: ‘I personally know several of the partners who will be involved in managing TABC’s 
policy work and outreach and am certain that TABC’s members will be very well served’ 
(emphasis added)  (Bennett, 2018). The idea of a service being provided is here very strong.  
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There are a few indicators pointing to the fact that a certain degree of competition still 
persists in the framework of the dialogue, turning them to ‘associated rivals’. In the words of 
an American TABC participant, ‘TABC creates an interesting situation where you see 
competitors sitting next to competitors because both are interested in the same specific issue. 
In the framework of the dialogue, they work a lot together and support each other a lot’ 
(Interview no. 26). In other words, representatives of companies often in rivalry with one 
another temporarily accept being partners in the framework of the dialogue, but inherently they 
remain fierce competitors. For one TABC interviewee, ‘There is a team spirit as much as it can 
be in a company. Companies remain profit entities and for sure, there is a certain competition 
for new investments. I would say that the working spirit is more on the corporate side’ 
(Interview no. 40). In a similar vein, ‘In terms of personal relationships among members, I 
would call them dominantly professional partners driven by common professional obligations’ 
(Interview no. 42). Put even more accurately, this TABC member argued: 
I suspect the interests are largely commercial and this is an organization that really 
serves commercial interests. Most of the members see it as a means of enhancing their 
opportunities to sell goods with a minimum of governmental interference so they 
promote things like free trade - all companies benefit from the opportunity to trade more 
freely so in this regard, their interests are aligned but at the end of the day, they are still 
competitors (Interview no. 45).  
 
This lack of trust due to competition among members is reflected in the drafting process 
that remains completely anonymous among the members: only the chairmen of the working 
groups know who wrote which comments. As one TABC co-chair commented: 
I think people are more willing to be more open in their comments if they know that 
they are only responding to head of the TABC because sometimes obviously, you have 
competitors who are part of this organization. So, if you have somebody from BMW 
and somebody from Volkswagen Audi, they will be more forthcoming in providing 
comments just to the head of the organization than they would be in providing 
comments to everybody including their competitor (Interview no. 45). 
 
More strikingly, he mentioned the fact that not all the recipients are on the mailing list so it is 
virtually impossible to know with whom you are exchanging and engaging (Ibid). By the same 
token, many TABC members emphasised a more adversarial type of exchange among 
themselves: ‘This is quite rare, but yes, you can have heated discussions around certain 
recommendations’ (Interviews no. 30 and 40). In the description of the drafting process, 
another TABC staffer used quite confrontational language, arguing that, ‘When each side starts 
giving its input on the draft proposal, this is where you see the fight happens’ (Interview no. 
26). Reinforcing this line of argument, another TABC staffer mentioned that ‘coming to a 
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consensus was sometimes a very painful process’ (Interview no. 31). 
 
The story in the case of the TACD is slightly different due to the nature of the 
institutions represented and the causes they defend. The dedication for the consumers’ 
movement is deep and constitutes the ultimate goal of the participants of these dialogues. 
Members in key positions (on the steering committees and as policy co-chairs) have often been 
involved in these activities for a long time and have developed a genuine personal attachment 
to the organisation and its success: ‘What is really fascinating about TACD is the fact that 
many members have been here basically since the beginning. It’s not because there is some 
sort of dictatorship that we don’t want other people to take over but it has really been the case 
of them having renewed their commitment and no one else really wanted to take over because 
they have done such an amazing job’ (Interviews no. 43, 20, 22, and 44). In addition, the fact 
that they have been investing so much work on a voluntary basis amplifies the significance of 
the level of engagement in this endeavour. It suggests that participants are willing to dedicate 
effort and time for a non-profit activity in the service of a more important cause/value they 
truly believe in: ‘Everybody has a regular job so the TACD is just something we do on the side 
but it is important for all of us’ (Interviews no. 20 and 22). Another TACD participant echoed 
this idea: ‘Even though members have full-time jobs, the policy positions they produced are 
always really well-researched and well-articulated. I am surprised every single time at how 
dedicated members are and how they really do this out of passion for their job and for the 
consumer movement’ (Interview no. 43).  
The fact that the representatives are all engaged in the defence of the consumers on a 
non-profit basis makes a huge difference in terms of the interaction. The analysis shows that in 
the case of the TACD, certain practices unfolding during the dialogical interaction point to an 
even deeper level of proximity and familiarity among the participants whereby the participants 
consider each other as ‘members of one big family’, as part and parcel of a network. In the 
words of a senior member, ‘We are a very bonded community. We all work towards the same 
goal, we very much like each other, and have become very good friends over the years, like a 
big family’ (Interview no. 44). This metaphorical description of the relationship between 
participants is further reinforced by the fact that Europeans and American members meet in 
very casual places, often literally in homes: ‘Last year, we had a dinner at the chair’s place 
with the chairs of the committees and people from TACD. It’s more than a network, it’s like a 
family’ (Interviews no. 33 and 34). Echoing this idea, another participant reported that, ‘the 
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last time I was in Washington, one of the chairs of the working groups invited us to his house, 
we had a big BBQ. You can see how deep the ties are between ourselves’ (Interview no. 43).  
In this big family, ‘there are no family secrets’. The absence of comments regarding the 
degree of openness of the members during their virtual discussions and physical meetings is 
telling. It suggests that members are naturally honest and open in an authentic way. At the very 
least, they are not perceived as withholding any relevant secret information from others. To put 
it differently, the issue of trust and honesty in sharing relevant information is not mentioned 
here because there is an expectation and a shared understanding that representatives are fully 
cooperative and working towards the same goal in a common endeavour. This trait of the 
dialogue reflects the trust prevailing among them. Particularly telling in this regard is the fact 
that members share the principle of being ‘as transparent as possible in the drafting process of 
the resolutions’. In the exchange of emails, everybody can see and know which modifications 
were required by whom (Interview no. 46). This contrasts with the case of TABC, in which the 
very same process develops in complete confidentiality in order to preserve the interests of the 
members, who remain competitors despite their participation to this common endeavour. 
Finally, the fact that the representative members identify themselves as big a family 
working towards defending the same cause is also reflected in the sense of solidarity among 
themselves that goes beyond the framework of the dialogue. In the case of the TACD, many 
members refer to the utility of the network that brings so many consumer organisations 
together. For example, in the framework of lobbying activities (i.e. dialogues and hearings with 
decision-makers), ‘sometimes member organisations do lobbying on behalf of TACD when 
TACD staffers are unable to attend the event. People from BEUC, for instance are based in 
Brussels, they are close to the institutions and always very supportive. They would send a 
BEUC member to represent TACD – like it was recently the case in a hearing in the EP on 
privacy shield’ (Interviews no. 43 and 46). Similarly, in the United States a senior TACD 
participant recalled proudly the achievements of KEI’s work, mentioning that ‘it was not a 
purely TACD initiative but we helped provide the argument and the platform for James Love’s 
endeavour and are very proud of the results’ (Interview no. 27). In other words, the 
relationships forged during the meetings turns the dialogue into a ‘power-multiplier’ whereby 
members of the network can work more efficiently to promote their common goals.  
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9.2.3. After leaving the room or disconnecting from internet: no anchoring needed 
In contrast with the previous dialogues in which the EU representatives were particularly keen 
to celebrate the recognition of their institutional identity outside the room, this is not the case 
here. The only types of activities fed to the press relate to the relations between the transatlantic 
civil society groups and the EU and US decision-makers (such as recommendations and letters 
put forward or pictures of meetings featuring the group with decision-makers). But nothing 
transpires regarding the internal dialogues among European and American members. This 
absence of discursive and visual anchors related to the dialogical interactions at the civil society 
level reinforces the main argument, according to which European and American consumers’ 
and businesses’ representatives are not looking for recognition of their institutional identity in 
this particular setting. Contrary to other dialogues, there is no particular need to visually capture 
these moments together to disseminate them.  
 
9.2.4. What is at stake during the TABC and TACD?  
If the quest for recognition is not a central feature of the interaction, then what is at stake in 
these virtual and physical dialogues? As in the previous cases of dialogues, the liberal 
institutionalist approach provides an accurate analysis of the discursive interaction among the 
participants. As an interviewee accurately put it, ‘We are basically fostering transatlantic 
understanding and not transatlantic wars against each other’ (Interview no. 40). In fact, what 
transpires from the participants’ descriptions of the dialogical interaction is the ‘imperative’ to 
achieve an agreement reflecting the most accurately as possible the ‘transatlantic’ position on 
a given issue. Compared to the TLD, in which the mere participation of American 
Congressmen was considered a successful dialogue, the main indicator of success for both 
TACD and TABC participants is the level of activity of these dialogues and the resulting 
initiatives. In other words, success is related to the vitality of the dialogue measured in terms 
of joint actions (How many resolutions? How many policy drafts and lobby activities 
together?). The emphasis here is really put on joint action and on what European and American 
can concretely achieve together – going beyond the mere exchange of views (Interview no. 
43). Therefore, the best possible outcome in the eyes of the participants is the production of 
precise policy recommendations/resolutions representing a genuine transatlantic position on 
this issue (rather than uploading the preferences of one side or the other, as in the case of 
traditional diplomatic dialogues). Both participants of TABC and TACD agree that, ‘the real 
value at the end is that you have a truly transatlantic position’ (Interview no. 29); and, ‘the 
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substance we created was always representative of a transatlantic viewpoint: it was never 
purely the US or the EU viewpoint. That was fundamental for us: we never compromised on 
the transatlantic nature of our message’ (Interview no. 42). At this level of dialogue, the 
different parties are expected to eventually come to a joint position that will then be advocated 
and hopefully heeded. Compared to the TLD, in which the negotiation of the joint statement is 
conducted on the margins by only a small number of actors (see chapter 7), agreeing on a policy 
recommendation is the ultimate goal of the dialogue and stands at the core of the interaction. 
The most important function of these dialogues is to allow interest groups to reach common 
positions on various issues that they can take to governments and press for ongoing bilateral 
negotiations (Bignami & Charnovitz 2001, p. 256).  
This objective inevitably implies a series of discursive activities geared towards 
reaching an agreement on key relevant issues – including an exchange of views and consensus-
finding. First, the actors emphasise the importance of understanding the different realities in 
which they operate (in terms of legal procedures, economic, and political constraints). But 
contrary to the other dialogues, there is no quest for recognition behind this practice. It is 
important as long as it allows to reach more efficiently a consensus among the different 
members. For instance, in the case of food issues, one interviewee reported: ‘We do not have 
the same expectations when it comes to labelling or issues like GMOs. On the US side, some 
organisations are worried about import checks (i.e. control at the border), whereas for us, this 
is not an issue as we have good controls at the border and legislative procedures in place. So, 
we were surprised to see that our US counterparts had concerns regarding the influence of TTIP 
on the frequency on of the controls. Once we understood that thanks to the dialogue, we could 
start working on the joint document taking into account their concerns’ (Interviews no. 33, 22, 
and 40).  
Building on this exchange of information, the dialogical interaction involves intense 
consensus-building around the content of the resolutions/recommendations. In the case of 
TABC, participants emphasise that despite differences, ‘We (they) would always strive for 
consensus and convergence and this is always what drove the ongoing discussions’ (Interview 
no. 42). In the exact same vein, another interviewee insists that, ‘The goal is always to find 
consensus and to find a compromise’ (Interview no. 30). More specifically, participants 
described the dialogue as a way to, ‘first, really understand the topic we look at and then to 
discuss how the TABC is going to deal with this’ (Interview no. 26 and 40). For instance, 
‘When there is a new policy proposal from the Commission that is relevant to our work and on 
which we don’t have a position yet, we would discuss and see how we can move forward in 
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the framework of the TABC’ (Interview no. 30). Or: ‘We are trying to understand the 
perspective of the other side and always ask ourselves: what’s the problem? What do we want 
to achieve? What is the message we want to send? This is important because the resolution is 
really here to send a recommendation to both sides in terms of policy’ (Interview no. 33). In 
this process in which the different interlocutors try to come to a joint position, there is an 
intense exchange of best practices towards harmonisation upwards: ‘If countries are working 
on issues involving trade and regulations, we work together to harmonize upward the message. 
Some countries have protected people better than others, so we want any European law to be 
at the level of the highest country not at the lowest. We want the same in the United States. So, 
we are constantly communicating with each other about these kinds of fights’ (Interview no. 
27).  
Particularly remarkable in this regard is the emphasis by a majority of participants on 
the fact they almost always find a consensus, i.e. the common denominator eventually 
transcending differences (whether EU-US, or across sectors). In the case of TACD for instance, 
a regular participant commented: ‘Since I joined, there has not been any instances of 
disagreements in the organization that have prevented a policy resolution to be adopted’ 
(Interview no. 43). In the same vein, another observer stressed that, ‘Even when there are 
disagreements among ourselves, we all know that we are on the same side and we ultimately 
find a solution’ (Interview no. 22). Similarly, a TABC participant reported that, ‘During my 
(his) time at TABC, there was only one case where we couldn’t find compromise’ (Interview 
no. 28) (emphasis added). The bottom line is that the most important objective shared by the 
members of these dialogue is to reach an effective agreement to promote their common goals, 
irrespective of their American or European belonging. If any reinforcement of identity happens 
it is more likely to be of their own identity as successful international businessmen and 
consumers’ champions.  
 
9.3. TABC and TACD as indirect instances of recognition for EU’s 
identity 
 
It is my contention that the transatlantic civil society dialogues have an additional role beyond 
the functions traditionally attributed to them in terms of policy input and building communities 
across the Atlantic. These dialogues, created by the EU and the US and involving non-state 
actors, also serve to reinforce the institutional identity of the EU and as such constitute an 
indirect case of recognition. Taking the view that the EU wants to prove its relevance and 
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distinctiveness, I will explain how the creation and involvement of these groups serve to reach 
this goal.  
 
9.3.1. Indirect recognition of the EU’s distinctiveness: the attachment to 
democracy  
The establishment of the transatlantic civil society dialogues are by themselves a strong 
manifestation of a key institutional trait of the EU, namely its deep attachment and commitment 
to representative and participatory democracy, reflected in the stakeholders’ participation and 
civil society engagement in the decision-making process. Put it differently, the EU organises 
these dialogues in order to be perceived as engaging with civil society, thereby anchoring this 
trait of its identity.   
In the EU’s perspective, the civil society dialogue was regarded as a means to ‘foster a 
sense of solidarity and of citizenship and provide the essential underpinnings of our 
democracy’ (European Commission, 1997). This trend towards more involvement of the civil 
society in the EU institutional machinery has developed throughout the 1990s with the 
European Commission taking the lead in the facilitation of the cooperation with different 
interest groups (European Commission, 1992, 1997, 2000). This is exactly during this 
timeframe that the TACD and TABC came into being. Eventually these efforts culminated in 
the 2001 White Paper on European governance and the importance of ‘civil society’ was further 
underlined by introducing the principle of ‘Participatory Democracy’ in the draft of the EU 
constitutional Treaty in 2004 (Finke, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, this attachment to the idea of 
involving civil society as a key feature of democracy is also reflected in the EU development 
policy as these lines from the European Commission testify: ‘An empowered civil society is a 
crucial component of any democratic system and is an asset in itself. It represents and fosters 
pluralism and can contribute to more effective policies, equitable and sustainable development 
and inclusive growth’ (European Commission, 2017e). In the specific context of the 
transatlantic relations, Commissioner Liikanen liked to emphasise that ‘the business-
community was the driving force of transatlantic economic integration’ (European 
Commission, 2003).   
So, how does the TABC and TACD concretely reinforce this component of the EU’s 
institutional identity? First, EU (and US) decision-makers have given more access and more 
opportunities to interact with these civil society groups. In the case of the TABC, many 
interviewees commented on the fact that there has been an improvement in the opportunities 
to interact over time in different frameworks (both formal and informal). In the first years after 
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its creation, the main forum of interaction between CEOs and the relevant policy-makers was 
restricted to the TABD yearly conferences where US regulatory agency officials would sit 
down with their European counterparts and the heads of major US and EU companies to discuss 
regulations and at times resolve procedural difficulties (Green Cowles, 2001, p. 215). It 
traditionally brought together each year over 100 EU and US business leaders and high-level 
representatives of the European Commission, US administration, Congress, and European 
Parliament for a two-day conference.39 Time-wise, it coincided with the EU-US Summit 
meetings (the last one dates to 2014) (Interview no. 28).   
In 2007, with the creation of the TEC – the political level body established to oversee 
transatlantic economic cooperation – another opportunity was given to the TABD to exert 
influence on policy-making. TABD has been designated as the official business adviser to the 
TEC and, since then, TABD co-chairs have actively participated in TEC meetings. According 
to a former TABD official: 
The participation [in] the TEC was highly valuable, in the sense that people in the 
working groups could directly work on things that were relevant to governments and 
that made our group very special, not really a lobby – but a real business stakeholder 
organization engaged with governments. For instance, on the e-mobility agenda 
advanced by the TEC, the work done at the TABD level was highly valuable (Interview 
no. 28). 
 
In addition, the TABC gained access for its member companies to EU and US government 
officials at the margins of official EU-US dialogues, including the EU-US Energy Council, the 
Joint EU-US Financial Regulatory Forum, the EU-US Information Society Dialogue (ISD), 
and the Transatlantic Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (TIPRWG) (TABC, 2017).  
Besides these formal high-profile events on the transatlantic calendar, the discussions 
between the TABC representatives and EU and US officials also occur on a more regular 
informal basis (i.e. the so-called ‘consultations’). According to Cowles Green (2001), a contact 
point list for TABD had even been established to allow the organisation to easily talk to the 
relevant EC officials according to the issue at stake. These regular informal government-
business contacts have extensively been used, as the comment of this former European policy 
officer testifies: ‘I felt that the government access was really good. In the TEC and in DG trade, 
there was a person leading the stakeholders’ efforts and I would meet with her every couple of 
weeks or so. That was a really good working relationship- it was very practical, reasonable and 
                                               
39 Government attendees of the annual summit have included the EU Commissioner for Trade, the EU 
Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society, the US Commerce Secretary, the USTR, the US Vice 
President, and the WTO Director (Steffenson, 2005, p. 74).  
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useful for both sides’ (Interviews no. 28 and 32). Similarly, according to another participant, 
‘The meetings between the TABC representatives and the officials are on an ongoing basis. 
It’s not as institutionalized as it was in the past, it is much easier now. They would not turn us 
down. When we reach to them, they are available. It’s part of democracy’ (emphasis added) 
(Interview no. 31). The same is true for TACD: members have the opportunity to interact with 
policy-decision makers in two different formats: (1) during the annual conference; and (2) on 
a more regular basis during consultations with relevant representatives either in Brussels or 
Washington. For instance, the staffers of the Secretariat get to meet representatives from DG 
Justice and Consumers, DG trade, DG Sante, and European members of Parliament three or 
four times a year (Interviews no. 43 and 44).  
In addition, importance is also given to these meetings with transatlantic civil society 
dialogues through the high level of representation of EU (and US) officials in these annual 
meetings. Both TABC and TACD members emphasised their satisfaction regarding this fact. 
For a TABC member, ‘We really appreciate the commitment of high level governmental 
officials – including from time to time the level of US president or a Commissioner and even 
national leaders, such as Angela Merkel’ (Interview no. 42). The same sentiment can be found 
on the TACD side: ‘The dialogue gives us a special opportunity: we met several times with 
Commissioner Malmström when she came to the US. We can also get meetings with Michael 
Froman, the US trade representative whenever we want. At least every three and six months’ 
(Interviews no. 27 and 20).   
During the dialogues themselves, decision-makers show a genuine interest in gathering 
input and understanding the complexities of the issues. As this interviewee describes: ‘It’s 
always the government stakeholder reaching out. They would typically say: ‘we saw your 
statements. Can you elaborate a bit further on your concerns on the IP chapter on CETA?’ 
Following this kind of request, there would be a more detailed exchange in which the 
companies would explain that they have experienced these difficulties etc.’ (Interview no. 40). 
An additional feature of the dialogue that also reflects on the democratic values of the EU is 
the principle of transparency and accountability. For TABC members, ‘Key in these dialogues 
is that there is nothing secretive about it. This is not a process that lacks transparency or 
accountability. On both sides, there is complete accountability – it requires the disclosure of 
activities, governmental records and of our activities. There is no secretive behaviour’ 
(Interview no. 42). Reinforcing this point, another interview emphasised: ‘The interaction and 
dialogue are full, rich, open and frank. This is very good. I never had the experience of a non-
open dialogue’ (Interview no. 28). In the context of the negotiation of trade agreements – such 
233 
 
as TTIP, which was at the focus during the times of the interviews – the EU has also 
traditionally been more committed to transparency than its US counterparts, as underlined by 
many interviewees: 
The systematic stakeholders’ events where people can attend in front of the negotiators 
are a big thing. For TTIP, there is also the idea of a special advisory group with current 
advisors plus public participation where anybody could come and ask questions and 
give input so this is something very important. The commission is really trying to make 
an effort. By contrast, there is no real effort on the side of USTR. They even cancelled 
questioning with stakeholders in New York because they argued they needed more time 
to negotiate. This is problematic because it is much less transparent and open than in 
the EU. Here (in the EU), since January of last year – there have been a lot of systematic 
stakeholders’ events (Interview no. 33). 
 
Echoing this claim, an American member of TABC highlighted this key difference in 
transparency between the EU and the United States: 
In the US, we do not have real time access to the documents– the same way the 
Europeans do on their side. We constantly argue that we do not understand why the 
American government does everything like a military-type agency. Everything is 
secret: trade negotiations are viewed like war negotiations, this is crazy in our opinion. 
So we fought the transparency issues (Interviews no. 27, 20, and 21).  
 
The issue of inclusiveness goes hand in hand with the rationale behind the setting up of 
this dialogue from a principled perspective (i.e. democracy and better representation of civil 
society interests). In this regard, the EU encouraged more inclusiveness in the opinions being 
represented through the TEC: 
One of the key roles of the leadership was to make sure that you can build a possible 
coalition – much bigger and leading to be heard. That role of coalition participation was 
required in the TEC but it was also a sensible way of ensuring that the broadest possible 
view was on the table. We became a formal channel that other business organizations 
used because we represented a partnership. It meant that there were additional 
opportunities for synchronization and convergence through debates and discussion of 
viewpoints (Interview no. 42). 
 
Similarly, the TACD is very much aware of the value of its resolutions as ‘they represent the 
position of all the EU and US consumers’ groups, that is the position of 80 groups in total that 
have millions of members on both sides of the Atlantic’ (Interviews no. 20, 27, and 44).  
Finally, a crucial point to take into account relates to the extent to which the advice and 
resolutions given by these groups are eventually translated into policy. The responses of the 
interviewees were mixed, but a slight majority had a positive point of view on this issue. For 
members of the TACD, the degree of success in terms of influence varies: 
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During one of the round of TTIP negotiations, they noticed that most of our concerns 
were taken into account and we could see it in the final text. So, this is where we could 
see that there is an added value and we were listened to by the European negotiators in 
the EU commission. It was really powerful and we were quite positive about it. On the 
other hand, their efforts failed when it came to the investment-court system in CETA. 
They should have listened to us because now they are facing a huge criticism from civil 
society and we were right. So, it depends on the topic really (Interview no. 33). 
 
A similar position was expressed by another TACD member: ‘I think that we definitely have 
an influence, otherwise we wouldn’t do all that. But sometimes you lose some, sometimes you 
win’ (Interviews no. 20 and 27). As to TABC members, they also have a rather optimistic take 
on the question: ‘We felt that we were listened to. For instance, on trade secret, there was a big 
issue at the time with India (with very weak protection of IP). The input of the working group 
was used in the discussions with the Indian government and it was very rewarding’ (Interviews 
no. 28, 20, 23, and 34).  
Last but not least, the use of visual data to document the stakeholders’ meetings with 
officials also contributes to my argument according to which the EU wants to be seen as talking 
and engaging with civil society actors because these help it to enhance and anchor its 
institutional identity as a proponent of democracy and transparency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This tweet from the official account of the EU TTIP team part of DG Trade on a meeting with 
civil society members, has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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9.3.2. Indirect recognition of relevance: making the EU more efficient  
The second way through which the transatlantic civil society dialogues indirectly reinforce the 
EU’s identity as a relevant actor is by making it more efficient. As the EU seeks recognition 
for its relevance, the recognition of powerful business leaders and representatives of 
consumers’ groups contribute to giving it legitimacy but also provide valuable input that makes 
the EU more competent. While this claim has already been advanced in the literature (Kohler-
Koch, 2001; Kohler-Koch & Finke, 2007), my take is that behind the rationale for more 
efficiency there is a deeper quest for recognition as a relevant and competent actor. In the 
context of the TABC and TACD, the inputs given to the EU officials aim not only at making 
the EU more effective but also indirectly reinforce its centrality as the authority responsible for 
trade deals.  
First, at a more general level, the systematic meetings and consultations between TABC 
and TACD members with EU officials arguably act as a mechanism reinforcing the relevance 
of the EU as the main negotiator of trade agreements. The establishment of these dialogues and 
the consultation arrangements have been deliberately thought to have these non-state actors 
engage with the EU and reinforcing its importance in this field. The possibility for these groups 
to influence the policy-making process provides them with an incentive to directly engage with 
the EU’s institutions making it more relevant: ‘Our group (TABC) was able to influence and 
shape the way governments would look at certain issues. For instance, the TABD was the 
driving force behind the e-mobility initiative – we would push the topic as part of the TEC’ 
(Interview no. 28). Subsequently, the vitality of these groups indirectly and positively reflects 
on the European Union.  
Second, the EU’s acute challenge in shaping effectively trade agreements acceptable 
on both sides for the relevant stakeholders is well perceived by the civil society actors. For this 
TABC member, ‘We had a lot of EU and US officials tell us they really like to receive inputs 
from us because they know that we already had a lot of fights internally that they will not have 
to have in creating policies between the two’ (Interview no. 26). In a similar vein, another 
TABC participant emphasised the value of the consensus already reached among themselves 
from the policy-makers’ perspective: ‘We have really a transatlantic consensus on positions. If 
you take that to policy makers, it carries some weight especially within the TTIP context. They 
know that they don’t have to fear to take this proposal to their constituencies: nobody will say 
that it is unthinkable and in this sense, it is very practical for them as well’ (Interview no. 31); 
In the same vein, other participants emphasized: ‘Thanks to the dialogue, officials are ensured 
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that they have CEOs on board and that they can implement these proposals’ (Interviews no. 40 
and 28). To achieve this goal, conscious efforts are made on the civil society actors’ side to 
deliver ‘actionable advice’ that would be more easily taken into account by American and 
European officials: ‘The key for us is to deliver clear and operational policy recommendations 
that they could easily implement’ (Interviews no. 28, 43, and 45). This seems to be working, 
as reflected in this quote that nicely puts into sharp relief the difference between a group where 
consensus has already been reached and when this is not the case: ‘In several of the meetings 
I attended with decision-makers, it was striking to see the split among EU and US institutional 
representatives whereas it wasn’t the case for consumer people: we backed each other, people 
talk through each other. You really could feel that the transatlantic consumer dialogue was 
representative of the transatlantic view rather than EU here and US here’ (Interview no. 34). 
Conclusion 
This chapter offered an original take on the transatlantic civil society dialogues (TABC and 
TACD). First, the fine-grained analysis of the dialogical interactions among European and 
American members of civil society (both among CEOs and representatives of consumers 
groups) showed that the participants of these dialogues are not primarily interested in having 
their distinctiveness and relevance recognised by their counterparts in the framework of their 
virtual communication and face-to-face meetings. In this context, no particular importance is 
given to the symbolic elements so crucial in the diplomatic settings. What matters is the action-
oriented nature of the dialogue, whose success is not measured in terms of recognition of 
identity but on how much they achieve together in drafting actionable resolutions and 
recommendations for policy-makers. In these dialogues, the end product is more important than 
the process itself, compared to the other dialogues in which the process of the dialogue – as a 
way to experience the institution – was particularly important. This key difference is due to the 
fact that the actors’ institutional identities are already well anchored elsewhere and that they 
come together to advance common interests that transcend the European/American divide – be 
it the promotion of economic liberalisation in the case of TABC or the protection of consumers 
for TACD. In this respect, this chapter presented the most different case compared to the 
previous ones (Chapters 7 and 8) as the interaction under analysis did not involve formal 
representatives of the European Union. Secondly, the chapter has shown that even if there is 
no dominant recognition process at play among the members of these transatlantic civil society 
dialogues, these dialogues still serve the quest for recognition of the EU as they indirectly 
reinforce its institutional identity by constituting an indirect act of recognition. The 
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establishment of these civil society dialogues and the way they are conducted can be seen as 
an expression of the EU’s attachment to the value of democracy (accountability and 
transparency), which is a key feature of its institutional identity in terms of principles. In 
addition, the involvement of these non-state actors feeding into the activities and agenda of the 
EU is also a way to give recognition to the EU’s relevance in this field. The EU constitutes the 
platform that allows them to operate. If the EU were to collapse, they would not meet again, as 
the EU provides them with a target (i.e. decision-makers). They might perhaps still exchange 
best practices but their raison d’être is primarily to influence decision-makers at the EU level. 
In other words, the vitality and success of these transnational civil society dialogues act as an 
indirect recognition of the relevance of the EU. 
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Chapter 10 – Conclusions 
 
 
Recognition is a key mechanism in international relations whose saliency is often overlooked 
but that remains nonetheless part and parcel of world politics with far-reaching implications.  
My interest in the practice of dialogue and its magical powers, to paraphrase Yankelovitch 
(1999), dates back to the years when I was actively involved in a variety of civil society 
dialogues, bringing together young Israelis and Palestinians to advance mutual understanding 
and eventually peace, as well as dialogues between Israeli and European researchers of 
different think tanks, examining together the pressing security challenges characterizing the 
Middle East at that time. In both frameworks, the high expectations I held from the dialogue 
were dashed: mutual understanding was not easily reached and the exchange of views between 
the participants often left a ‘bitter aftertaste’ accompanied by a deep sense of frustration – 
palatable where both sides left the room without having made any significant step towards the 
other. This was a puzzling observation and at that time, I was unable to put my finger on the 
exact reason behind this disillusionment. I was just left with the intuition that a crucial element 
was missing for these exchanges to be more valuable.  
Several years later with the first interviews conducted in the framework of this research, 
the missing intangible element that I could not identify back then became clearer. I realized 
that it was all about recognition. This ‘bulb moment’ occurred when the chairman of the EU 
parliamentary delegation to the US equated the success of a dialogue with the mere number of 
American representatives of the Congress, making the effort to travel to Brussels, to take part 
in the dialogue (Interview no.1). Given the fact that the transatlantic dialogue is one of the 
oldest and thickest dialogues, I was expecting a different measure of success related rather to 
the quality of the exchange. This answer was as surprising as instructive. It suggested that the 
transatlantic relationship was not to be taken-for-granted, and that what was at stake in these 
dialogues, was first and foremost, the recognition of the importance and distinctiveness of the 
other. Put another way, it revealed the basic need to have one’s identity recognised, whether 
we talk about a single individual participating in a people-to-people dialogue in a turbulent 
zone of conflict or a representative of a prestigious institution, such as the EU.  
But why is recognition so important? Because it fundamentally relates to our most 
profound socio-psychological needs as human beings striving for respect and self-esteem. The 
quest for the recognition of our identity goes hand-in-hand with emotions that are by 
themselves so powerful that they can literally trigger wars or bring about extraordinary positive 
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changes in international politics. Recognition is omnipresent in social interactions and 
underpins other practices, such as the quest for security and profit. In fact, the social structure 
underpinning these two practices, assumes identity in the first place. In the absence of 
recognition for the relevance and particularities of the other, it is very difficult to build strong 
and enduring relationships.  
Looking at the EU’s impressive record of dialogues with third countries around the 
world and considering its deep attachment to the culture of debate and compromise, I decided 
to investigate the following research question: why has the EU promoted and institutionalized 
more dialogues than any other international actor in the world? What is actually going on 
during all these dialogical interactions? What is the rationale and most importantly, what is the 
added value of all these interactions that have become so numerous that they become almost 
impossible to quantify in an accurate way?  
 
10.1. Discussion of the findings and of the research methods 
 
Several theories of International Relations have already conceptualized what happens in a 
dialogue, defined as a face-to-face interaction in an institutionalised framework. While for 
realists, dialogical interactions are nothing more than a pure reflection of power constellations 
hinging on coercive mechanisms, liberal institutionalists consider this practice to be a real 
engine for cooperation, enabling intense exchange of information and views, and possibly 
leading to joint action. As to the constructivist approach, it considers dialogues as a site in 
which genuine processes of persuasion and arguing might develop, resulting in the emergence 
of common understandings and shared ideas. Without downplaying the relevance of these 
mechanisms at work, I took a different perspective drawing on insights from socio-psychology 
to reveal the underlying layer related to identity and the quest for recognition. While traditional 
IR approaches define the essence of the dialogue either in terms of power relations or in terms 
of communication revolving around the transmission of information and knowledge in a 
rationalistic/cognitive vein, I chose to bring to the fore the more intangible dimensions of 
human interaction related to identity and emotions.  
 From this perspective, the standpoint of this research shows that the main goal of the EU in 
conducting such dialogues with non-EU countries is to anchor its institutional identity by 
gaining recognition as a key international actor. In this quest for recognition, the dialogue offers 
an instance in which institutional actors can experience the institutional identity of the other 
and their own, as well as engage in recognition processes with far-reaching implications at the 
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macro-institutional level. In fact, the dialogue constitutes a framework of direct encounter in 
which temporal and spatial immediacy allows for non-verbal cues and emotions to take a 
prominent position alongside other forms of communications as mentioned above (Chapter 2).  
In addition, it is worth remembering that not all the states or organizations have 
necessarily the same recognition needs. In this respect, the EU specifically constitutes a 
gripping and special case facing peculiar challenges in the recognition of its institutional 
identity: its sui generis hybrid nature as a political actor, its complex machinery of decision-
making in constant evolution, and the ambiguity surrounding its end purpose are crucial to 
understand why it is so difficult for non-EU countries to fathom the EU’s institutional identity. 
The multitude of internal and external challenges that the EU currently faces contribute to make 
its needs for recognition even more acute (Chapter 4).  
Given these pressing recognition needs, it is no coincidence that the EU has the highest 
number of dialogues with parties in the world. Chapter 5 has comprehensively described how 
this entire ‘dialogue system’ incrementally came about from the early days of the EC until 
today, following different patterns of initiation. While the EC/EPC was very much a sought-
after interlocutor in its formative years, the trend was reversed in the 1990s with the EU taking 
the lead and institutionalising more systematically dialogues with third countries. It is no 
exaggeration to argue that the EU is now championing the practice of dialogue: it currently 
conducts dialogues with almost all regional organizations and states in the world, from Albania 
to Zimbabwe, covering an ever-increasing range of issues (from human rights to nuclear non-
proliferation) and with a wide variety of actors, including diplomats, parliamentarians, and civil 
society actors. In my view, this intense dialogical engagement with the world can be explained 
by the EU’s acute needs in terms of recognition of its complex institutional identity.  
The practice of dialogue serves to anchor the EU institutional identity through an on-
going and iterative process of recognition, achieved in the face-to-face interaction between 
representatives of participating institutions. To substantiate this key argument, I devised a 
theoretical framework detailing the exact process through which the anchoring of institutional 
identity occurs at the micro-level with implications at the macro-institutional level. Drawing 
on my working definition of dialogue as a ‘face-to-face interaction in an institutionalised 
framework’, it was crucial to first emphasize the particularities of this distinct form of 
communication. In fact, it is the temporal and spatial immediacy allowing for the display of 
non-verbal and emotional cues that make the dialogue such a favourable setting for processes 
of recognition and anchoring of institutional identity to unfold. This argument in turn sheds 
light on the added value of the physical encounter and the persistence of this form of dialogue 
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even in the age of fast-moving technological changes. Despite technological advancements, 
representatives of states and institutions keep travelling to be physically in the presence of each 
other, as no other form of interaction can better satisfy their needs for recognition.  
I unpacked the mechanism of anchoring of institutional identity hinging on recognition 
at three critical moments of the dialogue: (1) the entering of the room, i.e. the preparation and 
the setting; (2) communication and exchanges in the room; (3) and leaving the room. For each 
one of these phases, I pointed to the variety of verbal and non-verbal cues that can be used and 
interpreted by the actors in presence, as recognition acts or markers of recognition-seeking 
behaviour. Following the symbolic interactionist tradition à la Goffman (1959), I showed that 
the dialogue can be thought of as a performance in which actors can experience first-hand the 
institution they represent in all its relevance and uniqueness. In fact, in this symbolically framed 
interaction, the actors project the identity of the institution they represent in terms of values, 
interests, and procedures, through the way they act and interact. The symbolic dimension of 
these encounters is key: while the interaction unfolds among individual representatives at the 
micro-level, its significance transcends the meeting room due to the power of symbolism. In 
this regard, the third phase of the process (i.e. leaving the room) is crucial, as it definitely 
clinched the recognition that has taken place in the room by projecting it to the outside world. 
This is achieved thanks to the enactment of visual, discursive, and practical anchors of 
institutional identity.  
In order to test this model, I investigated the constellation of practices related to the 
dialogue, as well as the perceptions held by European and American participants of the added 
value of these interactions. The analysis revealed that in addition to the exchange of 
information characterizing these dialogues, the quest for recognition of the EU’s institutional 
identity features predominantly, albeit in a more subtle and hidden manner. Indeed, the 
application of the theoretical framework to the three case studies corresponding to different 
levels of dialogue between the EU and the US has shown that all kinds of actors (legislative, 
executive, and civil society) participate in this large identity recognition game, like cogs in a 
big machine. Instead of disaggregating the different EU institutions, the argument remained at 
a broader level and dealt with the recognition of the institutional identity of the EU as a whole.  
Put another way, the findings across the different empirical chapters point to the fact that the 
EU does anchor its institutional identity through the dialogical interaction. There is indeed a 
widespread perception among the European participants of these dialogues that ‘the treatment 
they get during these dialogues matched to a great extent with their self-image’ (Lindemann & 
Saada, 2012, p.17-18), which amounts to the recognition of their institutional identity. 
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Importantly, this perception of enhanced recognition is shared by the American participants, 
suggesting that the Europeans are not fooling themselves cultivating an illusion of recognition. 
In fact, the analysis has shown that for a majority of American participants, the dialogue does 
help to better fathom and appreciate the EU in its complexity and distinctiveness.  
Upon closer examination, different shades of equality emerged in each one of these 
cases. In the case of the Transatlantic Legislators’ dialogue (Chapter 7), I told the story of a 
dialogue among friends. At the inter-parliamentary level, the asymmetry between European 
and American participants in terms of commitment and participation to the dialogue is 
particularly striking. But the analysis of the interaction in the room and the informality of the 
session exposed strong indicators of recognition of the relationship identity as friends. As to 
the case of the executive EU-US dialogues involving diplomats (Chapter 8), it features the 
recognition of the relationship identity as partners who are more oriented towards the 
achievements of concrete results in the form of ‘deliverables’. Compared to the TLD, the 
efforts put in the dialogue by EU and US representatives are more even, both in terms of 
engagement and participation in the dialogue. The nature of the interaction within the room 
confirms to a great extent the partnership relationship that both sides maintain with each other: 
whether it is ‘strategising’ vis-à-vis other actors, or enjoying the high level of conviviality and 
trust among themselves, all these implicit acts of recognition do matter for the anchoring of the 
EU institutional identity. As to the civil society dialogues (TABC and TACD), they differ from 
the two other empirical examples in two fundamental ways (Chapter 9). First, at this level of 
dialogue, where the participants are not official representatives of the EU, the quest for 
recognition of their institutional identity is not crucial at all. Rather, what matters in the 
interaction between American and European businessmen or consumers is their common 
interest in advancing a common cause, and their willingness to find a consensus and reach a 
transatlantic agreement that would hopefully influence the policy-making process. Even 
though recognition does not feature predominantly in this case, the interaction among the 
participants of this group reflects different shades of equality in the relations among associated 
rivals in the case of TABC and among family members in the case of TACD. Furthermore, 
keeping in mind the acute quest for recognition of the EU, the analysis has also shown that this 
type of dialogue at the civil society level established by the EU itself also contributes to the 
recognition of the EU as a competent and distinct institution. Overall then, successful processes 
of recognition are at play across all the case studies confirming the thesis that  the EU engages 
so prolifically in political dialogues in order to anchor its institutional identity.  
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Yet a few points need to be underlined in order to challenge the rigidity of the 
theoretical framework presented in the thesis.  
First, the concept of identity which constitutes a core component of the recognition 
process at play during the dialogue has largely been treated here as a thin concept – 
encompassing the ‘relevance and distinctiveness’ dimensions of institutional identity in a rather 
general way. According to my theoretical framework, institutional identity is expressed both 
in the values for which the institution stands and in its unique procedures. While the analysis 
has shown that in each one of the dialogues, the European participants promote certain values 
that have traditionally been associated with the European Union as a normative power 
(Manners, 2002), such as the promotion of democracy, the respect for human rights, and 
multilateralism– more explicit links could be made to these thicker conceptions of European 
identity. In other words, the conceptualization of identity can be refined by focusing more 
exclusively on the values characterizing the EU as a distinct actor. However, the analysis has 
shed light on how the values cherished by the European Union are also reflected in the 
procedures and practices it pursues in the framework of the dialogue. For instance, the strong 
European commitment to democracy is well-mirrored in the importance attributed to the 
representativeness of the delegations (particularly so in the case of the European Parliament). 
Similarly, the positive way through which Europeans traditionally approach every single 
opportunity for dialogue is well-aligned with the EU’s clear preference and deep attachment to 
the practice of deliberation and diplomacy more generally.  
 Secondly, by delving into the intricacies of the different dialogues, more nuances have 
been uncovered. The aim of the following paragraphs is therefore to sharpen the 
differentiations and variations observed within the recognition seeking processes across the 
different chapters. 
First of all, as mentioned above, my thesis treats the EU as a predominantly unified 
entity, such that the European participants within each type of dialogue present a common front 
in terms of recognition. I argue that they are all carriers of the EU institutional identity and 
typically seek recognition of this identity in terms of values and procedures in their interaction 
with their American counterparts. However, this does not mean that each institution composing 
the EU has necessarily the same recognition needs. In fact, the analysis of the three different 
types of dialogues has revealed that each institution (the European Parliament, the 
EEAS/Commission and the non-governmental actors) have various degrees of recognition 
needs. This variation could possibly be illustrated along a spectrum of neediness featuring the 
European Parliament at one extreme with the most acute needs for recognition, and the 
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transatlantic non-governmental dialogues at the other extreme, functioning more like a network 
with no real need for recognition among the organization members. Where does this variation 
in neediness come from and what impact does it have on the recognition processes at work in 
the dialogue? While all these institutions (in particular the EP and the EEAS/Commission) 
promote the values and interests of the EU as a whole, they also have their own vested interests 
and organisational culture and history. Depending on the institution’s degree of “neediness” 
for recognition, the recognition processes at play during the dialogue can be more or less 
salient. In this study, it comes as no surprise that the European Parliament is the “neediest” 
institutional actor in terms of recognition: it has been trying hard to assert its role as a new 
foreign policy player – not just vis-à-vis the United States but also vis-à-vis other European 
institutions, such as the EEAS for instance. This idea was often mentioned in the interviews: 
MEPs and their staffers were proud to be able to reach unique transatlantic agreements that 
would profoundly matter for future executive decisions, thereby highlighting the added value 
of their participation in the European decision-making process when it comes to foreign policy. 
In the middle of the spectrum, one finds the EEAS, which has also to deal with its own 
recognition challenges as a relatively new foreign policy institution established by the Lisbon 
treaty. In future research, it might be interesting to compare the conduct of the EEAS and its 
degree of neediness in terms of recognition under the respective leadership of Catherine Ashton 
and Federica Mogherini. Finally, at the other hand of the spectrum, one finds a different type 
of actors whose role in the recognition process of the EU is only indirect: the non-governmental 
actors in the framework of the TABC and TACD. Among themselves, the recognition for 
institutional identity is not at stake. They operate much more like a network advancing common 
causes where identity matters do not feature predominantly. As a result, the recognition 
dynamics particularly salient in the two other types of dialogues are absent in this case. This 
variation in the degree of recognition sought by the different actors in the framework of the 
dialogue is interesting in itself but it does not weaken the general claim according to which 
they are all imbued with the same mission of recognition on behalf of the EU when interacting 
with outsiders.  
Apart from the nature of the actors involved, the predominance of the recognition 
processes varies also according to the policy area discussed during the dialogues. When it 
comes to policy areas where the EU has a comparative advantage over the United States, the 
recognition processes at play during the dialogue will be more intense. Such policy areas 
include for instance Justice and Home Affairs with a special emphasis on data privacy and 
protection as well as topics related to development and security. Aware of its expertise in these 
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fields, the EU will typically project with more confidence and determination its institutional 
identity and as a result will also have higher expectations in terms of recognition, as it is much 
more invested in the process in the first place. By contrast, if the EU does not get the expected 
recognition when it comes to the dialogues on these specific topics, the emotional negative 
response might be particularly acute. In the dialogues analysed in this study, I found a fair 
degree of alignment between the high expectations of the European participants and the “extent 
of learning” experienced by the Americans. In fact, both at the inter-parliamentary and 
executive levels, the American participants explicitly praised the European participants for 
their expertise in these policy areas – thereby recognizing the EU’s competence in these 
specific policy areas. More generally, any acknowledgement on the American side that they 
have learnt something from the EU is perceived as a recognition act on the European side.  
A third background condition that impacts the saliency of the recognition processes at 
play during the dialogue deals with the level of familiarity between European and American 
participants (i.e. turnover in terms of membership).  As mentioned in the theoretical section, 
due to the repeated nature of the interaction, strong inter-personal links can be forged over 
time, leading potentially to the thickening of the institution-to-institution relationship. The 
development of these relationships is an inherent part of the recognition process. In fact, the 
existence of these links (as practical anchors of identity) are the testament that recognition has 
already been granted. As such, a dialogue in which European and American participants are 
well-acquainted and have already the experience of working together will feature less 
prominent recognition processes. Alternatively, in a situation where new members enter the 
dialogue, the recognition challenge comes to the fore again. This can be nicely illustrated by 
the lack of recognition processes at the non-governmental level where members have known 
each other for years on the one hand, and the renewed pressure to seek recognition at the inter-
parliamentary level and executive level with the change in the American administration on the 
other hand. In fact, anticipating the first months of the Trump administration, many European 
participants clearly reiterated the challenge of being perceived as competent and credible in the 
eyes of their new American counterparts.  
Furthermore, variation in the intensity of the recognition processes at play during the 
dialogue might also be due to the different levels of visibility of the dialogues. As the 
recognition process unfolding in the meeting room needs to be effectively projected to the 
outside world, the possibility to disseminate the results of the dialogue is crucial. In fact, the 
more such possibilities exist, the more acute the recognition process will be with the actors 
taking advantage of every single opportunity to project the recognition of their identity. In the 
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case of the TLD where the recognition process is the most salient, the participants are well 
aware of the possibilities to publicize these meetings and their results. In fact, the meetings are 
quite transparent, they are even sometimes accessible online. A lot of pictures are taken in the 
course of the inter-parliamentary meetings and are then extensively disseminated along with 
the joint statements.  Being aware of the availability of so many visual and discursive anchors, 
the participants of these inter-parliamentary dialogues invest more in the quest for recognition 
as its outcomes can more easily be projected to the world. This stands in contrast to the other 
two dialogues that benefit from less visibility. In the case of the EEAS, the meetings are much 
more confidential and there are typically not as many visual anchors in the form of pictures 
available. As to the case of the non-governmental dialogues, this visibility aspect is not relevant 
at all when the interaction is just among member organisations as they are not looking for the 
recognition of their identity as institutions.  
Finally, a comment is in order regarding the long-term consequences of the recognition 
processes for the European Union as a polity in general. While the theoretical framework makes 
the connection between micro-processes of recognition unfolding within the meeting rooms 
and macro-processes defined as the impact of recognition at the institutional level, it does not 
explain the specificities of the potential gains these processes have for EU external action as a 
whole. In fact, due to the diffuse nature of these ongoing and iterative processes, it is difficult 
to establish a clear causal link between successful recognition instances and the EU external 
action as a whole. One might however be able to discern a trend whereby the EU will be more 
assertive in its foreign policy with a strengthened sense of identity guiding its actions in the 
international realm. Further research will be necessary to assess with more precision the impact 
these recognition processes on the conduct of external policy by European actors.  
 
Critical discussion about the research methods  
Turning now to the research methods used in this research, a few comments about their 
suitability in terms of generating useful data and analytical insights are in order.  
Overall, the thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted with the 
participants of the dialogue, the participant observations and the analysis of key official 
documents and visual data were highly effective in answering the research question on the 
added value of the EU-US dialogues. Taking a socio-psychological approach to the study of 
the EU dialogues, it was absolutely crucial to use a great variety of sources in order to provide 
a rich description of the phenomenon under study and to capture the subjective understandings 
of the participants in this specific social context (i.e. EU-US dialogues). More specifically, the 
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use of ethnographic data collection tools, in the form of semi-structured interviews and 
participant observations, was key in generating useful data. They allowed to uncover the subtle 
socio-psychological dynamics at play during the dialogue that would not have been discernible 
otherwise. In fact, the very open exchanges I had with both American and European 
participants of the dialogues have enabled me to understand how the representatives of the 
institutions interpret and assess what they are doing in this specific context, referring regularly 
to the idea of recognition. Undoubtedly, qualitative interviewing is one of the best research 
methods to grasp the perceptions of the main actors of these dialogues. This method provided 
an original insider’s perspective on these dialogues - one that has been blatantly missing in the 
literature so far.  
As to the participant observations of the meetings, they nicely complemented the accounts 
collected during the interviews. In particular, they allowed me to grasp in real time the non-
verbal, emotional and ritual elements that are so important in the realm of socio-psychology. 
Being present in the meeting room, observing the subtle gestures of the participants while 
listening to the content of their exchanges definitely helped me to get a more precise and 
concrete sense of what was going on during the dialogue from a practical and symbolic 
perspective. Equally important was the participation in the informal moments following the 
official dialogues themselves. Indeed, being present in the “debriefing” discussions where the 
participants openly talked about their feelings and impressions regarding the dialogue that had 
just taken place, was extremely useful in comprehending their subjective assessments of the 
interaction. However, a caveat is in order here. While participant observations are particularly 
valuable in generating useful data on the conduct of the dialogues as they unfold, the access to 
the room remains a serious challenge for researchers due to confidentiality matters. While I 
have managed to attend only two meetings at the inter-parliamentary level, the observations I 
made during these sessions, reflected to a great extent the descriptions I previously heard from 
a number of interviewees – thereby reinforcing my confidence in the validity of my findings.  
In addition, the analysis of the official documents and visual data emanating from the dialogues 
was highly valuable in making the link between the micro- and macro-levels. In fact, the 
wording of the joint statements and press releases, the mise en scène behind the pictures 
released on the internet - as well as the dissemination practices of these documents, were all 
significant indicators that needed to be taken into account when assessing the added value of 
these dialogues. They are the only tangible outcomes of the dialogues accessible to the public 
and to the world and as such, are not innocuous. However, while the comparative analysis of 
the wording of the documents over time and the analysis of the dissemination patterns are 
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insightful in and by themselves, they do not tell the whole story behind their raison d’être. In 
fact, their meaning and importance can only be fully understood when coupled with insights 
gleaned from the interviewees, i.e. from the actors that produced them in the first place. In the 
case at hand, interviewees recurrently pointed to the important function that these documents 
and pictures fulfil in terms of projecting an institutional identity to the world. In sum, for the 
purpose of this research exploring the practice of dialogue from a socio-psychological 
perspective, the data- triangulation, consisting in the analysis of a wide variety of sources, was 
of great import. It allowed to gain a thorough understanding of this practice in all its dimensions 
(practical, symbolic and subjective) and greatly enhanced the internal validity of the research.  
In terms of method, the thematic analysis supported by the QDA NVivo 11, was an appropriate 
and effective method to extract significant patterns of meaning from the interviews and other 
data sources in a very systematic and rigorous manner. In particular, the different queries 
available on the software enabled to discover interesting differences in the data both across and 
within cases (for instance, differences between the Europeans and Americans’ definition of a 
successful dialogue). I would therefore recommend to any researcher interested in the rigorous 
analysis of a wide variety of data to use this type of software. It is extremely useful.  
 
10.2. Contribution to the literature  
 
This study makes several contributions to different bodies of literature, both theoretically and 
empirically.  
First, the thesis sheds light on the added value of taking a socio-psychological approach to the 
study of dialogue in international relations. In fact, by closely examining the subjective 
understandings of the participants of the dialogue, who act as the carriers of institutional 
identity in the specific social setting of the EU-US dialogues, a new function of the dialogue 
related to the recognition needs of institutions, has been revealed. In other words, this 
theoretical lens has the merit to draw the attention to powerful socio-psychological dynamics 
related to the identity needs of institutions – that have traditionally been overlooked by the 
more conventional IR theories. The main idea according to which the dialogue also serves to 
anchor institutional identity by enabling recognition processes to unfold is by itself innovative 
and original and as such brings added value to the study of dialogue in international relations.  
However, the salience of the recognition game at play during the dialogue does not 
mean that the other classical dynamics identified by more conventional IR theories (realism, 
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liberal institutionalism and social constructivism) are not unfolding during the dialogues as 
well. Rather than eclipsing the other dynamics (in terms of bargaining, exchange of information 
and knowledge), I showed that the recognition process underpins the other kinds of discursive 
engagement taking place among the participants of the dialogue. Indeed, the socio-
psychological approach is instrumental in explaining the nature and quality of the dialogical 
exchange, as described by the more classical IR theories. More specifically, if recognition is 
granted during the dialogue, this will inevitably be reflected in the quality of exchange among 
the actors of the dialogue. Inversely, in the case where recognition is not granted, the dialogue 
is most likely to be characterized by less effective persuasion processes and by a lesser degree 
of trust, influencing the nature of the information being exchanged etc. As such, the socio-
psychological approach adopted in this study does not refute nor contradict the other IR 
theories regarding the role and content of political dialogues in international relations. It rather 
complements them by shedding light on an underlying dimension that has the potential to 
influence the quality of the exchanges, as described by the other theories. It therefore 
contributes to a richer conceptualisation of dialogue in IR rooted in the full appreciation of the 
identity factor and its effect.  
While the thesis has mainly referred to the three conventional IR theories (realism, 
liberal institutionalism and social constructivism) and their conceptualisation of the role of 
dialogue, another set of approaches focused more specifically on the development and 
functioning of institutions, could also have been considered in order to explore the dynamics 
and added value of the political dialogues conducted between the EU and the world. In fact, 
there might be room for interesting combinations between the socio-psychological approach 
adopted in this research and different types of institutionalisms, such as historical and social 
institutionalism.  
At first sight, historical institutionalism – which is primarily concerned with the study 
of patterns of institutional development - seems to be quite relevant in the context of this 
research, which describes the remarkable development of the architecture of dialogues between 
the EU and the US. Indeed, in its attempt to understand the processes that shape, reproduce and 
alter international political institutions over time, historical institutionalism puts the emphasis 
“on the micro-level processes that create incentives for individuals to reproduce (or not) 
designs during and after critical junctures” (Fioretos, 2011, p.375). This micro-level focus 
strongly resonates with the socio-psychological approach looking at the behavior of individuals 
in specific social contexts. However, for historical institutionalism, the preferences of the 
actors shaping patterns of institutional changes respond mainly to a rationalist interest-based 
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kind of logic. In fact, historical institutionalism explains the persistence of a specific 
institutional design thanks to the investments and costs that have been invested in them in the 
first place as well as the interests of the actors in these institutions to preserve their role 
(Fioretos, 2011, p.376). In other words, this account makes no reference to the psychology of 
the individuals nor of the institution in which they are embedded. By contrast, my analysis 
based on insights gleaned from the actors of these dialogues, shows that there is another 
rationale behind the decision to keep the dialogues going, namely the necessity to gain 
recognition to fulfill important internal and external identity needs. In this sense, the socio-
psychological approach can be a good complement to historical institutionalist analysis, as it 
looks also at non-material considerations and makes an effective link between individuals and 
institutions in this context.  
Another approach that could be relevant to this research is sociological institutionalism, 
which typically focuses on the ways through which institutions come to affect individual’s 
behaviour (Jepperson, 1991). In this regard, the sociological institutionalist approach has the 
potential to explain well some of the dynamics described in this thesis – referring particularly 
to the process of socialization that the European participants of the dialogue undergo and 
through which they internalize their role as carriers of institutional identity seeking recognition 
when interacting with the US. Yet while sociological institutionalism is helpful in explaining 
how the institution shapes the behaviour of its agents, the socio-psychological approach is still 
needed in order to highlight the recognition needs of the institution and the ways through which 
the individuals engage in the recognition game as a performance. Put differently, a socio-
psychological approach applied to institutions provides additional original insights on the 
needs of the institution itself while sociological institutionalism provides additional insights on 
the processes through which the constituting agents become imbued with this mission.  
Taking this alternative socio-psychological view on dialogue has several implications 
both for researchers and practitioners. First, from a theoretical perspective, it invites scholars 
interested in the intricacies of dialogue to pay due attention to the powerful socio-psychological 
dynamics at play in any dialogical interaction, as these have the potential to bear on the way 
the exchange eventually takes place. Subsequently, it should encourage researchers to use 
ethnographic data collection tools in order to capture the thickness of this unique kind of human 
and social interaction that has much more to reveal than what transpires from the mere analysis 
of official documents or of speech utterances. Secondly, important lessons can be learnt for 
practitioners often involved in dialogues. Indeed, considering the omnipresence and 
significance of the socio-psychological processes related to recognition, more attention needs 
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to be given to the way through which the dialogue is being prepared, conducted and followed 
up within institutions. The fact that actors are so sensitive to the recognition dynamics at play 
during the dialogue has far reaching practical implications in terms of how the participants of 
the dialogue (i.e. practitioners) should approach it. For instance, more empathy and sensitivity 
should be displayed regarding the way others are treated, as a poor treatment (equating a lack 
of recognition) can have detrimental effects on the nature of the interaction when it comes to 
the exchange of information or bargaining etc. These intangible dynamics at play have the 
potential to turn the dialogue into a success or a failure. Therefore, the importance of the socio-
psychological dimension of the dialogue should prompt a better and more conscious code of 
conduct when it comes to political dialogues from the practitioner’s standpoint.  
In addition, this research makes also a contribution to the distinct literature on 
recognition in international relations. First, the findings show that recognition permeates 
everyday diplomatic practices, with dialogical interactions being one of the most intense and 
favourable settings in which recognition processes can unfold due to the spatial, temporal, and 
emotional immediacy it allows. In this sense, my research enlarges the scope of ‘recognition 
acts’ identified so far in the literature, which remain situated mainly at the macro-level of 
interaction, be it in the form of legal recognition or public statements. This study therefore 
completes the picture by providing a detailed fine-gained framework of analysis to show how 
recognition is granted within the specific setting of dialogues, focusing at the practices of 
recognition at the micro-level with macro-level implications.  
Secondly, while there is already a degree of acknowledgment in the literature about the 
crucial social dimension of recognition (Lindemann & Ringmar, 2012)  (in addition to its legal 
aspect), this study provides a thicker understanding of these dynamics by taking into account 
the strong emotional components involved in the recognition process as well. In fact, the 
findings show that the recognition process is always accompanied by emotions that in turn can 
help the researcher to recognize recognition or lack thereof. These emotions appear very 
distinctively in the dialogical setting thanks to the spatial and physical proximity, in which the 
‘recognisees’ and ‘recognisers’ interact. Typically, positive emotions such as trust, joy, and a 
sense of satisfaction emerge when recognition is granted whereas negative emotions like anger, 
humiliation, and a sense of frustration are more likely to arise when the participants perceive a 
mismatch between the treatment received and their self-image. The emotional layer is 
important to take into account, as emotions can be extremely powerful triggers of actions. 
Finally, this research has shown that a variety of actors other than states can be involved in the 
recognition game. This innovation contrasts with the literature on recognition that has 
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traditionally put a heavy emphasis on the state as the main actor seeking formal recognition 
and being able to grant it. In this study, I highlighted the specific recognition needs of the EU, 
as a complex and constantly evolving organization and the subsequent efforts being made to 
get recognition for its challenging institutional identity. This insight is crucial: not all 
institutions have similar needs in terms of the recognition of their identity. More research could 
be done on the theoretical front to better identify the evolution of the recognition needs of an 
institution at different stages of its life, for instance. The study also illustrated how non-state 
actors in the form of business and consumer groups partake in this complex recognition game. 
Contrary to the widely held assumption in the literature about the directionality of the 
recognition process, from states or international organization to non-state actors, this research 
shows that non-state actors can also indirectly grant recognition for the institutional identity of 
states or international institutions, like the EU.  
This study makes a significant contribution to the literature on the EU foreign policy. 
While political dialogues have typically been described in the literature as a foreign policy tool 
deployed in order to influence the behaviour of another party mainly through persuasion  
(Smith, 2014), my findings provide an additional rationale. Dialogues are not just intended to 
have an effect on the other party, but they also fulfil a key internal function related to the socio-
psychological needs of the EU in terms of identity. In this sense, the study goes beyond the 
classical conceptualisation of dialogues as mere foreign policy tools and sheds light on the role 
dialogues play in the reinforcement of the EU’s institutional identity, as a relevant and distinct 
foreign policy actor. This additional rationale behind the extensive use of these dialogues has 
so far been overlooked by traditionalist explanations. Any future study focusing on the EU 
practice of dialogue with other organisations, states, or even non-state actors should also 
consider the internal function that these dialogues play in terms of identity. The focus on the 
subjective feelings and perceptions of the participants coupled with the observation of the 
dialogue at the micro-level in real-time showed that the EU is indeed capable of anchoring its 
institutional identity, taking advantage of all the possibilities inherent in the dialogue as a 
specific form of communication (i.e. spatial and temporal immediacy and display of emotions).  
The extent to which these findings, drawn from the specific transatlantic case, can be 
generalized and described as a  key pattern in the conduct of EU foreign policy needs however 
to be critically discussed. In fact, a critical reader might question the external validity of these 
research findings giving the unique dynamics and power asymmetries characterizing the EU-
US dialogues. To address this important issue, I will first briefly highlight the specific aspects 
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and findings that might be largely applicable only to the EU-US case before making the case 
for the wider relevance of the findings across a variety of other cases.   
First of all, the intensity of the recognition process at play and its visibility might be 
very specific to the case of the EU-US dialogues due to the nature of the relationship between 
the two players. As explained at great length in Chapter 6, the transatlantic relationship has 
always been characterized by an ambivalent mix of cooperation and competition revolving 
around the key issue of equality. From the inception of the European project, it has been a 
challenge for the Europeans to assert themselves vis-à-vis the US in light of the structural 
power asymmetries between the two actors. In addition, the recognition granted by the US as 
a fellow democracy and powerful traditional alliance partner has a very strong significance. 
Therefore it comes as no surprise that the quest for recognition is so salient and visible in the 
case of the dialogues with the United States. This is true for the three distinct phases of the 
recognition process detailed in the theoretical framework: from the preparation stage where 
intense coordination efforts at the European level are made to come across as a unified actor 
vis-à-vis the US to the wide dissemination of the outcomes of the dialogues (in the form of 
visual and discursive anchors of identity). Whether the EU puts as much effort into political 
dialogues with other countries that are not as significant and powerful as the US, needs to be 
investigated in future research projects. Furthermore, another aspect that might only be relevant 
to the EU-US case, relates to the ease with which the recognition process unfolds due to the 
rich common cultural background shared by both sides. Even though there are a lot of important 
differences between the European and American models when it comes to politics and 
economics, their cultural proximity remains unparalleled when considering the other 
interlocutors of the EU. The fact that both players are born out of the same Western cultural 
heritage and are used to communicate and negotiate intensively in English might facilitate their 
mutual understanding and the common interpretation of the subtle gestures and language so 
present in the dialogical interactions. In other words, the recognition process might be 
facilitated by these common cultural understandings. This might not be so easy in other cases 
where the cultural backgrounds of the actors are fundamentally different – such as the case of 
the EU and China for instance.  
However, while it is true that the EU-US dialogues might be an extreme case in terms 
of the recognition dynamics it displays, there are a few reasons to believe that the EU will still 
be seeking the recognition of its institutional identity with other countries as well through its 
intense dialogical engagement. First, the EU’s recognition conundrum – emanating from a 
complex institutional identity that is often difficult to fathom by external players- holds true 
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for all the interlocutor countries- not only with the United States. Put it differently, it is not 
only a challenge for the United States to capture the complexity of the EU. Arguably, all the 
other countries are struggling with making sense of what the EU is and which powers it really 
has. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the EU will take advantage of every single political 
dialogue to project its institutional identity with the aim of being better understood – and 
thereby recognized by third countries regardless of their power or status. There is no doubt that 
the recognition coming from a powerful actor like the United States might be particularly 
valuable for the EU. Yet it does not mean that the EU will not pursue recognition from less 
important players as ‘there is never enough recognition’: for an institution that seeks to gain 
recognition for its relevance as an international actor, every single country matters.  
Secondly, it is reasonable to think that the dialogue will always help satisfy (partly at 
least) the EU’s internal need to confirm its distinctive identity. In fact, the reinforcement of 
institutional identity takes already place in the preparation phase of the dialogue, whereby the 
different EU actors reaffirm their common values and interests with the view to come across 
as a consistent and coherent actor in the eyes of their interlocutors. During the dialogue itself, 
the importance given to emphasize the uniqueness of the EU as an institution (both in terms of 
values and procedures) also entails an anchoring of identity internally. This process is most 
likely to happen with other interlocutors as well and not just in the case of the US – albeit with 
perhaps a different degree of intensity. Thirdly, the research finding according to which 
different EU institutions have various recognition needs might well be a constant feature that 
goes beyond the specific interaction between the EU and US institutions. For instance, the fact 
that the European Parliament as a relatively new actor of foreign policy is needier when it 
comes to recognition than the EEAS or the Commission might be reflected in all the dialogues 
with third countries.  
Lastly, the fine-grained analysis of the evolution of the EU-US architecture of dialogues 
and the examination of the micro-practices of communication among European and American 
representatives at different levels (parliamentary, executive, and civil society) contribute to the 
dense literature on the transatlantic relations. In fact, it brings further empirical evidence 
supporting the case for the solidity and vitality of the transatlantic relationship even amidst 
periods of deep disagreements between the two entities. In this sense, it is a welcome addition 
to the transatlantic literature that only rarely emphasises the strong cooperation between the 
EU and the US compared to the heavy focus on the crises and conflicts punctuating the 
relationship. The analysis conducted in Chapter 6 in particular shows the evolution of the 
cooperation and consultation patterns, with multiple channels of communication flourishing 
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over the years even in times of adversity. In fact, when the headlines in the newspapers were 
all about the “death of the West”, the West kept talking and institutionalized new forms of 
dialogues. As such, my emphasis on the thickness of the relationship in terms of 
communication channels and trust, as well as its resilience even in times of turbulences 
supports Pouliot’s argument about the strength of the transatlantic security community 
(Pouliot, 2006). However, as the study has shown, it is important to go beyond the mere 
existence and frequency of the dialogues and examine more closely the practice and content of 
the dialogues themselves in order to better assess the extent to which (1) both sides recognize 
each other as relevant partners and (2) accept and respect, rather than disdainfully dismiss, the 
concerns and sensibilities of their interlocutors. At this level of micro-resolution, the picture 
becomes more complex, as some fundamental differences opposing the EU and the US in their 
approaches to international politics quickly resurface. I would therefore call for a more 
balanced and accurate approach in assessing the strength of the transatlantic relationship, 
looking at the dialogue in all its dimensions. It is only when recognition for the institutional 
identity of the other is granted that the relationship really gets cemented and strengthened.  
 
10.3. The way forward: what’s next?  
More empirical and theoretical studies could build on this study. Indeed, the main discovery of 
this thesis –i.e. the fact that the political dialogues between the EU and the US serve to gain 
recognition and to anchor the EU institutional identity on the world stage– prompts the question 
of the extent to which this holds true in cases of dialogues conducted with different partners. 
In fact, the nature of the actors and the specificity of the transatlantic relationship display 
unique features that might render difficult the direct transfer of the findings to other cases. The 
characteristics of the EU-US relationship include a broad common cultural background, strong 
common interests and values, arguably equal power relations at least in economic terms, and a 
complex history whereby the US can arguably be conceived as the significant other of the EU. 
As a result, in this specific case study, the EU is seen as actively seeking recognition for its 
institutional identity through the dialogical interaction vis-à-vis the US. Moreover, due to the 
social proximity with and higher status of the US (as the US is a highly regarded player and 
partner), the specific recognition from the US is particularly valuable in the eyes of the 
Europeans. This might not be the case when the EU enters into a dialogue with a less significant 
partner. More research could be done about the nature of the “recogniser”: obviously the 
judgments of a superpower do not carry the same weight as the recognition given by a micro-
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state. Another striking particularity of the EU-US dialogues is the absence of conditionality 
attached to it. The dialogue is renewed on an automatic basis, thereby depriving the EU from 
the use of political dialogue as a carrot or as a stick in its dealing with the US.  
Bearing in mind these comments, future studies should focus on dialogues featuring 
variation along the following dimensions. In terms of power relations, what would the 
interaction at the micro-level look like when the EU has the upper hand facing a weaker 
interlocutor (for instance in the dialogues between the EU and the Maghreb countries, or the 
EU and the African countries or even micro-countries)? In other words, how different would 
the dynamics be if the EU was in a different configuration facing a weaker insignificant 
“other”? Would the EU still seek recognition with the same craving? The same question would 
be interesting to ask with partners having a substantially different cultural background, such as 
China, Japan, or India for instance. How good is the EU at navigating the challenges arising 
from different diplomatic cultures with different notions of respect, honour, and saving face in 
these countries (Cohen, 1997; Ting-Toomey, 1988)? Therefore, exploring the dialogical 
dynamics at the micro-level between the EU and other countries besides the United States with 
its own particularities would definitely be a valuable area of future inquiry. It could potentially 
give indications regarding the different roles that the EU holds depending on the partner of 
interaction and reveal its capacity to adapt to different situations. While in the case of the US, 
the EU seeks first and foremost to be recognised as a relevant and distinct player (i.e 
institutional identity), it might be that in other dialogues it will seek to get other more specific 
parts of its identity recognised. For instance, in the case of the dialogues between the EU and 
Israel or between the EU and the PA, is it reasonable to think that the EU might seek to get 
recognition as a relevant diplomatic actor in peace-making, as a mediator? In short, a part of 
mystery in dialogues is yet to be unveiled 
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Appendix 1: list of interviewees 
 
 
Interview n° 
 
Position Location Date 
1   Member of European 
Parliament, EU 
Brussels  9 December 2015  
2  EU Official  Brussels  
The Hague 
10 December 2015 
25 June 2016  
3   EU Official  Strasbourg  
The Hague 
16 December 2015  
25 June 2016  
4  Member of European 
Parliament, EU  
Brussels  16 March 2016  
5   Member of European 
Parliament, EU 
Brussels  16 March 2016  
6  Member of European 
Parliament, EU  
Brussels  17 March 2016  
7   EEAS Official  Brussels  16 March 2016  
8   EU Official   Washington, DC  19 May 2016  
9   US Congressional 
Staffer  
Washington, DC  19 May 2016  
10  US 
Congressman/woman 
Phone interview  20 May 2016  
11  US Member TACD Phone interview  20 May 2016  
11  Former US Intern in 
EPLO 
Washington, DC  21 May 2016  
12  Former US 
Congressional Staffer, 
Current Expert Advisor 
Washington, DC 24 May 2016  
13  US Official, State 
Department  
Washington, DC  24 May 2016  
14  US Official, State 
Department 
Washington, DC  24 May 2016  
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15   US Official, State 
Department 
Washington, DC  24 May 2016  
16  Assistant to US 
Congressman/woman 
Washington, DC  26 May 2016  
17  US 
Congressman/woman  
Washington, DC 26 May 2016  
18   EU Official  Washington, DC 
The Hague 
26 May 2016  
25 June 2016  
19   Assistant to US 
Congressmen/women 
Washington, DC 27 May 2016 
7 February 2017 
20  US Member TACD  Washington, DC  1 June 2016  
21   Former US 
Congressional Staffer, 
current Expert Advisor 
Washington, DC  1 June 2016  
22  US Member TACD  Washington, DC  1 June 2016  
23  EEAS Official  Washington, DC  1 June 2016  
24   EEAS Official  Washington, DC  
London  
2 June 2016 
9 February 2017 
20 July 2017 
25  Former US 
Congressional Staffer 
Washington, DC  2 June 2016  
26  US Member TABC  Washington, DC  2 June 2016  
27 US Member TACD  Washington, DC  2 June 2016  
28  EU Member TABC  London  4 October 2016   
29  Former US Official, 
State Department 
Brussels  2 November 2016  
30  EU Member TABC  Brussels  3 November 2016  
31  EU Member TABC  Brussels  3 November 2016  
32  EEAS Official  Brussels  3 November 2016  
33  EU Member TACD Brussels  4 November 2016  
34  EU Member TACD  Brussels  4 November 2016  
35  EEAS Official  Brussels  4 November 2016  
36  EEAS Official  Brussels  4 November 2016  
259 
 
37  EEAS Official  Brussels  4 November 2016  
38  US Official, State 
Department  
Washington, DC  21 February 2017  
39  US Official, State 
Department 
Washington, DC  21 February 2017  
40  EU Member TABC  Phone interview  30 March 2017  
41  US Member TABC  Phone interview  3 April 2017  
42   EU Member TABC  Phone interview 6 April 2017  
43  EU Member TACD  London  12 April 2017  
44  EU Member TACD  Phone interview  31 May 2017  
45  US Member TABC  Phone interview  1 June 2017  
46   EU Member TACD  Phone interview 14 June 2017  
47  US Official, US 
Mission to the EU 
Phone interview  28 June 2017  
 
 
 
Information on participant observations and video resources:  
 
I participated in the preparatory meeting of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the US 
in December 2015, which took place in Strasbourg, France. 
 
I participated in the 78th Inter-Parliamentary meeting in June 2016 in The Hague, the 
Netherlands. 
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Appendix 2: List of EU dialogues with third 
countries 
 
Levels of Dialogue: 
0=No Political Dialogue, 1=Political Dialogue, 2=Human Rights Dialogue, 3=EU Countries 
 
Countries Dialogue   Countries Dialogue 
Afghanistan 1  Libya 0 
Albania 1  Liechtenstein  1 
Algeria 1  Lithuania 3 
Andorra 0  Luxembourg 3 
Angola 1  Macedonia 1 
Antigua and Barbuda 1  Madagascar 1 
Argentina 1  Malawi 1 
Armenia 2  Malaysia 2 
Australia 1  Mali 1 
Austria 3  Malta 3 
Azerbaijan 1  Marshall Islands  1 
Bahamas 1  Mauritania  1 
Bahrain  1  Mauritius 1 
Bangladesh 0  Mexico 1 
Barbados 1  Micronesia 1 
Belarus 2  Moldova  1 
Belgium 3  Mongolia 1 
Belize 1  Montenegro 1 
Benin 1  Morocco 1 
Bhutan 0  Mozambique 1 
Bolivia 1  Myanmar (Burma) 2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1  Namibia 1 
Botswana 1  Nauru 1 
Brazil 1  Nepal 0 
Brunei 0  Netherlands 3 
Bulgaria 3  New Zealand 1 
Burkina Faso 1  Nicaragua 1 
Burundi 1  Niger 1 
Cabo Verde 1  Nigeria 1 
Cambodia 0  North Korea  1 
Cameroon 1  Norway  1 
Canada 1  Oman  1 
Central African Republic  1  Pakistan  1 
Chad  1  Palau  1 
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Chile 1  Palestine 1 
China 2  Panama  1 
Colombia  1  Papua-new Guinea  1 
Costa Rica  1  Paraguay  1 
Cote d'Ivoire 1  Peru 1 
Croatia  3  Philippines 1 
Cuba  1  Poland 3 
Cyprus 3  Portugal 3 
Czech Republic 3  Qatar 1 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo  
1  Republic of Congo  1 
Denmark 3  Republic of Guyana 1 
Djibouti 1  Romania 3 
Dominica 1  Russia 1 
Dominican Republic  1  Rwanda 1 
Ecuador  1  Saudi Arabia  1 
Egypt 1  Senegal  1 
El Salvador  1  Serbia  1 
Equatorial Guinea  0  Sierra Leone  1 
Eritrea 1  Singapore  0 
Estonia 3  Slovakia  3 
Ethiopia 1  Slovenia 3 
Fiji 1  Somalia  0 
Finland 3  South Africa  1 
France 3  South Korea 1 
Gabon 1  South Sudan  2 
Gambia 1  Spain 3 
Georgia 1  Sri Lanka 0 
Germany 3  Sudan 1 
Ghana 1  Suriname 1 
Greece 3  Swaziland 1 
Guatemala 1  Sweden 3 
Guinea 1  Switzerland 1 
Guinea-Bissau 1  Syria 1 
Haiti 1  Taiwan  0 
Honduras 1  Tajikistan  2 
Hungary 3  Tanzania 1 
Iceland 1  Thailand 0 
India 1  Timor-Leste 1 
Indonesia 1  Togo 1 
Iran 1  Trinidad and Tobago  1 
Iraq 1  Tunisia 1 
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Ireland 3  Turkey 1 
Israel  1  Turkmenistan  2 
Italy  3  Uganda  1 
Jamaica 1  Ukraine  2 
Japan 1  Union of the Comoros 1 
Jordan 1  United Arab Emirates  1 
Kazakhstan 2  United Kingdom 3 
Kenya 1  Uruguay  1 
Kiribati 1  USA  1 
Kosovo 1  Uzbekistan 2 
Kuwait 1  Venezuela  0 
Kyrgyz Republic 2  Vietnam 2 
Laos  1  Western Sahara  1 
Latvia 3  Yemen  1 
Lebanon 1  Zambia  1 
Lesotho 1  Zimbabwe  1 
Liberia 1    
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ANNEX B. EU - USA Strategic Partnership Dialogues 
First joint mention of a "strategic partnership" not identified. The EU mentions the USA as a strategic partner in the Security Strategy 2003. 
Joint Summit, almost annual or on ad hoc basis since 1993 
gathering CEU President, COM President, HR and  President of the USA (latest 26.03.2014) 
 
Political/ 
diplomatic 
dialogues 
 
 
MFA meetings 
(simultaneously 
with the joint 
summits) 
 
Almost annual since 
1993 
 
MFAs, DG Trade 
 
Ministerial 
meetings (in the 
margin of UN 
General Assembly) 
 
Annual 
 
National Ministers 
Ministerial meetings 
on justice and home 
affairs 
 
Biannual 
 
DG HOME  and DG 
JUST Commissioners,  
National ministers 
from presidency 
Political and 
security committee 
 
Biannual (flexible) 
 
EEAS 
Political dialogues on 
 
-Africa ; -Maghreb ; -Asia; -Oceania; -Eastern 
Europe; Central Asia; -Latin America ; -
Western Balkan; -Middle East/Gulf; 
-Middle East peace process; 
-OSCE ; -UN; -Consular Affairs 
-Disarmament/Non-proliferation; 
-Terrorism; -Arms export 
-Enlargement; -Human rights 
 
Biannual 
 
EEAS 
Economic 
and trade 
dialogues* 
Transatlantic 
economic council 
 
Annual since 2007 
 
DG TRADE 
Commissioner 
Informal 
macroeconomic 
dialogue 
 
Ad hoc 
 
DG EFCIN, DG 
MARKT 
High-level regulatory 
cooperation 
 
Biannual 
 
DG ENTR 
 
High-level meeting 
on the enforcement 
of competition laws 
 
Annual 
 
DG COMP 
Joint customs 
cooperation 
committee 
 
Annual 
 
DG TAXUD 
High-level working 
group on jobs and 
growth 
 
Throughout the year 
2012 
 
DG TRADE 
Sectoral 
dialogues* 
 
Energy council 
 
Annual since 2009 
(Working groups 
meet regularly) 
 
HR, DG ENV  
Commissioner 
 
Joint committee on 
higher education 
and vocational 
education and 
training 
 
Biennal since 1995 
 
DG EAC 
 
GPS-Galileo satellite 
cooperation 
 
Annual 
 
DG ENTR, ESA 
Steering committee 
on countering 
violent extremism 
 
3-4 per year 
 
DH HOME, EEAS 
Steering committee 
on migration and 
refugee issues 
 
3-4 per year since 
2010 
 
DG HOME, EEAS 
Joint technical 
working group on 
nuclear technology 
research and 
development 
 
Annual 
 
Joint Research 
Centre 
 
 
 
 
Dialogue on drugs 
 
Biannual 
 
DG JUST, EEAS 
 
 
 
Working group on 
cyber-security and 
cyber-crime 
 
Annual (flexible) 
 
DG HOME, DG 
CONNECT, EU 
Agencies, EU 
Counterterrorism 
Coordinator 
Working group on 
employment and 
labor-related issues 
 
Annual since 1996 
 
DG EMPL 
Informal financial 
markets regulatory 
dialogue 
 
Biannual since 2002 
 
DG MARKT 
Chemicals regulatory 
dialogue (trilateral 
with Canada) 
 
Annual 
 
DG ENTR 
 
Technical 
commission on 
energy efficient 
labeling programs 
 
Annual 
 
DG ENER 
 
Consumer product safety 
cooperation 
 
Several per year 
 
DG SANCO 
 
Transport security 
working group 
 
Annual 
 
DG MOVE 
Joint committee for air 
transport and air safety 
 
Biannual 
 
DG MOVE 
High-level regulatory 
trilateral EU-US-China 
meetings 
 
Biennal 
 
DG SANCO 
Joint senior level working 
group on development 
 
Biannual 
 
DG DEV 
Parliamen-
tary, Media 
and Civil 
society 
dialogues 
 
Transatlantic legislators dialogue 
 
Biannual since 1999 
 
Delegations of the European Parliament 
 
Transatlantic consumer dialogue 
 
Annual since 1998 
 
EU Consumer representatives 
Transatlantic business council 
Ad hoc since 1989 
 
Business leaders 
 
 
Abbreviations :  
COM : European Commission, CEU : Council of the European Union, DG : Directorate General, HR : High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, MFA : Minister of Foreign Affairs. *Part of these dialogues have generated parallel talks in the framework of the FTA 
negotiations. The Website EPSO helped to fill some missing working group names in this document. 
E. Vivet, V. de Lalande, ESSEC IRENE  
Appendix 3: The architecture of the EU-US 
dialogues 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vivet & Lalande (2014).  
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Appendix 4: The  
Proliferation of EU-US Dialogues 
 
 
Source: US and Canada Division, European External Action Service, EEAS, November 2016.  
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Appendix 5: Sample of visual data 
 
 
 
These photographs of official meetings and of visits on-site during inter-parliamentary 
meetings – have been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
Similarly, the MEP’s tweets commenting on the different inter-parliamentary sessions,  
have been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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